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When I left school and wasn’t sure that I knew what I was doing with my 
life, I worked in a call centre. So, when I read Dave Beer introduce his 
book on the power of data (2016) with his recollections of working in a 
call centre in the mid- to late 1990s, memories came flooding back. When 
you logged on to start taking calls, and how many calls you were taking, 
even when you went to the loo and for a cigarette break and had lunch, 
were some ways data about you were collected. This data, or these data,1 
were used to indicate how well you were doing at your job. They enabled 
people to make judgements about you.
Crucially, I didn’t feel like I knew what I was doing with my life, but as 
a result of the data collected on me at work, others knew exactly what I 
was doing with moments in my life. Dave Beer’s account is an important 
part of an increasing body of research critiquing the use of data as a form 
of surveillance. Using data in this way is changing workplace cultures and 
breaking codes of privacy2 in broader everyday life that are seen as part of 
our societal values. It also changes how we feel in day-to-day life in ways 
we may not immediately recognise.
Using data to monitor people is also referred to as a ‘data practice’. 
These data practices have been shown to make people feel uncomfortable, 
as they sense they are being watched. In turn, this increases stress and 
anxiety. These feelings are understandable: these data are about you, but 
out of your control, and clearly enabling someone else greater control 
over what you do. The existence of these data changes people’s experience 
of work; it can make them apprehensive of how long they spend going to 
the toilet or eating a sandwich. Also, despite data’s capacity to capture 
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these mundane aspects of your life, these data, and what they look like, 
remain abstract, somewhat bewildering and hard to grasp.
Moving forward ten years to the mid- to late 2000s, I found myself 
working with data in a very different way. I was working in a university 
that trained students in various aspects of theatre and the performing arts. 
Part of my job was trying to argue the value and impact of the students’ 
work. This task was bigger than that, really; it was to argue the value of 
training that these students were receiving at the university I worked in, 
precisely for the impact it had on students and the impact they had on 
society. A part of making this happen was to ‘find data’—often data that 
could tell a story about well-being. ‘We need data to evidence these 
claims’, I was often told.
I believed in the work of the cultural producers I was working for, and 
with, all those years ago. I was just not so sure about the data and statistics 
cited in the policy documents that I was being asked to find for funding 
applications and evaluations. These numbers and the way they are used in 
arguments about society, culture and value sat uneasily with me. The ones 
I was borrowing from policy documents didn’t make sense to me in a 
common-sense way, but I also simply didn’t quite understand them well 
enough to feel confident that they were evidence. I was also worried about 
the quality of the data I was collecting myself and their limits. Was I really 
sure that graduates from creative courses were contributing millions to the 
economy through the soft skills they gain in their training? Was I really 
sure that by simply attending a theatre-in-education workshop that the 
children involved would experience an improvement in their well-being?
It turned out I wasn’t sure enough to feel confident using evidence in 
ways that were demanded for funding bids and evaluations. It also turned 
out that it did not necessarily matter, as the fact I cited data as evidence was 
all that mattered to those who expected numbers in return for funding. 
The anxiety I felt about the quality of data and evidence I had to use, and 
the slightly absurd realisation that no one else seemed to care, led me on a 
journey: leaving this job for another university to become a student myself.
Understanding cultural policy in my masters, I hoped, would help me 
recognise how I might feel confident in using data and evidence—particu-
larly to argue the social impacts of different types of cultural activity. I 
hoped it would help me overcome the barriers between me and the num-
bers and the policy documents that had increasingly become the backbone 
of my day-to-day job. In actual fact, all that extra critical thinking meant I 
became even less sure and less trustful of data and evidence as they are 
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often used in cultural policy to argue social aims. It also made me less sure 
that cultural policy means or should mean culture as the arts. Instead it 
made me more sure that society is far more cultural than what is limited by 
the category ‘the arts’. So, I proposed a PhD on well-being data, policy, 
culture and society (which also didn’t help me feel reassured in how evi-
dence and data are used).3 After which I took two academic fellowships to 
improve data and data practices in the cultural sector,4 to now find myself 
as a Lecturer in Data, AI and Society, as of 2020.
So, this book is written for the me in 2010: the me who was reading 
the Labour Party’s cultural manifesto and cutting and pasting arguments 
with a sick feeling that I didn’t know what I was doing, but I did know it 
felt a bit wrong. It is also written for the me in 2015 as a PhD student 
editing a conference presentation, when someone looked over my shoul-
der at an equation I had copy and pasted for a PowerPoint slide to tell me 
that the equation did not make sense to them—it wasn’t talking their lan-
guage. I turned and laughed and said: ‘I thought it just didn’t make 
sense to me’.
This book is for so many of the people I have met in the last ten years, 
who have said, ‘I hadn’t thought of that’ or ‘I didn’t know that’—when 
these ‘thats’ can often be simply explained, but never are. Or maybe they 
are indeed amazed when they have understood something they thought 
they could not. It is also for the many people who have to use data in their 
day-to-day jobs, but feel a bit anxious about it—even if they are unsure why.
This book is also for the me in the 1990s who knew I was being watched 
at work in some way, and it changed my behaviour. Yet I did not really 
think of this as anything to do with data at all—which all happened some-
where in sci-fi land. It is for all the people who are maybe interested in 
how data are such a big part of our lives and our way of being. Whether 
this is experiencing call centres in the 1990s to Fitbits of the 2010s, the 
management of resources in World War II or the use of data in the battle 
against COVID-19.
This book is for my friends who send me links to online articles about 
data that are misleading or misrepresentative or, worse, shared Facebook 
posts about ways to happiness and well-being (my pet hate). It is for those 
I don’t know, but who aren’t sure about how data about us are used: it 
isn’t all Alexa and deliberating the latest Bill Gates conspiracy theory. In 
fact, data about us have been used for thousands of years in ways we don’t 
hear about. Even when we know about data collection, as with the UK 
Census 2021, do we really think about what data they are collecting and 
why? Who is it for? What do they actually do?
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This book is for my current Data Science students. Last term one of them 
told me that ‘people don’t care about other people’s well-being’, while 
another said, ‘I really liked the idea of thinking about data with a human 
element and not just as something a machine would produce’. For those 
who can do great things with data, how much do we know about whether 
they think about the people involved? What do people’s data help us under-
stand about them? Can it help us be more understanding as a society?
This book is for all my previous students who care so much about their 
work improving other people’s well-being or society in some way. They 
were often hindered by anxiety surrounding their own research skills and 
data comprehension. There is often an unacknowledged cultural gap 
between data and well-being, despite the proliferation of well-being data. 
This needs addressing.
This book has an agenda for improved data literacy and data competency 
to address this gap. The book therefore reflects on how understanding well-
being data use might help us become a society that is more understanding 
of each other. The fact that most of the people I list I am writing for are 
people I have met also means the book retains a mainly UK-specific focus. 
Perhaps in another ten years, I will be writing about these issues from a dif-
ferent place again. For now, this book is a personal endeavour to reflect on 
how I have come to understand the issues and to address data literacy in 
two main ways: first, in research on, in and with cultural and social policy 
sectors and, second, in the social aspects of data science and data studies. 
More simply, this might be explained as teaching ‘culture and society peo-
ple’ about data and teaching ‘data people’ about culture and society.
As this review of sociology, as the study of social life and society, points 
out, everyone has to interpret research in their lives by way of the media, 
but few of us produce it:
to consider more seriously the relationship between research literacy and research 
competency. All students of sociology at whatever ‘levels’ and in whatever insti-
tutional settings will become long-term consumers of research, but very few of 
them indeed will ever become producers of it apart from in undergraduate 
classrooms. In our view, most textbooks (and with honourable exceptions) over- 
emphasise teaching students competency skills, and considerably  underemphasize 
giving them the literacy skills to read, unpack, interpret and evaluate research 
and the conclusions drawn from it. (Wise and Stanley 2003)
This book is no textbook, but an overview of how we are equipped to 
understand data in society and how that helps us understand well-being. 
The book offers many examples of data collection, and some examples of 
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analysis, that can improve your research skills, should you so need them. 
However, it was not necessarily written to help people understand how to 
do research, but how to understand data in research. Therefore, it aims to 
improve understanding of how others use data—and how data can be 
used. This means we can better appreciate the limits and benefits of asser-
tions regarding what we can understand of people, well-being and data.
This book is for those who feel uncomfortable with data to feel more 
comfortable with its collection, its expression (basically, those tables and 
statistics and sometimes squiggly lines) and the language of data. Even for 
those people who undertake research, or work with data in some way, the 
language of data can feel so different and alien that this is a barrier to 
engaging with data. I have found that this is the case with cultural and 
social policy practitioners, and as we shall see, this affects how people 
engage with evidence and arguments.
This book is also for people who feel confident with data, but have per-
haps been trained to think of data as objective and neutral and to be read 
as fact. Consequently, the prospect of considering the social contexts of 
data may feel odd. It is, therefore, also for those who feel comfortable with 
data to be able to imagine the uncomfortable aspects of data. These include 
the various questions we should ask about contexts of the data used: where 
they have come from? Have they already undergone some kind of analysis 
or cleaning? How they will be used? Context is key to considering the 
limits to claims made from data about well-being, and, perhaps, even more 
importantly, how does ‘what we do with data’ (that we call data practices) 
affect a person’s well-being, or does it have broader negative social impacts?
Caring about well-being doesn’t necessarily mean people consider data 
issues. As I have described, the same is true the other way around: people 
who care about data don’t necessarily consider well-being. It is critical that 
this book does not reinforce a line of clichés of those who do and do not 
care about one thing or another, and those who are good at data and those 
who are not. Rather, there is a culture of misunderstanding that this book 
aims to help address. This book tackles this gap from the standpoint that 
just because things are not readily understandable to all does not mean 
they are hard to understand. Crucial to overcoming this is making it easier 
to feel more confident that if something about data is incomprehensible, 
then that may be because the way the data are used is bad, rather than you 
are not able to grasp what is going on.
As I have discovered a number of times in ten years’ researching well- 
being data, the way data have been used to describe society may not be 
robust. Also, they may be used to make claims of improving society in 
xii PREFACE: A PERSONAL NOTE ON WHY I WROTE THE BOOK
some way, when in fact these may not be true. Similarly, the negative social 
and cultural effects of how data are used to manage and monitor people 
and society may not be considered. We do not all need to be able to look 
under the bonnet like a trained mechanic to understand well-being data, 
but being able to peer in with some confidence may be enough to help us 
grasp the limits of what we are looking at. Only then can we—as a soci-
ety—better understand well-being and data: how well-being is captured as 
data and how data affect well-being.
Sheffield, UK Susan Oman
notes
1. A note on data as singular or plural. Most of the time, people talk of data as 
one thing. Actually, in this book we are going to use data as a plural, as data 
are rarely one thing, but lots and lots of small things.
2. Legislation is beginning to address these issues. GDPR is an example that 
offers greater protection, but is currently flawed and cumbersome.
3. My PhD (Oman 2017) was attached to the AHRC-funded project called 
‘Understanding Everyday Participation: Articulating Cultural Values’, 
2012–2017 [AH/J005401/1]. This was funded by Arts and Humanities 
Research Council’s Connected Communities Large Project funding. 
Orthodox models of culture and the creative economy are based on a narrow 
definition of participation: one that captures engagement with traditional 
institutions such as museums and galleries but overlooks more informal activ-
ities such as community festivals and hobbies. The project aimed to paint a 
broader picture of how people make their lives through culture and in par-
ticular how communities are formed and connected through participation.
4. This research project, initially called ‘Social Mobility: The Case of the Arts’ 
was supported by two AHRC-funded projects: Data, Diversity and 
Inequality in the Creative Industries (or DDI) and What Constitutes ‘Good 
Data’ in the Creative Economy? (or Good Data) ran from January to August 
2018, January to July in 2019, respectively. Both were funded by the Arts 
and Humanities Research Council’s Creative Economy Engagement 
Fellowship Scheme (or AHRC CEEF).
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being, data and the research disciplines and professional practices con-
cerned with them. It is therefore informed by many, many conversations 
and collaborations—both formal and informal. I am so grateful to every-
one who has listened to, read and watched the papers, ideas and reflections 
that underpin this book. Many discussions over the years have proved 
essential in developing its positions, arguments and insights. I include 
those who asked difficult questions when I presented earlier versions of my 
research (including all the research that does not appear here) and all the 
students and research participants that pushed me even further on path-
ways of discovery to further interrogate some of the whys, whats, wheres, 
hows and whos of well-being and data that form much of the book. Valuable 
provocations also came from brilliant people across policy and social and 
cultural sectors, and different forums from Twitter to meetings to work-
shops and events. I want to thank everyone who has contributed in this 
way. You are too many to name individually, but you know who you are.
I also want to thank all my research participants who made the empiri-
cal research that informed my understanding and made the case studies in 
this book so rich. This includes those behind the scenes who helped orga-
nise this: the UK’s Office for National Statistics (ONS) for agreeing 
access to their free text data set and my interviewees in the ONS, and those 
who provided contextual detail for the broader PhD research project. 
With the Arts Council England (ACE) and the hundreds of people who 
donated their time across  the individual arts organisations, I want to 
thank their generosity and openness to discovering how things might be 
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“Given their power and influence, we might wonder how we feel about data and 
how data make us feel. In considering the relations between data and well-being, 
Susan Oman's vital new book considers what data now mean for our lives, oppor-
tunities, judgments and, crucially, for our impressions of our selves. Taking a criti-
cal approach, this book makes the crucial step of not just thinking of how data 
shape well-being but also how well-being itself is redefined by data processes.”
—Prof. David Beer, Professor of Sociology, University of York
“To understand well-being is to understand current cultural policy; it is also to 
understand the new language of data and metrics at the heart of how culture is 
governed. Understanding Well-being Data offers an essential and accessible guide 
to the future of the cultural sector, showing both the potential, and the critical 
limits, of well-being as the new language of cultural and social life.”
—Dr Dave O’Brien, Chancellor’s Fellow in Cultural and Creative Industries
“Susan Oman has written a much-needed book on how social and cultural policy 
use, for good or ill, data on well-being. She takes nothing for granted, and looks 
deeply into the centuries-old history of how we have thought about happiness and 
well-being, and the various ways it might be measured, before turning to its con-
temporary use as a metric for the impact of arts institutions and policy. It is engag-
ingly written, lively and accessible for all students of culture.”
—Michael Rushton, Professor, O’Neill School of Public and Environmental 
Affairs, Indiana University
“Understanding Well-being Data is a very timely and valuable book. In a period 
when we have continually heard politicians claim to be following ‘the data’ on 
well-being, this book looks ‘under the bonnet’ of data collection. It examines the 
various types of data and information that policy-makers select for use, and how 
they analyse and interpret them. It shows how understanding the contexts of data 
and decision-making are critical for policy and practice that aims to do good, or at 
least prevent harm. It is written in an exemplary accessible and engaging style and 
provides much food for thought on how data shape society, culture, politics and 
policy. It deserves to be read by all who are interested in the use and misuse of data 
and how this impacts everyday lives.”
—Professor Ian Bache, Department of Politics and International Relations, 
University of Sheffield
Praise for Understanding Well-being Data
“As a practitioner, now more than ever, we need to critically reflect on our data 
practices; understanding the contexts of data and decision-making across policy, 
practice and research is core to this endeavour. This is a timely and accessible book 
that facilitates important conversations about well-being data and their role in 
research, policy, culture and society, brought to life through a collection of practi-
cal examples.”
—Dr Rhianne Jones, BBC
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1.1  IntroductIon to Understanding 
Well-being data
This book seeks to advance understanding of the role of well-being in 
social and cultural policy, politics and research. It does this by focussing on 
ideas, concepts and uses of well-being, as well as differences in types of 
well-being data. It was written primarily to offer practitioners a view 
‘under-the-bonnet’ of data collection, analyses and uses to see how they 
actually operate, as well as what happens as a result of their very existence. 
Its accessible style aims to include students and a more general audience in 
discussions about data and those about well-being as two crucial issues of 
our time.
Understanding Well-being Data uses real-life examples, paying particu-
lar attention to the ways data are generated, analysed and used, to demon-
strate how data practices respond to, and how they shape, society, culture, 
politics and policy. Its short and longer case studies make this an accessible 
learning curve, and one that is applicable to experts and novices of all sorts 
in all our everyday lives. The book focuses on uses of data in culture and 
society, and how they work as social policy, so that comparisons and con-
tradictions are easy to see.
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‘Following the data’ is a now familiar phrase in the UK from its signifi-
cant role in government communications about COVID-19. The phrase 
is important, because it demonstrates that the very idea of data is used to 
justify decisions and policies for the nation’s health and well-being. Many 
across the UK watched various press conferences in 2020  in which its 
prime minister and other advisors would refer to ‘the data’ as an objective 
thing that they were following, rather than various types of data and infor-
mation that people learn how to use, deliberately collect and generate, and 
that they interpret and analyse.
The government broadcasts on managing the COVID-19 crisis also 
included graphs and other data visualisations. Some of these were designed 
to show a comparison across areas of the country to justify which were 
under restrictions and which were not. They were badly labelled, making 
them hard to interpret by those who are data literate, let alone ‘the public’ 
being broadcast to. Most people felt more alienated by these uses of data 
than comforted that they understood what the government was doing—
and why. The last one of these press conferences that I personally saw, 
before finishing this book, was a few days before I was supposed to travel 
to spend Christmas with loved ones. The whole nation was told that this 
was no longer to be possible. We were told that the government had fol-
lowed the data, but that the ‘science had changed’.
Of course, ‘the science’ had not changed at all. Instead, the decisions 
made, based on human interpretations of data about COVID-19, and 
other data about the economy and mental health, about schools and uni-
versities, about the inequalities of those who can work safely, and those 
who cannot, were all in a melting pot of pressures involved in decision- 
making at this level. It was policy that had to change, not the science that 
had changed, and suddenly one set of data seemed more important than 
another to those in charge.
So, here we can clearly see that it is not that there is ‘the data’ as one 
indisputable thing, but these data are not neutral. By which we mean the 
data are not unbiased, nor impartial. They are collected, read, interpreted 
and presented and these processes involve many decisions. But, how can 
data themselves be biased? A good example of bias in data lies in the recent 
increase in algorithms that are trained using data to automate certain digi-
tal processes.  Algorithms have actually been with us for centuries  (an 
eighteenth- century happiness algorithm appears  in Chap. 2). The word 
still refers to any form of automated instruction. The majority of algo-
rithms are simpler than most people think and can be a single ‘if some-
thing is this, then do that’ statement that can then be actioned. 
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Contemporary algorithms tend to be long sequences of these instructions. 
As you can imagine, with these many instructions and decisions, bias is 
likely to creep in.
One of the starkest instances of bias can be found in the search engine, 
which most of us now use all the time. It is a mundane part of our everyday 
lives that we don’t often think about. Search engines have been designed 
to learn to second guess what we are looking for, as they have a record of, 
or they ‘know’ all the searches we have made before this one, alongside all 
of everyone else’s searches.1 Safia Noble (2018) revealed how these guesses 
are biased in dangerous ways that are both racist and sexist. As recently as 
2011, the first thing that would appear in searches with the term ‘black 
girls’ was a link to hardcore porn. You may try and explain this away as an 
algorithm prioritising some ads over others. Explaining these things away 
may be—in fact—a part of the problem, of course, when it comes to bias, 
sexism and racism. It therefore very much deserves attention.
Noble provides much more evidence than this example above, though. 
Noble shows a variety of ways that the search engine predicted the searcher 
was looking for derogatory images of black women, even apes, as well as 
pejorative character traits. Noble ‘followed the data’ to reveal how data prac-
tices are biased, but also revealed our own biases to us. People were shocked 
when Noble’s revelations were published. This shows us that not only are the 
search engines biased, but that we are. People are biased, in the way some 
want to believe that we live in a ‘post-racial’ society, and that we do not need 
to worry about racism any longer, when actually they are blinded to the fact 
they are consuming culture, through data, that are both biased and racist.
Data play a large role in society. Critical data studies, like Noble’s and 
throughout this book, where we ‘follow the data’ to see how it works in 
context, reveal truths about both data and society. We need to learn from 
these revelations about data to improve well-being and society.
Subjective and Objective Data
But what if we return to data used by politicians, surely this does not con-
tain evidence of the same biases? A good example is ‘the poverty line’. 
When a politician talks about ‘the poverty line’, we think that this is an 
absolute thing. Not necessarily a real thing, like picturing people living 
under a power line, but that the line represents a measure from data which 
are objective.
Objective measures of poverty are objective by name, but they are not 
entirely neutral. So, does that mean they are actually objective? There is no 
measure of poverty that is conclusive: while it means not having enough 
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resources to cover essential needs, this is a subjective valuation of the 
words ‘essential’ and ‘enough’. The subjective nature of the word essential 
has also gained prominence in the UK, as politicians have used it to avoid 
making clear decisions on what COVID-19 restrictions should entail—
despite their data expertise. Instead, people are forced into making their 
own evaluations on what counts as ‘essential’ travel, work or food, and 
therefore what is lawful behaviour under parallel lockdown restrictions in 
different areas of the UK at different points in time.
Returning to the issue of poverty, in the UK and in most countries, 
‘enough for essential’ tends to mean around 60% of the nation’s median 
income (Francis-Devine 2020). This is classed as ‘relative poverty’, and it 
fluctuates. Absolute poverty is adjusted in line with inflation, rather than 
average living standards. These two different metrics can be used to paint 
two pictures of the same story, as a topical case demonstrates in Prime 
Minister’s Questions in UK Parliament.
The UK government refused to commit continued support of free 
school meals in the 2020 summer holidays. This policy decision about 
children’s well-being led to a high-profile campaign and a U-turn (that 
was repeated again in the Autumn). This controversy and debate included 
a wider discussion of the current government’s impact on child poverty. 
The leader of the opposition cited that 600,000 more children were living 
in relative poverty than in 2012 (UK Parliament 2020). Given that the 
Conservative Coalition took office in 2010, the implication here was that 
the Conservative governments of the last decade are responsible, and with 
serious negative effects. The prime minister retorted, ‘There are 400,000 
fewer families living in poverty now than there were in 2010’ (UK 
Parliament 2020). How can one politician use poverty data to make a 
claim and the other use poverty data to claim the opposite?
How can data on poverty from the same time period, and cited in such 
an important setting as parliament, paint such contrary pictures? Each 
party leader chose slightly different timeframes within this ten-year period 
and they chose different poverty data. The leader of the opposition chose 
the poverty data and timeframe that told a story of the greatest negative 
impact, while the prime minister is thought to have possibly chosen a dif-
ferent timeframe and the other index to argue the exact opposite2 (BBC 
2020). These different indices aren’t intended to be fiddled with by politi-
cians, but, actually, some measures will subjectively suit some arguments 
more than others. This does not mean that they cannot offer a more 
objective appraisal in other contexts, but as you can see, expert judge-
ments can be subjective when deciding which objective data to use about 
people’s well-being, and in which context.
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This use of poverty data is a good example of how well-being data have 
been used for centuries. Their collection and analysis are motivated by the 
need to track the health and wealth of society and evaluate the success and 
progress of social projects and policies. Indeed, these underlying assump-
tions have been the backbone of social science, statistical and policy work 
for the last 200 years. Yet, these data are not neutral or entirely objective. 
They can be used and misused as evidence in forums in which important 
decisions are made, and yet, we do not often ‘follow the data’ to appreci-
ate these inconsistencies ourselves.
Understanding well-being data means looking at instances and incon-
sistencies of their use. It is generated to inform decision-making, which 
also means it can be used to hold others—particularly those in power—to 
account. It is also gathered on far smaller scales to appreciate the impact 
of aspects of society on us: our weight, our work, our children and their 
schooling. Major events, such as COVID-19, enable the power of well- 
being data to come to the fore. But these are data about us and are used 
to evaluate what to do next in a crisis. That is why everyone should feel 
able to access tools to help them better understand how this all works in 
society, should they want to; that is why this book tries to offer something 
for everyone.
1.2  Who Is thIs Book for?
For people who work in social and cultural policy and charities, this book 
offers lots of context to the data they use every day and aims to help every-
day usage of data in practice. It hopes to speak to people who think they 
can’t do numbers at all. This includes those who think they do not under-
stand the numerical aspects of arguments that use data. It also includes 
understanding the arguments themselves and potentially their limits.
Capability, capacity and confidence with data are issues for researchers 
and practitioners working in cultural policy and the sector (DC Research 
2017; Oman 2019a, b). Organisations and individuals are affected differ-
ently by data-related issues, depending on various matters, including who 
funds them, how large and ‘professionalised’ the organisations are, for 
example (Oman 2019a, b, 2020). Despite increasing emphasis on the 
importance of data in social policy and cultural policy practice and 
research, capability, capacity and confidence have not received much 
attention.3
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Alongside some evidence of data gaps in social and cultural policy, there 
is anecdotal evidence that key arguments relating to the value of particular 
social policy areas remain obscure to some working within them, because 
of the way data are expressed. For social and cultural policy researchers 
and students, who are not comfortable with numeric data and the way 
they are presented, this book aims to open the black box and shed light on 
what is happening. Looking under the bonnet of data means peering 
under the cover of the workings, the arguments made, the evidence used 
and the connection between them and data. Looking at all these compo-
nents together helps us better understand well-being and data at the 
same time.
For readers who are happy with analysing data and reading statistics, 
the book reveals some of the social or political ramifications of data and 
their uses. How governments ‘follow the data’ as a way of justifying policy 
decisions has been foregrounded in COVID-19 times. Revealing the 
implications of using the idea of data to justify bad, even dangerous deci-
sions, does not mean all is fixed, however. The enduring presence of the 
pandemic should be the motivation to ask more questions about policy 
decisions that claim to be fair and equitable based on evidence using spe-
cific data, but which are often just the opposite. Understanding well-being 
data in these broader contexts is therefore critical.
1.3  What Is thIs Book tryIng to do?
It’s just really hard when you’re bogged down in numbers and reports, and 
you’ve got a deadline looming, to be sure to know that the statistics you use 
are correct, or that you’re even reading a graph properly.
Someone who uses data all the time said this to me a few years ago. This 
person’s confession in an interview chimed with me and my own imposter 
syndrome. How can we feel reassured in the data we use and the way oth-
ers use data? How can we begin to trust ourselves more to know when to 
trust others?
This whole book reflects on my realisation that—without training and 
familiarity (and sometimes even with this stuff)—it is really hard to be sure 
to know that the statistics you cite reflect the ‘real world’ in some way or 
that you are interpreting a graph or data visualisation properly. This feels 
all the more important when these data and arguments are related to peo-
ple’s well-being or social justice. This is the main justification for the value 
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of data in social and cultural policy. Yet data are undervalued at the same 
time, in that while the importance of data is an absolute, less attention is 
paid to the data itself: where they are from, who they are about, how they 
are used. Are well-being data being used appropriately?
Most importantly, the book aims to tell those of you that think you are 
inherently bad at numbers, that you are not, and this goes for reading 
graphs or policy documents. Instead, more often than not, it is how these 
are presented that are flawed or lacking in various ways. People who do 
research are not always good at communicating it. This is probably, to be 
honest, mainly because the authors had their own deadline looming, 
rather than necessarily any immoral practices. But also, sometimes, it can 
be that people report on their findings without thinking about how to 
make their findings accessible. This is—of course—why it is important for 
people who are confident with data to consider those who are not.
There are times, however, when you encounter a bad statistic: one that 
is misleading or misused. We encounter them all the time in the press and 
in parliament—and we’ll encounter many throughout this book that are 
linked to well-being. This book might encourage you to realise that you 
are fully equipped to look for alternative statistics, or to look through the 
headline findings to understand the data better, and why that statistic 
sounds inflated or confusing. We have lost confidence in our common 
sense, which affects confidence in critical thinking and our own resource-
fulness to see through the ways that data are used. This book hopes to 
increase confidence in looking beyond a presented statistic: to look (or at 
least peer) underneath the bonnet ourselves.
Data of some sort are a vital part of our daily lives, now. Whether we are 
writing a report with numbers in it, filling in a ‘well-being at work’ survey 
or having our BMI measured by our doctor. We have all spent time in 
COVID-19 working with the data we were given to decide whether our 
trip to the supermarket was essential enough. We are all living and working 
with data and in contexts that need data. Well-being data are often our 
data, in that they are personal data about us—and their collection requires 
our time and consideration.
When thinking about data, we need to remember the version of us—
yes that’s you—that encounters data daily. The version of us that ignores 
those emails asking for our opinions or asking after our well-being because 
we are too busy, or we feel that whoever is asking for these data don’t 
really care any way. We need to remember that we (well, we here is actually 
me) will always give an Uber driver 5 stars, irrespective of how safe we felt 
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or kind they were. We need to remember that time we went to a capital 
city and the highest rated restaurant was McDonald’s. We need to think 
about whether those numbers represent our understanding of the world 
or not, and if not, then, why not? In a book about well-being data we need 
to be pragmatic about how different official well-being data are from these 
more familiar data contexts.
Every day, we interact unthinkingly with metrics, statistics, numbers 
and data collection all the time. We make common sense, snap judgements 
that enable us to dismiss them as useful or not to us. What is so different 
about statistics in a book or in our jobs—or even in research published in 
reports? Why is it that some people’s use of numbers feels incontestable? 
What is it that means we do not even think to question numbers and their 
uses? It is a sense of authority and context. So, I hope that with more per-
sonal authority and greater appreciation of context gained through read-
ing this book, maybe we can feel more like engaging in and with, not only 
data as numbers, but ideas of data.
More specifically, this book has six key aims:
• one, to explain the history, politics and contexts of data produced 
that might be called well-being data;
• two, to explain some of the limitations of these data and the research 
and policy that have used them;
• three, to describe how changing uses of data have changed how we 
live in various ways;
• four, to present real-life examples of presentations of data and statis-
tics, to break down how they have been ‘made’;
• five, to show how numbers can be misrepresentative, why this is a 
problem and how you should be able to feel confident challeng-
ing them; and
• six, to show that data do not capture reality neutrally, but are used to 
create realities through public decision-making that directly affects 
personal, community and national well-being.
The examples chosen have been accumulated from my experience of 
learning to feel more confident with different kinds of data and numbers. 
They come from my own moments of head scratching and the lost hours 
on the internet trying to understand why things don’t quite seem right; all 
those times I have asked someone else ‘does this make sense?’—to which 
the other person has sometimes looked puzzled and said, ‘actually, no’.
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This book also emerges from my feeling uncomfortable with what I was 
asked to do with data and comfortable to question the status quo. I found 
myself in a situation where there was an assumption that only numeric 
data are evidence and that somehow all numeric data were assumed to be 
evidence. I felt able to challenge the idea that just because data are in a 
formal-looking report, it is not necessarily ‘good data’, or factual.
This book also emerges from my realisation that just because things are 
not readily understandable to all does not mean they are hard to under-
stand. For example, this book also developed from collaborations with 
academic colleagues who do use data well to understand culture and well- 
being. It also emerges from working in a sector-based data network with 
colleagues who collect data on what the cultural sector and creative indus-
tries are well-known for, as well as what they are less well-known for.
So, let’s shake this identity that arts can’t do numbers—a phrase I’ve 
heard too much. Let’s shake this idea that one of my Data Science stu-
dents shared, that people who do data don’t care about well-being. Let’s 
also make sure that the claims made using well-being data in cultural and 
social research and policy can be substantiated and understood.
1.4  Why Well-BeIng data?
Well-being data can be about individuals, such as Fitbit data, or popula-
tion data, such as the census. They include health data and poverty data; 
information on how we feel, on how we live and how long we live. This 
book focusses on well-being data for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is easy 
to assume that well-being data are similar in some way, because they are 
about the ‘same thing’: we will look at how diverse well-being data are. It 
is also through trying to understand ‘well-being data’ as a thing that I 
came to know data in general.
To come to know well-being data, I had to spend years trawling through 
books from within and beyond economics, psychology, statistics, policy, 
politics and philosophy. This was a slow process, and an uncertain process, 
which fuelled my feelings of imposter syndrome. All these different disci-
plines used different language that I had to be familiar with. Or worse, the 
same words to mean different things, which I try to overcome as much as 
possible in this book. It was years before I slowly gained confidence in my 
own common sense when reading about either well-being or data. The 
very idea of data and academic or policy language means we stop trusting 
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our own common sense. We shouldn’t. To be honest, some academics do 
too. They also shouldn’t.
Secondly, well-being ‘as the aim of all policy-making’ (we’ll come to 
this in the next chapter) has unique relevance for areas of social and cul-
tural policy. This is because—in common-sense terms—culture and soci-
ety are undisputedly about people, and those working in these policy 
domains often aim to either improve people’s quality of life or interrogate 
what improving lives might actually involve! Unlike other aims of policy, 
well-being, as a concept, makes sense to those working in it and those 
affected by it—which is everyone.
Thirdly, well-being is about experience. Some people find it hard 
enough to explain how they feel with words, let alone using the same 
words. It is even harder to capture experience with numbers. I mean, for 
thousands of years, people haven’t even agreed on what well-being is 
exactly and statisticians also admit it’s impossible to agree on a definition, 
even, as we shall see! How do you know what you are measuring when 
you don’t know what it is? We’ll find out how people have tried and why 
they have tried.
Fourth, we all have a sense of what well-being is. We also have a sense 
of doing what is good for us and knowing what has been bad for us or 
others. We all make decisions daily that are well-being related—that bal-
ance of going to the pub versus going to the gym. Maybe it’s not getting 
takeaway coffees and sandwiches for a month to save for a holiday. These 
decisions we make are based on pleasure and purpose at different moments 
in time, that’s all well-being. We are all well-being experts and we all 
ignore the evidence (except that app that told me I was happiest in a beer 
garden with my friends; I listened to that and return to it in Chap. 5).
Fifth, it is also all too easy to forget that not everyone has the same idea 
of well-being: what makes some people feel better can actually be bad for 
others.4 For example, not all religions and cultures will feel as at home in 
a British pub as I do on a sunny day: not all activities are available or desir-
able to everyone. Even formal well-being advice from governments and 
the media in the pandemic has routinely forgotten you can’t go for a walk 
to make you feel better if: you are home alone with three kids, are in the 
middle of a long shift or are indeed unable to walk. It is important to 
remember that exposure to well-being solutions is a reminder of what is 
not available for some, which is inevitably bad for their well-being. We also 
need to be mindful of when ignoring ‘evidence’ is better for well-being 
and that universal solutions do not work.
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Lastly, data affect people’s well-being. As I’ve already said, it may seem 
like data are neutral, but they are used to inform decisions that are political 
because they affect people—and some people more than others. I ask my 
students to think about good data and data for good. Good data might be 
thought of as an issue of quality. In the case of statistics, this means they 
‘fit their intended use, are based on appropriate data and methods and are 
not materially misleading’ according to the government statistical service 
(GSS n.d.). The GSS also state that their statistics ‘serve the public good’, 
not only because they capture aspects of society, but because they are 
shared. So, how data and the information they are capable of providing are 
shared is implicit in an idea of ‘good data’. However, more attention 
should be paid to how this is shared understanding (which is where we 
shall conclude this book).
1.5  hoW are data cultural?
Popular culture is constituted by data about popular culture. (Beer and 
Burrows 2013: 56)
Data issues are bigger than well-being and bigger than social and cul-
tural policy. As we have seen they affect much of how we experience soci-
ety. In 2015, Helen Kennedy asked ‘is data culture?’ (2015), ultimately 
answering yes. We interpret data through journalism and visualisations like 
graphs, which change the way we understand the world. Data also change 
the way that we consume the arts and culture.
We might think that data can tell us facts about popular culture, but as 
Beer and Burrows argued in 2013, data don’t just capture culture. In 
actual fact, data feed back into popular culture, again changing how we 
feel about things and the decisions we make. Beer and Burrows were diag-
nosing the digital consumption of music, and the ‘digital traces’ these 
processes create. This has been proved empirically in a number of cultural 
forms,5 and what they describe is relevant of culture more generally. In 
other words, they argue that data shape and define culture and have a 
hand in making culture: they change what we do with our lives in ways we 
may not notice.
What we listen to, or what we watch, is tracked and stored as data. 
These data are used to suggest to us what to watch or listen to next (by 
way of what is called a recommender system). As you might imagine, this 
then changes what shows are thought popular, which are commissioned 
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and recommissioned, the actors in them and who becomes a star. 
Therefore, data can change what is valuable and this is another obvious 
way in which we can see some of the biases described by Virginia Noble 
(2018). What is happening in the virtual world, or how we move around 
the online world, therefore changes what happens in our offline social 
world. We saw this relationship play out in the call centre in the opening 
to this book. What we do, and when, generates data that do more than 
help us decide what we might want to watch. These data can restrict our 
behaviour in more sinister ways.
Thus, data are cultural in that they shape our social values and ways of 
living. They can also shape how we feel, even our access to healthcare or 
welfare support. Yet, the way we are taught to live with numbers and data 
in school, and throughout our lives, does not account for these realities. 
This is why everyday data literacy and comfort with numbers is a social 
issue, and one that is increasingly acknowledged by government. Not just 
the parts of government that care about statistics like the GSS (as men-
tioned in previous section), but data and the data strategy are now the 
responsibility of the Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport. 
‘Creating a fairer society for all’ is one of the key aims of the strategy, 
which is ‘underpinned by public trust’, according to the Secretary of State 
(DCMS 2020).
There has been a lot written about ‘trust in numbers’ (Porter 1996), 
but also, trust in how data are used. We trust certain institutions to use 
data well, while others use them badly; yet trust other institutions, again, 
to report data honestly and transparently (Steedman et al. 2020; Kennedy 
et al. 2020). We have already seen how an idea of a poverty rate can be 
manipulated by politicians to suit their own ends. While politicians them-
selves exclaim it is only others’ numbers we cannot trust. Donald Trump 
claims that ‘negative polls are fake news’ (Batchelor 2017) and the UK is 
told that it has ‘had enough of experts’ (Gove 2016).
COVID-19 management has resulted in governments telling us how 
important it is to trust data, but to trust in their interpretations of data. 
People in authority are now dictating how we should feel about numbers 
(and showing us which numbers they want us to feel safe or terrified as a 
result of). Running in parallel to this rollercoaster of data and trust is the 
disproportionate faith that we have in the numbers we read on 
Facebook and other social media. Which presentations of COVID-related 
deaths do we believe? What makes one more believable than another? 
Missing from many analyses and discussions of trust and data is how it 
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came to pass that despite the fact that data are everywhere, we do not trust 
ourselves to use and read data.
Why don’t we (the general public) feel able to trust ourselves to under-
stand data and numbers? Are there particular parts of society who feel at 
greatest disadvantage from this lack of faith in ourselves? Many were 
taught at school that numbers offer some sort of objective truth: that 
there is a purity to numbers. We leave school with the feeling that if we 
don’t get them, that’s because we won’t get them. In fact, as you can 
hopefully see more clearly, all sorts of numbers, statistics and graphs are 
misused all the time. Sometimes this is to deliberately mislead people, oth-
ers it is not. Quite frequently, in terms of well-being data though, num-
bers only suggest what is going on, and they can be interpreted in different 
ways, if truth be told.
It is hard to navigate which numbers to trust in our everyday lives, but 
what about the numbers we may use in our working lives—or, as a student 
writing an essay? For most people, these are not numbers we will have 
been involved in generating. Even academics, experts and statisticians 
probably refer to more data generated or analysed by others, than those 
they may have had a hand in. Instead we all use data to justify our posi-
tions, whether that’s down the pub to argue about the football, how many 
man-hours are needed to fix a leaking roof, or for how much, or to a 
funder for the value of the work we do.
How do we trust which numbers to use in our working lives? Perhaps 
we trust those that appear in a policy document or from something else we 
think is a reputable news source. Does citing a published academic paper 
make us feel like the numbers should be okay, even if we suspect some-
thing feels fishy about them? In this book we’ll look at how you can better 
trust yourself with numbers—by feeling more confident in the signs that 
the numbers are good and not bad. This involves knowing where the data 
came from, how well explained the approaches to analysing the data are 
and looking at how it’s presented.
1.6  hoW should I use thIs Book?
The simple answer here is that, like with any book, you should use it how 
you want. What I wanted to say is that although there is a logical order to 
this book, which we go into next, not everyone will find all of it useful or 
interesting. So, as much as this book is about feeling confident in your 
judgement about data, you should feel confident that if you are not 
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interested in a section of this book, you should feel you can read the next 
section.
Because this book aims to explain a lot of background detail to give 
contextual information for different types of data, or ideas about well- 
being and society, not everything will feel relevant to everyone. For exam-
ple, you may be interested in the history of well-being data in a general 
sense (Chap. 2), but feel like you do not have a need to read about the 
history of decisions behind the OECD well-being indicators in particular 
(at the end of Chap. 3). If you are that reader, then feel you can skip a 
section and move onto the shiny new chapter about the recent history of 
happiness as a new science (Chap. 4) or Big Data (Chap. 5).
Similarly, you may be interested in the first section about well-being 
data, but less interested in the specific case studies in social and cultural 
policy. So, why not skim or skip those and jump to the conclusion—where 
you may find you want to refer back to specific points in previous chapters 
any way. This book is designed to hopefully allow you to feel confident to 
read the whole thing in order, like a novel, or refer to sections. It is 
designed for you to use it how you like.
There are boxes scattered throughout (that you will find after the list of 
figures). These are used in different ways. Sometimes the material in the 
box elaborates on the main text and can be skipped if you are not inter-
ested. It is often definitional, explaining the difference between two types 
of economics, or what a variable is, for example. Sometimes a box might 
present example data, as with the case of some tweets in Chap. 5. 
Sometimes, reading it will help contextualise what is happening next. 
Again, the boxes are meant to make it easy to decide whether you want 
this detail or not.
1.7  Why Is the Book WrItten In thIs order?
This book is a game of two halves, with a post-match pint to digest what 
we have just watched: the performance of the players and those calls which 
are on the edge of the rules of the game. The first half is about how differ-
ent kinds of well-being data (data about well-being) came about. It begins 
with the historical traditions of philosophy, governance and social science 
that led to ‘well-being data’ becoming a thing that is useful and looks at 
the methods, innovations, contexts and limitations of these.
The second half looks at how well-being data are relied on as evidence 
in social and cultural policy, also how they are used to answer questions 
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beyond the contexts they were collected in. Ideas of a cultural society as a 
good society have long-shaped social policy and informed future philoso-
phy. We look at how this enabled cultural policy to become an aspect of 
social policy, before presenting a number of case studies on the relation-
ship between well-being and culture that I have elsewhere (Oman 2015a, 
2015b) called the culture–well-being relationship.
The conclusion aims to be a sort of post-match pint down the pub. It 
reflects on moments of tension, recapping on what has happened and 
reflecting on how these might be understood from a different position. 
We end with trying to understand ‘understanding’ in a number of ways. 
First, as the ways we understand the world, through data, information, 
knowledge and wisdom.6 Second, as a reflection on the work that needs to 
be done towards a shared understanding of data. Third, how in using well-
being data, we may become more understanding of each other.
The First Half
We start by setting up some of the background story to well-being data. 
Chapter 2, ‘Knowing Well-being: A History of Data’, puts the concerns of 
this book into context, these contexts being historical, political and tech-
nical. There are different theories of well-being from different times and 
places, and how these are understood today by researchers, national statis-
ticians and policy-makers affect what data are collected to understand 
well-being.
We look at the project of measuring well-being as one that wanted to 
understand how to improve human welfare. We also consider well-being 
as a tool of policy, as the very idea of it is used to make arguments for one 
policy decision over another. Or in more real terms, to fund one social 
project over another. This is deeply connected with developments in 
national politics and governance, which changed and increased the role of 
economics in auditing, efficiency and valuation. We consider how these 
processes led to not only more well-being data, but more well-being data 
practices. In other words, more uses of more data. This chapter will help 
the reader think more critically about why and how well-being became 
such a default ‘good idea’—and some of the issues at play here. It will also 
help think about how striving for a good society became inextricably 
linked with well-being data.
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Chapter 3, ‘Looking at Well-being Data in Context’, moves more spe-
cifically into thinking about the uses of data and measurement in policy, 
practice and research. The previous chapter’s historical focus on measure-
ment as an expression of objectivity and governance is extended here. This 
chapter is a more focussed appraisal of contexts in which data are collected 
and used. We think about the role of methods and methodology (explain-
ing what this word means). We look at specific examples of how well- 
being is measured and how that maps onto philosophical accounts of 
well-being. This is not a methods textbook, as there are plenty out there 
that do this job. Instead, this chapter’s focus on context, difference and 
limitations across mundane, critical and authoritative contexts aims to 
help us think about how we might understand well-being better, or 
differently.
Therefore, we think about the implications of different kinds of data, 
starting with how they are collected. Well-being data can be collected in 
various ways: through administrative processes, such as the recording of 
births, marriages and deaths, or crime-rates. These data will be used as 
quantitative data, to understand and develop measures we see in the press, 
like ‘mortality rate’. Quantitative data can also be collected using surveys 
that allow understanding of more complex aspects of people’s lives. Asking 
people questions means you can know how long it is since they visited 
their GP (general practitioner), for example, or how far they have to walk 
to their nearest children’s play area. These data are easily turned into num-
bers to give a picture of how people’s lives compare, or how we are doing 
overall, and can help governments make decisions about how to allocate 
resources.
Data collected in questionnaires and online surveys can also be qualita-
tive, as can interviews, diaries and observations. Qualitative data are most 
generally text-based, and so are good to understand how people have 
described their experiences or opinions; although can also involve image 
or sound, for that matter. Using qualitative data can allow researchers to 
understand the complexities of a situation and the specificities of people’s 
personal lives. While quantitative and qualitative approaches tend to be 
discussed separately, some data collection methods, such as surveys and 
questionnaires, collect both quantitative data (by ticking a box) and quali-
tative data (by a free text field), so surveys are able to gather data that offer 
a bigger picture and more detail at the same time.
Qualitative data often have lots of rich detail about few people in a spe-
cific context that have to be interpreted by the person analysing it. 
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Quantitative data will have been collected so they can be quantified, 
removing contextual detail for analysis using numbers and comparison 
across a population. Somewhat confusingly, if you have enough qualitative 
data, you can quantify them, but this is less common and we look at how 
and why that can be useful sometimes. While quantitative data also require 
interpretation, there are standardised mathematical approaches, usually 
drawing on statistical methods to support these decisions and analyses. 
This means quantitative approaches are considered to be more neutral and 
objective. But as we shall see, lots of decisions are needed, and this poses 
key questions about the idea of objectivity in the data used to make state-
ments about what is good for society and to make arguments that one 
thing over another will improve well-being.
Chapter 3 is the first chapter where we start to look under the bonnet 
of well-being data. At some points we get up-close to specific research 
examples and ideas, including quotes from focus groups and examples of 
well-being survey questions in an imagined context of evaluating a local 
community event. We also look at so-called objective well-being indicators 
(e.g. mortality rate) that feature in well-being metrics, like the OECD’s 
Better Life Index. We ‘follow these data’ using qualitative data in reports 
to think about how objective these measures really are. We will reflect on 
the distinction between objective well-being, as something experts decide 
is important to well-being, such as an aspect of health, and subjective well- 
being measures which involved asking people how they feel. All data and 
ways of using them have pros and cons, which is why context is important. 
Understanding how different data work in different contexts is key to 
well-being data and key to data for well-being.
‘Discovering “the New Science of Happiness” and Subjective Well- 
being’ is the title of Chap. 4. Here we consider the formation of happiness 
as something that can be measured. Happiness is part of a broader aca-
demic concept called ‘subjective well-being’—as an idea of how well- being 
is felt. Subjective well-being becomes extremely influential in the well-
being agenda and we look at the role that these new measures hold. The 
chapter begins by describing how ‘happiness’ became a ‘new science’ 
including the different academics, politicians and fields of study involved. 
It describes the evolution of positive psychology and happiness economics 
and their influence in the realm of policy-making.
Disciplines like psychology and economics often group subjective well- 
being data into different types. They refer to evaluation, experience and 
eudaimonic7 measures. This chapter does the same to explore what these 
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mean in practice, and how they are used or useful to understand specific 
aspects of the human experience, which is then used in evidence for policy- 
making. Again, specific examples of the contexts in which these sorts of 
data are collected and used reveal their limits, as well as contradictions in 
their use. We then focus on subjective well-being measures in the UK and 
the Office for National Statistics’ (ONS’) Measuring National Well-being 
Programme.
Looking at the invention of subjective well-being measures in the UK 
offers context behind the ubiquity of well-being measurement practices. 
Understanding the recent history behind, and breaking down the different 
ways of measuring a particular idea of well-being, is vital to appreciate the 
limitations of such projects. While the innovations and limitations of well-
being data remain unaddressed, their positive contribution for society can 
never be fully realised. This chapter’s comprehensive survey and critical lens 
aim to offer tools to promote better understanding of subjective well-being 
and happiness data, their capacity to change culture and society, and the 
limits of their application in areas of social and cultural policy and practice.
Chapter 5 looks at Big Data, which is an enormous topic to try and 
cover in one chapter. ‘Getting a Sense of Big Data and Well-being’ asks 
many questions, beginning with: what do we even mean by the term?—
how are data big? The amount of data on individuals that is now collected 
is quite simply mind-boggling. The International Data Corporation (IDC) 
predicts that by 2025, the total amount of digital data created worldwide 
will rise to 163 zettabytes (Coughlin 2018). That is 1021 
(1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 bytes) or one trillion gigabytes. The 
European Commission forecasted the European ‘data market’ to be worth 
as much as €106.8  billion by 2020 (Ram and Murgia 2019). We can 
therefore see that not only have the amounts of data increased, but their 
economic value has as well. It is, therefore, even harder to maintain that 
all uses of well-being data enable neutral decisions about how society is 
managed, when it is being called ‘the new oil’ (The Economist 2017).
We begin by asking the question: ‘What even is Big Data?’ We look at 
what the term means, as well as what Big Data are and what they can do, 
including how as soon as someone tries to define it, somehow that defini-
tion is not quite right. Emergent technologies from all walks of life are 
producing and collecting and analysing data about us as we move about 
the online and offline world. This means that more can be known about 




Big Data are often attributed with much power—by those in favour of 
their use, and those who actively work to limit the negative possibilities of 
these new data and how they are used. The chapter demystifies Big Data 
by putting them into historical and a number of practical contexts. For 
example, smaller organisations, in the arts and social sector, use data min-
ing in small, mundane and often unobtrusive ways (Kennedy 2016; 
Oman 2013). It is possible to use data in research like this in a way that is 
ethical and without much software skill or financial resource. We revisit a 
practical example of a manageable project I undertook to reanalyse 
Twitter data using a hashtag that was started by a Mass Observation proj-
ect8 to understand what makes people happy. As a spoiler, there are 
many cats.
Mass Observation was a project originally established by an anthropol-
ogist, a poet and a filmmaker in 19379 who wanted to record everyday life 
in Britain. The project emerged at a time where there was a desire for 
more detail in data, and around the same time as social surveys were 
becoming more complex to understand more detail about people’s every-
day lives, particularly around World War II. More data were wanted to 
understand quality of life and manage populations beyond the administra-
tive data collected on mass-scale, like the census.
Most countries now undertake a census of sorts, and in the UK, the 
ONS have collected its census data every ten years since 1801. The new 
‘enthusiasm for numbers’ in the early to mid-nineteenth century (Hacking 
1991, 186; Porter 1986, 1996) coincided with a growing infrastructure 
to collect and analyse data. This desire for numbers, and the data processes 
that were required to provide them, led to the ‘great explosion of numbers 
that made the term statistics’ (Porter 1986, 11). In this ‘avalanche of 
numbers’, ‘nation-states classified, counted and tabulated their subjects 
anew’ (Hacking 1990, 2; 1991, 186). Censuses date back far farther, of 
course, and the ONS’ website offers an interesting history of censuses in 
the UK, back to the Domesday book ordered by the Norman (French) 
King, William the Conqueror in 1086 (ONS 2016). Again, censuses pre-
cede these European data moments by some 4000 years in both Egypt and 
China, who recorded who lived where how wealthy they were. The 
Romans held regular censuses to keep track of their expanding—and then 
contracting—empire. Further back still, the clay tablets of Sumerian script 
(Harford 2017) might be considered a dataset of Big Data from 6000 years 
ago. The promise of Big Data is therefore not new.
1 INTRODUCING WELL-BEING DATA 
20
We look at the promise of Big Data to predict a pandemic, reflecting on 
the obvious failings of Big Data to forecast COVID-19’s impact in a way 
that could have averted international crisis. We also look at a company that 
claims to have predicted the pandemic, yet failed to stop it: is it possible 
that the commercial value of the intelligence they had was a barrier to 
more effective global prevention? We start some years before that, in 2009 
with the failings of Google Flu Trends (GFT), which promised to beat the 
slow infrastructures of health services and testing in the US. GFT analysed 
what people searched for on Google, analysing what, where and when 
people typed symptoms into the search. Yet, this did not work for a num-
ber of reasons tied to a lack of capacity to understand context.
Back in the UK, I took part in a home testing programme that the 
media said would ‘clear up [the]  “Wild West” of Covid-19 estimates’ 
(Devlin 2020). In what has been called the ‘largest testing study for 
Coronavirus’ (Ipsos Mori 2020), tests were posted to you, using the UK’s 
traditional Royal Mail postal system. That all worked fine for me, but there 
were a series of steps registering different barcodes and I found myself 
wondering how accessible this was for everyone (when I say everyone, I 
often think of my once tech-savvy Dad, who’d have been bewildered at 
this whole process). As a result of these steps, a courier was ordered to 
collect the test, but failed after three attempts (that I describe in more 
detail in the chapter). A neighbour told me in passing that this particular 
courier company was infamous for not bothering to try and collect from 
my high-rise flats, probably because the buzzer has never worked and it 
can take too long for a resident to come down. This looks bad for the driv-
ers’ performance data, which are meant to encourage them to make as 
many deliveries and pick-ups as possible.
In my case, while some aspects of the traditional data infrastructure 
(the post) worked fine for this COVID-19 data collection research, they 
didn’t necessarily all work together as they might. This meant that my test 
remained uncollected; therefore my data became ‘missing data’. Thinking 
about the contexts in which data are collected (or not) can be both 
extraordinary and mundane, and we often don’t hear of these stories—
when they work, and the odd occasion when they don’t, and what that 
might mean for the data.
We follow other case studies of data from mobile phone usage, social 
media data and tracking apps, for example. We, again, ‘follow the data’ 
and how they are used to interpret whether these data projects are primar-
ily concerned with improving human well-being, or with refining data 
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practice. It is crucial to problematise the ethics of Big Data for well-being, 
particularly their commercial aspects, rooting these in the larger questions 
of what data can do more generally and the limits of data for understand-
ing well-being or improving well-being.
Half Time
The data we look at in the first half of this book are either all collected to 
better understand people or society, or have been analysed to do so to 
enable a government or a company to make better decisions. There is a 
sense that these data are all neutral—they are not affected by bias and can 
all be treated as fact. These chapters reveal the fragilities in the assump-
tions behind these kinds of data. When you consider the hypothetical and 
real-world examples, you can see lots of humans mainly doing their best to 
work with data. We can also see mistakes in the systems and analysis, and 
therefore, some of the data-driven decisions we live with are not the best 
decisions they are assumed to be.
The fact that data have real-world impacts and implications is not some-
thing that is often made clear by those who use data, or advocate data- 
driven decision-making. The impact of Big Data has seen an increase in 
those considering their social effects. Consequently, the negative aspects 
of data are an issue of government agendas with new emphases (DCMS 
2020). However, the ways that data about people make the problems of 
society legible are not necessarily new, and neither are the problems. Data 
on residents, together with a map produced by the City Office of Statistics 
of Amsterdam, enabled the rounding up of the city’s Jewish population 
under Nazi occupation in 1941 (Scott 1998, 77). Yet, the same tech-
niques of mapping people and personal data about them also led epidemi-
ologists to identify how the AIDS pandemic was spreading and of course 
the current COVID-19 crisis.
We need context to understand data practices and the possible ramifica-
tions of their social effects. They have their own ‘social life’ (Beer and 
Burrows 2013; Oman n.d.), meaning they might be thought of as living 
in that they act on the world as much as humans do. Data and numbers 
‘make up’ people (Hacking [1983] 2002) and tese later theorists enable 
us to think. Decisions are made about our lives without asking us, but 
looking at how we are represented by data. Data decide whether you will 
get a commercial loan or access to financial support by the state. Postcode 
data in the UK will decide how you will receive medical treatment and 
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what drugs you are entitled to. Data hold much power through metrics 
(Beer 2016) and algorithms (Kennedy 2015). But also, the very idea of 
data is powerful; it affects our day-to-day behaviour. Crucially, however, it 
is also in the desire for data where its power lies.
The Second Half
We ‘switch ends’ in the second half. The goal instead is thinking more 
about how society has increasingly required well-being data. So, while we 
do not entirely leave thinking about contexts of data collection, we think 
more about the contexts in which they are used. We continue to focus on 
how society works, its relationship to governance and decision-making, 
and the role of data in this. Given that data are social and cultural, we will, 
therefore, look at areas of social policy, focussing on cultural policy in par-
ticular to make comparisons more readily across some simple arguments 
about well-being that use data. To be truthful, it is also in looking at data 
in the cultural sector and in cultural policy that I came to understand data, 
and is my natural data habitat.
Chapter 6, ‘Well-being, Values, Culture and Society’, provides an over-
view of how cultural policy became a form of social policy, specifically 
looking at the role of well-being. The chapter historicises the idea that 
particular aspects of culture have a social role and are good for well-being 
using accessible interpretations of key philosophers from Aristotle to Kant. 
We reflect on the fact that much like population data, the arts have an 
honourable and dishonourable history (Belfiore and Bennett 2008), as 
both have been co-opted for political projects, such as fascism: that didn’t 
just damage well-being, but were almost indescribably catastrophic for 
people and society. The chapter brings these empirical accounts of uses of 
culture into play with social theory from cultural studies scholars, includ-
ing Raymond Williams ([1961]  1971, 1977, [1958]  1989a, [1968] 
1989b). These later theorists enable us to think through some assump-
tions around the role of culture, even what gets to be called culture, and 
why that is a problem for cultural and social policy. In turn, we are in a 
position to contextualise how the institutions and historical assumptions 
that decide what is good culture, and manage cultural policy, are not so 
different from thinking about the institutions that manage data and the 




We reflect on a genealogy of the idea that culture (broadly defined) is 
good for well-being (broadly defined); how that has been naturalised over 
time and then popularised. By this I mean, there is a generally accepted 
view that culture is good for well-being, and we look at the lineage of this 
idea as something that began with philosophers and is now common sense. 
We will then investigate how this relationship has been instrumentalised as 
a form of social policy. This involves looking at how culture is used as a 
means or ‘instrument’ for attaining goals in other areas of society. Examples 
of this can be found in policy documents, research agendas and in practi-
tioner movements including ‘arts in health’ (ACE 2007; AHRC n.d.; 
AHSW 2019) or the use of culture in urban regeneration projects (DCMS 
2004; LGA 2020; UNESCO 2018). The idea that the arts can be used to 
directly address societal problems has led to arguments that culture is—in 
fact—instrumental to these social policy areas.
The idea that arts are instrumental in delivering broader social projects 
and improving social infrastructure has been operationalised to advocate 
for funds for the arts. We have, therefore, witnessed changes in the value 
of culture from something belonging to everyone (Hall 1977; Keynes 
1945), to how much social impact it can demonstrate, or indeed financial 
estimates of the creative industries (Campbell 2019; DCMS 2011). In 
return for advocating the value of culture, the sector is increasingly 
required to evaluate how much of this value it has generated in response 
to funding, or to argue for more funds.
This has also seen the slippery nature of culture and its definitions be 
instrumentalised in arguments, where one meaning of culture is used to 
justify another aspect of it. The benefits of culture as something more 
everyday (Williams [1958] 1989a) are used to justify the funding of art-
forms which are considered the opposite of commonplace in that they are 
elitist, with often small numbers of people interested in participating 
(opera being the default perpetrator in this argument). This slippery effect 
is also used when it comes to ‘creativity’ and arguments surrounding the 
economic impact of the arts, where ‘the arts’ become ‘the creative indus-
tries’, including some professions in IT, which in many cases do not seem 
to be very creative at all—in the way we would normally use the word.
We have, therefore, seen a process in which the culture–well-being 
relationship is theorised (through philosophers) and become naturalised in 
people’s day-to-day thinking: making it common sense. Figure 1.1 shows 
the full journey of processes described in the chapter. The common-sense 
nature of the relationship is operationalised in policy and instrumentalised 
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to argue the value of the arts and culture to other areas of social policy. 
This process, however, has led to the cultural sector finding itself in a bind 
to the burden of proof. It has to evidence the social impact of the work it 
does, which is a costly exercise of data production and analysis.
These shifts in the culture–well-being relationship have seen the value 
of data increase and become capitalised on (Oman and Taylor 2018). The 
increase in funding saw an upturn in evaluations required to report back 
to funders. With this came demand for data and data practices that are 
often outside of the skills and confidence of many working in the cultural 
sector, and broader areas of social policy. These skills therefore often need 
buying in from elsewhere. With the newer forms of well-being data intro-
duced in the first half of this book, come new metrics and valuation tools, 
which are presented as a solution to issues of advocacy and proof in the 
sector. They also perpetuate this cycle of funding and evaluation, which 
preserve this process of instrumentalising, operationalising and capitalis-
ing on the culture–well-being relationship. We will therefore look at some 
examples of how well-being data are used to make arguments about cul-
ture—and we will follow the data in different ways to see how they work.
Chapters 7 and 8 draw from the framing in Chap. 6 to look at how the 
culture–well-being relationship has been operationalised in research to 
provide proof. Chapter 7 is called ‘Evidencing Culture for Policy’. It takes 
three fundamental arguments about the culture–well-being relationship-
that are used in advocacy and looks at them more closely. The first is that 
culture warrants funding, because it is good for well-being. We look at a 
number of different examples of data to establish if a relationship between 
public funding and well-being can be found. Again, through investigating 
the contexts of data collection and analyses, we are able to think about the 
limits of what can be known using these data.
Why are well-being data in demand to understand some relationships 
and not others? Despite the naturalised belief that we should invest in 
culture for its well-being benefits? There is little research which explores 
whether a pattern can be established between increased funding and well- 
being. Why are some questions repeatedly asked and not others? Is this a 
matter of the data (what can be known) or the limits of what people want 
to know?
Theorised -> naturalised -> operationalised -> instrumentalised -> metricised -> capitalised
Fig. 1.1 The culture–well-being relationship
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We look at the question of ‘how much is culture good for well-being’ 
in more detail. The chapter considers two pieces of research which inves-
tigate the well-being of cultural practitioners and creative professionals 
who are often presented as similar, even the same, population. The two 
studies ostensibly use the same approach to analyse survey data to under-
stand this culture–well-being relationship. In comparing these two cases, 
we unpack differing findings and look at limitations of data, in categories, 
populations and analyses, and question how they help us understand well- 
being in this instance. Crucially, this is not necessarily a case of comparing 
studies to see if one is better than the other. Instead, we look at how ask-
ing (at least superficially) the same question using similar data about simi-
lar people at comparable points in time does not present the same results. 
So what does this mean for ideas of evidence?
The final section looks at a piece of research that is found in important 
and high-profile reports as evidence that culture is good for well-being. 
The article uses what it calls ‘data mining’ to understand ‘cultural access’. 
We look under the bonnet of this idea of cultural access and the data that 
have been used to measure it. We also follow the authors’ data mining 
practices and analyses to find combined variables which change the mean-
ing of the category ‘cultural access’, resulting in an inflated outcome.
Unpacking the different ways that culture has been packaged as some-
thing that is good for people and society is important. In this chapter we 
discover how particular findings become popularised as ‘common knowl-
edge’ and how they then become operationalised in reports, the media 
and policy documents. This is crucial to grasping the idea that the rela-
tionship between data and evidence is cultural, and relies on practices, 
understandings and meanings.
Once we begin to question the social value of generating evidence in 
this way, the economic value of contracting in well-being data and research 
practices warrants investigation. In Chap. 8, ‘Talking Different Languages 
of Value’, we follow a piece of research that was commissioned to help 
with advocacy for the arts. The commissioners were an organisation called 
the Happy Museum, and the research was funded by Arts Council 
England. Building on the work we have done in previous chapters to 
understand how data work in contexts (see also Oman n.d.), we look at 
how culture and well-being are operationalised in this study, and walk 
through the processes, step by step.
The chapter opens with this idea that this book seeks to challenge: that 
the arts and data speak different languages. Breaking down what is 
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happening, we follow the data in various ways. There is a description of 
how the data were collected in a national-level survey. We look at the 
questions, as they appear in a survey, because it can be hard to imagine the 
mundane contexts that data originate from, when you are looking at the 
complex results. We follow the data forward, to see how key findings are 
interpreted by the world. This allows us to ask questions like: what does 
research do? How does it affect the world or change things?
We follow the conceptual work behind what is being measured before 
reflecting on some of the steps in the analysis. There was another way that 
these data were followed, as I was part of a research project to reproduce 
findings, using details on the processes and the data available. Crucially, 
the second piece of research arrived at different conclusions from the first. 
What does that mean for the very idea of ‘evidence’?
How does commissioning well-being data analysis to support the argu-
ments people want to make change the nature and role of evidence in 
different social policy areas? How does this affect overall knowledge of 
‘what works for well-being’ in terms of social policy? Importantly, how 
does ‘capitalising’ on well-being data affect their capacity to do social 
good or to be good data? Do the economic value of data and their analysis 
change the relationship between well-being data and a good society? We 
have found indications that this is the case with COVID-19, but  is this 
more generalisable?
Chapters 7 and 8 break down various aspects of how data are used in 
cultural policy to communicate quantitative expressions of well-being to 
people who lack confidence in these areas. Crucially, this will enable read-
ers to think about how something that is described as culture or cultural is 
said to impact on well-being, whilst also looking at the limits of the data 
we have to make such claims. These chapters aim to encourage you to 
make your own mind up (with a little help) as to whether everything adds 
up (not just the numbers). Do the arguments make logical sense based on 
the evidence we actually have, rather than what we are told we have? How 
can considering the contexts of data help those working in data and work-
ing in social policy do more good with data? History tells us the dangers of 
ignoring the good and the bad that can be done with data, and that how 
it is used is a matter of culture.
The final chapter is simply called ‘Understanding’. Here we will reflect 
on different ways of understanding well-being and different ways of inter-
preting data. We will look back on how well-being and data are related by 
way of policy and politics. We consider the relationship between evidence 
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and policy, and the politics of data. How do these conflicting ideas work 
together when the aim of the game is well-being?
We reflect on how understanding contexts of data helps us better 
understand the politics of data and evidence for policy. We look at the 
limitations of well-being data that we have explored in terms of claims that 
can be made and we look at their limitations when it comes to calling data 
objective. The huge amounts of decisions involved in establishing the 
well-being measures in Chaps. 3 and 4 show these are not neutral deci-
sions. Furthermore, Chaps. 7 and 8 reveal the decisions made in model-
ling: what data to clean, weights and adaptations to valuation techniques 
when well-being data are used to make arguments about value.
We think about what understanding means. It means understanding as 
knowledge, shared understanding of how something works and being 
understanding, or having empathy. Well-being data promise information 
that leads to knowledge and wisdom, but these do not currently lead to a 
shared understanding. Research is commissioned for the cultural sector 
and presented in ways preoccupied with proof, rather than communicat-
ing findings with those who work in the sector.
The concluding chapter presents a case study of how people crave 
understanding of why they are being asked certain questions on equality 
monitoring forms, what will happen to and with the data they offer. Yet, it 
is not common practice to share understanding of how and why different 
data are valuable. There is much room for understanding and empathy in 
approaches to inequality and well-being data, and this is currently over-
looked in most projects that work with these data in the name of social 
justice.
The ‘social life of methods’ is a body of research proposing that meth-
ods are not neutral ways of capturing an objective reality, but have their 
own social effects; in fact, changing the reality they claim to capture. Data: 
how it is collected, shared, analysed and where the results are published 
are a fundamental part of this. We have looked at how data are cultural, in 
that they change culture, making new cultures, and we look at the implica-
tions of these social effects. Those who are campaigning for data rights are 
very focussed on what can be known about people from data. However, 
this is often framed as an issue of privacy as an abstract human right or as 
an issue of social justice, as the effects of data-driven decision-making dis-
proportionately affect marginalised groups. This, of course, is an impor-
tant ethical question.
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A broader question, however, is what can these data actually tell us 
about people? There are limitations to most data when it comes to what 
we can actually understand about society that are not always taken into 
consideration. Crucially, the question we must ask ourselves at this 
moment is how can we also rethink questions of what can be known about 
people from data to incorporate data’s limits, as well as their power? How 
might well-being data improve well-being? Can we be better at moving 
from understanding people as units of analysis to becoming more under-
standing in the way we collect and use data?
These are the provocations this book leaves us with and I hope to con-
tinue to do work that not only tries to answer these questions, but which 
goes about changing things. This book is set up so that we can look at the 
work that well-being does in policy and practice contexts for social and 
cultural policy, for third sector organisations and arts managers, for chari-
ties. Most of all this book is meant to help us all have a better grasp of ideas 
of well-being and ideas of data, how they work in different contexts and 
how they are used and manipulated for different ends. Neither are neutral. 
They are imposed by historical traditions which say what works and what 
doesn’t. They are imbued with values—and I hope this book will help you 
value your own judgement to decide what they mean for you.
notes
1. Of course, you can use alternate search engines and change settings to have 
some control over this to some extent.
2. Although, it must be noted that the analyst on the BBC’s More or Less pro-
gramme did state that this was only a possibility—Boris Johnson’s numbers 
were—in fact—far more generous than using the index that would give the 
best results, and within the best timeframe.
3. A recently formed network of practitioners, the Cultural Data and Research 
network, is tackling these issues in various ways. See: www.cdrn.uk for more 
information.
4. For further discussion of ideas of well-being: Sara Ahmed compellingly 
explains how the ideals of happiness are not available to all: they are reliant 
on race, class, gender and sexuality (2010). I have tested this using a Google 
search over different years (see Oman 2015b as an example). I found that 
when I searched for the word ‘well-being’, the majority of images comprised 
stock images of white people who were able-bodied and doing yoga or 
jumping, or they were a middle-class family sitting down to a healthy dinner 
together with perfect teeth. These very ideas of what well-being looks like, 
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who has well-being and who doesn’t are reinforced by government health 
messaging. This changes what we think well-being means. See Ryan (2021) 
for some alternative messages.
5. See Airoldi (2021) for the most recent example of research on recommenda-
tions and YouTube.
6. Data, information, knowledge and wisdom are sometimes thought of in 
terms of a DIKW Pyramid. This pyramid helps imagine and visualise the 
relationships between them. Each is thought to be a step towards a higher 
level—first come data, then is information, next is knowledge and finally 
comes wisdom. Each step answers different questions about the initial data 
and adds value to it. This idea suits one way of thinking about the relation-
ship between data and wisdom. This book explains how this process is more 
complicated. See also Frické (2009) for why it’s more complicated than this.
7. We look at the idea of eudaimonia in greater detail in Chaps. 2 and 4. Most 
simply, eudaimonia means feeling purpose, or flourishing.
8. Mass Observation is a project that has long aimed to record everyday life in 
Britain. More detail can be found on the different phases of the overall proj-
ect and its smaller projects, here: http://www.massobs.org.uk, and in 
Chap. 6.
9. There were a number of iterations of Mass Observation (n.d.), with different 
people initiating them, but the original founding members were anthropolo-
gist Tom Harrisson, poet Charles Madge and filmmaker Humphrey Jennings.
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CHAPTER 2
Knowing Well-being: A History of Data
2.1  What Is Well-beIng?
Centuries of philosophical inquiry have failed to result in agreement about 
what the ‘good life’ is. (Veenhoven 1984, 18)
How do we know what well-being is? The term ‘well-being’ is familiar and 
widespread and yet there is ambiguity around its definition. There are 
even disagreements in whether it is spelt ‘well-being’ or wellbeing. ‘Health 
and well-being’ or ‘mental health and well-being’ are common expres-
sions in public services and formal reports, from housing to arts councils 
(i.e. ACE 2018). While well-being is key to social policy-making (Wolf 
2019), it is increasingly distinguished from ‘welfare’ (Scott 2012, 37) and 
instead linked to what we now call ‘the wellness industry’, which, at its 
extreme is seen as a hybrid of clean eating, yoga and meditation 
(Cederström and Spicer 2014; Davies 2015). So, well-being can therefore 
be used to describe health, but more than health; it is key to public ser-
vices, but is not used to describe welfare, as such—and the very idea of 
well-being has been co-opted by big business who want to sell us what 
they want us to believe is good for us.
This chapter asks the question: ‘knowing well-being, how did we get 
here?’ Its main aim is to present the historical and policy context of well- 
being as an agenda. ‘The well-being agenda’ has emerged as a consequence 
of people and organisations considering it a priority: as a problem that 
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needs solving, or an aim that warrants achieving. You might be familiar with 
the idea of a policy agenda: the well-being agenda is bigger than policy, 
with more individuals and associations involved and with an interest. We 
will establish how well-being is used, including definitions and traditions of 
well-being, beginning to see how well-being data1 emerge as useful for 
measurement, and how measurement is used to know about well-being in 
certain ways. Well-being measures have two main uses: to track the health 
and wealth of nations and to make policy decisions. These involve either 
evaluating previous interventions or predicting how a future decision might 
have positive impact. The chapter reflects on well-being as a tool of policy 
that emerged as a result of an agenda across academic, technical, commer-
cial and political interests. The story of the well-being agenda is important 
to understanding contemporary society, and the role of data, vital to it.
Some see well-being as synonymous with happiness,2 and therefore 
arguably only a part of the human experience, and others as an all- 
encompassing concept to describe the quality of people’s lives (Dodge 
et al. 2012). We will explore these aspects in Chaps. 3 and 4. As Veenhoven 
(1984) suggests, well-being as a concept can also encompass broader ideas 
about what a good life might be; which others, such as the Greek philoso-
pher Aristotle saw as connected to how we might envisage a good society 
(Aristotle 1976).3 It can therefore describe how humans experience the 
world as individuals, or as society.
Well-being is also used to describe things which aren’t really about peo-
ple or life at all, such as ‘the well-being of the sector’ when talking about 
the arts and culture (UK Parliament 2018) and ‘the well-being of the 
economy’. We have seen this used recently to justify releasing of lockdown 
laws which were in place to protect the vulnerable, following peaks of 
coronavirus infections in the UK (John 2020). This linguistic trick can 
lead someone to connect the economy to well-being, when they would 
not necessarily have done before.
The well-being of the economy is not ‘well-being economics’, however, 
which aims to re-focus away from economic policy to account for the 
negative effects of growth on people and the planet. Think of the links 
between McDonald’s and the destruction of the Amazon rainforest, for 
example (Vidal 2006), and calls for a ‘local economy’. Thus, well-being 
economics is often ideologically opposite to concerns that we must safe-
guard the economy, instead directing attention to protecting community 
infrastructures and interests, while being sensitive to impacts on the planet 
in a move ‘towards sustainability’ (see Scott 2012).
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Some economists and psychologists, however, might refer to ‘happiness 
economics’ when thinking about well-being. Rooted in positive psychol-
ogy and behavioural psychology, happiness economics is based on the 
premise that what we do affects our well-being, and that people can make 
better decisions for themselves (Dolan 2014; Layard 2006). The approach 
has been adopted in policy-making as it offers rationales for decision- 
making and has also been capitalised on. For example, the digital mental 
health market was valued at $1.4  billion (£1.1  billion) in 2017 and is 
projected to reach $4.6 billion in 2026 (Morris 2020). This industry com-
mercialises a solution for people’s desire to improve themselves or make 
themselves feel better. If you take a moment to think about how making 
people feel more responsible for their own well-being is attractive to those 
in government who want to be less accountable for our well-being, this 
may make you feel suspicious of the links across the business of well-being 
and the governance of our welfare.
The well-being agenda has, therefore, manifested in different camps 
with different agendas—which have different relationships with data. As a 
result, we have different kinds of well-being data that are produced and 
generated for different purposes. They are also used differently: various 
parts of society use well-being data to manage themselves—and others—
in different ways.4 This makes it difficult to navigate well-being data and 
how it is used, or how we should use it—both in our own work, and when 
reading about others’ work in our everyday lives or when watching 
the news.
While this book’s primary concern is not to define well-being, nor is it 
to re-document the histories of ideas around well-being (there are many 
other excellent books which have done these things e.g. Davies 2015; 
Layard 2006; McMahon 2006; Schoch 2007), the fact that there is no 
single use of the term makes it complicated. It is also what makes it so 
Box 2.1 Ideology
When this book talks about ideology, it means a set of ideas that go 
together, as is common in a political ideology, like socialism, fascism 
or democracy, for example. The well-being of the economy might be 
thought to ideologically put the economy first, whereas well-being 
economics wants to foreground protecting people and the planet 
over economic growth.
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valuable for those who use well-being data to suit their aims, needs and 
communicate their beliefs.
This book is designed to help navigate the complexities of well-being 
data: to reveal the roots of the well-being data you encounter profession-
ally or in everyday life. So, in order to do that let’s first outline how differ-
ent aspects of well-being have been imagined historically, how they have 
been defined. We will also need to account for different moments in time 
that have resulted in the varieties and uses of well-being data. These politi-
cal histories contextualise why certain data are generated, how they are 
generated—and how they may not represent what you may imagine. With 
this background knowledge and understanding, you should find it easier 
to navigate ‘well-being’ as an intellectual field; a social, cultural and per-
sonal aspiration; and a policy agenda. This helps understand different 
forms of well-being data—and how they are used.
Traditions of Well-being Thought
There are two overarching ideas of well-being which emerge from two 
main traditions. These are found in the way well-being data are most often 
used to inform policy-making or evaluate decisions made in organisations. 
These two traditions have been described as ‘Benthamite-subjective- 
hedonic-individualistic’ or ‘Aristotelian-objective-eudaimonic-rational’ 
(Bruni and Porta 2005, 20). This way of describing these two traditions is 
a bit of a mouthful and can be broken down.
 Hedonia: Most Simply Understood as Pleasure or Positive Feeling
The first account of well-being is based on hedonia: most simply under-
stood as pleasure. The easiest way to remember its meaning is through the 
words: hedonism and hedonistic, as meaning ‘a bit of a party animal’ or as 
a good friend used to say: ‘a pleasure monster’. This is a recent adaptation, 
however. Historically, it was grounded in peoples’ subjective experience of 
their own lives. Hedonia is philosophically rooted in the Epicureans’ (c. 
300  BC) belief that pleasure is good—and morally virtuous to aspire 
towards. This was later adapted by the Utilitarians: Bentham asserted that 
an act was good based upon the outcome of the act, specifically, if it pro-
vided more happiness for more people than harm. As a result, he believed 
that the maximisation of pleasure, and reduction of suffering, was the role 
of government (1996 [1789]).
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Jeremy Bentham’s ‘hedonic calculus’, also known as the ‘felicific calcu-
lus’,   was a theoretical algorithm. We tend to think of algorithms as a 
recent invention, but instead it is a term from the late seventeenth century 
referring to a series of rules for problem solving, particularly in calcula-
tions.5 Bentham proposed to understand the moral worth of an act as its 
value. By which he meant, that he wanted to be able to come up with a 
valuation mechanism to understand how people’s actions were moral, 
based on their contribution to happiness. The  economist  Francis 
Edgeworth, some 100 years later, argued that utility was directly measur-
able. Utility is a term in economics that does not refer to the cost of your 
water bill, but instead captures the idea that when people consume a good 
or service, they do so to gain satisfaction. We will come to this in greater 
detail later, but much economics works on the proviso that humans make 
rational choices that will maximise the utility and the experience. 
Edgeworth believed that new developments in ‘physio-psychology’ made 
a ‘hedonimeter’ possible. The hedonimeter was imagined to measure plea-
sure through reading bodily responses. This, he argued, would allow 
economists a physiological underpinning of utility, based on the natural 
sciences (Colander 2007). In other words, it would prove the existence of 
rational choice and satisfaction, rather than this only being a theory. 
Improving knowledge of how we experience the world: our pleasure and 
pain is one of the motivations behind wanting to understand well-being. 
Making this seem more scientific is one of the drivers behind measuring it 
and using data, as is the idea of living a good life.
 Eudaimonia: Most Often Understood as Purpose or Flourishing
The second account is not based on a mental state, as such, but on the 
process involved in human flourishing, as living our best possible life. This 
Aristotelian account of well-being, eudaimonia, is formed by what we do 
across all the aspects of our lives and is more aligned to purpose, rather 
than pleasure (Aristotle c. 330 BC). These days, many worry that Aristotle’s 
ideas of living a best life (1976) go too far: they are too idealistic and pur-
ist. In order to live a good life, a person had to separate themselves from 
the mundane to consider the theoretical and the scientific. This not only 
is exclusionary, by today’s standards, but depends on others to undertake 
these mundane activities. Despite the societal issues of slavery and elitism 
of Aristotle’s Athens,6 much of his thinking of Eudaimonia remains in use.
The binary of pleasure versus purpose grounds much of the well-being 
discourse. It manifests in proposals of how to achieve both in self-help 
literature (e.g. see Dolan 2014), or the role of government in reducing 
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suffering or maximising people’s opportunities to flourish (Sen 1999). 
The two traditions have been described as ‘Benthamite-subjective- 
hedonic-individualistic’ and ‘Aristotelian-objective-eudaimonic-rational’ 
(Bruni and Porta 2005, 20). As we have briefly covered these concepts 
separately, with any luck, they now mean more than a string of words. I’ll 
now break down the last of those differences (individual vs rational), 
although, as will become clear later, the positions are not as much in oppo-
sition to each other as implied.
Individualism, as you might expect, foregrounds the individual. This 
position sees the moral right to autonomy, and the importance that people 
make their own decisions. It involves understanding how individual peo-
ple live and appreciate things differently, which is why it has been aligned 
with the subjective and centres on experience. However, this should not 
necessarily mean that people can only care for themselves. Bentham, for 
example, believed the role of government was to enable the most happi-
ness for the largest number of people7 (Bentham (1996 [1789])).
Rationalism, on the other hand, does not necessarily seek empirical 
truth of experience, by which we mean concrete evidence of what some-
one else is feeling. Instead it favours what can be deduced via logical intel-
lectual engagement. Rationalist thinking therefore seeks objective ways of 
understanding the world: meaning those who aspire to rationalism, also 
aspire towards facts which can be neutrally observed. In other words, how 
they feel or what they expect should not affect judgement. It is, as we shall 
discover, more difficult to be a neutral thinker, than you may imagine; 
similarly, the methods and tools used to capture objective data are not able 
to capture ‘raw data’,8 but all data are contextual and shaped by decisions 
made on how they are collected and interpreted.
In general, the data that comprise objective indicators are considered 
more reliable than those in subjective indicators. If we think on a smaller, 
more everyday scale: in healthcare, objective data include X-rays, and sub-
jective data include the reporting of symptoms. If you were to make a 
diagnosis of a broken rib, you would use a combination of these data, but 
the X-rays would be considered more reliable than someone saying they 
feel like they have broken a rib. However, if someone said they felt as if 
they’d broken a rib, and the X-ray said otherwise, you would undertake 
another test to collect more objective data. Statistics doesn’t quite work 
like that as you very rarely go to the individual level to see how one bit of 
objective data corresponds to a subjective one. This, however, might be 
tested using qualitative research like interviews, which we’ll discuss in the 
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next chapter. Having briefly summarised the theoretical background to 
ideas of well-being and their uses, we will begin to look more at data and 
how they can be used by the well-being agenda.
Common Definitions Used with Well-being Data
There is no single definition of wellbeing. The terms wellbeing, quality of 
life, happiness, life satisfaction and welfare are often used interchangeably 
(although some disciplines draw distinctions between them). (Allin 2007, 46)
Paul Allin became Director of the UK’s Office for National Statistics’ 
(ONS’) Measuring National Well-being programme. As he acknowledges 
above, there are a number of terms used as if they are substitutable in dis-
ciplines associated with measuring well-being. In addition to happiness, 
life satisfaction and quality of life are also synonymous with well-being. As 
we shall find out throughout the book, when it comes to data, although 
these ideas are linked in a common-sense way, life satisfaction metrics are 
largely from different sorts of data than quality-of-life metrics. Life satis-
faction measures aim to capture how people feel and so they are from 
subjective evaluations. Quality-of-life measures are used to understand 
various qualities of life, such as health and relationships; the endgame is 
understanding how these work together, to then assess overall well-being. 
They are made from objective lists and measures.
 Objective Well-being
This approach examines what are thought to be the components of the 
good life, using objective data which include resources (income, food, 
housing) and social attributes (education and health). Objective well- 
being data are then added up (aggregated) to become society-wide 
descriptions that imply concrete conditions, such as employment rate or 
life expectancy. They are objective because they measure material condi-
tions, and are considered impartial. They are well-being data as they are 
used to understand how something like housing or income might impact 
our lives. In other words, they can be used as a proxy measure for well- 
being. By proxy we mean an indirect measure. For example, someone’s 
income does not necessarily directly tell you about their quality of life, but 
because the relationship has been long-studied, assumptions can be made 
about well-being using what we know about how income relates to well- 
being—so the theory goes.
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Objective well-being data predominantly come from what we call 
administrative data. These data are collected in the processes of our every-
day lives, like taxation or the registration of births, marriages and deaths. 
Objective data are also collected from people using surveys. Questions 
that ask for details on salary and how many people live in someone’s home 
(like in the census), for example, are objective. Chapter 3 looks at objec-
tive lists and measures in much greater detail.
 Subjective Well-being
As with health diagnoses, subjective well-being data are generated by ask-
ing people questions about how they are doing and/or how they are feel-
ing. This can be about their material conditions: how they feel about their 
local area; is it clean; is it safe? It can also be how they are feeling in and of 
themselves. One example is the UK’s ONS’ four questions to understand 
personal well-being. We will return to ‘the ONS4’ often in this book. 
They ask:
1. Overall, how happy did you feel yesterday?
2. Overall, how satisfied are you with your life nowadays?
3. Overall, to what extent do you feel the things you do in your life are 
worthwhile?
4. Overall, how anxious did you feel yesterday?
People score themselves out of ten, with most scoring around a seven 
out of ten for life satisfaction. These scores are aggregated to become the 
well-being data of a population who answered these questions. These 
aggregated data are used in a number of ways which can be tracked over 
time. Subjective measures are also used against objective measures, so if a 
measure of poverty spikes, we can see if this appears to be linked to anxiety 
using data produced by question 3. More recently, subjective well-being 
questions have been used to track impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on 
different samples of different populations all across the world.
As we have touched on, understanding the human experience in a more 
scientific way is one of the key drivers of the well-being agenda. Chapter 4 
looks in greater detail at the study of subjective well-being as ‘a new sci-
ence’ (Layard 2006). Interestingly, this ‘new science of happiness’ is one 
of the academic and intellectual developments that saw a resurgence in 
interest in well-being measurement more generally, especially in policy. 
Somewhat confusingly, the well-being agenda—as the measurement of 
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well-being—tends to be discussed in terms of objective indicators to 
replace Gross Domestic Product (GDP), rather than subjective well-being. 
As we discover in the next section, this is a more complex history than is 
ordinarily accounted for.
2.2  MeasurIng Well-beIng to IMprove huMan 
Welfare: a brIef hIstory
The measurement of well-being and quality of life for policy-making has 
recently been described as ‘an idea whose time has come’ (Bache and 
Reardon 2013). Articles on happiness and well-being averaged less than 
five a year in the journals covered by the EconLit database9 in the 1990s. 
By 2008 this had risen to over 50 each year (Fleche et al. 2012, 8). Bache 
and Reardon (2013) historicise this surge in interest as a political phenom-
enon that they term ‘the second wave of well-being’.
The first wave of well-being evolved as a project of redistribution after 
World War II. Prior to this, in the 1920s, Gross Domestic Product was 
developed as a broad quantitative measure of a nation’s total economic 
activity. It was treated as a proxy for increases in individual wealth, and 
fluctuations in unemployment, thereby tracking material quality of life at 
national level. A recent history of national accounts in different countries 
indicates that the well-being of citizens, not their bank accounts, was con-
sidered to be the end goal of government (Perlman and Marietta 2005). 
The goal of collecting information on income distribution, growth and 
productivity was to examine how those indicators influence the welfare of 
the nation, according to economist Simon Kuznets, one of the originators 
of GDP. Although Kuznets also acknowledged that economic indicators 
were only one piece of the puzzle of citizens’ well-being, and that ‘the 
welfare of a nation can ‘scarcely be inferred from a measurement of 
national income’ (Kuznets 1934, report to congress, cited in OECD 
2007). He was, therefore, arguing for the value of GDP as an instrument, 
but aware of its limitations, crucially stating:
Goals for more growth should specify more growth of what and for what. 
(Kuznets in Croly 1962)
GDP and national accounts data were not only generated to go about 
understanding individual nations, but also meant that countries could be 
compared in these terms, reflecting a broader trend towards comparable 
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data across nations at this time. In 1924, the League of Nations Health 
Organisation created the Permanent Commission on Biological 
Standardisation to monitor drug tests. This increasing momentum to 
share information on populations, including unemployment, wages and 
migration led to the new International Statistical Commission in 1947. 
The modern term ‘statistics’ was, in fact, coined with the invention of new 
system of accounting for national governance to ascertain ‘the quantum of 
happiness’ with a view to using these data to govern the nation better 
(Sinclair 1798, vol. 20, xiii).
Growing concerns evolved in the 1950s that personal prosperity cre-
ated social costs which manifested as public poverty10 (Noll 2002). There 
was also growing recognition that these social costs could not be captured 
by GDP. It was decided that this needed to be addressed through the 
development of new measurement tools that could help track whether life 
was actually getting better. These were hoped to be able to compensate 
for some of the shortcomings of GDP as a measure of human progress.
This is what came to be known as ‘the social indicators movement’, 
which emerged in the spirit of redistribution and an aspiration for new 
levels of knowledge of everyday life, birthing new surveys, such as the 
Level of Living Survey (The Swedish Institute for Social Research 1968; 
ONS 1970). These alternative but ‘objective’ benchmarks of progress 
grew in relevance on the international political agenda (Scott 2012; 
McGillvray 2007 in Bache 2012). The economic collapse of the 1970s is 
believed to have compromised the impact of these new indicators. The 
fact that economics had failed to avert economic crisis (Bache 2012), 
alongside a growing distrust of government, prevented the social indicator 
movement from toppling GDP as the primary measure of prosperity, and 
thus the focus on progress as growth remained.
The ‘second wave’ of well-being began in the comparative prosperity of 
the late 1990s (Bache and Reardon 2013) and was cemented in the high- 
profile commission of leading international economists.11 This responded 
to ongoing work of the OECD and concerns that material growth was 
impacting negatively on the planet (Bache 2012). It also responded to 
what has become known as the Easterlin paradox (1973): the discovery 
that rising wealth was not—in fact—improving people’s life satisfaction. 
The commission recommended, with considerable influence, that an alter-
native benchmark of progress should be found that was able to measure 
more than GDP and that all nations find a way to measure their own well-
being. This task was taken on by most OECD countries, in different ways, 
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and its timing in the UK resulted in its branding as Conservative Prime 
Minister of the Coalition Government, ‘Cameron’s happiness index’, 
when it was a far bigger movement that started a decade earlier.
The second wave also coincided with recent developments in subjective 
well-being data collection. The ONS example which they called Personal 
Well-being was introduced in April 2011.12 The measurement of subjec-
tive well-being for policy emerges from ‘happiness economics’ (Layard 
2006), which builds on work in the positive psychology movement (e.g. 
Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi 2000) and which we explore in Chap. 4. 
Richard Layard (2006) used the term ‘hedonic treadmill’13 in response to 
the Easterlin paradox. It describes how we adapt to increasing wealth, 
resulting in a need for more income to maintain the levels of life satisfac-
tion we are accustomed to. This results in greater consumption, which 
causes material growth and negative planetary impacts. Around the same 
time, other research was beginning to note the positive impacts of more 
social aspects of life on subjective well-being: social interaction, faith, inti-
mate relationships, government spending and different political- 
institutional frameworks (Bache and Reardon 2013).
The demise of the social indicators movement in the 1970s was argu-
ably not only the result of economic downturn (Scott 2012). Instead 
weaknesses in the objective indicators and data themselves made them 
unsustainable. Described as a ‘bewildering array’, these metrics were not 
linked to a robust theoretical or ideological analysis of what quality of life 
was exactly. The metrics and their analysis did not answer what needed to 
be achieved for whom and how (Scott 2012, 36). Thus, the second wave 
appealed to these proclaimed deficiencies.
The history of well-being measurement raises important questions 
regarding what measures are suitable for policy. Experts argue that the sci-
ence behind measuring well-being is becoming more robust (O’Donnell 
et al. 2014; Helliwell et al. 2015; Cameron 2010; ONS 2015), but do the 
indices address the fundamental question of what ‘quality of life’ is? Do 
they accommodate how people will find different qualities more valuable 
in various circumstances? Also, if wealth remains a proxy for well-being for 
some, and addressing well-being inequality14 is a new policy focus, has it 
been decided how redistribution of well-being would be undertaken in 
practice?
The very essence of well-being, as it is generally understood (particu-
larly subjective well-being), not only is attached to the lived experience, 
but should encompass it. Instead, well-being is often discussed in a 
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detached way as an object of politics that changes over time. Some argue 
that this is as a consequence of it becoming measurable (Beer 2016; Davies 
2015; Doria 2013; White 2014) which means well-being assumed its own 
agency, and in ways which are not necessarily understood by the general 
public. Others argue that this is the very consequence of attributing value 
to values (Doria 2013; Kaszynska 2021). This obscures the political moti-
vations, and the power of those creating and operationalising the measures 
and models, for policy evaluation. Remember when we were thinking 
about the idea of facts being neutrally observed, as objective and neutral, 
without factors which can affect judgement? Power is one reason why 
neutrality is harder to prove or argue than is always recognised.
These are the politics of data. It is imperative to consider these issues if 
we are to respond to the well-being agenda, including calls to move from 
‘national well-being measurement to a national well-being strategy’ in a 
report by the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Wellbeing 
Economics (Berry 2014, 4). Furthermore, different policy domains take 
different positions in a national well-being strategy. A well-being strategy 
might imply working towards a better social infrastructure, thus improv-
ing welfare provision overall, but it may actually be about foregrounding 
any one of a number of issues attached to the well-being agenda: social 
care, mental health resources, more NHS nurses, decarbonisation or 
increasing the minimum wage.
To understand how well-being data might enable a well-being strategy, 
we need to side-track briefly into some other historical contexts. We have 
mainly talked about national indicators: the social indicators’ movement as 
an international imperative to change the way progress was measured (in 
the 1960s) as a project of redistribution, or the more recent second wave 
(of the 1990s and 2000s) encouraging individual nations and interna-
tional bodies to devise more complex indices of objective and subjective 
well-being. The same kinds of data can be collected to evaluate policy 
decisions, actions and investments, and there are numerous techniques 
used in policy evaluation. These were generated to value the non- economic 
in the audit society, but ‘they are too liable to be co-opted, in support of 
some broader notion of efficiency’ (Davies 2014, 193). The following sec-
tions explore how we arrived at what has been called ‘the cult of the mea-
surable’ (Belfiore and Bennett 2007, 137) and what that means for 
well-being data and what we value.
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2.3  audIt Culture, value and publIC ManageMent
[T]he ‘fact of audit’ reduces anxiety, or more positively, produces comfort. 
(Power 1994, 307)
One of the effects of developing better measures of well-being and 
human progress is that we are measuring more things. More than this, we 
are measuring things for more reasons. Some argue that this is just because 
we can, or a more cynical description might be to ask whether this is just 
because some people say we can (whether or not we can being still up for 
debate in some areas of society). Increasing the ways we measure and what 
we measure has been diagnosed as ‘audit culture’ (Strathern 2000) and liv-
ing in ‘the audit society’ (Power 1994). This has been linked to the idea of 
a ‘Thatcherite revolution’ in UK politics15 (named by Power 1994), which 
refers to UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s reforms of how the public 
sector is managed, as well as how the public sector manages society.
Again, we must deviate into the task of defining some of these key 
terms. The public sector is responsible for public services in the UK, from 
the emergency services and healthcare, education and social care, to hous-
ing and refuse collection. It is, therefore, inextricably linked to delivery of 
social policy in a way that results in public managers having to ensure ‘a 
cost effective and friendly service but with the need to defend the involve-
ment of government in the delivery of such a service’ (Halachmi and 
Bouckaert 1995, 324). This process was called ‘new public management’ 
(NPM) (Hood 1991).
Box 2.2 The Characteristics of New Public Management
NPM and has been summarised as:
1. the adoption of private sector management practices in the 
public sector;
2. an emphasis on efficiency;
3. a movement away from input controls, rules, and procedures 
toward output measurement and performance targets;
4. a preference for private ownership, contestable provision, and 
contracting out of public services; and
5. the devolution of management control with improved report-
ing and monitoring mechanisms. (Hope 2001, 120)
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The NPM processes are inspired by the ways that commercial firms used 
financial auditing to demonstrate efficiency, with the idea that these should 
be applied to the public sector. NPM replaced existing aspects of account-
ability, such as quality control, with ‘auditabilty’ (Power 1994, 302–303). 
Many analysts of NPM (and it has many critics) point out that what is 
bizarre about NPM is that it does not matter what the audit practices are, 
as it is the idea of having them which is their most effective property.
In other words, in appearance, it doesn’t matter which value system 
(and here I mean moral and political values, rather than numbers) and 
which kind of valuation tool you use. For example, you might rank items 
by order of importance or working out the ratio of their value in compari-
son to other items. It also doesn’t matter whether you are deciding the 
social value of, say, someone choosing books over cigarettes (as George 
Orwell did), or saving local libraries open versus building new ‘super- 
libraries’ as ‘palazzos of human thought’,16 the point is that the technique 
was used, and so the policy decision can be justified.
Data which enable auditing, therefore, appear to reassure that things are 
being done correctly, but ‘the audit society is the anxious society’, accord-
ing to Power (1994, 307). Power argues that the system is set up so that 
the only way to deal with this anxiety is in the further commissioning of 
more auditing. Audit for audit’s sake does not improve things, but ‘audit 
success or failure is never a public fact’ and the ‘criteria of success are with-
drawn from public discourse’ (Power 1994, 308). Think of the recent rise 
in well-being at work surveys that you may have seen discussed on social 
media or which sit unanswered in our inboxes. At the time of writing this 
book, there was not much discussion of how the data these surveys gener-
ated had done anything to improve well-being, yet there was much discus-
sion on Twitter (in my bubble, at least) of how they exacerbate ill-being. 
They can make us feel watched and give us additional administrative tasks 
in the service of an employer who is compelled to audit well-being.
Consequently, the logic of NPM and its use of data to audit how policy 
decisions have performed (or how successful they were at achieving their 
aims efficiently) has trickled into all kinds of management and sizes of 
company. As we have recently seen, it has also trickled into apps and 
watches that help us manage ourselves and our own efficiency (which we 
discuss in greater detail in Chap. 5). The processes of ‘audit culture’ were 
initially argued to make policy-making more transparent to ‘the public’, 
but how data are used to make decisions, or monitor the effectiveness of 
such decisions, is not made clear. Arguably, this has resulted in the mecha-
nisms of policy—and the accountability of politicians, civil servants and 
their decisions—becoming even more obscure to the general public.
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We should remember the point that the first wave of well-being came 
to an end—in part—as a result of the mistrust of experts in the economic 
crash of the 1970s (Bache 2012). What is interesting is that the audit cul-
ture approach to efficiency which followed this crash has become natu-
ralised as the way that policy is done. It has also become the way our 
working lives are managed; some of us even audit our efficiency by way of 
how many steps we walk a day or how many hours we sleep. In audit cul-
ture, well-being metrics replace, reinforce and underwrite expertise. We 
are therefore trusting metrics more than experts, rather than distrusting 
experts and their metrics, as was the case in the 1970s.
Social Policy
Just as policy decisions became less fathomable to people, NPM also 
changed the relationship between people and policy in other ways. 
Members of the public were increasingly regarded as customers, and com-
pulsory competitive tendering (CCT) was introduced. CCT requires local 
council services to be tendered out, and the winning contract going to the 
most ‘efficient’ tender. The political relevance of this Thatcherite evolution 
lies in the fact that this government aimed to reduce ‘dependency’ on the 
state and encourage citizens to take responsibility for their own welfare.
A social policy-specific example might be the Right to Buy Scheme in 
the UK. This saw national government encourage local councils to offer 
up its social housing ‘stock’ (housing it was responsible for) to buy, for 
those people living in it. On face value, a policy that enabled more people 
to own their own home seemed a good one. Over time, people moved 
from the houses they had bought; consequently, housing that was looked 
after by the local council became private housing. However, many, many 
people cannot afford to buy, even rent this new private housing stock. 
Therefore, the welfare state has to step in to support this new rental mar-
ket with private landlords and inflated rents for people to rent houses that 
may have belonged to the public sector 30 years ago, and which are now 
often left in unhealthy disrepair by private landlords.
In this instance, objective well-being indicators of home ownership, 
rental prices or homelessness enable researchers, journalists and policy-
makers to piece together a retrospectively objective view of whether this 
policy was efficient and good for people’s quality of life. In short, it was 
great for some people, but not for more people over time, and contributes 
to inequalities (Murie 2015). As we will continue to see, just because mea-
suring well-being claims to improve how we monitor progress, and these 
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ideas were born from belief in both redistribution and efficiency, does not 
mean they will improve welfare or are even value for money. In fact, the 
issue of value is—in and of itself—also complex and contradictory.
So, What Is Value?
To complicate the issue further, ‘value’ not only refers to what counts 
(what is valuable, or of value), but how to count. It can also be used to 
describe our values—as the moral codes we live by in terms of what is right 
and wrong. In this sense the word and meanings of value are incredibly 
important when thinking about well-being data, especially what it might 
mean for social and cultural policy.
To assess the value (or worth) of something, people can go about their 
own personal estimation, perhaps on a scale, for example: ‘in a fire I would 
save my family photos over my TV’. This is a hypothetical ranking system, 
where you state you value photos more than television. Or people can use 
(or invent) a measuring device: a tool, which might include systems of 
rankings or ratings, for example. Crucially, no matter how neutral and sci-
entific these tools and devices are (or claim to be), they perform an act of 
calculation that assigns value on behalf of the person who invented or is 
applying the scale (Espeland and Sauder 2007). As Sociologist Bev Skeggs 
explains, ‘values will always haunt value’ (Skeggs 2014, 1). Metrification—
as the process of converting aspects of life into metrics for measurement—
does represent existing inequalities, so that they can be addressed. However, 
it can also reproduce inequalities set out by demographics, such as class and 
race. This is a broader and bigger argument that we will return to, but let 
me begin to explain with the example of the photographs versus the TV.
What’s interesting about the idea that you would save old family photos 
over your television is that this is an expression of your values, as a sort of 
moral value—or the kind of person you see yourself as—as much as it is 
scale of values (that you could translate into numbers). So, like any rank-
ings scale, or well-being index, they express the values of the person who 
designed them. Sometimes a well-being index that is a ranking system 
might want to appear as if it cares about one thing, when in fact it cares 
about something else entirely. This is also true of people, and when you 
ask them about themselves, they may feel like they might be being judged 
in some way (asking people questions can have that effect, see Chap. 9). 
For example, many people may want to look like the sort of person who 
would save photos of their family, rather than a surround sound TV, 
because they think that will make them appear a better person. Sociologists 
have long been interested in the way we judge our own actions and com-
pare them to the actions of others.
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Sociologists often call this a process of ‘distinction’, after Pierre 
Bourdieu (1984). Bourdieu has proved very influential in how people 
understand class (working class, middle class, etc.). This includes how we 
classify and categorise each other in day-to-day life, as well as how society 
is ordered unequally. This means—as Skeggs (afore-cited) tells us—judge-
ments about how we classify ourselves and each other affect how we also 
come to value things.17 This is also wrapped up in how we want our ‘taste’ 
to be understood by others—what we like and dislike, or what we think is 
good and bad. So, how we want to express our taste, through music, for 
example, relates to other people’s perceptions, values and how we wish to 
be seen by them. Likewise, taste can indicate social position or privilege. 
People judge people’s class based on the beer they drink, the clothes they 
wear and what they say they watch on TV. It is a cultural cliché to joke that 
‘the middle classes just don’t understand the importance of a giant telly’ 
(Moran 2019), but that also they pretend they don’t watch telly at all. 
This trope is an attempt to understand how a group of people value things 
in relation to their values.
Taste: how it is expressed and how we show our taste are very much 
embedded in cultural life, helping people to feel equal to their peers, or 
demonstrate superiority over others. For example, you might say, ‘Lauren 
has a good taste in music’, but what you decide is ‘good’ is different from 
what I decide is good. It is all caught up in this process of distinction, of 
how we classify people, and this is influenced by class. It also allows people 
to undermine perceived norms (what the majority does). For example, 
people in UK sub-cultures (whether rave, punk or Grime) might like simi-
lar things, products and clothing that are deliberately distasteful to many. 
How people ‘use’ this to navigate or succeed in social groups is called 
cultural capital (Bourdieu 1984; Bennett et  al. 2009). Cultural capital 
means that how people connect to particular culture (e.g. knowledge of 
music, food, travel and history) can give them a particular privilege, but 
that the more privilege you have to start, the easier it is to gain. Evidence 
suggests that people’s cultural capital changes how they value things and 
what they say are valuable.
So, how people answer a question on how they value one thing over 
another might change from a socially controlled situation (such as answer-
ing a questionnaire or social survey) to a real-life situation for many rea-
sons and what people value differs quite a lot. In fact, in any mundane 
moment, any subjective valuing system might appear. Someone may wish 
to disguise the fact that they actually value the financial worth of their TV 
more than the priceless photographs, because this may be seen as crass or 
shallow. They might use another value system, for example: ‘well, I would 
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spend more time in the future watching TV than I would spend looking 
at photographs, therefore the TV would bring me more joy’ (were they to 
use the Marie Kondo18 value system of which objects to keep). We might 
argue they are protecting their future well-being here? Or they might 
think, what would I pay to replace these items? These are all examples 
where a rational value is applied to one object over another using a ranking 
system where the value of one thing is based on its relationship to another.
In cultural policy terms, the TV and the photo album might be consid-
ered relative: they could be categorised as cultural objects. For the UK’s 
‘Happiness Tsar’, Lord Layard, these two items could symbolise two aspects 
of culture he has pitted against each other: watching television is responsi-
ble for depreciating well-being in the country of Bhutan, because it reduced 
family relations (see Layard 2006, 77–78; and further discussion in Oman 
2020 and Chap. 6). Couched in these terms, the TV has a proxy value that 
is bad for family relations, while the photo album represents a positive, sym-
bolic value of the family; thus, one is good for well- being and one is bad.
The photo album and the TV could also be seen as incommensurable, 
meaning that they do not share enough in common to enable comparison. 
For example, the photos may have emotional value and are unlikely to hold 
much economic value (for most families, at least); the TV, perhaps, the other 
way around. But who is to assume that someone’s TV isn’t a family heir-
loom, when their photo album may be one where those that houses all the 
photos which have been rejected because they were badly taken? So we 
assume and judge how people value things over other things as making them 
a better person when we don’t know about them: their rationales of value, or 
Box 2.3  Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value
Extrinsic Value is value from external factors.
• Also known as Utilitarian Value.
• Placing a value on something, say, a park, based on what we can 
get out of it or get from it.
Intrinsic Value is something’s own inherent qualities.
• Can be moral, ethical, emotional or spiritual value.
• Do animal species have value even if we can’t ‘use’ them?
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whether an object holds intrinsic or extrinsic value for them. Indeed, we are 
in no position to decide what should be valuable to them and why.
The problem with categories and ranking systems is that they have to 
assume all TVs are the same and all photographs are the same on at least one 
dimension. Also, how we judge people’s behaviour using these categories is 
based on assumptions which are organised by class and race and disability, 
by gender and place and time; the tendency to judge people for watching 
TV is very classed, for example, and may not consider how able- bodied they 
may be, or indeed the quality of their relationships with people who may be 
in a family album. Value systems and tools also, therefore, tend to generalise 
who people are in order to make them ‘commensurate’ which is a process of 
making different things understandable in relation to each other.
Economics, Value and Human Behaviours
As observed by the historians of the hedonimeter (Colander 2007), eco-
nomics has trends: periods of time where ideas, approaches and aspirations 
for what should be possible ebb and flow. This is not unlike any discipline 
or, to be honest, act of human effort. Following Edgeworth’s failed 
dreams of a hedonimeter in the nineteenth century, economics largely lost 
interest in understanding the motives behind human behaviour in this way.
Instead of wanting to know how people felt about something, it was 
deemed sufficient to observe behaviour through consumption as a proxy 
for feeling. When someone buys a widescreen TV, a photo album, a frozen 
pizza or an avocado, the implicit assumption is that they make this pur-
chase because it offers them satisfaction or makes them happy somehow. 
This presumes that people’s preferences are revealed in such choices. In 
fact, it was thought that everything outside of the observable was beyond 
the realm of economists’ study (i.e. Scitovsky 1976).
So, understandably, people tend to think of economics as being about 
the economy, but the discipline is far more than that. Some popular econ-
omists call economics ‘the logic of life’ (Harford 2008) while others dis-
pute the ‘hype’ and ‘megalomania’ of some popular economists (Chang 
2014, 19). Crucially, economics aims to understand the value of things to 
different people, and how much of any resource is estimated to be needed 
for particular populations in different domains (aspects) of their lives. 
Therefore, the discipline of economics is used for insights into how invest-
ment or resources should be distributed across a population. Or, to make 
the policy decision between, say, saving older, smaller community libraries, 
or investing in new ‘super-libraries’.
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Both positive and normative economics have roles in evaluating the 
kinds of policy interventions described in audit culture and throughout the 
book. Economics forms the foundations of what is called the HM Treasury 
Green Book in the UK—and of how most OECD member countries eval-
uate their policy decisions. While the flaws of ‘audit culture’ have been 
presented briefly above, it is also important that evaluation of policy deci-
sions happens: that policy-makers are accountable and that resources are 
handled with care and with a view towards social justice. What is called 
consequentialist welfarism dictates that actions should be evaluated by 
their outcomes and that the outcome which matters most is welfare.
Welfare in this instance does not only refer to the welfare state, but 
‘how people are doing’. So, economists have been trying to find the best 
ways to evaluate how a policy intervention impacts on how people are 
doing. Box 2.5 holds four key ideas of valuation that will help understand 
approaches that will appear throughout the book.
Box 2.4 Positive and Normative Economics
It can be helpful to know the difference between positive and 
normative economics.
Positive economics attempts to explain what is happening or 
what has happened thus far. This might include the relationship 
between investment in super-libraries and how that has changed 
library usage. Although other changing societal factors will affect 
how you can measure this over time. For example, confounders will 
include digitisation, the rise of the audio book and of course the 
market forces of Amazon. A confounder confounds (or confuses) the 
possibilities of measuring a direct relationship, as such, economists 
try and ‘control for’ these effects. We shall get to this later with 
examples in Chaps. 7 and 8.
Normative economics aims to evaluate what should happen. This 
branch of economics draws heavily on philosophical or theoretical 
arguments to think about what is ‘fair’ and ‘just’. It is, therefore, 
based on value judgements. This means that the policy decision to 
direct limited resources towards saving older, smaller community 
libraries because of the social benefits in local communities are weighed 
up against building new, super-libraries, for example, which update 
technology and perhaps encourage different groups to use them.
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Box 2.5 Four Key Approaches to Valuation
Revealed preference was introduced by the American economist 
Paul Samuelson in 1938. Samuelson decided that consumers’ pref-
erences are revealed by what they purchase. The implications of this 
idea are that we can look at how people purchased one thing over 
another and assess the circumstances in which these purchases were 
made. This context may consider other things they may have pur-
chased, how much these things might have cost and the limits peo-
ple may have in their income.
Even the economists don’t all believe that all preferences can be 
revealed in this way, by proxy. Stated preference techniques involve 
asking people what they would be willing to pay for something. Or, 
in public policy terms, sometimes this involves the hypothetical 
example of asking whether they would be prepared to pay more 
taxes to reduce hospital waiting times, for example. Because these 
approaches involve asking people their opinion, they are expensive 
to administer and, as we now know, there are doubts that what peo-
ple state or declare is their preference is their actual preference.
Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) is a form of economic 
evaluation of policy interventions that is particularly useful in health 
policy decisions. It involves estimating the value of quality and quan-
tity in years of human life remaining for a patient following a particu-
lar treatment or intervention. It is often measured on a scale in terms 
of the person’s ability to carry out the activities of daily life, and 
freedom from pain and mental disturbance. This is then translated 
into an economic analysis of cost-effectiveness for often very differ-
ent health interventions. This process makes different things com-
mensurate for easy comparison.
In the last ten years, Well-being Valuation has increasingly appeared 
across domains of social policy. This takes well-being data, say life sat-
isfaction data, to calculate the impact of something which has no mar-
ket value, or for which market value is not its primary value, as is 
common in much of social and cultural policy. There are many years of 
research on the relationship between income and well- being, and, 
although this is not fixed, some of the estimates are considered robust. 
Three data points can be taken from a survey. Let’s say access to parks, 
life satisfaction and income. The Well-being Valuation approach works 
on the basis that you can not only find the relationship between parks 
and life satisfaction, but that you can take what you also ‘know’ about 
income and life satisfaction to estimate the value of this relationship in 
economic terms. We shall come back to this step by step in Chap. 9.
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What Is Social Value?
There is no single authoritative definition of ‘social value’. Nevertheless, 
several leading organisations in this field do provide similar explanations of 
it. These explanations are almost always within the context of measuring 
social value. (New Economics Foundation 2016)
The debate around value, its definition and its measurement will never be 
one on which consensus can easily be reached (if ever), but one which will 
require on-going negotiations of values, pressures, interests and power. 
(Belfiore 2015, 107)
One of the earliest uses of the term ‘social value’ on record dates from 
1872, advocating ‘the Scientific and Social Value of the British Medical 
Association’ (Shettle 1872). What is particularly interesting in our ongo-
ing discussions in the book is that the term emerged as a compulsion to 
assert the importance of an organisation that is both an intellectual and a 
practical endeavour to improve human well-being. Welfare economics—
that is how the government can improve social welfare or well-being, is 
referred to in the UK Government’s guidance on the appraisal and evalu-
ation of policies, projects and programmes (the Green Book) as social value.
While the term ‘social value’ is widespread, there is little discussion of 
what it means in practice—and, again, when there is, there is much dis-
agreement (Mulgan 2010; Barman 2016). More recently, the idea of 
social value has been used to describe the distinctive contributions of com-
mercial companies and third sector organisations, such as charities or com-
munity groups, or a domain of society. Social values and value are also 
expressed via Corporate Social Responsibility, where, as Bill Gates said in 
the 2008 World Economic Forum, ‘more people can make a profit, or 
gain recognition, doing work that eases the world’s inequities’ (Gates 
2008). Such ‘good work’ is often incentivised by governments via tax 
breaks (McGoey 2019). Thus, the value to these companies of ‘good 
work’ exceeds the social value, instead being very much about private and 
corporate value which is, of course, ultimately about wealth generation for 
those already most wealthy.
In social policy terms, examples could include the social value of hous-
ing (HACT 2020; IPPR 2019) or the arts. The latter is touched on in 
Chap. 6 when we reflect on cultural policy as social policy. In the UK, the 
Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012 (UK Parliament 2012) builds on 
some of the principles of NPM described in the last section. It legally 
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requires public bodies to consider how the services they commission and 
procure might improve economic, social and environmental well-being.
The idea of the Social Value Act is that calculating the potential social 
value created by public and voluntary services helps to ensure value for 
money. This also acts as an impetus to create additional value. In other 
words, the aim is for the impact of any public service to exceed the activity 
or programme being delivered. An example of this can be found in the 
domain of social housing. The argument for this is that in building new 
housing that is better quality than that which preceded it, it is not only 
housing which is improved, but the quality of life of those who live in 
these houses. It is also argued that this ‘regeneration’ will improve the 
quality of life of those people who live near this housing, as it will develop 
the area in various ways.19 Your value-added could be the addition of a 
public park (where before it was brown land or wasteland, for instance, 
and thus unusable) and perhaps commission some form of public art with 
the development.
The Minister for Civil Society announced a review of the act (February 
2017), emphasising that a commitment to social value ensures that public 
sector bodies are able to maximise the benefits of ‘tax-payers’ money’. 
This was after the collapse of Carillion, a private company, that specialised 
in public sector contracts across defence, transport, education and health. 
Contemporary critics said that ‘the preoccupation with costs had hit the 
quality of public services because the outsourcing companies were sent a 
clear signal that cost, rather than quality, was the government’s consistent 
priority’ (Reuters 2018). The changes were intended to help restore pub-
lic trust and confidence in outsourcing, by renewing focus on wider social 
values and increasing transparency (Reuters 2018). In other words, NPM 
and auditing had resulted in large private companies that not only deliv-
ered poor public services, but which went bust because ‘efficient’ meant 
cheap, thus costing more than was saved.
There is increasing evidence that the preoccupation with social value 
results in promises that are not kept. One example is with the promises of 
affordable housing in regeneration projects. These emerge from a com-
mitment to contribute to social justice and well-being by improving infra-
structure and retaining aspects of welfare redistribution. In other words, 
rather than just building more luxury flats for more ‘lucky’ and privileged 
people to move into, and the ‘value’ of the project going to the developers 
through economic rewards, the rationale is that affordable housing enables 
key workers to live in the centre of cities with housing issues, such as 
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Manchester and London. As part of audit culture, councils have targets to 
address the housing shortage in such cities, but the economic value of the 
homes built are at odds with, and arguably get in the way of, the social 
value of new houses for people who need them. This state of affairs can be 
dangerous and at its very worst, cost the lives of many, as in the Grenfell 
tragedy, 4 June 2017.20
Therefore, when we talk of social value, well-being metrics and effi-
ciency, it is vital to ask: whose value is added when we mean ‘social’ value? 
We might also ask, who is the social of social policy? Who does it benefit?
2.4  ConClusIon: Well-beIng as a tool of polICy
There are rising numbers of well-being metrics, which are increasingly 
used by those who want to know more about  people and populations. 
These data influence national policies and international initiatives. The use 
of well-being data  to make policy decisions is said to be premised on 
Jeremy Bentham’s Greatest Happiness principle: that ‘the right moral 
action is the one that produces the greatest happiness’, and therefore, ‘the 
best public policy is the one that produces the greatest happiness’.21 As the 
introduction outlines, for some years there have been hopes to understand 
the well-being of a population at any given moment, which can then be 
traced over time. New models have been developed with the aspiration to 
appraise the impact of particular policy interventions by assessing their 
impact on specific measures of well-being.
An evaluation of how a particular action has impacted on the well-being 
of people or populations allows for predictions as to how similar choices 
will impact in the future. We may not know what will happen, but people 
in power like to make educated guesses. Governments and other agencies 
use this information to judge which policies are thought to ‘maximise’ 
well-being. According to the rationales of NPM, it is considered possible 
to estimate the most efficient way of increasing well-being by making deci-
sions using econometric models and subjective well-being data to estimate 
impact valuations.
The supposedly neutral frameworks and technologies used to decide 
which lives benefit, and which do not, are, of course, never truly impartial 
(Williamson 2015; Oman 2015). Choices are made at all junctures when 
evaluating a policy action, and in the ‘science’ which informs the evidence: 
what is measured: what is included and excluded from the models and 
what proxies will be used. In times of increasing inequality, improving the 
well-being of the majority, a little bit, is potentially all the more dangerous 
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for those with the least well-being, especially as it is ‘easier to improve the 
quality of life of people who have relatively high levels of well-being to 
start with’ (Oakley et al. 2013). This opens up questions for how knowl-
edge about well-being is used, and in turn, affects well-being?
This naturalised belief that progress is about striving for well-being is 
engrained in society, becoming a central logic of policy-making and in our 
everyday lives. Yet, well-being is not a fixed concept; it shifts depending on 
who is using it when, and in what context. As we have seen, it has different 
levels of influence and impact and can be dangerous if used neglectfully. As a 
tool of policy, well-being is a concept that is applied in various ways which 
can be implicitly or explicitly guided by valuation. These definitions, histories 
and contexts are important and come to guide our knowledge of, under-
standings, measurements and policy implementations of well-being. Thus, 
reviewing how they all work together, as this chapter has done, is a useful 
exercise in introducing how we know well-being through data. Crucially, this 
background  forms what well-being data are, where well-being data come 
from and how they are analysed, as we shall discover in the next chapter.
notes
1. You may be used to thinking of data as one thing. In this book, we will use 
data in the plural, as data are made up of many things. This also acknowl-
edges that well-being data or data about well-being are so varied, as we 
shall discover.
2. For example, the OECD Guidelines on Measuring Subjective (2013, 10) 
say: ‘The measurement of subjective well-being is often assumed to be 
restricted to measuring “happiness”. In fact, subjective well-being covers a 
wider range of concepts than just happiness.’
3. Aristotle’s ideas of the good society are not without flaws. In order for 
Athenians to have the time to engage in the activities of a good society, 
slaves performed duties that were manual and thought less skilled. They 
were considered and treated as an underclass. Arguably, these are not the 
conditions of a ‘good society’.
4. Data about well-being have different units of analysis. In other words, 
some well-being data are analysed about individuals, and some about 
whole countries. Chapter 3 expands on these differences in more detail.
5. Algorithm still means any form of automated instruction. The majority of 
algorithms are simpler than most people think and can be a single ‘if some-
thing is X, then do this’ statement. Contemporary algorithms are long 
sequences of these instructions.
6. Aristotle has even been called ‘the father of racism’; Sears 2018.
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7. While this is a nice idea, we know that actions which focus on improving 
the material living standards of the largest part of population can lead to 
minorities being extremely unhappy through neglect and maltreatment.
8. Geoff Bowker says that ‘raw data is both an oxymoron and a bad idea; to 
the contrary, data should be cooked with care’ (Bowker 2005, 184).
9. The EconLit database is considered the authority on economic research 
citations and abstracts. It is managed by American Economic Association 
and contains more than 1.4 million records, indexed from 74 countries, 
with citations and abstracts dating back to 1886.
10. Similar to contemporary inequality arguments, such as Piketty 2013.
11. The Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and 
Social Progress (CMEPSP) is also referred to as the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi 
Commission after the surnames of those who led it. It was a commission of 
inquiry created by the French Government in 2008 and so is also referred 
to by the name of Sarkozy, as France’s president.
12. The ONS began measuring personal well-being in April 2011 to provide 
the indicator that the ONS call ‘Personal Wellbeing’ (see e.g. ONS 2015 
for more detail).
13. The term was in fact coined by Brickman and Campbell in 1971.
14. See, for example, the What Works for Wellbeing website (2016) on address-
ing well-being inequalities.
15. Although this change in management of the public sector was also seen in 
the US, Australia and other countries (Hood 1991).
16. In the early 2010s, there was a wave of building ‘super-libraries’ in poorer 
communities, such as Peckham and Canada Water, as well as major city 
libraries elsewhere. Birmingham city council’s leader, Mike Whitby, said of 
its £193 million Library of Birmingham, ‘It will be much more than just a 
library. Perhaps we should call it a palazzo of human thought’, cited in 
Jeffries (2010).
17. There is much work which addresses these issues of class, geopolitics and 
stigma, that there is no room to repeat here. Key texts include Skeggs and 
Loveday (2012); Bennett et al. (2009). See also Tyler and Slater’s 2018 
special issue of The Sociological Review.
18. Marie Kondo, a Netflix sensation, has encouraged people to go through 
their belongings to de-clutter by way of a value system that asks people to 
anticipate future joy.
19. ‘Regeneration’ may seem a good well-being solution. However, resulting 
‘gentrification’ means that poorer and more vulnerable residents are 
pushed off social housing estates, and priced out of their local communi-
ties. A high-profile example of this is London’s Heygate estate which was 
demolished and replaced by luxury flats, rather than replacement social 
housing. As the rental value of the area increased through gentrification, 
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the rental values of surrounding areas are further inflated. Therefore, the 
displaced residents have to move far from the community in which they 
had been living and the housing and social conditions to which they move 
are sometimes worse; hence their life chances and well-being are dimin-
ished, not enhanced.
20. Notably, the dangerous cladding which accelerated the fire remains on 
many buildings some years later (Kennedy 2019).
21. This description of ‘the Greatest Happiness principle’ is taken from 
Layard’s introduction to Bentham, in his book, Happiness: Lessons from the 
New Science (2006, 5). Although a footnote later in the book points to the 
fact that Bentham corrected this phrase later, saying that he meant the 
greatest total sum of happiness (2006, 262). This is further discussed in 
Chap.  4 in the section on the Greatest Happiness principle.
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CHAPTER 3
Looking at Well-being Data in Context
3.1  Well-being MeasureMent (Other Data 
are available)
It measures neither our wit nor our courage, neither our wisdom nor our 
learning, neither our compassion nor our devotion to our country, it mea-
sures everything in short, except that which makes life worthwhile. And it 
can tell us everything about America except why we are proud that we are 
Americans. (Robert F. Kennedy 1968)
These remarks from Robert F. Kennedy are often found in arguments 
for measuring well-being,1 as an alternative to gross national product 
(GNP, and what Kennedy calls ‘it’).2 As touched on in the previous chap-
ter, GNP (and GDP) are ‘national accounts’ and are administrative data 
that capture the economic activity of a country. Data on economic activity 
are used to measure financial success, compare countries against each 
other, and track progress over time.
Robert F. Kennedy’s comments are from a speech at the University of 
Kansas on 18 March 1968, forming part of his campaign for nomination 
for the US presidency.3 Fondly called ‘Bobby’, he is remembered for his 
advocacy for the civil rights movement. In this speech, he also declares 
support for student protests as good for society, and against the Vietnam 
War happening at the time (Kennedy 1968). Interestingly, his questioning 
of the value of GDP to measure human flourishing did not make much of 
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an impact at the time. It is only retrospectively, and with hindsight, that 
this quote has gained notoriety, thus implying that it resonates more now 
than it perhaps did to American citizens in 1968.
Why is this speech important? Kennedy advocates changing priorities of 
public policy-making in line with altering values (both how we value and 
what we value). It indicates that it was politically prudent for a politician 
like Robert F. Kennedy to argue for replacing GDP as the main indicator 
of human progress at that time; it also suggests that believing in measuring 
well-being, rather than GDP, was ideologically aligned with supporting 
student protests and problematising the Vietnam War. Likewise, it tells us 
that there is an alternative to GDP or GNP to measure at that time. With 
the previous chapter, we can historicise this speech as coinciding with the 
social indicators movement that characterised what Bache and Reardon 
(2013) called the ‘first wave of well-being’. This means we can contextual-
ise this political speech as from a time when different measures were called 
for—by people with particular values—to understand human flourishing, 
or how a nation was progressing. We are acknowledging that these com-
ments were little repeated at that moment in time, but were later revisited 
to justify another ‘second wave of well-being’ (Bache and Reardon 2013).
So why are these historical and political settings for measuring well-
being valuable for this chapter? Because they help contextualise well-being 
data. Context is key to recognising the role of methods in generating well-
being data, as this chapter will show. Exploring the stories that lie behind 
data, and looking under the bonnet of how they are generated, is impor-
tant to understanding: what they measure; whether they measure what 
they say; and the reasons why they have been collected and analysed in 
particular ways.
This is all part of what I call ‘data contexts’, arguing it is important to 
know how data work in what contexts (Oman n.d.). What do I mean by 
this? Well, understanding where data come from, and why they were gen-
erated, is important. Were they generated in a lab or in a real-world set-
ting? Why do they exist? Were they collected for one purpose and are 
being used in another? Who has analysed them and how may that affect 
how we view the data? We also need to think about how different tech-
niques of analysis are applied and how they are operationalised in different 
contexts. What do they achieve? Do they monitor people’s toilet breaks in 
a call centre or how many steps a day we take while working from home? 
Do people know these data are being collected and why? Do the data help 




Measuring well-being as a political and scientific project does not have 
a consistent historic arc. There are moments where various technical and 
intellectual disciplines, and people with differing political interests, gather 
around ‘the well-being agenda’ as a project. This results in different types 
of well-being data being foregrounded, even acting as the catalyst for 
political change, at different times. The UK’s national well-being mea-
sures are often called ‘Cameron’s happiness index’ (Clinton 2011; Mirror 
2011) after the UK’s Prime Minister contributed to the launch of the 
Measuring National Well-being (MNW) project (Cameron 2010). As we 
shall see, the next section of this chapter opens with evidence that the idea 
of well-being measures for the UK (to become the MNW project) devel-
oped under the previous New Labour administration. The history of these 
measures is, therefore, not always obvious.
Similarly, it is not always clear what might be well-being data, and what 
are not. Data about well-being have long been valuable because they could 
help to understand how well a population was doing. Sometimes the data 
collected were believed to capture a specific aspect of happiness; other 
times to understand a particular part of a population, or indeed, one per-
son’s quality of life. Therefore, data about well-being do not all look the 
same, do not have the same unit of analysis (individual people, nations or 
communities), are not used the same way and do not all exist for the same 
reason. Again, this is why context is important.
This chapter considers how well-being data is collected: the diversity of 
methods and the range of data that can be called well-being data. This 
includes background and context to the well-being statistics you might read 
in newspapers, online, or have seen in COVID-19 briefings and press confer-
ences. It also begins to look at claims about what can possibly be concluded 
from different kinds of well-being research. We will continue to break down 
technical terms to show well-being data and measurement are complex, and 
their uses in policy are not universal. It aims to show that this language and 
these ideas can be more accessible when you know where they come from.4
Well-being data as a term most often describes well-being metrics or 
indicators. This chapter offers some examples of how many decisions are 
made when choosing an objective indicator of well-being. Despite the 
name ‘objective’, which implies they are not affected by feelings or opin-
ions, they do not fall from the sky as facts. If truth be told, they are the 
product of a specific methodology, which means they must fulfil certain 
practical and theoretical criteria that satisfy often long-established opin-
ions of what are the best methods to capture the most objective data, and 
then how to go about analysing them.
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Objective well-being indicators predominantly originate from survey 
data (like the census) or administrative data (such as mortality rates). They 
also include some subjective data where people are asked about aspects of 
their lives, such as how satisfied they are with their health. We come to this 
later. These datasets will include enough of the population that it is sensible 
to analyse them numerically—as quantitative data. These quantitative anal-
yses are not always conducted by the person or the organisation who col-
lects these data. Similarly, secondary uses of data can make the data useful 
as well-being data, when it may not have been collected for such a purpose.
Whether objective or subjective, it is mostly agreed that:
1. all well-being measures must be theoretically grounded (Haybron 
2008), meaning that there is a clear, agreed rationale as to what 
exactly is being measured, what for and how the data are collected 
and handled
2. the limited impact of previous attempts to measure well-being lies in 
deficient theoretical grounding, and therefore failed understanding 
of what the measures are for and who they benefit (Scott 2012)
3. assessing one’s own well-being is a subjective and aesthetic5,6 experi-
ence (Rapley 2003)
4. well-being survey questions should involve concepts which are read-
ily understandable and easy to relate to, such as ‘satisfaction’ and 
‘happiness’ (Fleche et al. 2012, 9)
5. well-being measures need to be subject to harmonisation (GSS), 
meaning that they should be able to work with other well-
being measures
Not all well-being data are numbers, or the result of large-scale data 
collection, however. It can be easier than you may imagine to produce and 
use well-being data. To discover how accessible other methods are, we will 
explore other ways of collecting data, such as interviews and focus groups. 
We will also look at policy documents as data, like the speech above, find-
ing that ideas of measurement and well-being are used together, and how 
that can reveal the all-important context to why data are used to make 
certain arguments. As with the quantitative data found in well-being indi-
cators, it is also important to understand the limitations to what we can 
claim to know as a result of analysing qualitative data. Whether from a few 
policy documents or interviews with a community in a particular place 
(rather than a whole population), these data tell us a lot about a small 
number of people and may not describe how things work on a larger scale. 




Methodology is more than the methods used to collect data (e.g. a 
questionnaire or interview) or analyse data (i.e. statistical techniques 
or thematic analysis7). It is more than who is using methods, whether 
in academic research, in national-level surveys, or in evaluations of 
how much a policy decision or an individual project has impacted on 
well-being. It is the system behind methods: why people have 
decided to do these things in these ways. This is what makes data 
‘theoretically grounded’ (see above).
As we go about our day-to-day activities, we don’t tend to con-
sider the theory of what we are doing and why, but odd moments 
might make us stop and think about why we have done something 
in a certain way and whether that is the best possible, or the one 
most suited to our situation (how much time we have and where we 
are, for instance). Think about when we hear how other people do 
something, their tips or techniques might be different from ours and 
can be about something quite mundane.
Think about a cup of tea (English tea to non-native Brits, or 
depending on dialect: ‘a cuppa’ or ‘a brew’). It has different names, 
depending on where you come from, and there are often discussions 
about how to make tea the right way: milk first or second; let the bag 
stew or not; in a teapot, cup or mug, and for how long. There are 
also TikTok videos and Facebook posts on the issue, Reddit feeds 
exclaiming the crimes of others’ tea-making methods, and reports in 
the national press, saying certain methods ‘spark outrage’ (Morris 
2020). What works best, and in which order, is therefore not a uni-
versal truth and there are opinions on how these all work together.
Methodology, similarly, involves the theory behind how stages of 
working with data work together. Working with theory doesn’t only 
mean reading philosophers, but more practically involves careful 
consideration of each process.
Some useful questions to ask about these stages include:
Was it appropriate to apply this particular approach to collecting 
and analysing data to the particular issue the researchers want or 
need to know more about?
Or would it have been more appropriate to analyse data already avail-
able or accessible in a different, perhaps easier, and less intrusive way?
(continued)
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Would people have been easily able to answer the questions?—
we’ve all answered plenty of surveys where we cannot answer the 
questions truthfully, because the questions are badly designed. Or, 
indeed, because we do not want to tell the truth, exactly.
Is it fair to ask people to answer this question about themselves in 
this context (on the street, in a room full of others, at work where 
their screens might be viewed by colleagues, etc.)?
Is this ethical?
Methodology is often described as bringing theory to method. It 
is not so different from debating how tea is made, and how that 
affects the result. Methodology discussions are also often tribal, with 
in-fighting and disciplinary arguments—even disagreements over 
namings and meanings. In the case of data, this more simply involves 
thinking through what we do with data and how we have thought 
about collecting them. What order certain processes go in and what 
are our approaches to each process, and why that is best suited to the 
situation at hand. It is the foundations of why research has been 
done in a particular way.
There is often a tendency in the social sciences to feel the need for aca-
demics to take a position on the value of quantitative data over qualitative 
data or vice versa. This is colloquially called the ‘Quants-Quals debate’, 
which I had never heard of until I became an academic, but it is rife.8 
Other academics have requested I make it clear where I stand in the past. 
So, I want to make it clear that in this chapter—and the whole book, in 
fact—I resist this assumption that any data is better than another because 
we read them as text or count them as numbers, or collect them differ-
ently. All well-being data might be valuable to understanding well- being. 
Whether they are qualitative or quantitative is not the issue at hand. 
Instead, context is the issue: where the data came from, are they used 
appropriately and how are they applied? Are their uses ethical and fair? 
What are the limitations to the data we have? What can we know as a result 
of the data? What happens next?
The chapter describes different sorts of data: a moment from my 




statistics agencies to reveal some of the contexts of data collection, inter-
pretation and uses of well-being data. It does this to show that all data 
have origins of thought, process and practice and are therefore rarely com-
pletely neutral or objective. All methodologies have their limitations, 
which thereby limits the claims that can be made. These are not always 
fully recognised.
If limitations are acknowledged in one place, that place is often far 
removed from the headline findings9 to make caveats clear when interpret-
ing results. The de-contextualising of data removes how we understand 
their limits and appropriateness. It must, therefore, impact on how ‘good’ 
the data can be in understanding society and well-being. It also affects the 
capacity for data to do good and inform societal change in such a way as to 
improve social, personal or national well-being. We need to account for 
the data used and we need to heed different accounts of what well-being 
means, as well as how we might understand it better.
3.2  accOunts Of Well-being
Example 1 Wellbeing is a positive state that people experience when they are able 
to meet their needs for strong social relationships, equality of opportunity, 
rewarding work, economic and physical security, health, and opportunities to 
participate in cultural activities and enjoy contact with nature. It is enhanced 
when an individual is able to fulfil personal goals and achieve a sense of purpose 
and fulfilment in society.
Example 2 Wellbeing is a positive physical, social and mental state; it is not 
just the absence of pain, discomfort and incapacity. It arises not only from the 
action of individuals, but from a host of collective goods and relationships with 
other people. It requires that basic needs are met, important personal goals are 
achieved and people are able to achieve a sense of purpose and fulfilment in 
society, and that they are satisfied with their lives. (Levett-Therivel Sustainability 
Consultants’ Report to DEFRA 2007)
The above definitions are examples from a consultation across govern-
ment and well-being experts, in response to the UK’s 2005 Sustainable 
Development Strategy. Called Securing the Future, the new strategy (HM 
Government 2005) committed the UK government to working towards 
new well-being indicators and to work towards policies with an explicit 
well-being focus (Levett-Therivel 2007).
The final definition that is often assumed as the working definition for 
the UK’s Measuring National Well-being programme combines these two 
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examples (DEFRA 2007), also drawing heavily on the World Health 
Organization’s definition of health:
Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not 
merely the absence of disease or infirmity. The enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every 
human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic 
or social condition. (WHO 1946, 1)
When the UK’s Office for National Statistics (ONS) started to produce 
working papers on well-being, they began with DEFRA’s final statement:
Wellbeing is a positive, social and mental state; it is not just the absence of 
pain, discomfort and incapacity. It arises not only from the action of indi-
viduals, but from a host of collective goods and relationships with other 
people. It requires that basic needs are met, that individuals have a sense of 
purpose, and that they feel able to achieve important personal goals and 
participate in society. It is enhanced by conditions that include supportive 
personal relationships, involvement in empowered communities, good 
health, financial security, rewarding employment and a healthy and attractive 
environment. (DEFRA in ONS 2009, 6)
As the previous chapter indicated, there are many definitions of well- 
being from different parts of the world and philosophical traditions. These 
different accounts of what well-being is have lineages: they are cumulative; 
learning from and adapting previous versions to suit who is using it, and 
for what: to suit its context. The same is true with policy.
Here we have traced the lineage of definitions across policy documents 
over a number of years, which can be a useful methodology to help under-
stand how meanings adapt in policy documents to suit the context. In 
other words, we have ‘followed the data’ in a very different way, those data 
being textual. They are still important data about well-being, however, as 
they help us understand how well-being is understood and why.
The quotation immediately above is an example of the ONS establish-
ing the lineage of their working definitions. They account for their catego-
ries before explaining how they might go about using them to measure 
well-being. In 2007, Paul Allin, who was to become Head of the ONS’ 
MNW programme, explained that well-being ‘can best be viewed as a 
multidimensional, shifting concept’ (Allin 2007, 49). Despite indications 
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that the self-named new sciences of happiness (Layard 2006) were evolv-
ing (O’Donnell et al. 2014; Helliwell et al. 2015; ONS 2015; Dolan et al. 
2011b), as we explore in the next chapter, some academics fear that the 
concept of well-being itself has lacked attention, as the ‘empirically- 
oriented field’ needs more theoretical input (Jugureanu 2016, 68). The 
lack of consensus on how to conceptualise well-being for policy and mea-
surement is a concern, however, when policy-making (OECD 2013, 11). 
As is deciding on what the best methods might be for measuring well- 
being effects and outcomes (Dolan et al. 2011a). So, as you can see ‘objec-
tive well-being data’ involve many decisions: what to measure and how to 
measure it are key to understanding what are the best well-being data.
Before the UK started collecting well-being data to form its well-being 
national accounts, the MNW programme took a novel approach to mak-
ing the decision on what to measure. The methodology chosen to inform 
this decision became a national well-being debate that was launched by 
then Prime Minister David Cameron (2010) and administered by the 
ONS. This large-scale exercise collected different kinds of data, using dif-
ferent methods, asking people what mattered to them about well-being; 
what to measure and how to measure. The UK’s ‘What Matters to You?’ 
debate received 34,000 responses and has been applauded for its demo-
cratic approach to meaning and measurement (Kroll 2011, 6), which we 
shall come to later.
So, GDP and GNP were ‘national accounts’10 that used economic 
activity to measure progress and the international well-being agenda was 
keen to replace these with new national accounts of well-being.11 The 
UK’s MNW debate was to inform this work in the UK, alongside expert 
consultations, such as the one that wrote the report quoted at the opening 
of this section. In this context, national accounts are called this because 
they ordinarily track economic transactions, like an organisation’s accounts. 
The ONS still do not formally include well-being in its national accounts, 
a label they still reserve for transactional data.12 Somewhat confusingly, the 
economists informing the MNW programme also talk of accounts of well- 
being too. Their meaning is slightly different. We encountered the two 
main traditions in the previous chapter: ‘Benthamite-subjective-hedonic- 
individualistic’ or ‘Aristotelian-objective-eudaimonic-rational’. The short- 
hand versions of these being pleasure (or feeling) and purpose (or 
flourishing). In addition to these traditions are three different ‘accounts’ 
of well-being that are used to understand well-being and inform policy 
(Dolan et al. 2011a). These are:




3. Mental states (or what has come to be known as subjective 
well-being)13
Different ways that well-being might be captured and measured are 
therefore ‘accounts’ of well-being. These have informed the programme 
to devise ‘the national accounts of well-being’. We cover the ways that 
well-being is captured as an account below.
Objective Lists
Objective lists of well-being involve a list of assumptions regarding basic 
human needs, rights and conditions that are believed to impact on well-
being. A simplified example is the Human Development Index (HDI), 
which is a composite index of three separate indicators: life expectancy, 
education and gross national income per capita. A composite index means 
a single number is calculated from these three indicators to make the data 
easier to use and visualise. This enables the HDI to rank countries into 
‘tiers of human development’ (Human Development Reports 2020; 
United Nations n.d.). The key aspect of the HDI’s design is its simplicity. 
Rather than intending to capture all aspects of well-being, the idea is that 
it is simplified and made easy for a broad audience to read and understand.
The use of indices like the HDI to understand international develop-
ment has been criticised. One source of criticism is that the dimensions 
that contribute to these indices are those things that are considered impor-
tant in the richer countries in the global North, rather than those things 
that are considered important in the countries where these indices are 
being used.14 Another source of criticism is to do with what happens when 
these dimensions are combined. In the case of the HDI, the three dimen-
sions are treated equally: for example, the income dimension is treated as 
holding the same importance as the two social dimensions (education and 
life expectancy). This assumes that all human beings value the three dimen-
sions equally (United Nations 2020). However, this is not always the case 
and the representations of these various ‘achievements’ are sometimes 
criticised as being arbitrary, subjective or depending on a priori value 
judgements (OECD 2011b). In particular, because wealthier countries 




Box 3.2 A Composite Index
A more familiar type of index might be from hearing or seeing things 
about the stock market on the news. The Dow Jones Industrial 
Average is a composite index. Ordinarily called the Dow or the Dow 
Jones, the index is made up of financial data from 30 large compa-
nies listed on US stock exchanges. Composite indexes are used to 
conduct investment analyses, measure economic trends, and forecast 
market activity in a way that is easy to read. ‘The Dow’ is criticised 
because it only includes 30 companies, as it was designed in the 
1880s to represent the main markets at the time. Markets are, of 
course, now more complex. It is also criticised because it is weighted 
by price, when other indexes use alternative weights that capture 
more of the intricacy of the market.
As you can see, there is even methodological disagreement on 
how to best represent stock market data so they capture the most 
important aspects of the market (change) while remaining under-
standable. Interestingly, both in spite of and because of its age, the 
Dow is still the most used.
The objective list approach (or establishing a list of objective indicators) 
is mainly used by national and international statistics offices, with the aim 
of generating a complete list of what is necessary to satisfy a good life or 
ensure a good society. The OECD and ONS examples of well-being 
indexes are more comprehensive examples of these lists and have closer to 
50 indicators (rather than the HDI’s three).
Preference Satisfaction
Preference satisfaction accounts work on the premise that ‘what is best for 
someone is what would best fulfil all of his15 desires’ (Parfit 1984, 494). 
This is how economists have long approached understanding well- being 
(Dolan and Peasgood 2008). The rationale behind expressing well- being 
like this for economists is that people’s preferences are revealed by what 
they purchase (see Chap. 2, Box 2.4 for a description). By extension, this 
means that the higher a person’s income, the more they are able to gain 
access to what they want. Also, the greater the choice available, the more 
able people are to satisfy their desires. The idea that choice is better is also 
a driving principle of new public management we also encountered in 
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Chap. 2: the rationale being that people should be free to purchase from 
a wide variety of market providers, rather than public services being deliv-
ered by the public sector.
It is this account which has historically informed policy decisions at a 
monitoring level, using GDP as a proxy for well-being.16 It is also this 
account of well-being that the Easterlin paradox (1973) found wanting, as 
Easterlin’s analysis found that improved material living standards had not 
improved measured happiness in wealthy countries over time. This is 
largely assumed to be as a result of adaptation, in that as one preference 
becomes satisfied, we adapt and want more.17 This is ultimately seen as 
benefiting the economy, but bad for people and societies. Alongside 
empirical issues are concerns that ‘making preference satisfaction the mea-
sure of political health completely cuts out the possibility of public delib-
eration about the ends we should pursue as a self-governing people’ 
(Williamson 2010, 171). This latter issue was, of course, what the UK’s 
MNW debate aimed to overcome.
Mental States (or Subjective Well-being)
Subjective well-being is ‘an umbrella term’ (Hicks 2011, 3) which covers 
three strands of a person’s self-assessment of their happiness levels: life 
satisfaction, mood and meaning. The whole of Chap. 4 is about subjective 
well-being, so we only cover it briefly here. The term can also, confusingly, 
be used to just describe mood or happiness, rather than necessarily encom-
passing all concepts. Subjective well-being can be measured in various 
ways, like asking people about their happiness in any given moment, or 
about how satisfied they feel with their life overall. Along with preference 
satisfaction, subjective well-being measures have been thought to be more 
democratic than objective lists (Graham 2010), because they allow people 
to decide how well they are doing, without someone else assigning a level 
of well-being to them on their behalf. We will come to people deciding 
their own well-being later.
The above ‘accounts’ of well-being have been formulated with quanti-
tative data in mind, collected through large samples and national-level 
surveys. It is these data that are used most in decision-making, especially 
in policy. However, other kinds of data allow you to derive preference 
satisfaction, subjective well-being—even objective lists. These methods 
collect people’s own accounts of well-being from them on a smaller scale. 
Various methods can be used, like interviews or diaries, and are designed 
to understand how people’s lives work in more detail. Owing to the 
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smaller scale of these projects, they are more available to the researcher 
who does not have the resources of the United Nations (UN) or a national 
statistics office to understand well-being at national or regional levels. 
These methods also tend to present more detail about specific people and 
contexts, and so are often better for a project that wants to understand the 
well-being of the staff of an organisation or, perhaps, how one thing affects 
a small group of people in great depth. It is also especially useful for under-
standing people’s lives and experiences in the everyday.
As we touched on earlier in the chapter, there is a history of researchers 
gathering around their own preference for qualitative or quantitative 
approaches. This can result in habitual silos of research and a history of 
squabbling over the value of one kind of data over another. The tradition 
of a divide tends to obscure the fact you can make the most of both worlds. 
It is possible to take a mixed methods approach to research, using both 
qualitative and quantitative data generated by various methods. There are 
also ways of collecting data that can result in both sorts of data. Many 
surveys offer a chance to answer using tick boxes and text. What should be 
at the forefront of any research is what is most appropriate to the context 
of collection and the question at hand. We shall think a little bit more 
about everyday contexts of data in the next section.
3.3  everyDay Well-being Data: asking PeOPle 
QuestiOns abOut their lives
Well-being data are not only for policy-makers or international economic 
development agencies. They can be collected in various ways available to 
us in everyday situations. Many of us have seen an increase in emails pop-
ping into our inboxes or Facebook timelines asking us to complete some 
kind of questionnaire about our well-being. COVID-19 has seen collec-
tion of these kinds of data increase.
These are well-being data collected through a questionnaire not so dif-
ferent from a national-level survey, but on a smaller scale. Although most 
require good planning and ethical consideration of how the questions you 
ask people may have some negative impact on them. In short, could your 
research negatively impact on people’s well-being?
The following section offers a brief overview of methods that can collect 
‘smaller data’ for different ends. Vignettes from my own research, a hypo-
thetical questionnaire scenario, and the ethics of ethnography are presented 
to help you consider the different contexts and considerations of well-
being data. Table  3.1 shows the advantages and challenges of different 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































kinds of data for understanding well-being. While this section might help 
you design your own research, there are countless exhaustive textbooks out 
there that devote more space to that. Here the goal is to help you to imag-
ine data contexts, and so better evaluate how other people have used data.
Questionnaire Data
If the idea of data collection is new to you, perhaps the easiest way to 
imagine well-being data being collected is by using a questionnaire that 
asks people how they feel about things related to their well-being. 
Questionnaires are easily distributed, and ask the same questions in the 
same way and can be repeated numerous times with the same or different 
people. This means their data are easily comparable, providing insights 
into well-being across a group or sub-population. If you ask the same 
people, you can understand their well-being over time. Online question-
naires distributed by organisations that have some responsibility for our 
well-being are increasingly familiar, for example, universities surveying 
their students and employers, their staff.20 These tend to ask us questions 
about our well-being that are useful to the running of the organisation in 
some way. The data can be used ‘by management’ to decide if it is allocat-
ing resources well, or if HR needs to make an intervention, in the same 
way that policy-makers can use well-being data.
Another way to imagine the context of questionnaire data collection 
might be the market researchers who used to be on the streets with clip-
boards (that my mum would always desperately avoid at the shops). In our 
increasingly online world, people’s opinions are still sought using ques-
tionnaires in person (although, along with everything else, COVID-19 has 
compromised this, and we are yet to see how social research will find its 
new normal). Questionnaires could involve asking whether people would 
buy a product in the case of market research, but can also include questions 
about something they have just seen, an experience they just had, or how 
they feel about a particular place, like the park they are in. Some have had 
questionnaires after their COVID-19 vaccine, asking about their health-
care experiences. People can fill in the questionnaires themselves, or the 
researcher could complete the questionnaire on their behalf. If the research 
wanted to understand how people feel about a local, publicly subsidised 
event, the questions answered could look something like:
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Q1 Have you just seen [specific subsidised concert]? Y/N
Q2 Is this your local park? Y/N
Q3 How are you feeling right now—out of 10, with 10 
being the best you’ve ever felt, and 0 the worst?
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
These questions would generate binary data (yes/no) that can be 
aggregated (totalled) alongside numeric data from the scale. These sorts 
of data are easy to work with quantitatively, as you can categorise easily 
across the binary questions. Q3 uses a Likert21 rating scale that presents a 
series of answers to choose from, ranging from one extreme attitude to 
another. It’s sometimes referred to as a satisfaction scale as it is ideal for 
measuring satisfaction, and is therefore often used to measure well-being. 
The numbers from the scale are used to establish trends or averages.
Say, a researcher was lucky enough to get 100 people to speak to them 
on their way home from a concert in a park, they would have a sample of 
100 people, and would know that they saw the event (is that the same as 
attended, you may ask? We will see what to do about that shortly). The 
researchers could establish what percentage of those spoken with were 
local residents (although, note, that what is meant by ‘local’ is not speci-
fied, which is not ideal). They could then look for trends in how people 
felt having attended the concert using the numeric data.
Or, they could ask the question,
Having seen this subsidised concert in your local park, how are you 
feeling right now?
This box, called a free text field or open text, allows people to answer a 
question in their own words. Whilst this is less easy to process and com-
pare at scale, it can sometimes provide valuable information. In each case, 
the majority of the data collected would be subjective, as the numeric or 
textual answers would reflect the reported experience of the individual. 
Therefore, the answers collected—the data—may be considered a valuable 
reflection of how they are feeling.
However, not all textual or verbal responses are succinct. In fact, when 
you ask people how they feel in themselves or about something to do with 
well-being, their responses can contain much rich detail (Oman 2015, 
2017, 2019). So they might say, something like:
Yeah, good, ta. There was a great atmosphere.
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These qualitative data contain: objective data in the salary disclosure, an 
example of preference (in that they chose to spend their limited income on 
the subsidised concert), as well as what they think this means for their 
well-being and concert attendance.
However, there are confounders, too: their limited income = limited 
concert attendance, which means that they think their enjoyment of this 
concert was heightened. How does this compare to other people who 
attended, etc.? How could it compare? How might a valid argument be 
made for the impact of this concert (as a cultural product, or an arts event) 
rather than capturing ‘the social value’ (which we covered in the previous 
chapter) of going to an event in the local park? How could claims made be 
generalisable? Meaning how could what is learnt from 100 people in one 
context be used to understand different people who attend different kinds 
of concerts with different life circumstances in different places at different 
times? Also, the fact that this person lives locally to the concert is probably 
a factor impacting on their decision to go. How might we isolate the rela-
tionship between concert attendance and happiness from these confound-
ers? Here we mean how much of an effect did proximity to the concert have 
on attendance versus wanting to go to the concert for another reason? How 
do you know they weren’t caught in a very limited moment of elation that 
meant they said they felt great, but which didn’t last? How do you know the 
people spoken to could possibly represent diverse opinions? Perhaps they 
were all picked because they were all wearing band T-shirts for those on the 
line-up? It may be that people who are more likely to stop and answer ques-
tions will also have more time to go to concerts? How do you know if you 
need to know these things, or indeed, which of them you need to know?
Perhaps, more importantly, how sure can we be that what people say is 
an accurate representation of their feelings and opinion more generally? 
There is evidence that people who are approached will say nice things to 
people because, despite popular belief, people are generally nice, and they 
don’t want to offend people. This may mean giving an answer they think 
the interviewer wants and is called the ‘interviewer effect’.22 In our case this 
I feel great! It was great to have the opportunity to go to a gig close by. 
Because I only earn £6000 a year, I don’t get to go to concerts any more. 
I think that because I never get to go, that made this all the more special
Yeah, good. There was a great atmosphere.
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would mean that people are inclined to say that something has improved 
their mood or happiness or well-being because they think that is what the 
person posing the question wants to hear. Asking the question, did you see 
the concert? followed by how do you feel right now? will suggest to the 
person asked that the researcher wants to understand if the concert has 
positively impacted on how they are feeling and is a leading question.
There are other aspects of situations like this which will affect people’s 
answers: can they be overheard, for example? Do they want to look like 
they like the music played, or do they want to suggest they have ‘better’ 
taste? Sometimes people answer for the benefit of others, rather than 
truthfully.
It is not only how truthful someone is in the moment, but also a ques-
tion of how long that moment lasts. If you ask someone directly after the 
concert how they feel, are you able to argue for a longer-term effect on 
well-being? We don’t know how long such an effect will last. Can feeling 
great for five minutes be argued as a positive impact on well-being? These 
are contextual issues with data: often the context in which data have been 
collected compromises the claims which can be made through analysing 
them. These are issues of validity (see Box 3.3). Yet, when you read a local 
council’s report about an event like a park concert, it will rarely acknowl-
edge the limits to what can be known.
Similarly, how do you also account for negative effects on well-being 
and social impacts that are less positive? What of the park being shut for 
the concert take down and put up? What of the noise pollution affecting 
older people, pets or babies sleeping? All of these are examples of con-
founders on the claims that what might seem a simple initiative, such as 
the local council subsiding a concert in a local park, can have social impact 
in a way that is simple to express. The negative impacts are not often 
accommodated in research which asserts social impact, yet is clearly impor-
tant to account for these issues in any claims made for any positive effects.
It is not often acknowledged that good questionnaires that collect 
‘good data’ are not easy to design or execute well. Questionnaire data 
therefore may be useful for many purposes and relatively easy to access, 
but need testing. One way of feeling more secure in the quality of ques-
tions, even on a small scale, as with our concert scenario, can involve the 
same questions and techniques as questionnaires used in large surveys. Of 
course, the claims cannot be generalisable, as you are less likely to speak to 
a range of people, but you can then compare your data with a representa-
tive sample.23 Researchers should, therefore, think very carefully about the 
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context of where they want to use the questionnaire, who and what they 
want to know about, and the limits of what can be known from specific 
questions asked of the people they are able to speak to. They also need to 
think about their impact: will they ruin the experience of the concert? Will 
they offend people in some way, or indeed, will the simple act of asking 
them if they enjoyed something affect their desire to say yes or no, and to 
communicate how much they enjoyed it? How much can be known from 
such a short-lived interaction with a hundred people? What use are these 
‘snapshot’ data in answering bigger questions?
Interview Data
Interviewers are able to ask people what they think well-being means and 
what things are important in their life. We have already noted that ques-
tionnaires are used in national-level survey data collection; these usually 
use closed questions which can easily be added up quantitatively. The 
questions are asked by ‘interviewers’, whose job is to ask closed questions 
and make the experience of the questionnaire as similar as possible for all 
respondents.
Box 3.3 Validity
Researchers need to think in terms of validity to understand the lim-
its of what can be known by what they are asking. There are two 
main types of validity.
Internal validity is concerned with how capable a research tool 
(say a survey question) is in enabling a researcher to answer their 
research question. For example, when you ask someone ‘how are you 
feeling right now’ without asking them to connect the feeling to the 
concert, you are unable to know that the feeling is linked to attend-
ing a concert. This will limit the claims you can make with validity.
External validity is concerned with how generalisable the results 
of a piece of research are outside of the study; by which we mean 
‘can the findings of this study (speaking to 100 people outside X 
park) explain how people that we didn’t speak to feel about concerts?’
Limits to validity are not always bad, it depends on the context, 
but they should be accounted for.
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Contrarily, interviews are a common feature of smaller data collection 
projects, where the questions can be more open-ended and may have very 
few questions at all. It is also common for an interviewer to develop a rap-
port24 with an interviewee: something which you might hear talked about 
in positive terms when journalists interview key figures. Having a connec-
tion with your interviewee can, therefore, make the interview better, 
because people trust the person they are speaking to—because the data 
(the information) are richer and more detailed.
We tend to think of interviews as one-to-one situations, but you can do 
group interviews, often called focus groups.25 In my PhD research, I 
started my focus groups with a question from the ONS’ MNW debate: 
‘What Matters to You?’ They were designed as group discussions, where 
people had a lot of time to talk about a few questions at length, rather than 
asking lots of questions and people having less time to answer them. There 
are merits to both approaches, but I decided that it was more important 
to my research that people speak amongst themselves about what was 
important to them and think about how it related to well-being (Oman 
2017). What we call ‘a structured interview’ has a strict set of questions 
which all interviewees answer, and these can be applied in a group setting. 
A ‘semi-structured interview’ is more fluid, allowing the interviewee to 
bring up whatever they want, which could be entirely unexpected, and so 
each discussion can take a completely different direction. Taking the for-
mer approach would have made my conversations as similar as possible for 
comparability; the latter allowed me to watch people chat away about any-
thing they thought important.
The group discussions26 I have organised in previous research projects 
have produced qualitative data that are largely subjective and about all dif-
ferent domains of people’s lives and experiences. For my well-being focus 
groups, people talked about all sorts: redundancy, bereavement, suicidal 
thoughts, loneliness, parenthood, their sexuality, education, careers, dis-
abilities, dwindling community resources and transport and their hobbies. 
To return to the concert example, in the kind of well-being data I col-
lected with open questions, people might talk amongst themselves about 
local events, without being asked a question about concerts at all. As it 
was, although many people talked about the value of their leisure activities 
(Oman 2020), the only occasion people talked about concerts specifically 
was not to say how much they enjoyed one in particular. Instead, one 
young person barely noticed and the other (in the exchange below) was 
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highly critical of a large-scale cultural event in Northern Ireland. Here’s a 
snippet between a 17- and 18-year-old, who I’ve renamed James and Jack:
James:  During the summer when they had the big concerts and stuff, that 
was like the only time I noticed that town was different. It kind of 
seemed like it was all decorated and everyone was kind of buzzing.
Jack:  Yeah but I just think was kind of a distraction purpose to turn 
everyone’s heads away from the real issue. Like a home basically, we 
need a home to live, people die on the streets how many times a year? 
And they’re dressing up the city as, oh we’re a great city and people 
are lacking the basic human rights, that is not right.
One thing about research which aims to evaluate how people feel about 
things is that the longer you allow them to talk, the more comfortable 
they feel, which can mean that they become more honest. It can also mean 
that they deviate from the topic, and may not say what you anticipate. 
Another example from this research was a community arts project where I 
expected people to mention the arts project in relation to their well- 
being—especially as it was the one thing they had in common and the 
reason we were meeting. Yet, they did not refer to it, not even once. 
Instead, they held a very political discussion about the lack of community 
services for their families in their area. This may be that they thought that 
was what I was there to listen to, so I could report back in some way to an 
authority that would do something about these aspects of their lives. It is 
not always possible to conclusively know why an open conversation has 
followed a particular path, and part of qualitative research is to reflect on 
the possibilities of why that may be.
Another thing to bear in mind with these sorts of data collection is that 
through discussion, people find themselves agreeing with others in the 
group. This may mean that opinions expressed independently at the begin-
ning of a focus group27 have evolved through discussion and group 
‘meaning- making’ (Freeman 2013) or it can mean that they feel pres-
surised to assimilate to ‘groupthink’. It can be hard to establish which of 
the two processes have provoked a changed opinion and how that affects 
your results. Again, aspects of the context can give you clues and are part 
of your methodology in group interviews and focus groups, as much as 
any other approach. Their limitations can be as much opportunity as con-
founder, as long as they are considered.
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My PhD28 focus groups enabled me to speak to over a hundred people 
and listen to them discuss what mattered to them about well-being. This 
was important to my research question which wanted to recreate a debate-
like feel and therefore encourage people to talk—and debate—amongst 
themselves. But this can mean that quieter people’s views are not as audi-
ble and that it is not possible to understand how many of a group feel one 
way over another. As you can see, all decisions have pros and cons to 
weigh up.
One-to-one interviews enable you to understand the perspective of one 
person in detail and then compare that with the views from another inter-
view, if appropriate. They can be used in evaluations and impact studies, 
providing testimonials of experience. Also, much like with focus groups, 
these are often transcribed into long pieces of text. This turns audio quali-
tative data into textual qualitative data and can take considerable time to 
analyse and compare. Interviews offer incredibly rich data on a person’s 
well-being, and with a well-thought-out strategy, can enable researchers to 
make some broader claims about how a particular group of people experi-
ence something like well-being, or indeed what is important to them 
about it. However, these claims must acknowledge the limits of context as 
discussed above.
Ethnographic Data
Another way that interview data might be useful for understanding well- 
being would be in the case of ethnographic research investigating the 
impact of a social policy. Ethnography involves a researcher spending a 
long time in their research site. This means they understand as much about 
the context in which they are collecting data as possible. For example, 
Kelly Bogue was embedded in her local community investigating the 
impact of ‘the bedroom tax’ (2019). ‘The bedroom tax’ was a nickname 
for an aspect of the Welfare Reform Act (DWP 2012) which meant that 
people living in social housing saw their benefits reduced by 14% if they 
have a spare room or 25% if they have two or more. The negative well- 
being implications of this policy on the community studied were multiple, 
with carers and those registered disabled being penalised for necessary 
home adaptations, alongside the anxiety and stress of people forced to 
leave the homes in the communities in which they had lived for decades 
(Bogue 2019). While this research was not seeking data to answer ques-
tions on well-being per se, the study produced much data that could inform 
well-being research for policy.
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Some ways of doing ethnography allow you to participate in a context 
as a contributing member. This means practitioners, whether social work-
ers, artists or people working in an office, might find it a useful way to 
examine well-being within their own work contexts. Overall, it’s rich, 
meaning that there is much detail gathered to deepen understanding, but 
time-intensive and gaining permission can be difficult to negotiate unless 
the researcher is already embedded in the community. Crucially, this kind 
of ethnography writes you into the context, so you affect it to an even 
greater extent than time delimited interviews. This requires thinking 
through in terms of whether it is ethical, or too intrusive. It also needs to 
be considered in terms of the claims that can be made: how would the 
particular context have been different had you not been there?
Secondary Qualitative Data
Qualitative data are increasingly collected with a view to the data being 
used again. This means those collecting data must be mindful of this when 
designing the questions asked and ensuring interviewees give permissions 
for storage, secondary access (used by someone else) and re-use (in publi-
cations or otherwise). Secondary data usage involves analysing data col-
lected by someone else, as opposed to analysing primary data that you 
collect yourself and is more common with quantitative data.
It is sometimes possible to ask permission to access qualitative data that 
were not collected with the same questions in mind. This would mean that 
the same data, collected for a different purpose, could possibly be reanal-
ysed to answer the specific question: ‘what were the impacts of X social 
policy on the well-being of a specific community between X and X date, 
for example?’ However, much qualitative data are too specific, in that they 
contain too much data and information about issues that are too personal 
to the people involved. For instance, given the sensitive nature of Bogue’s 
data on the bedroom tax, it would be unlikely that these data could be 
reanalysed to answer a broader question on well-being for ethical reasons, 
even if it were a practical possibility. It is unlikely that permissions for re- 
use would have been sought at the time of collection, and were people 
told the data might be placed in a repository, they may have not been as 
honest. These kinds of data are extremely difficult to anonymise in a way 
that completely protects participants and were one to try, perhaps there 
would be very little left to analyse. The benefits of qualitative data in cap-
turing the specificities of people’s experiences, therefore, mean there can 
be barriers to secondary qualitative research.
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Data collected by international bodies, such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) or the UN, and national statistics agencies, such as 
the ONS in the UK, make their data publicly available for secondary analy-
sis. These are primarily quantitative data and in addition to the findings 
that these bodies publish themselves (often presented as tertiary data). 
The ONS have pages and pages of findings and data on their website 
under well-being now, and there are a lot of data available from the UN’s 
HDI on its website.29
Sometimes large surveys managed by national and international agen-
cies, and available for secondary analysis, contain free text data (as shown 
above). If qualitative data has been collected at a large enough scale, then 
there is sometimes value in coding these and then adding up (aggregating) 
the answers which are similar, and turning this qualitative data into quan-
titative data. In 2013, I requested permission from the ONS to access free 
text fields from the Measuring National Well-being debate. I had devel-
oped a hypothesis from reading a report which contained quotes from the 
debate that I wanted to investigate.
My research question for these data, related to the issue we found out-
side the imaginary concert (described earlier in this chapter). If the evi-
dence we have about the well-being impact of particular leisure and cultural 
activities can be argued as circumstantial, and from leading questions, the 
credibility of data is called into question—most specifically, its collection 
(Selwood 2002; Belfiore 2002). This is an issue that plagues arguments 
over the quality of the evidence on the relationship between aspects of cul-
ture and well-being that we return to in the second half of this book. If the 
data can be dismissed as resulting from leading questions and years of 
research projects that are therefore not able to offer generalisable results, 
then how might this issue be addressed?
I proposed we turn this question on its head. How does that help us 
overcome some of these issues with the context in which these data are 
collected? What if the question was more like: ‘When people describe well- 
being, how often do they talk about participating in different kinds of 
activities—and what might that tell us about aspects of social and cultural 
policy?’ I coded 6787 free text fields on well-being that were collected by 
the ONS and collated them into themes of all the things they talked about. 
I then quantified the themes (Oman 2015, 2020) and then ordered them 
in terms of prevalence of response.
Table 3.2 shows the difference in order according to what the ONS 
said it found in the overall debate (34,000 responses) and what I had 
found in the free text fields. Again, people did not refer directly to 
 S. OMAN
93
concerts (using the word) in the national debate, and only once in a sub-
sequent consultation (Beaumont 2011, 29), but people did refer to the 
importance of broader concepts of social and cultural participation (Oman 
2015, 2019, 2020).
Well-being data include many sorts of data beyond those used in 
national indicators or the statistics we read in the media. They can all be 
extremely useful to inform work of many kinds from social work and pol-
icy, to arts administration, to the management of a particular company or 
understanding how to better care for students away from home at univer-
sity. The data required, and how they are analysed, involve a balance of 
what needs or wants to be known (see Table 3.1). It is also a practical 
matter of preference of approach, skill and resource; all need to be bal-
anced and there are various limits on different kinds of data to answer 
different questions. Table 3.3 offers an overview of how different data can 
help answer different questions for different reasons and/or audiences. 
Table 3.2 ‘A re-ordering’ of priorities in the Measuring National Wellbeing 
Debate Questionnaires
ONS’ ordering of tick box responses (most prevalent 
at the top)
A re-ordering of free text field responses 
(most prevalent at the top)
1st Health Leisure and spare time 1st
2nd Having good connections with 
friends and relatives
Quality of natural environment 2nd
3rd Job satisfaction and economic 
security
Family 3rd
4th Present and future conditions of 
the environment
Security 4th
5th Education and training Protect planet/nature 5th
6th Personal and cultural activities, 
including caring and volunteering
Freedom/power 6
7th Income and wealth Access to leisure possibilities 7th
8th Availability to have a say on local 
and national issues
Healthcare 8th
9th Crime Equality 9th
10th Other Happiness/well-being of others 10th
Government 11th
Fairness/social justice 12th
Access to services 13th
Politics 14th
Adapted from (Oman 2019, 2020)
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Understanding whether data are ‘good data’, as in good at the job you 
need it to do, requires an appreciation of all the many aspects of the con-
text, situation and/or population you want to understand. It requires an 
understanding of what you want to know about well-being, which we 
have discovered is contestable and varied in different contexts. Thus, for 
them to be data for good (and thus good for well-being) requires context 
and reflection. There is a tendency to view and to use certain kinds of data 
as if they are objective and unaffected by human decisions. The next sec-
tions look at objective data and their issues.
3.4  Objective Well-being Data anD Measures
In terms of quantitative data, you might imagine that the key question is 
how should well-being be measured? Really, this is a much bigger ques-
tion, or series of inter-related questions, which are how should well-being 
be conceptualised, operationalised and measured? Or before well-being 
can be measured, we need to decide what we mean by well-being (concep-
tualise) and find measurable dimensions of our concept (operationalise),30 
and then we can decide on a way of measuring it.
We have discussed some of the methods of collecting well-being 
data. Many decisions are involved that are not always made obvious, but 
are all important. The point here is that the conceptualisation of ‘what 
is it we’re actually trying to get at when we want to understand well-
being’ is distinct from its operationalisation. It is also worth noting that 
to operationalise a concept in research has a slightly different meaning 
than it does in everyday life. We come back to this in Chaps. 6, 7 and 8. 
If someone operationalises something, it generally means they put it to 
use, or bring it into use. In research, it is more a process of establishing 
how we can measure. So, conceptualisation is different from operation-
alisation, but connected. The operationalisation of ‘here is the form of 
words we’re using to ask the question’ is different again from ‘here are 
the options for the answers people can be provide (and if applicable, 
how we’ll combine these answers from different questions to give peo-
ple an overall well-being score)’.
As we have hopefully established in the introduction to this chapter, 
money is important in most contexts, but is far from everything. There 
are many more features that shape people’s lives and that need to be 
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understood if we aim to understand well-being as quality of life (Dodge 
et al. 2012). You could ask a population any number of questions to 
understand aspects of their quality of life. For example, is your housing 
adequate? How sanitary is your local environment?31 Do you have pub-
lic institutions that respond to your needs? Would you say have an active 
social life? Are quality healthcare and education services easily available 
to you? You may note that all of these questions are phrased in such a 
way that they ask for people’s opinion on aspects that are thought to 
affect our quality of life. They are therefore going to produce data that 
are subjective.
All of these issues can also be measured using data that are objective 
indicators. For example, administrative data such as GP visits and hospital 
wait times could be used to generate a benchmark for ‘fair access to health-
care’, and then community-level data could be measured against this 
benchmark. These are proxy indicators because they do not directly answer 
the question ‘does this person have fair access to healthcare’, but are used 
to stand in for data that could.
Proxy indicators have a number of pros. They are not biased by peo-
ple’s inaccurate memories of how long they waited in hospital, which, 
for obvious reasons, may be clouded with frustration. You do not have 
to worry about issues of sampling bias (see Box 3.4). Also, proxy data 
have often already been collected and cleaned by someone else, or a 
statistical organisation. So, while they can only partially answer the 
question of how many people have fair access to healthcare, the pros 
will have been thought to outweigh the cons. Similarly, being able to 
answer a research question on fair access to healthcare doesn’t tell us 
everything we need to know about well-being: it is one aspect of well-
being. It only partially indicates someone’s quality of life, and so to 
understand quality of life more completely at population level, we need 
more indicators.
Objective measures of well-being are based on assumptions regard-
ing human needs and rights, believed to impact on quality of life. Herein 
is the difference between quality of life and well-being. The academic 
literature tends to assume that quality of life involves material condi-
tions, whereas well-being also involves life satisfaction, mood and mean-
ing (although as we know from the previous chapter, this is not always 
clear-cut). It is the quality of life aspects of well-being that are measured 
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with objective indicators using the objective list theory that most 
indexes are based on.
The existence of the list, of course, suggests that a person or people 
with expertise have decided what should go on the list: what is impor-
tant and what standard measures should be used, or indeed to whose 
standard? There is even an ‘objective list theory of well-being’ (Rice 
2013) that is pluralistic. This means that instead of identifying a single 
feature common to all states of well-being (think of an overarching 
argument for ‘what is the meaning of the good life?’), it identifies a 
number of characteristics of what makes for a good life. This philo-
sophical theory is applied to lists of objective indicators, of what would 
be all the qualities needed for a good life. The key is that the aim is to 
cover all the important domains in life, so unlike a simple index, like the 
HDI, these tend to have lots of indicators. In other words, the well-
being data are about lots of aspects of life.
The previous chapter explained a brief history of the move away from 
a single measure of progress (GDP) towards multiple measures of well- 
being in the twentieth century. These tended to be an index of multiple 
objective indicators of quality of life, associated to different ‘domains’ 
of life. Some organisations and nations recognise the same six major 
objective and observable dimensions for the measurement of objective 
well- being. These include international organisations, such as the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 
2011a) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 
2015), as well as national statistics offices, such as the Italian Statistics 
Bureau (ISTAT 2015). Notably, within each dimension are multiple 
indicators (ordinarily two or three). Figure 3.1 shows just how many 
indicators there are within domains in the OECD’s index and per mem-
ber country. As we shall discover in the following chapter, these bodies 
all heavily influence each other by way of advisory groups and drawing 
on perceived best practice.
Given that the theory behind the objective list approach means you 
need to analyse data from across all these dimensions, this can make it dif-
ficult to interpret these data, even at headline level (see Fig. 3.1), but also 
to compare them. Changing the unit of analysis from each indicator, to 
per country, or domain, makes them more readable. This is the same as 
with the Dow Jones, where the index is designed to have a single measure 
for readability. With the HDI,32 the three dimensions are combined into a 
single measure for easy comparison.
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With more complex indexes than the HDI, such as the OECD’s 
(Fig. 3.1), decisions need to be made on balancing the importance of 
the different domains. As we know, each of the three domains contrib-
utes equally to a country’s overall HDI score (United Nations 2020), 
this is not the case with all indexes. If domains are not equally weighted, 
then decisions have to be made about the relative importance of each to 
overall well-being decisions. As Table  3.2 demonstrates, establishing 
the importance of different domains of well-being is not a neutral 
process.
To this end, these weights involve subjective decisions by experts on 
what is more important about the objective indicators. That is not to 
say it is not a rigorous process, that it is not based on much evidence, 
and that experts do not debate and review these processes to ensure 
robustness. Yet, the term objective can obscure what is going on behind 
the scenes, or underneath the hood, if you like, of what are called 
‘objective indicators’ of well-being, or imply that they arrive at some 
sort of universal truth about well-being. As criticisms over the HDI 
surface, people do not value these aspects of life equally, or, indeed, the 
same as each other. Remember that there is a difference between mea-
suring what is valuable and what is valuable to measure—to whom 
and why.
An attempt to counter criticisms of weights applied by experts, The 
OECD states that its ‘Better Life Index is an interactive composite index 
that aggregates average measures of country’s well-being outcomes 
through weights defined by users’ (OECD 2018, 4). What does this 
mean, and why have the OECD attempted to do this? Let’s break 
this down.
The OECD’s Better Life Index website has an interactive dashboard, 
enabling people to use sliders to order and balance the importance of 
different aspects of well-being. When people use the sliders, they are 
effectively applying weights to the different aspects of well-being to 
construct an overall index that is personal to them.33 In this instance, 
the index aims to avoid representing the experts’ view of what is valu-
able, presenting those of the person interacting with the dashboard 
back at them.
This is all well and good, but how does this impact on change for social 
good? Are the OECD listening/watching/recording these interactions, 
and how might it change the way they value what is important? While 
some analysis has been done on people’s interactions and values (OECD 


























































2018), and this dashboard implies democratic engagement or participa-
tory decision-making to a degree, there is no commitment to this. People 
are also only able to interact with the pre-defined categories: were some-
thing of importance to you not there, there is no way to include this in the 
dashboard or tell anyone it should be included.
The terminology, processes and decisions behind what are used for 
objective well-being data, and how they are used together—as an objec-
tive list of indicators—are complex. I have tried to cover specific examples 
and drill down into the processes of why things happen in certain ways and 
to explain some of the terminology. We are going to look at one index in 
greater detail in the next section. This is to help those who wish to under-
stand what goes on underneath the hood of a well-being index and  to 
have a better understanding of what decisions are made about what good 
data practices might be for well-being data.
Box 3.4 Weights and Sampling Bias
Weights
The term ‘weighting’ is used in several different ways in the analy-
sis of quantitative data, and it’s important to be clear about which 
way we’re talking about.
In this section, we are concerned with how different bits of infor-
mation about countries are combined to give an overall score for 
those countries. Or, how important money is, as opposed to educa-
tion or health. The HDI applies an equal weight to these categories.
Weighting is also used to describe a technique when working with 
survey data to correct for sampling bias. As we have discussed, it is 
rare to achieve a whole population, and so most survey data are a 
sample. No matter how large that sample is, your sample is unlikely 
to look the same as the whole population, so you need to adjust for 
different proportions who answered the survey. For example, 
younger people are often less likely to respond to surveys, so esti-
mates based on surveys often weight young people’s responses more 
heavily to adjust for this difference.
These two different meanings of the term ‘weighting’ are applied 
in very different ways—in one case, to the questions that are being 
asked, and in another, to the people who are being asked the ques-
tions—and shouldn’t be confused.
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3.5  the OecD as a case stuDy Of What lies 
behinD Objective Well-being Data
Measuring well-being and progress has been and will continue to be a key 
priority for the OECD, in line with its founding tradition to promote poli-
cies designed to achieve the highest living standards for all. (OECD 2011a, 4)
The OECD have been key to the ‘second wave’ of framing well-being 
as important to measure (Bache and Reardon 2013). National well-being 
initiatives have tended to be in OECD or EU countries, and it is thought 
that the OECD had a hand in the process of the influential Sarkozy com-
mission (Bache 2012, 26, 30). The OECD Framework for Measuring 
Well-Being and Progress is said to be based on the recommendations from 
the commission (OECD n.d.b). We are going to peer under the bonnet of 
how the OECD devised its well-being indicators to reveal the decisions 
and care that go into such a programme.
The OECD claim that:
the ultimate objective of this work is not just measurement per se, but to 
strengthen the evidence-base for policy making. Better measures of well- 
being can improve our understanding of the factors driving societal prog-
ress. Better assessments of countries’ comparative performance in various 
fields can lead to better strategies to tackle deficiencies. (OECD 2011a, 4)
The OECD wanted to understand well-being in a way that can both 
offer comparisons across nations and potentially inform policy evaluations. 
They decided the qualities that best represented well-being; made objec-
tive lists; researched appropriate proxy indicators using existing data that 
can answer the dimensions of well-being. They tested the indicators that 
they have used to meet the demands of their well-being framework and 
ensured that they meet additional quality criteria; they sought expert 
advice on these moving parts and then offered a caveat on the experimen-
tal and evolutionary nature of these metrics: they will change and they are 
not perfect. This level of detail is not always readily available when research 
is published. So, we are going to look at the decisions made in the devising 
of the index in order to understand what lies behind these well-being data.
The OECD devised a list of criteria of what would be good to measure. 
Crucially, they also undertook a review of the data available from member 
countries (who, of course, may not be measuring the same thing). Prior to 
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finalising the index, a compendium was released, which contained the 
framework on which decisions were made regarding which well-being 
indicators they might use (OECD 2011a). This was the criteria they pub-
lished in the compendium:
• the well-being of people in each country, rather than on the macro- 
economic conditions of economies; hence, many standard indicators of 
macro-economic performance (e.g. GDP, productivity, innovation) are 
not included in this Compendium.
• the well-being of different groups of the population, in addition to aver-
age conditions. Measures of inequalities in people’s conditions will fig-
ure prominently in the “How’s Life?” report but are only discussed 
briefly in this Compendium.
• well-being achievements, measured by outcome indicators, as opposed to 
well-being drivers measured by input or output indicators.
• objective and subjective aspects of people’s well-being as both living con-
ditions and their appreciation by individuals are important to under-
stand people’s well-being. (OECD 2011a, 5)
The OECD were also keen that their framework distinguished between 
current material living conditions and quality of life, on the one hand, and 
the conditions required to ensure their sustainability over time, on the 
other. Notably ‘material living conditions’ do not always mean economic, 
and often the term elsewhere incorporates quality of life dimensions, as 
discussed above.
• Material living conditions (or ‘economic well-being’) determine peo-
ple’s consumption possibilities and their command over resources. While 
this is shaped by GDP, the latter also includes activities that do not 
contribute to people’s well-being (e.g. activities aimed at offsetting some 
of the regrettable consequences of economic development) while it 
excludes non-market activities that expand people’s consumption 
possibilities.
• Quality of life, defined as the set of non-monetary attributes of indi-
viduals, shapes their opportunities and life chances, and has intrinsic 
value under different cultures and contexts.
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• The sustainability of the socio-economic and natural systems where 
people live and work is critical for well-being to last over time. 
Sustainability depends on how current human activities impact on the 
stocks of different types of capital (natural, economic, human and 
social). However, suitable indicators for describing the evolution of these 
stocks are still lacking in many fields. For this reason, indicators of sus-
tainability are not included in this Compendium, although some of 
them will feature in ‘How’s Life?’ (OECD 2011a, 5).
The OECD claim that the framework reproduced above ‘underlies the 
selection of indicators in each dimension of well-being’ that work within 
two additional quality criteria:
• conceptual soundness (i.e. relevance in terms of measuring and moni-
toring well-being across the population in the perspective of inform-
ing policies)
• data of high quality (i.e. based on well-established standards and codes 
of practice). The selection of indicators has been made following exten-
sive consultation with National Statistical Offices and experts from 
various OECD directorates. (OECD 2011a, 5)
It is within the tension between conceptual soundness and the quality 
of data that the sustainability indicators sit: they would be what we would 
ideally be measuring if we want to capture well-being; remembering that 
the principle of an objective list is that the indicators included 
(BetterEvaluation 2012) are all vital to well-being. It is interesting that the 
OECD consulted with individual statistics offices on which indicators to 
select. The UK’s ONS also state they consulted the OECD to decide their 
well-being metrics (Oman 2017).34 Therefore, despite apparently separate 
investigations, the same experts were informing different indices. Sharing 
expertise is undoubtedly a good thing, especially when it comes to meth-
odological rigour, but it might arguably limit the possibility for indepen-
dence or innovation in how countries measure the well-being of their 
citizens. Notably, despite the fact that Bhutan’s measures of Gross National 
Happiness are often cited as inspiring the OECD, Sarkozy commission, 
and so on, expertise from Bhutan is not very evident on these advisory 
groups. We return to this in Chap. 6, but who the experts are, are always 
important questions to ask.
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Another important thing to note about the OECD’s contribution to 
well-being data are the caveats that were presented alongside these 
domains, namely that the indicators are:
experimental, in that the proposed selection of indicators has not yet 
reached the stage of meeting all agreed standards;
evolutionary, as the indicators proposed in this Compendium are, in 
many cases, only proxies of a broader underlying outcomes, for which 
ideal measures are currently lacking. (OECD 2011a, 7)
The report also notes that the selection of indicators will change in the 
future as better measures are developed, and as member countries reach 
agreement on indicators that are more appropriate to summarising condi-
tions in the various dimensions of people’s lives (OECD 2011a). So, 
whilst these national indicators tend to be presented as absolute, or fixed, 
in some way, like other forms of science and social science, they are 
invented to respond to developments and improvements. This is rarely 
acknowledged when objective indicators are presented in official reports 
and briefings.
So, what might these indicators look like?
The description ‘bewildering array’ (Scott 2012, 36) may come to 
mind when looking at  Fig. 3.1. As a result, Table  3.4 shows only the 
domains and indicators in 2010. There are 21 indicators across the 11 
domains, with a row for each member country. This is how the indicators 
were presented in 2010. Some of these have now changed, perhaps imper-
ceptibly to most. It can be difficult to establish exactly what is meant by or 
what has changed about an indicator, why, and when that change hap-
pened, because this information is not readily available.
To explain what I mean here, we are going to zone in on the ‘domain’ 
of ‘Personal Security’, in our case study. Personal Security has two indica-
tors in our 2010 visualisation: intentional homicides and self-reported vic-
timisation. So, one question might be, ‘why not just say crime, if you 
mean crime?’ If you look at all the domain names, they are all positive in 
their inflection: environmental quality might read as pollution, or litter, 
for example. What is also interesting about the idea of personal security is 
that it does not necessarily mean crime, really. It could possibly include 
financial security to most people: do you have a pension; do you own your 
own home, and so on?
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Another question is why, then, has the domain changed in the current 
2020 version of the index? The Personal Security domain name is now 
called ‘safety’. The OECD explain this domain as follows: ‘Personal secu-
rity is a core element for the well-being of individuals, and includes the 
risks of people being physically assaulted or falling victim to other types of 
crime’ (OECD website/topics/safety). Therefore, the headline domain 
name has shifted from ‘personal security’ to ‘safety’, but has retained the 
credibility of the original measures.
Not only has the domain name changed. The indicators themselves 
have shifted: ‘homicide rate’ remains the same, but ‘self-reported victimi-
sation’ has been replaced with ‘feeling safe walking home at night’. Thus, 
an objective indicator has been replaced with a subjective indicator, as the 
data were collected by surveying how someone feels, rather than the 
administrative data from reporting crimes.
Table 3.4 Summary of the OECD indicators in 2010
Domains Indicators
Income and wealth Household net adjusted disposable income per person
Household financial net wealth per person
Jobs and earnings Employment rate
Long-term unemployment rate
Housing Number of rooms per person
Dwelling with basic facilities
Health status Life expectancy at birth
Self-reported health status
Work and life Employees working very long hours
Time devoted to leisure and personal care
Employment rate of women with children of 
school-age
Education and skills Educational attainment
Students’ cognitive skills
Social connections Contacts with others
Social network support




Environmental quality Air pollution
Personal security Intentional homicides
Self-reported victimisation
Subjective well-being Life satisfaction
Source: Adapted from Compendium of OECD Well-Being Indicators 2011
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There are methodological reasons why this is a sensible change. In 
some places people do not report crimes, as they happen, so as a chosen 
proxy measure of a domain well-being, this is not necessarily the best indi-
cator of the relationship between crime and quality of life. Secondly, it 
could be argued that it is in the ‘feeling safe’, rather than the reporting of 
crime that we experience well-being. This is why more subjective mea-
sures—even on an objective list—can be a better way of capturing what it 
is about well-being that we need to know.
In the previous section we encountered what objective indicators are, 
and this section has presented a lot of detail on one well-being index, as it 
is not always clear where such official-looking data come from. We focussed 
on some of the decision-making aspects of devising an index. This also 
revealed their methodological complexity—even without the quantitative 
modelling involved in statistics. We have also questioned the nature of the 
data assembled in objective lists and what is implied by their naming as 
objective. We have learnt that they are, in fact, shifting rather than fixed 
sets of measures. They evolve and respond to reflections on their limita-
tions and how they could be done better. As we continue to use these sorts 
of data as objective facts, we lose these qualities, which are not considered 
important. Yet, the contexts of these data practices are both valuable and 
credible. It is a disservice to statistics and people who wish to understand 
them, that they remain obscured.
3.6  cOnclusiOn
Understanding whether data are ‘good data’, as in good quality—or 
whether they are data for good (and thus good for well-being) requires us 
to look at context. We have to consider whether international indicators 
appeal to certain standards, and if so, how so, or to whose standard? Data 
are often used as if they are neutral and context-less, yet they have rich 
context that is rarely acknowledged. Understanding the expertise, reflec-
tions and decisions involved in these ‘objective data’ makes them appear 
richer and therefore could be argued to demonstrate, rather than decrease 
the appearance of rigour.
This chapter has aimed to offer an overview of different contexts that 
dictate both what and how good well-being data are. These environments 
have varied from local parks to international statistics forums; from a youth 
club in Derry five years ago, to a presidential candidacy speech in Kansas 
over half a century ago. Across qualitative and quantitative data; primary, 
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secondary and tertiary data; proxy data, administrative data, survey data 
and ethnographic data. Data collected from talking to people can be 
harder to imagine as data, because we usually think of data as numbers. 
However, the contexts of these data—how they are collected and anal-
ysed—are also often easier for most people to imagine than those of inter-
national statistics. This is because it is easier for most people to picture 
themselves being the person speaking to people, either asking questions or 
answering them.
Most of us don’t spend much time thinking about how data experts work. 
Why should we? But then how statisticians and data experts work are not 
transparent, or often discussed. This is, in fact, a barrier to understanding 
how their statistics and data work. This is not a textbook, and so looking at 
all these different types of data may not make you a statistician, but in reading 
this chapter, you may have improved your understanding of well-being data 
and their diversity. Looking at these data in context should also better enable 
you to better appreciate these data when you next see them in the media or 
in another government briefing (hopefully not about COVID-19).
We start this chapter by contextualising a political quote that is used a 
lot to justify why well-being data are good. We also look at a collection of 
attempts to define well-being for data across some policy documents over 
time that coincides with the recent rise of well-being data. The reflections 
on this political speech and policy documents treat these texts as data, 
enabling us to contextualise policy, politics and data with well-being.
The chapter then reflects on a number of different situations in which 
well-being data are generated, interpreted, analysed and applied. A hypo-
thetical scenario of a well-being at work survey, a questionnaire outside a 
concert and real-life examples of well-being data that are relevant to social 
and cultural policy are shared to show the variety and accessibility of some 
approaches to well-being data collection, but the need for caution, consid-
eration of others and the foregrounding of context in these matters. How 
you affect the data and the participants by collecting and using data is 
crucial to all research on society, especially that which supposedly improves 
it. This is not only a moral and ethical  issue, but one that can limit the 
claims that can be made using these sorts of well-being data, should the 
wrong decisions be made, or should they not be explained. Therefore, the 
consequences of well-being data are crucial contexts, as well.
The HDI and the OECD well-being measures evolved from working 
within professional codes to innovate and generate the indices. It is not 
always obvious that this is a long process of organising and interpreting by 
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experts before final decisions are made. In presenting good practice and 
contextualising how these things work, these sections hoped to improve 
your capability and confidence (which we identified as data issues in Chap. 
1) if you are less familiar with these data. The objective lists that feature in 
these new well-being indices are often made of data that have been long 
collected. Once this context is understood, they seem less revolutionary 
than the politics sometimes implies. It is actually the newer subjective 
well-being measures that were being developed over the 2000s that were 
the more novel aspects of these well-being indicators, and we come to the 
limits of these claims in the next chapter.
The very name ‘objective indicator’ suggests it is that: objective, but 
often the data does not measure what they say it measures, instead being 
a proxy for what would ideally be measured, were there a measure for it. 
You may have found yourself reading the section on quality of life indica-
tors, thinking how these indicators would pick up on the negative well- 
being impacts of the bedroom tax that Bogue’s research uncovered. The 
answer is they are very unlikely to at national population or international 
population level, and were not designed to do that.
Well-being data are not all one thing. They have different purposes, 
pros and cons. Qualitative data are able to get closer to the meaning of 
well-being and the experiences of ill-being in some cases, but are often 
unable to generalise and are criticised for the subjective nature of the asso-
ciated processes and the limits to claims of causation. We will look at how 
asking people how they really feel in surveys attempts to address some of 
these circumstantial issues of capturing the human experience in the next 
chapter where we put ‘the new science’ of happiness into context.
nOtes
1. One example of this is that the UK’s national newspaper, The Guardian, 
offered him his own blogpost to put the UK’s Measuring National Well- 
being measures into context. See Rogers 2012.
2. Gross domestic product (GDP) and gross national product (GNP) are 
measures of a country’s aggregate economic output. They are both widely 
used, differing in what exactly they measure: GDP is a measure of (national 
income = national output = national expenditure) produced in a particular 
country. GNP = GDP + net property income from abroad.
3. This speech was a few months before he was sadly assassinated.
4. These contexts of data can be notoriously difficult to find out about! It can 
be difficult to know where to begin looking. Even all the fact-checking, 
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and then re-checking, to finalise this book (and I have been doing this for 
years, now) required hours wrestling with broken links and inconclusive 
information on websites and in reports. I even emailed international statis-
tics bodies for clarification. Most people probably don’t even know that 
this is a thing you can do if you have questions. The ONS and the OECD 
have both replied extremely quickly to my general queries this last year, 
and they are mandated to answer queries. Hopefully this book offers a 
starting point to help answer some of your queries.
5. We tend to think of aesthetics as a sense of beauty, but more generally it 
means being actively engaged and conscious of the world’s effect on us, 
whilst at the same time appreciative how we might affect the world. 
According to philosopher John Dewey ([1934] 1958), this enables us to 
appreciate how our experience is organised, making it coherent, and allow-
ing us to appreciate the past, present and future—whether we are satisfied, 
or dissatisfied.
6. According to Rapley, ‘asking about the quality of life amounts to a request 
for an aesthetic judgement’, rather than a scientific one, from the person 
asked. You cannot take for granted that people have the same notion of 
quality of life, and therefore its assessment is a qualitative appraisal of how 
things stand. ‘Aesthetic judgement’, according to Kant ([1790] 1951), is 
dependent on discriminatory abilities at a sensory, emotional and intellec-
tual level all at once.
7. Thematic analysis groups people’s responses into themes to help a 
researcher understand commonalities and differences across their sample.
8. There is much written on this so-called debate, but Gary Goertz and James 
Mahoney are interesting on how it is A Tale of Two Cultures (2012).
9. Headline findings are provided in separate documents and executive sum-
maries and are written to underpin messages that are the intended ‘take 
away’ findings from research. They are presented accessibly for the inter-
ested public, policy-makers and media with the intention that people will 
know what they need to know from reading a few bullet points, rather than 
looking at detailed results.
10. For more information on national accounts, the ONS website explains 
their national accounts here: https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationa-
laccounts/uksectoraccounts/methodologies/nationalaccounts.
11. Some key figures in the well-being agenda, in particular The New 
Economics Foundation, foregrounded the term national accounts of well-
being (New Economics Foundation 2009; Diener and Tov 2012).
12. The OECD also hold a useful repository of different country’s national 
accounts, which is also useful to see similarities and differences (OECD 
website https://www.oecd- ilibrary.org/economics/data/oecd- national- 
accounts- statistics_na- data- en).
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13. This section on the three accounts of well-being is largely influenced by 
Dolan et al. (2011a, b), who wrote a working paper for the UK’s measures 
of national well-being. However, each country’s index of well-being (col-
lection of individual indicators or well-being) may be informed differently. 
Again, this is part of the lineage of the account.
14. The HDI has received critique (Kovacevic 2010) as has the use of any 
index in developing contexts. For example, anthropologically-informed 
well-being research tends to focus on how policy approaches overlook the 
specificities of culture: people, places and their histories (White 2006). 
Non-Euro-centric practices, which may be culturally different, are often 
categorised as deficient in some way: either bad for well-being or inefficient 
(Gough 2004). Work in this field extends that of Critical Development 
Studies, which state that imposing the agenda of the global north else-
where is problematic (White 2015, 5).
15. His desires being all that were considered important in 1984, of course.
16. By proxy we mean it is an indirect measure, described in Chap. 2. Preference 
satisfaction has also been used widely in policy appraisal as a form of cost-
benefit analysis (CBA) which values benefits according to people’s willing-
ness to pay (HM Treasury 2003), but these are contested (Dolan 
et al. 2011a).
17. Layard explains the principle of adaptation well in his book (2006, 48–49).
18. For more discussion on Mass Observation and two examples of their quali-
ative data on the meaning of happiness, please refer to Chap. 5.
19. For more information on these approaches, please see Chap. 5.
20. Elsewhere I have written that universities aren’t necessarily that good at 
looking after the well-being of staff or students. See Oman and Bull 2021 
and Oman et al. 2015, forthcoming.
21. The scale is named after its inventor, psychologist Rensis Likert. There can 
be confusion with Likert scales, when it comes to the middle of the scale 
and moderate or neutral options, as sometimes these will record ‘don’t 
knows’, rather than my well-being is five.
22. Matarasso’s (1997) ‘now discredited’ Use or Ornament report (Belfiore 
2002; Merli 2002; Selwood 2002) was highly influential for its ‘impressive 
sounding numbers’ (Belfiore 2009, 348). It was described by the then 
Secretary of State as ‘compelling’, despite the ‘paltry evidence’ (Belfiore 
2009, 348). One of the key methodological flaws highlighted by Belfiore 
are those relating to asking participants whether they were happier or 
healthier as a result of participation (2002, 99). The interview effect is an 
ongoing issue with qualitative research in the cultural sector, in which 
questions, such as Matarasso’s: ‘has the project changed your ideas about 
anything?’ or ‘since being involved I have been happier’ lead the inter-
viewee to respond positively—to appease the interviewer in some 
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way. These questions about the degree to which you can trust responses to 
these questions are a problem for evidence in a number of fields, particu-
larly the cultural sector, that we will return to. 
23. A representative sample is quite simply a sample that is representative of the 
population, in that it holds similar characteristics. It is useful when think-
ing about how different kinds of people will respond to questions, depend-
ing on their age, health, ethnicity, gender, and so on. If the characteristics 
of the sample are similar to that of the population studied, then they are 
more generalisable. 
24. Qualitative researchers will often acknowledge how they affect the person 
being questioned. Interviews can be quite intimate meetings, where inter-
viewers hear important details about someone’s life. How that person 
relates to the interviewer will greatly affect what they say—the data. Also, 
qualitative researchers acknowledge their own relationship to the person 
being interviewed, the research questions or issues being discussed, even 
the ‘research site’. This is called ‘positionality’ and in-depth qualitative 
research acknowledges how a researchers’ position—be it race, gender or 
life experience, (e.g.) affects how they interpret qualitative data.
25. Focus group methodologists can often be very specific on the difference 
between a group interview and a focus group (see note 24 for great litera-
ture on how to do focus groups, and the limitations and benefits of differ-
ent approaches).
26. As Table 3.1 acknowledges, resource is a big consideration. This is both in 
time processing data but also in compensating people to participate in data 
collection. If people give up their time for a focus group, it is important to 
consider compensation, at least in transport cost. This isn’t a how-to guide 
but it may be relevant to factor this in to your thinking when designing 
your own research, or thinking about that of others.
27. For the benefits and complexities of focus groups, see Carey 1994; Crabtree 
et al. 1993; Hennink 2008; Kamberelis and Dimitriadis 2013; Kitzinger 
1994; Liamputtong 2011.
28. Very briefly, my PhD looked at the Measuring National Well-being debate, 
conducted by the ONS in 2010 to establish what the UK should adopt as 
its measures of national well-being. My PhD reanalysed some of the debate 
data (described in this chapter), undertook policy analysis, observation of 
well-being experts, focus groups with people and interviews with key 
actors in the debate from the ONS.
29. See ONS n.d. and UN n.d. for more information.
30. Box 7.1 explains operationalisation in research in greater detail. Notably, 
Chap. 6 talks about operationalising an idea in policy, which is different 
from operationalising a concept for measurement in quantitative research. 
These are different applications of the same word, which can be confusing.
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31. For additional detail, you may notice the first two questions will collect 
different kinds of data. Is your housing adequate? invites a yes/no answer 
(probably with a don’t know option for best practice). How sanitary is 
your local environment? invites a scale, so you will probably offer someone 
a scale to mark. Perhaps a Likert scale, as described in note 18. 
32. It is important to note that something being easier or more readily avail-
able for measurement does not necessarily mean it is accurate. Remember 
that the advice from the important, game-changing Sarkozy commission 
(see Chap. 2) was that each nation should devise its own measures. This is 
because each country has its own culture and priorities that may not be 
reflected in existing large-scale indices.
33. See the OECD Better Life Index website (OECD n.d.).
34. The politics of who were involved in well-being measurement are discussed 
by Bache (2012) in greater detail.
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CHAPTER 4
Discovering ‘the New Science of Happiness’ 
and Subjective Well-being
‘The rise of well-being’ in politics and policy-making emerges from devel-
opments across intellectual fields, including psychology, social policy, eco-
nomics and social statistics (Bache and Reardon 2013, 908). In Chap. 2, 
we also discovered that happiness and well-being are linked, but different, 
and hard to define, while Chap. 3 offered a brief overview of how well- 
being data can be collected and analysed. We also discovered that ques-
tionnaires can be used in one-to-one interviews and national-level surveys, 
collecting qualitative and quantitative data.
Subjective well-being data are largely generated using questionnaires. 
These could be a paper form you may be asked to fill in before entering a 
weekly therapy session. These data would be looked at in isolation from 
data on others, are private and confidential, and will be used to track one 
person over time. Similar questions are increasingly used in national-level 
surveys, which can generate large-scale datasets to inform national indices. 
These won’t be traceable back to the individual when analysed and are 
used to understand how populations and sub-groups are feeling, inviting 
comparisons between groups of people over time. The latter kind of sub-
jective well-being data are then used to inform important decisions in 
policy development, monitoring and evaluation, and to promote behav-
iour change in populations. We are going to look at how these data gained 
popularity and standing in this chapter by looking at the rise of happiness 
economics and its impact on well-being data.
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Chapter 2 explained that the discipline of economics also has trends 
over time and sub-disciplines. While people think of economics as primarily 
financial, it has far broader concerns and also tries to understand the value 
of things to people. For example, where the nineteenth-century hedonim-
eter project hoped to measure how people feel about things in a way that 
was ‘more scientific’, some economists have subsequently tended to focus 
on understanding what people do in the belief that this indicates what they 
value, and how they feel, whether subconsciously or consciously.
It is here that happiness plays a role for economics: to understand what 
makes people happy (in broad terms) at scale. Connectedly, to understand 
how to best go about measuring and modelling to establish this, and eval-
uate policy decisions of the past, in order to make better ones in future. 
This idea is based on the Greatest Happiness principle (Bentham 1996 
[1789]), which you may recall from Chap. 2, and is elaborated here. We 
also spend more time thinking through what is meant by subjective well-
being, and how it is defined in relation to happiness, before exploring 
categories of subjective well-being measures that are used, and what they 
do, or at least what they claim to. A key thing to keep in mind is that hap-
piness economics measures more than happiness, using the broader (and 
more complicated) concept of subjective well-being.
We are going to look at the rise of happiness economics, for two main 
reasons: (1) it is acknowledged as one of the key drivers of the second 
wave of well-being, and (2) it positioned itself as a new science of happi-
ness, advocating new measures, different data and analyses. This chapter, 
therefore, looks at how developments in psychology and economics come 
together to intervene in social statistics and social policy. The introduction 
argued that well-being data are used to (1) track the health and wealth of 
society using social statistics and (2) evaluate the success and progress of 
social projects and policies. Therefore, how all these interventions come 
together are key to understanding how well-being data work.
4.1  Happiness economics
People down the ages have agreed that money can’t buy happiness, though 
this exact form appeared only in the nineteenth century. (Cresswell 2010, 278)
Lord Richard Layard was called the UK’s ‘Happiness Tsar’1 and his 
seminal book Happiness: Lessons from a New Science (Layard 2006) con-
solidates aspects of what Bache and Reardon call the second wave of 
 S. OMAN
121
well- being (Bache and Reardon 2013). The book presents the rationale 
behind ‘happiness economics’, which this chapter covers as the Greatest 
Happiness principle, combined with aspects of positive psychology, 
together with established well-being indicators and newer subjective well-
being measures that we will come back to in greater depth throughout this 
Chapter.
The book Happiness is a call to action to do things differently, in a simi-
lar way to the politicians’ statements and reports from international agen-
cies we have already encountered. We are going to begin by looking at 
Layard’s presentation of knowledge and understanding of well-being and 
data, as an example from the field of happiness economics. The book 
opens with the idea that money cannot buy happiness, explaining that this 
is ‘no old wives’ tale’, but proven by ‘many pieces of scientific research’ 
(Layard 2006, 3).
The book opens with ‘the Easterlin Paradox’ (Layard 2006, 3) that we 
encountered in Chap. 2. In short, through looking at subjective well- 
being data, together with data on income, Easterlin found that while peo-
ple with higher incomes tend to be happier than those with lower incomes, 
increased average income has not increased average happiness (Easterlin 
1973, 1974). On this basis, Easterlin states that economic growth does 
not lead to an increase in happiness, at least in countries that are already 
relatively wealthy (Easterlin 2001). ‘The Easterlin Paradox’ remains a 
recurrent topic in discussions of well-being data and measurement, even 
though it has been challenged several times (most notably Stevenson and 
Wolfers 2008, 2012). Easterlin has nevertheless come out to defend the 
idea when it has been challenged (i.e. Easterlin et  al. 2010) and much 
work continues to build on this thesis. For example, testing whether it is 
generalisable (i.e. Grimes and Reinhardt 2019), that is whether the theory 
works when tested in various ways across countries, contexts and wealth 
bands. The paradox therefore remains a compelling idea for economists.
The Easterlin paradox is a popular framing narrative to introduce the 
importance of well-being data and knowledge, especially when it comes to 
understanding society and policy. If he is not the opening gambit, he’s 
near the top of the bill (e.g. see Adler 2013, 9; Alexandrova 2017, 4; Allin 
2007, 47; Bache and Reardon 2013, 902; Benjamin et  al. 2012, 18; 
Blanchflower 2008, 32). Or, more specifically, his findings published in 
1973 are presented as the turning point in understanding the relationship 
between social progress and societal well-being. For if economic growth 
does little to improve social welfare, should it be a primary goal of 
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government policy? Layard explains why not, as well as how economics 
can help us understand how not, with the help of philosophy.
The position taken is that ‘much of the social progress that has occurred 
in the last two hundred years’ has been driven by ‘the Greatest Happiness 
principle’ (Layard 2006, 5). The point of Jeremy Bentham’s ‘noble idea of 
utilitarianism’ for Layard is that:
it is fundamentally egalitarian, because everyone’s happiness is to count 
equally. It is also fundamentally humane, because it says that what matters 
ultimately is what people feel.
The best society, therefore, is one where citizens are happiest and there-
fore the best policy produces the greatest happiness and the most moral 
action produces the most happiness for those affected (Layard 2006, 5). 
This is in tension with ideas of happiness maximisation, which is that peo-
ple will, or should, have the right to pursue or consume or do whatever 
makes them happy, and they will always want more happiness. We touched 
on issues associated with individualism in Chap. 2, as fundamental ones of 
ideology and social justice.
Layard introduces eighteenth-century enlightenment philosopher 
Jeremy Bentham as a ‘shy kindly man’ who was a great thinker. He argues 
that Bentham’s ideas had been difficult to apply in practice because ‘so 
little was known about the nature and causes of happiness’, which ‘left it 
vulnerable to philosophies that questioned it’ (Layard 2006, 5). The 
implication being, of course, that this has been resolved because ‘the new 
science’ means we now have this information. Indeed, the front cover of 
Layard’s book proudly states using red block capitals in a golden sun-like 
graphic shape: ‘INSIDE: THE SEVEN CAUSES OF HAPPINESS’.
It is actually rather brave for an academic to announce they know the 
causes of happiness; doing so asserts a degree of certainty that is infa-
mously evasive. In fact, the influential Sarkozy commission report that also 
surveys the evidence, in particular from economics, notes:
A general difficulty for the study of the determinants of subjective well- 
being is to distinguish between causes and correlates. (Stiglitz et  al. 
2009, 150)
Ironically, it is difficult to identify the ‘seven causes’ in the book, as they 
are not explicitly presented inside. Instead, on page 62, in a sub-section of 
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a sub-section called Adult Life, and approximately half way through the 
chapter called ‘So What Does Make Us Happy?’ is a box, much like the 
ones in this book. Layard’s is called ‘The Big Seven factors affecting hap-
piness’. The box lists family relationships; financial situation; work; com-
munity and friends; health; personal freedom; and personal values. It states 
the first five are in order of importance. Interestingly, they are able to be 
ordered by a sense of importance using data from the US General Social 
Survey. Freedom and values are added as ‘two other key factors’ and in a 
footnote, Layard explains: ‘these last two factors cannot be ranked, but 
their relevance is shown in the table’ (Layard 2006, 63; 255). It’s not 
explicit why they cannot be ranked; it is also, therefore, not made clear 
why they were included to make seven, rather than five.
As you will see in the second half of this book, unequivocal claims that 
one thing ‘causes’ happiness, or improves well-being, rather than more 
modest claims, such as ‘contributes to’, ‘is related to’ or ‘affects’ are 
extremely difficult to substantiate. As with the Easterlin Paradox, which 
states that increased wealth does not [necessarily] cause increased happi-
ness, it is difficult to claim something is a universal truth. Studies looking 
at similar relationships with similar data have not resulted in causal claims, 
and other evidence and theories that are drawn on are contested. Yet, as 
Chaps. 7 and 8 of this book demonstrate, we often find that useful insights 
with well-being data become repackaged to make causal claims, which 
when we look ‘under the bonnet’ should be a bit less assertive or emphatic.
Layard’s ‘big seven’ may read a bit like an ‘objective list’2 of what is 
important to well-being, similar to those OECD and UK Office for 
National Statistics (ONS) examples from the last chapter. Coincidentally, 
Layard informed both of these organisations as an expert on the advisory 
panels. You will see that just as the categories differ slightly between the 
ONS and OECD lists, Layard’s own list of categories as to what causes 
happiness differs slightly, again.
You may note that Layard’s list does not explicitly include personal secu-
rity and safety, as the domains discussed in the OECD example from Chap. 
3. When you think about the concepts of safety and security, for you they 
may also sit in relationships, financial security or community. To re- cap 
briefly on Chap. 3, there are no perfect objective lists of the components of 
well-being, which tend to involve a subjective carving up of societal and 
personal concerns. In terms of data, objective lists of indicators tend to rely 
on ‘proxies’, by which we mean proxy measures where the thing we want 
to understand, say ‘personal safety’ or ‘personal security’ is measured by 
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data that is seen to stand in for it, in some way, but is not exactly the same 
thing. The OECD example in Chap. 3 demonstrates how personal safety 
and/or security is difficult to measure directly and so ‘self-reported victimi-
sation’ is used instead as a proxy. These are administrative data from crimes 
reported in individual countries (which of course is not the same as actual 
crime, risk or safety). The OECD replaced the proxy metric with ‘feeling 
safe walking home at night’. Thus, an objective indicator has been replaced 
with subjective data, as it has come from surveying how someone feels, 
rather than the administrative data from reporting crimes. However, we 
can feel safe and secure because of different domains in our life, and we can 
feel unsafe and insecure across numerous domains as well.
Crucial to the story of data is the moment when well-being is acknowl-
edged to be more than a list of objective indicators, such as crime rate per 
nation or in a local area. Instead, well-being is understood as how risk of 
crime is experienced. Even more crucial to this chapter is the delineation 
between subjective data about well-being and subjective well-being data. 
Somewhat confusingly, how people feel about crime is subjective data 
about an objective well-being indicator. Subjective well-being indicators 
are different again. They are about how we understand our own well- 
being and how we feel.
Replacing some proxies with subjective data about how people feel 
about an objective indicator, such as crime, still leaves many questions 
about personal well-being. To answer questions about personal well- 
being, we need more rigorous subjective well-being measures that tell us 
how people feel over time. This was the gap ‘the new science’ aimed to fill 
and the driving force of the new well-being indices.3 This chapter goes on 
to unpack the development of subjective well-being measures: how they 
were decided on; what the different measures capture and what they do 
not, and so on. It looks under the bonnet of ‘the science’, its: history, 
theory, politics, data and its methods. First of all, we will return to the 
Greatest Happiness principle.
The Greatest Happiness? And Other Principles
It is said that Jeremy Bentham himself was not convinced that his political 
project would work, or indeed, could be proven, and he corrected the 
Greatest Happiness principle later in his life from ‘the greatest happiness 
of the greatest number’ to ‘the greatest total sum of happiness’.4 Let us 
briefly consider the limitations to the Greatest Happiness principle. There 
are pragmatic objections, which we shall deal with first. The principle 
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assumes that happiness can be affected by what we do and what others do; 
therefore, happiness is a consequence of our own choices and behaviours, 
as well as those of others.
To apply the Greatest Happiness principle in policy, then, we need to 
be able to predict how different behaviours and actions affect happiness, 
so decisions can be made. In turn, this means we need to know what hap-
piness is, and that behaviours, actions and happiness must be measurable. 
As we already know, agreeing on what either happiness or well-being is has 
long proved difficult for philosophers and more recently for measurers. 
We will also discover in Chaps. 6, 7 and 8, that measuring what we do at 
a large scale is also challenging. This makes it hard to be sure that one 
action (whether on a personal or policy level) has positively impacted on 
happiness, or if an alternative would have done better.
Of course, it is here that the new science is presented to best intervene. 
As Layard indicates, it generates data and the means to analyse them in 
order to address the pragmatic objections to the happiness principle. Yet, 
not all believe that happiness can actually really be influenced by targeted 
actions or changing an individual’s behaviour. In contemporary society we 
see judgements regarding other’s behaviours being demonised as bad for 
well-being (as discussed in Chap. 2), and in ‘COVID-19 world’, the end-
less recommendations that people go for a walk or a run have little consid-
eration as to whether that is available to them (Ryan 2021). So, targeted 
actions are not universal.
Some argue that it is easier to improve those with better well-being first 
(Oakley et al. 2013, 23). Relatedly, ‘the utility monster’ was a thought 
experiment in ethics first developed in the 1970s. It presents a challenge 
to the Greatest Happiness principle, and to Utilitarianism, more generally. 
It asks what if a monster could accrue greater happiness from any given 
resource than anyone else? For example, imagine if being able to attend a 
concert in a park alone means that the utility monster is happier than all 
the other audience members in the local community put together. 
Following utilitarian principles, in order to maximise happiness overall, 
we’d have to ban everyone except from the utility monster from attending 
this concert, and potentially any future events ever again. More generally, 
if the way to maximise utility overall is to make the utility monster as 
happy as possible, even if this comes at the cost of everyone else’s happi-
ness, are we obliged to do so? While the designer of this thought experi-
ment, Robert Nozick, was proving a point of his own, the issue remains, 
that achieving the Greatest Happiness principle is not unequivocally fair, 
or egalitarian.
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As such, some argue that instead of focussing on happiness (or well- 
being), we should focus on social justice and equality. There is an uncom-
fortable tension in the well-being agenda and those of equality, diversity 
and inclusion.5 We have previously touched on Aristotle’s idea of a good 
life as dependent on a society supported by slaves. The question remains, 
at what or whose expense do the good lives of some, who make the ‘good 
society’ depend?
Returning to the Greatest Happiness principle, the main moral objection 
holds that it justifies a-moral means. This is owing to its consequentialist eth-
ics: that if the aim is generating the most happiness for the most people, or 
the greatest total sum of happiness, then many actions may be justifiable. An 
easy way of imagining how this works is in the distribution of financial 
resources across a population. If you do something to improve the well-being 
of the largest number, it is highly possible that those who are marginalised 
(often the most vulnerable) in society will disproportionally suffer. We will 
return to this issue in the next chapter when we look at how Big Data and 
newer data practices disproportionately affect people of colour and the poor, 
for example. At the more dramatic end, such principles are argued against 
because they can be used to justify genetic manipulation, mind-control and 
dictatorship (Veenhoven 2010, 606). A useful example comes from science-
fiction. Writer Ursula Le Guin’s (2017) short story The Ones Who Walk Away 
from Omelas features a thriving, joyful city whose prosperous existence 
depends on the extreme misery of a single child that lives in a dungeon.
Another issue taken with the ‘Greatest Happiness principle’ emerges 
from questioning the value of happiness as a goal: is it too focussed on plea-
sure, or is it just an illusion? Some question whether happiness as a goal 
fosters irresponsible consumerism and that it makes us less sensitive to the 
suffering of others. In other words that ‘happiness maximisation’ leads peo-
ple to pursue an idea of happiness that is fuelled by irresponsible consump-
tion, or to do what makes them happy without considering the consequences. 
This never-ending pursuit of things ‘to make us happy’ is called ‘the hedonic 
treadmill6’ and never satisfies; people always want more happiness and have 
been encouraged to seek gratification in the wrong places, to the detriment 
of their well-being, social well-being and ecological well-being.
You may think this sounds a culturally specific idea of happiness that 
applies to Western consumerism and you may recall the example from 
Chap. 2 which points to the dangers of assuming how people value things, 
comparing a TV to a photo album. You may also be thinking of criticisms 
of economists’ ideas of ‘preference satisfaction’ from Chap. 3, as well as 
those who disapprove of applying Western values, and valuation techniques 
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to developing contexts, as we discussed was the case with the Human 
Development Index (HDI). You may also note that this idea of people as 
individual consumers seeking personal gratification is at odds with many 
societies that operate as collectives and, indeed, many of the values of soci-
etal well-being that the well-being agenda appeals to. These are not the 
only contradictions in the well-being agenda and we will continue to 
explore value judgements of what happiness is, and for who (especially if 
what we do, or are able to do is a driver of happiness) in further chapters.
John Stuart Mill was Bentham’s godson and another key figure in the 
story of happiness and economics. He is said to have disagreed with the 
idea of general happiness as something universally experienced. He 
believed that happiness from a game of ‘pushpin’ was not comparable to 
that from poetry; that without the idea of higher and lower forms of hap-
piness, we should have to believe that a dissatisfied Socrates was worse off 
than a satisfied fool (Layard 2006, 22; 118). These variations in values and 
value systems are some of the key tensions in the agenda, especially when 
they inform us of what is good for our well-being.
‘The status race’ between people is seen as a key contributor to unhap-
piness (Layard 2006, 7) and is one of the behaviours we are encouraged 
to adopt in our commercialised society. Yet, competition is considered a 
contributor to progress.7 More than that, though, of course, there is com-
petition between policy domains for resources and competition between 
academic fields to produce the method that gets used, the data that get 
used and the knowledge that gets used for policy.
There are several discussions surrounding how the well-being agenda 
addresses competition. On the one hand, it pretends to flatten competi-
tion, while on the other, it reinforces it. See OECD (2014) and concepts, 
such as ‘sustainable competitiveness’ (World Economic Forum 20138). 
Other influential advocates for the well-being agenda naturalise a desire 
for ‘success’ and well-being measurements as tools for competition. For 
example, in a section entitled ‘Why use wellbeing as a measure of progress 
in society?’ in a report to a think tank, ex-Cabinet Secretary Lord 
O’Donnell explained:
As individuals we all are keen to know how we are doing: Are we top of the 
class or in the middle of the pack? So how should we measure success? 
(O’Donnell et al. 2014, 10)
Layard’s book both sells the Greatest Happiness principle, whilst also 
embracing some of the critiques, such as how the endless drive for 
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happiness is bad for people and society, and how ideas of competition and 
success perpetuate this. There is a sense that some advocates of the move-
ment cherry-pick, ignoring contradictions to tell a clear story, and this is 
familiar in criticism of the movement and its politics.9 The focus on mean-
ingful goals (Layard 2006, 197) will always lead to questions of meaning-
ful for who and leading to happiness for who. The focus on individualising 
happiness as something we can (and should) address for ourselves is linked 
to prominent positive psychologist, Martin Seligman, and his ideas of 
‘authentic happiness’ (2002). Here we move on to consider ‘positive psy-
chology’ for its influence on happiness economists like Layard, and society 
more broadly.
4.2  positive psycHology
At this juncture, psychology can play an enormously important role. We can 
articulate a vision of the good life that is empirically sound and, at the same 
time, understandable and attractive. We can show the world what actions 
lead to well-being, to positive individuals, to flourishing communities, and 
to a just society. (Seligman 1998)
In his speech to the American Psychological Association (APA) in 1998, 
its new president outlined his hope for a ‘positive psychology’: a psychol-
ogy which could help everyone as ‘a new science of human strengths’ 
(Seligman 1998). Positive psychology was more formally launched some 
two years later in a special issue of the American Psychologist. The editors: 
Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi framed it as a ‘new science’ for the new 
millennium (2000, 8).
The authors proposed a move away from psychology’s pathologising 
tendencies, by which they meant that the academic discipline and practice 
of psychology typically concentrate on the negative and the abnormal, to 
instead focus on the ‘positive features that make life worth living’ (Seligman 
and Csikszentmihalyi 2000, 5). Subsequently, Peterson and Seligman 
developed a formal classification handbook,10 Character Strengths and 
Virtues (2004). There were six virtues: wisdom and knowledge, courage, 
humanity, temperance, transcendence and a series of ‘character strengths’ 
(perhaps more traditionally called a trait) that fell under each category. 
Each of these character strengths is defined behaviourally, and it is recom-
mended that it is measured using psychometric tests.
Having established a person’s strengths, a range of ‘empirically vali-
dated interventions’ were proposed to make the most of their positive 
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traits, rather than address their weaknesses (Seligman et al. 2005). This 
was seen to assist lasting happiness (Seligman et al. 2005). The authors 
attempted to ‘present a measure of humanist ideals of virtue in an empiri-
cal, rigorously scientific manner’ (Peterson and Seligman 2004, back 
cover). These claims were echoed in reviews at the time in publications 
such as the American Journal of Psychiatry (e.g. Cloninger 2005,11 821).
Positive psychology has been lauded (by Seligman and his co-authors) as 
uniting the dispersed and disparate lines of theory and research about what 
makes life most worth living (Seligman et al. 2005). In 2000, Seligman and 
Csikszentmihalyi recognised that ‘positive psychology is not a new idea … 
and [they] make no claim of originality’ (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi 
2000, 13), instead arguing that they were able to present a ‘cumulative, 
empirical body of research to ground’ the ideas of ‘distinguished ancestors’.
It is interesting that positive psychology is presented as a ‘new science’ 
and ‘a cumulative body of research’, as these are also Layard’s claims in his 
book. These new, but linked, sciences, then, work on several levels as a 
valuable body of knowledge to claim that happiness can be a new science. 
The new science asserts that we now know the causes of happiness; that we 
now know the actions we have undertaken in the name of science, which 
are wrong; that these can now be measured; and that these measures can 
overcome philosophical queries via claims to science.
The happiness message here is that knowledge that is both policy-ready 
and accessible (popular, even ‘pop’) rests on clear and encouraging mes-
saging (positive), innovation (new), authority (science) and morality (phi-
losophy). It also, of course, must be measurable on an individual level that 
can be aggregated to population level.12 It is, therefore, entirely dependent 
on well-being data, in particular the newer subjective well-being data that 
emerge from developments in positive psychology and economics’ interest 
in happiness, as an idea that has appeal for policy-makers and the public.
4.3  establisHing a new science of Happiness
Layard’s (2006) book, Happiness: Lessons from a New Science emerged 
from a series of public lectures called ‘Happiness: Has Social Science a 
Clue?’ (Layard 2003). The LSE’s well-being programme was founded as 
a result of Layard’s public lectures. The website states:
Research from the programme has been devoted to understanding the 
causes of wellbeing and how wellbeing affects other outcomes that policy-
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makers care about (such as education and physical health). (LSE Centre for 
Economic Performance n.d.)
The LSE’s well-being programme foregrounds making well-being 
knowledge popular by way of ‘lessons’, making knowledge ‘that policy-
makers care about’. These words might imply that the aspects of happiness 
that policy-makers don’t care about fall outside of the remit of the centre. 
This is indicative of a general feeling amongst some social policy areas that 
the work that they do is ‘invisible’ to policy-makers (as with Holden 2012, 
in the case of culture). Such a feeling is corroborated by academic research 
(e.g. Stevenson et al. 2010; Gray 2004) and evidence that some domains 
of social policy hold more sway with policy-makers than others.
Knowledge that policy-makers care about is, therefore, very much a 
concern. Let’s remember from Chap. 1 that the very idea of using well- 
being data to inform policy decisions (evidence-based policy) hangs on the 
idea that policy-makers can make neutral and objective decisions—if fed 
the right evidence. We have discovered already many indications to the 
contrary, as with the different interpretations of poverty data to suit politi-
cal arguments in Chap. 1. We also know that ‘facts’ which reinforce estab-
lished moral beliefs (or what we feel is right) are attractive to policy-makers 
and the public (Davies 2018) as confirmation biases. What we see here is 
the possibilities for the new ‘science[s] of happiness’ to become influential, 
with some believing the field is dominated by economics’ adaptations of 
psychology’s tools.13 It is easy to see how this might be the case, as a result 
of their capacity for persuasive arguments that we come to later in this 
chapter.
Economics (and its sub-disciplines) tend to have much influence with 
governments and multi-lateral institutions (like the UN, where many 
countries are represented in the decision-making processes). However, 
economists have not necessarily presented ideas in accessible ways as a 
rule. Their relevance to decision-making institutions is also a matter of 
tradition: they have long-held sway and so are highly represented in the 
decision-making process. Similarly, decision-makers tend to be literate in 
the principles of economics and in the UK, there is a trope that all MPs 
attend the very same course at Oxford or Cambridge universities: PPE 
(Philosophy, Politics and Economics)—to the extent that it ‘runs Britain’ 
(Beckett 2017). Decision-making processes are reputedly controlled by 
Treasury’s economic approaches, including the valuation techniques dis-
cussed in Chap. 2. Economics for well-being is an easier message to 
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communicate than economics’ more abstract ideas, and borrowing the 
language of positive psychology is useful in promoting ideas that govern-
ments are, and individuals should be, taking positive action themselves.14
What we can also see, therefore, is the appeal of happiness in making 
economics an applied and more relatable discipline. This attraction can be 
seen in the increase in journal articles on well-being in the EconLit data-
base (EconLit (n.d.) and see Chap. 2). Yet, despite the increase in happi-
ness economics papers and emphasis on the increasingly robust ‘science’ of 
well-being (O’Donnell et al. 2014; Helliwell et al. 2015; ONS 2015a and 
2015b), the lack of conceptual consensus outlined in Chap. 2, and 
expanded on in Chap. 3, has remained a concern for policy-making (Fleche 
et al. 2012, 11). Layard himself told a journalist (Rustin 2012) a decade 
ago that we were a decade away from well-being measures that are good 
enough for policy to be made using them. Yet numerous policy recom-
mendations have been made on account of these measures over the last 
decade, as this book can attest to.
In their advisory paper to the ONS’ MNW Programme, Dolan, 
Metcalfe and Layard explain that any measure of well-being must be 
‘empirically rigorous’, by which they mean ‘that the account of wellbeing 
can be measured in a quantitative way that suggests that it is reliable and 
valid as an account of wellbeing’ (Dolan and Metcalfe 2012, 411). 
Although the insistence that any empirically robust account must always 
be quantitative is preferred practice for certain disciplines, that does not 
mean it should not be questioned. Measurement of well-being basically 
wants to understand either change over time or difference between people 
or groups of people. These data can be captured by qualitative approaches, 
such as diaries or photographs, as described in Chap. 3, and do not need 
to actually be quantitative, therefore.
The authors continue by making an important point regarding any 
measure of well-being: that it should ‘be sensitive to important changes in 
well-being and insensitive to spurious ones. In practice, distinguishing 
between the two is quite a challenge and often relies on judgement based 
on a priori expectations’ (Dolan and Metcalfe 2012, 411). Returning to 
the well-being data examples we have already come across in Chap. 3, 
whether the OECD indicators or a small-scale questionnaire, understand-
ing someone’s well-being using data gathered from any questions will 
have limits.
Recalling our hypothetical example of understanding whether a concert 
in a local park might improve well-being, how do we understand which 
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aspects of the experience were the contributing factors? How can you dis-
aggregate the contribution of the park, from the music itself, the people 
you were with, or the quality of the hotdogs for sale or the length of the 
toilet queue? Let alone understand which contributes to longstanding 
well-being or momentary happiness? Distinguishing between important 
changes to well-being and spurious ones is difficult, and therefore well- 
being data do not always meet Dolan et al.’s (2011a, b) criteria. Evidence 
of the impacts of particular activities and interventions on well- being is 
often criticised, as we discovered in Chap. 3: generally, if you ask certain 
questions because you seek a causal relationship, you are most likely to 
find it. The same is therefore an issue for well-being research more gener-
ally. The theory of confirmation bias is an account of how people tend to 
respond to causal messages which reinforce what they already believed or 
which suits their way of living and or thinking.
Thinking of the Facebook posts that have appeared on my feed in 
recent years, many different accounts, traditions and philosophies (that we 
have touched on briefly in this book) appear in the posts: we should try 
harder, we are trying too hard; we should visualise what we want and go 
for it, we spend too much time living in the future and not enough in the 
present and so on. All of these memes get shared because they appeal to 
things the person sharing already believes. Well-being wisdom repackaged 
is a large part of the wellness industry without any of the concerns with 
contradictions or evidence against the claims made. It appears that happi-
ness economics may be similarly equipped to package simple ideas and 
positive psychology with long-held traditions, empirical evidence and call 
itself a new science.
There are several takeaways from this overview of the new sciences of 
happiness. First, that happiness economics seems to dominate the social 
sciences of well-being. Bearing in mind that all social sciences could be 
argued to be about understanding and improving well-being in some way, 
it is happiness economics that appears to be at the forefront—and that has 
certainly seen the largest increase as a discipline. This is because it has 
gained ‘scientific authority’ based on a couple of factors. First, is the com-
bination of historical examples of moral philosophy, narratives of innova-
tion and claims that the measures are growing increasingly robust. Second, 
these aspects are presented as simply as possible for media, policy and 
public audiences. Yet, the multidimensional nature of well-being means 
that it remains extremely difficult to remove confounders which include 
philosophical and empirical contradictions. It is, therefore, challenging to 
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make and substantiate simple claims to know ‘the causes of well-being’, for 
example. Econometric models typically used to analyse subjective well- 
being data may lay claims to robustness, but are still not economically 
sound (see Cooper, in McKenzie 2015) and use data collected by ques-
tions that do not necessarily translate to the general public (as we shall 
discover later in the chapter).
These measures are, by the admission of prominent well-being experts, 
not neutral or objective measures of subjective well-being, but also involve 
subjective categorisation lists of people’s strengths or moral character 
(such as that in positive psychology) or a country’s development (as in the 
Human Development Index), as well as being the result of a process of 
decision-making when it comes to which data and how to model them. 
Having looked at the disciplines that have led to this new science of well- 
being, we will now turn to the data that inspired it and are generated by 
it. Specifically, we look at the ideas of subjective well-being and the meth-
ods that have shaped subjective well-being data and their prominence.
4.4  wHat is subjective well-being?
Notions of subjective well-being or happiness have a long tradition as cen-
tral elements of quality of life. (OECD 2013, 10)
How Is This Well-being Measure Subjective?
This portrayal of the ‘new science[s]’ of happiness is (as Seligman hints) 
not as new as implied, but also results from fundamental theories and 
indicators of well-being that date back centuries. One important—yet 
confusing—distinction is that there is the idea of experienced well-being 
(how we experience well-being or happiness) that gets called subjective 
well-being and then there are measures of well-being that form objective 
lists, like the OECD’s, that are based on subjective data.
As we have seen, objective approaches to measuring well-being investi-
gate the objective dimensions of a good life (using largely proxy indica-
tors). However, the subjective approach examines people’s subjective 
evaluations of aspects of their own lives by collecting numeric data. For 
example: ‘on a scale of 1–10, how safe do you feel walking home at night?’ 
This is not the same as how people feel about their well-being.
As we have also seen already, a number of well-being indices that were 
established around the same time have recognised the importance of 
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taking people’s perceived well-being into consideration alongside objec-
tive lists in order to measure overall well-being. Subjective well-being data 
are generally captured using questions about how people feel they are 
doing. We are going into more detail about this now, in order to under-
stand how these data can differ, and how they are different from the objec-
tive well- being indicators and the qualitative data described at length in 
the previous chapter. Crucially, it is the subjective well-being data about 
how we think our own well-being is that are the driving force of happiness 
economics and the second wave of well-being (Bache and Reardon 2013). 
As we shall discover, this is largely down to the influence of key advocates, 
such as Layard, in the well-being agenda.
Let’s consider the UK’s ONS’ subjective well-being data. As we have 
previously discovered, it uses four questions to understand what it calls 
‘personal well-being’. The questions are:
1. Overall, how happy did you feel yesterday?
2. Overall, how satisfied are you with your life nowadays?
3. Overall, to what extent do you feel the things you do in your life are 
worthwhile?
4. Overall, how anxious did you feel yesterday?
How are these data used? The answers to these questions are on a scale 
of 0–10 and could be traced over time to see how an individual is doing. 
This is not going to happen in an anonymous national-level survey; instead 
aggregated data are used to understand population-level well-being over a 
specific period or to compare population sub-groups by geography or eth-
nicity, for example.15 Some of these questions with almost identical word-
ing have been in surveys, and therefore generated data, for decades before 
‘the ONS4’ were invented. Therefore, there are baselines to measure 
change against. The fact that these data have been collected over time can 
help establish how a major event such as COVID-19 has affected the well- 
being of the population, as well as more minor events. Chapter 7 runs 
through an example of how a policy change over ten years affects life sat-
isfaction scores over a decade, for example.
These subjective well-being data can therefore be used to see how a 
particular event affected anxiety, alongside other social and structural 
issues, such as, say, poverty. Again, this does not mean that, for example, 
an individual’s household income is looked at against their anxiety levels, 
but that average anxiety of everyone who was asked the question (or, as we 
 S. OMAN
135
might say, the population sampled) is measured against the average house-
hold income levels. There are two things to remember about samples, the 
first is that few surveys are completed by a whole population, so the data 
collected almost always come from a sample; the second is that sampling is 
cleverly worked out so that if you sample enough of the population, you 
can make generalisable claims. Therefore, while national-level surveys do 
not measure nations in their entirety, they can make good estimations 
using mathematical rules. The other thing to say is that poverty can be 
measured using whatever indicator has been decided to represent poverty. 
There are numerous poverty indicators, which could be household 
income, for example, or the IMD (index of multiple deprivation). As we 
discovered in Chap. 1, ‘Introducing Well-being Data’, poverty is not one 
absolute, objective thing when it is discussed in parliament. Politicians 
cherry-pick from absolute and relative poverty measures and across differ-
ent timeframes to arrive at the most complimentary statistics for their 
argument. So, what subjective well-being is measured against can also be 
subjective, in that the data and their uses are not automatically neutral or 
without bias, but are indeed chosen.
What Well-being Means to People Is Subjective
While we have covered what subjective well-being means previously, it is 
important to note that what well-being means for people in their everyday 
lives is subjective. Recalling the free text field analysis discussed in Chap. 
2, when people are asked what is important to their well-being, they pres-
ent different kinds of answers, about different areas of their life.16 Similarly, 
you might look at the aforementioned four questions from the ONS and 
think, ‘well they don’t capture my well-being!’ You might also think about 
how your answer to a question about life satisfaction will have fluctuated 
across a year, or even a day: meanings may not be constant and bad days 
at work or a bad commute will make it fluctuate, affecting how you might 
answer the questions on how satisfied and happy you are overall. Alongside 
these smaller, more everyday interferences to our mood are the major 
events, such as grief, injury, sudden or long-term unemployment, divorce, 
or of course, the generalised anxiety caused by an international pandemic. 
Answers to these questions can reflect a fleeting positive experience, such 
as attending a concert, or reflect something you are missing out on, on a 
longer term: good relationships, a stable job, mobility or good mental 
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health. When we come to the different measures, we shall see how these 
are accounted for—to a degree.
As we shall discover, subjective well-being is complex to capture in a 
way that can inform behaviour. There are often trade-offs to supposedly 
positive choices. People who enter into adult education as mature stu-
dents, for example, gain the pleasure of learning and feeling purpose in 
their life (Duckworth and Cara 2012), and although the negative effects 
are less studied (Field 2009), people miss many hedonic aspects of subjec-
tive well-being that they were previously used to, because time and energy 
for social and leisure activities are further compromised (Aldridge and 
Lavender 2000). The same can be seen in data about parenthood (i.e. 
Pollmann-Schult 2014): it’s rewarding, but you lose fun, time, money and 
autonomy; other relationships suffer and it can be unexpectedly lonely 
(Oman and Edwards 2020). A simpler binary, as found by White and 
Dolan (2009), is that time spent with children is relatively more rewarding 
than pleasurable, whereas time spent watching television is relatively more 
pleasurable than rewarding.
The measurement of well-being aims to capture how life is lived in 
society so that we can know how people are getting on. But this happens 
at a scale that means the subjective experience of well-being can be lost. 
Different people have different opinions on whether this is important to 
the overall measurements of well-being of populations. Experts who are 
great with numbers work on the basis that if your unit of analysis is a 
population (as in population level), and as long as those whose experiences 
don’t fit the story are outliers, then, it will statistically even out. Therefore, 
crucially, these measures are not necessarily meant to capture how every-
one feels about everything. Instead, they are meant to be able to compare 
whether particular groups are affected or how things might change over 
time. The aim of these measures is to do better at measuring how people 
are doing overall, so that better policy decisions can be made.
Others argue that measuring well-being can obscure ill-being,17 par-
ticularly in already marginalised populations (Ahmed 2012; Tate 2016, 
2017). There is concern that people who are already vulnerable are placed 
at further risk through the way that policy deals with data. For example, 
an issue which has gained prominence since the #MeToo movement is 
sexual harassment in universities. These cases can be obscured as they 
might be considered ‘outliers’, and so not get picked up by data which 
looks for overall well-being trends (Oman and Bull 2021, forthcoming). 
Similarly, marginalised experiences of ill-being are generally less visible 
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(Tate 2016; Oman and Bull 2021, forthcoming; Oman et al. 2015). In 
Chap. 3, we briefly touched on the capacity of the domains and indicators 
in the OECD index, and how unlikely they would be to find the impact of 
policy change, like Bogue’s research on the ‘bedroom tax’. Capturing 
well-being data at scale, therefore, does not always pick up the complexity 
or subjectivities of ill-being.
The second wave of well-being is distinguished from the first, because 
it sees the collection of data about how people feel, at scale. For this to be 
effective, people need to relate to the ideas of well-being they are being 
asked to think about in the survey questions used. However, people do 
not always relate to the task at hand, or, even understand the questions 
asked. In my primary research, people talked about how they felt about 
the idea of measuring well-being (Oman 2017a), as they did in the ONS’ 
national consultations (as discussed in Oman 2015a, 2020). In both cases, 
some said it was a waste of time; that we have more important things to 
worry about. Others said that they didn’t understand how what is mea-
sured reflects their experience, or they didn’t understand the questions 
(Oman 2015a). As we will discover, the ONS also found this when they 
trialled the ONS4. So, although subjective well-being measures are 
thought more democratic (because they are about how people feel), they 
are—of course—by and large decided by experts and defined by experts, 
who preside on advisory boards and write influential working papers to 
the ONS and international agencies. What we see is a tension between 
‘robust approaches’ and ‘understandable to everybody’.
Definitions of Subjective Well-being
Subjective well-being encompasses different aspects (cognitive evaluations 
of one’s life, happiness, satisfaction, positive emotions such as joy and pride, 
and negative emotions such as pain and worry): each of them should be 
measured separately to derive a more comprehensive appreciation of peo-
ple’s lives. (Stiglitz et al. 2009, 16)
Subjective well-being measures aim to capture a number of aspects of 
how well-being is experienced. This moves the focus from the idea that 
what matters in a good life is the presence of a specific set of life circum-
stances or material conditions. Nevertheless, using objective indicators 
with subjective well-being ones enables estimates of the impact that 
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material conditions (measured with objective indicators) have on how 
people feel about their life (subjective well-being measures).
Measuring subjective well-being therefore lends itself to analyses of 
which circumstances and conditions are important for well-being 
(Kahneman and Krueger 2006). Looking at subjective well-being data 
also, then, helps to understand the gap between material living conditions 
and people’s own evaluation of their circumstances (Helliwell 2003). 
These sorts of relationships are normally tested with a specific research 
question, for example: ‘how does wealth improve subjective well-being?’ 
You would pick what variable or data you would like to use to measure 
wealth: personal income, household income, property value, or identify 
where someone sits on a scale of poverty and wealth using a marker, such 
as their postcode. You would then pick how you wanted to measure sub-
jective well-being. Using the ONS4 example, you might want to test the 
difference between how satisfied someone is with their life nowadays, or 
overall (life satisfaction) with how happy they say they were yesterday and 
the relationship between these two and wealth. One such example of this 
is a paper called ‘High Income Improves Evaluation of Life but Not 
Emotional Well-Being’ (Kahneman and Deaton 2010).
The OECD which ‘exist[s] to promote policies that will improve the 
economic and social well-being of people around the world’ (oecd.org) 
have also reported guidelines on measuring subjective well-being. The 
OECD propose a relatively broad definition:
Good mental states, including all of the various evaluations, positive and 
negative, that people make of their lives and the affective reactions of people 
to their experiences. (OECD 2013, 16)
As this book is not aiming to provide a definition or statement of deter-
minants of well-being, but offer the tools to understand how others use 
and understand well-being data, we are going to look at an overview of 
subjective well-being.
The diagram (Fig. 4.1) illustrates the key components of subjective 
well-being, contextualising them in the theories we have encountered 
before. You may remember from Chap. 2 that the eudaimonic is based on 
Aristotelian (c. 330 BC) teachings, and can most simply be understood as 
purpose or flourishing. The hedonic begins with Epicurious ([341–270 BC] 
1994), but is more familiar with the well-being agenda as a utilitarian 
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principle (Bentham 1996 [1789]). It is most simply understood as plea-
sure, but more accurately means positive feeling.
You will see how the divide of pleasure versus purpose is then captured 
as measurable aspects of life, and how they relate to each other, whether 
that is in someone’s experience and feeling, their satisfaction or a sense 
that their life is worthwhile in various ways.18 Inside each bubble on the 
right-hand side is the name of the type of subjective well-being measure 
(i.e. Life Satisfaction), underneath that is an example of the question or 
method used, and underneath that, a survey in which these questions have 
been used (the anomaly being ESM, which is not really used in national- 
level surveys, as I will explain, but is suitable in mobile apps data collec-
tion). I found it took me a long time to acclimatise to the idea that all of 
these measures and approaches are called subjective well-being; that they 
are related, yet so varied in approach, and use similar language. The next 
section walks you through this diagram, with examples from each ‘bub-





Affect at a specific time
- anxious yesterday?
e.g. ONS4
Affect over time 








- satisfied with life overall? 
e.g. ONS4 
Domain Satisfaction 
- satisfied with health? 
e.g. Understanding Society
General Happiness 
- Cantril's ladder 
e.g. Gallup World poll
Eudaimonic
Overall self-evaluation




- Ryff's PWB scale
e.g. Gallup World poll]
Fig. 4.1 Accounts and examples of subjective well-being measures. (Adapted 
from Oman 2017a)
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4.5  subjective well-being measures 
for Decision-making
There have been many attempts to classify the different ways in which 
subjective well-being can be measured for policy purposes (Kahneman and 
Riis 2005; Dolan et al. 2011a, b; Waldron 2010). According to the rec-
ommendations on measuring well-being to the ONS, there are three uses 
for any well-being measure in policy: monitoring progress, informing pol-
icy design and policy appraisal (Dolan et al. 2011a). There are also three 
broad types of subjective well-being measure: evaluation (global assess-
ments), experience (feelings over time or at specific times) and eudaimonic 
(reports of purpose and meaning, and worthwhile things in life). Table 4.1 
shows how each of the three ‘types’ of subjective well-being can be used 
to measure well-being in a way which best informs policy. This section 
walks you through the array of subjective well-being measures and meth-
ods that feature in Fig. 4.1.
Evaluation Measures
Life satisfaction is the most commonly used evaluative measure of well- 
being (Fleche et al. 2012). Life satisfaction data are collected using questions 
Table 4.1 Subjective well-being measures and their uses in policy
Monitoring 
progress






Domain satisfaction, for example: 
Relationships; health; work; 






















Worthwhile things in life
‘Reward’ from activities




Adapted from Dolan et al. (2011a)
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similar to question 2 in the ONS4, ‘Overall, how satisfied are you with your 
life nowadays?’ The measure is popular with economists for policy-relevant 
research for numerous reasons. First, because of its longstanding prevalence 
in international and national-level surveys, such as Health Survey England, 
and more recently, the OECD’s high-profile Better Life Index. Second, it is 
thought to be accessible to policy-makers (Donovan and Halpern 2002). 
Third, some believe it to be the idea of subjective well-being that overlaps 
most successfully with how people make decisions in their own lives 
(Kahneman et al. 1999). However, some evidence suggests that, as a con-
cept, life satisfaction is not understood by all members of the general public, 
particularly those who are marginalised in some way (Oman 2017a; Ralph 
et al. 2011). We might also question how universal a measure it is in develop-
ing contexts, which calls into question its utility on a global scale.
General happiness has been used as an alternative to life satisfaction and 
features in many international-level surveys. Key happiness variables seem 
to impact on general happiness responses in a similar way as life satisfaction 
(Dolan et al. 2011a, b; Waldron 2010). The measure aims to assess a per-
son’s general happiness, and a popular example of trying to collect data on 
this concept is Cantril’s (1965) ‘ladder of life’19 (see Fig. 4.2). The Gallup 
World Poll uses the principles of Cantril’s ladder, where the questions are 
asked using a scale. This is a ‘self-anchoring ladder’, which asks respon-
dents to evaluate their current life from 0 (worst possible life) to 10 (best 
possible life).
The term ‘general happiness’ can be used in reports (i.e. World 
Happiness Reports Helliwell et al. 2017, 2019) to mean the general hap-
piness of a nation, or indeed, as John Stuart Mill20 intended, ‘the sum of 
individual happinesses’ (Mill, cited in Crisp 1997, 78). This can be confus-
ing and is something to be mindful of. It is not always clear if the term 
general happiness, when used to refer to population happiness, means tak-
ing individual-level data from something like Cantril’s ladder and multi-
plying it to derive a population-level measure, or if it is another measure, 
such as life satisfaction, used at scale.
Domain satisfaction is an approach which is interested in how people 
evaluate different features of their life, such as ‘work-life balance’ or ‘rela-
tionships’. These different features of our lives are grouped together into 
domains, which we have seen as a prominent feature in the objective lists 
approach. With the UK’s national well-being domains, that would be: 
personal finance, the economy, what we do, health (Physical and mental), 
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education and skills, our relationships, governance, where we live, the 
environment. In theory you could collect satisfaction data about each 
domain, and if a person were satisfied with all domains this could demon-
strate overall ‘life satisfaction’.
An example of a question to derive domain satisfaction data is from 
Understanding Society: UK Household Longitudinal Study (University of 
Assume that this ladder is a way of picturing your life. The top of the ladder represents the 
best possible life for you. The bottom rung of the ladder represents the worst possible life 
for you.














Fig. 4.2 Cantril’s ladder. (Adapted from Cantril 1965)
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Essex et al. 2020), in which respondents are asked to rate their satisfaction 
with their general health on a scale from ‘completely dissatisfied’ to ‘com-
pletely satisfied’. Domain satisfaction data can be used to compare the 
reality of life with various standards of success (Veenhoven 1996, 30). 
Various domain satisfaction measures have been shown to correlate with 
numerous socio-demographic characteristics relative to income, health 
and gender, for example, and this has been replicated across studies (Dolan 
et al. 2008). Confusingly, sometimes the term ‘domain satisfaction’ is used 
to describe satisfaction across all domains (van Praag et al. 2003) but it 
more frequently refers to satisfaction within a specific domain, such as 
‘satisfaction with personal relationships’, or ‘satisfaction with health’ 
which both appear in the UK’s national well-being measures. As with the 
case in this index, domain satisfaction is most often used in an objective list 
approach with other administrative data. This means not all the domains 
are measured using satisfaction data, but with proxy data, such as crime 
rate or education level.
Affect is a term used to describe the experience of feeling or emotion and 
is prevalent in psychology. As an aside, the term has recently been taken up 
in the broader social sciences and humanities to describe emotion and 
experience in a less medicalised way (Sedgwick and Frank 2003; Thrift 
2004; Massumi 2002; Ahmed 2010; Berlant 2011; Wetherell 2012, etc.). 
While the concept is linked, these theoretical uses of the concept of affect 
are not really captured by surveys, which is an important distinction that 
is rarely acknowledged.
General Affect means how people are doing overall and is a concept 
which is understood in evaluation questions. In psy-sciences,21 it is the 
relative frequency of positive and negative affect that is thought to be key 
to how we experience well-being. The Affect Balance Scale (Bradburn 
1969) and the Positive and Negative Affect Scale, or PANAS (Watson 
et al. 1988; see Fig. 4.3), involve questionnaires that are designed to gain 
numerical responses to general statements about different affects. These 
questions are also used in some large-scale surveys, such as the English 
Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA n.d.).
Influential psychologists Huppert and Whittington have cautioned for 
some time that different versions of positive and negative scales are less 
similar than implied. Also, these scales are susceptible to change and adap-
tations in surveys. This must be accounted for when considering 
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subjective well-being metrics which use them. Affect is also a key part of 













__________ Interested __________ Irritable
__________ Distressed __________ Alert
__________ Excited __________ Ashamed
__________ Upset __________ Inspired
__________ Strong __________ Nervous
__________ Guilty __________ Determined
__________ Scared __________ Attentive
__________ Hostile __________ Jittery
__________ Enthusiastic __________ Active
__________ Proud __________ Afraid
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions.  
Read each item and then list the number from the scale below next to each word. 
Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment 
OR indicate the extent you have felt this way over the past week (circle the 
instructions you followed when taking this measure)
Scoring instructions:
Positive Affect Score: Add the score on items 1, 3, 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, and 19. Scores 
can range from 10 – 50, with higher scores representing higher levels of positive affect. 
Mean Scores: Momentary = 29.7 (SD = 7.9); Weekly = 33.3 (SD = 7.2)
Negative Affect Score: Add scores on items 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 15, 18, and 20. Scores 
can range from 10 – 50, with lower scores representing lower levels of negative affect. 
Mean Score: Momentary = 14.8. (SD = 5.4); Weekly = 17.4 (SD = 6.2)




Experience measures aim to capture a person’s feelings at a given, specific 
time which can be thought of as ‘the amount of affect felt in any moment’ 
(Dolan et al. 2011a, 7). Measures are constructed with the Benthamite 
view that certain aspects of life are good or bad, based on their qualities of 
‘pleasurableness’ or painfulness (Crisp 2006). How happy, sad or anxious 
any person is at a particular time is re-conceived as well-being by taking 
the average balance of pleasure (or enjoyment) over pain, measured over 
the relevant period. As already pointed out directly above, there is some 
evidence that positive and negative affect do not directly predict each 
other and should therefore be measured separately. Heeding Huppert and 
Whittington’s concerns (2003), positive psychology has more recently 
begun to conceive of well-being as a continuum (ONS n.d., 3; Diener 
et al. 2009), rather than something which can be assessed by taking the 
average of positive and negative measures. The experience approach relied 
on in surveys will tend to specify a period of time for you to remember 
how you felt. In the ONS4, this is the only account with two questions, 
one for happy yesterday and one for anxious yesterday (see also Table 4.1). 
As well as specifying the exact moment you want someone to recall, other 
methods capture people’s emotions at multiple points in a day or week, 
and for that reason, they are not really included in national-level surveys, 
which would be difficult to administer. However, they are suitable for 
mobile apps, as we shall discover.
The Day Reconstruction Method (DRM) (Kahneman et  al. 2004) is 
perhaps the most renowned of numerous measures which attempt to cap-
ture experienced well-being over time which is called the experience sam-
pling method (ESM). The DRM is a diary-based technique, through which 
participants reflect on the main episodes that affected them on the previ-
ous day and recall the type and intensity of feelings. In other words, it 
literally takes a sample of feelings from specific days and weeks. Affect is an 
aspect of subjective well-being that is particularly sensitive to immediate 
surroundings and activities (Smith and Exton 2013, 230). This is why it is 
considered suitable for understanding the relationship between what we 
do and how we feel, as well as situational aspects of life that affect us.
For example, short-term affect data can be collected through DRM 
approaches to include information about both activities and locations, as 
well as the affective states accompanying them (Kahneman and Sugden 
2005). Such an approach has the potential to capture data on how people 
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spend their time and the ‘experienced utility’ (Kahneman and Sugden 
2005) of such activities. For example, 132 teachers in the Netherlands 
completed a daily diary on three consecutive work days as well as a back-
ground questionnaire (Tadić et  al. 2013). The researchers found that 
despite a lack of work-life balance, working hard was not necessarily detri-
mental to the teachers’ happiness scores. If you take these scores at face 
value, then if the teachers were ambitious, then striving towards their 
goals was satisfying, but this motivation was not necessarily constant.
The Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA) (Stone et al. 1999) is 
based on self-reports of well-being at specific, but often randomly chosen 
points in time. Reports explicitly include self-assessments of behaviours and 
physiological measures, but also the recording of events. In Chap. 5, we 
discuss how an app alerts its users to record how happy they feel at random 
moments, allowing the user (and whoever is capturing their data) to track 
their mood over time and establish what is good for their mood. The 
researcher who developed ‘mappiness’ has used these data to measure a 
number of aspects of happiness: that we are most miserable commuting, on 
the one hand, and that ‘happiness is greater in natural environments’, for 
example (MacKerron and Mourato 2013; Krekel and MacKerron 2020). 
These data have also been used (Fujiwara and MacKerron 2015) to com-
pare how happy people feel doing different kinds of activities from bird-
watching, to making love; and more specifically, between artforms, such as 
watching the performing arts or reading alone.
An exploration of the determinants of, and changes to, affect and time- 
use may offer understandings of how people’s ‘experiences of utility’ vary. 
Returning to the example of the local, subsidised concert in Chap. 3, 
again, the questions we asked there can help us understand how people’s 
responses to the cost, amount of time and effort vary, and how that 
changed their declaration of how they felt. This may be at odds with the 
‘utility’ assumed by ‘the provider’, whether that is the local council, a the-
atre company or another funder.
However, it is important to remember that people who attended our 
hypothetical park concert, self-selected to do so. This is one of the key 
issues with valuing how people experience social and cultural activities: it 
makes it difficult to say how a particular experience might affect others in 
the future (Dolan et al. 2011b, 12). Also, people are liable to ‘mind wan-
derings’, which can mean they are not thinking of what you think they are 
when you ask them how they are feeling (ibid.: 8). Furthermore, what 
makes sense, or represents the experience of one person may not manifest 
in the average of a sample.
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These approaches ostensibly measure at different points during the day 
and they relate to experiences associated with specific activities and time 
points. However, because in a national-level survey, large population sam-
ples are questioned at certain points during the year, it is not feasible to 
repeatedly survey respondents during a particular day. As an alternative, 
the rationale with the ONS4 experience measures is to ‘replicate’ or 
‘proxy’ ESM approaches by asking respondents for their experiences and 
feelings relating to a whole day (yesterday).
While there is potential for the measurement of change in affect and 
time-use longitudinally, questions remain as to whether existing national- 
level survey data can capture the sensation and emotion of ‘situated expe-
rience’ (how it felt, to be there, in that moment) in a meaningful way, and 
to do so over time. In cultural policy studies, there is often a call for lon-
gitudinal measurement of the relationship between cultural participation 
and aspects of well-being. It is thought that this will solve some of the 
proclaimed issues with the evidence base (around data and causation, dis-
cussed in the latter chapters of the book). However, while longitudinal 
analysis can help address issues of causal direction in the evidence, they will 
not address issues related to capturing the duration of the impact of an 
experience, and this also is not always clearly understood (Oman 2017b).
‘Eudaimonic’ Measures
Some conceive of eudaimonia as part of subjective well-being (Dolan et al. 
2011a, b), while others choose to conceive of subjective well- being as 
purely hedonic (‘happiness’, ‘life satisfaction’ and ‘affect’). Eudaimonic or 
‘eudemonic’ theories conceive of people needing purpose and as having 
various underlying psychological needs, such as control and connected-
ness (Ryff 1989). Likewise, that satisfying these needs contributes towards 
well-being independently of any pleasure they may bring (Hurka 1993). 
These accounts draw on Aristotle’s ‘eudaimonia’ as what makes for a 
good life.
 Psychological Well-being
In the 1960s, Harold Dupuy, psychologist at the National Center for 
Health Statistics, developed his Psychological General Well-being (PGWB) 
Schedule, a questionnaire of 68 items to measure the psychological distress 
of the American population. It was reduced and simplified to 18 items for 
introduction to a general health survey in the 1970s and then increased to 
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22 items to become the PGWB Index. One of the case studies in Chap. 7 
uses the PGWBI, adapted again for an Italian survey.
Developed by psychologist Carol D.  Ryff, the 42-item Psychological 
Wellbeing (PWB) Scale measures six aspects of well-being and happiness: 
autonomy, environmental mastery, personal growth, positive relations 
with others, purpose in life and self-acceptance (Ryff 1989). Again, differ-
ent versions of the scale have been adapted to suit different contexts, 
including an 18-item version (Ryff and Keyes 1995). Ryff and Keyes 
(1995) compared their eudaimonic measures with evaluations of life satis-
faction and happiness, finding that self-acceptance and environmental 
mastery were associated, but that positive relations with others, purpose in 
life, personal growth and autonomy were less well correlated.
 Worthwhileness and Overall Evaluation
More simply, eudaimonia is related to ideas of worthwhileness that are 
connected to the diagnosed psychological needs listed above and, but can 
also be addressed with one question, as with the ONS in Fig. 4.1. White 
and Dolan (2009) measured the ‘worthwhileness’ associated with activi-
ties using the DRM method. They found some discrepancies between 
those activities that people find ‘pleasurable’ as compared to ‘rewarding’. 
The example they used is that spending your time watching telly brings 
pleasure, but few rewards, while spending time with children is the 
opposite.
How These Measures Can Be Applied
There are important distinctions when considering how aspects of hap-
piness economics can apply value to what we do. Recalling the photo 
album versus TV example from Chap. 2, it can be difficult to ascribe value 
to others’ activities. Ateca-Amestoy has tried to explain the value of leisure 
as a psychological need for different kinds of experiences, and which 
impact on how we evaluate our quality of life.
[L]eisure is a human need to be fulfilled by household production and con-
sumption of what we may call ‘leisure experiences’. Those experiences are 
commodities that fall directly within the individual’s determination and 
assessment of his/her quality of life. This means that leisure is one of the 
arguments of the individual’s utility function, one of the instances from 
which he/she will achieve well-being. (Ateca-Amestoy 2011, 53)
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The importance of understanding the different kinds of well-being 
benefits offered by different types of leisure has been an aim of high- 
profile research over the isolated periods of COVID-19 lockdowns 
(https://www.covidsocialstudy.org/). That some activities offer hedonic 
utility, such as streaming and television watching, and some offer eudai-
monic, such as reading (and some both, of course), is being studied (Bu 
et al. 2020; Mak et al. 2020; Nuffield 2021). However, what people do is 
often polarised as ‘watching television excessively’ (Bu et  al. 2020, 7), 
with claims that ‘these changes in behaviours and mental health are 
reflected in people’s assessments of the differences in their lives between 
this lockdown and that of spring 2020’ (Nuffield 2021). This is slightly 
misleading: from the evidence presented, we do not know that it is peo-
ple’s behaviour that has changed people’s assessments of their lives, when 
policy-making and poor weather in a pandemic are arguably having a 
greater affect than watching the telly. As you may recall, this is one limit of 
applying the ‘Greatest Happiness’ principle and can also be the conse-
quence of confirmation bias. For example, the Sarkozy Commission con-
trasted ‘cultural events’ with ‘poor leisure’22 (Stiglitz et al. 2009, 49) and 
Layard’s analysis of television’s negative effects was inevitably biased by an 
idea of good leisure.23 However, as we have discovered, assumptions as to 
what qualifies as good leisure and poor leisure are problematic ethically, 
and will not present universal results.
That pleasure and reward do not map onto each other neatly aligns 
with Aristotelian thinking. The think tank, New Economics Foundation 
(NEF), has been highly influential in UK well-being research since the 
mid-2000s. Its definition of well-being is ‘developing as a person, being 
fulfilled, and making a contribution to the community’ (Shah and Marks 
2004, 2). The report, ‘A Well-Being Manifesto for a Flourishing Society’ 
(Shah and Marks 2004), called for well-being to be foregrounded and for 
governments to work towards a ‘flourishing society’ with ‘happy, healthy, 
capable and engaged’ citizens (Shah and Marks 2004, 2). In 2008, NEF 
introduced a set of guidelines called the ‘Five Ways to Wellbeing’, based 
‘around the themes of social relationships, physical activity, awareness, 
learning, and giving’ (Aked et al. 2008, 17), summarised as connect, be 
active, take notice, keep learning and give.
The ‘Five Ways’ have proven successful, and have been adopted in parts 
of the National Health Service and by organisations such as Mind, the 
mental health charity,24 as well as many other social policy areas. Individual 
institutions have chosen to adapt it when offering well-being advice to 
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staff and other members of the institution. The University of Manchester, 
for example (The University of Manchester n.d.), has adapted it into its 
‘six ways to well-being’ which is used to frame its advice to students and 
staff. The cultural sector has embraced the guidelines, both in arts prac-
tices aimed at improving well-being (Dodd and Jones 2014) and as a 
means of evaluation of eudaimonic and broader well-being aspects of cul-
tural engagement (Daykin and Joss 2016). According to a review of the 
evidence from international arts and health literature, ‘[t]he benefits from 
arts programmes resonate strongly with the evidence-based “five ways to 
wellbeing” model of mental health: connect, take notice, keep learning, be 
active, give’ (Bidwell 2014, 3).
The success of the ‘Five Ways’ is down to legibility of its framework to 
many policy sectors, people in the general population and policy-makers. 
Let us briefly return to the takeaway conclusions from how the new sci-
ences of happiness generate knowledge that is both policy-ready and 
accessible (popular, even ‘pop’) rests on clear and encouraging messaging 
(positive), innovation (new), authority (science) and morality (philoso-
phy). The Five Ways to well-being meet all of these criteria, perhaps more 
than the idea of subjective well-being in and of itself. We will move towards 
closing, by looking at the ONS4 as a case study to understand the impor-
tance of legibility, transparency and understanding, when deciding on how 
to collect subjective well-being data.
4.6  case stuDy: subjective well-being, by 
tHe office for national statistics’ Design
The UK’s national well-being measures are categorised into ten domains. 
These are as follows: Our Relationships; Health; What we do; Where we 
live; Personal Finance; Economy; Education and Skills; Governance; 
Environment; Personal Well-being.25 Each of the ten domains is com-
posed of multiple indicators, just like the OECD’s index that is described 
in detail in Chap. 3. The subjective well-being domain was named per-
sonal well-being, because it was thought to make this domain more under-
standable to a general audience, which was considered  particularly 
important to the MNW programme.26 This domain comprises ‘the 
ONS4’.27 Table 4.2 presents the questions, together with their rationale.
‘The ONS4’ were designed to capture three types of subjective well- 
being: evaluative, eudaimonic and affective experience. The four 
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individual subjective well-being questions ask people to give their 
answers on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is ‘not at all’ and 10 is ‘com-
pletely’. The ONS considered consolidating the figure of all four mea-
sures to provide a single measure of personal well-being. Just as with the 
HDI in Chap. 2’s discussion of objective lists, this single number is 
easier to communicate and is most often discussed in national media and 
by politicians. It was, however, not considered conceptually robust to 
do so. Here, again, we see a tension between robust and easy to 
understand.
The first results from trialling the ONS4 were published in April 2011 
(ONS 2011a). The aim was to gather responses from survey participants 
which are an ‘assessment of their life overall, as well as providing an indica-
tion of their day-to-day emotions’ (ONS 2015a, 5). ‘The ONS4’ gained 
National Statistics status in September 2014 and, since then, have contin-
ued to be introduced to surveys across government. They are, therefore, 
not necessarily intended to be used by themselves. Table 4.3 shows the 
variety of these surveys and the sorts of data they capture. The Government 
Statistical Service has more recently published advice on the harmonisa-
tion of the ONS4 (Nickson 2020). This aims to ensure subjective well- 
being statistics and data are ‘comparable, consistent and coherent’ across 
government departments and beyond.
While we know that the ONS4 capture the different aspects of subjective 
well-being, and there were many reports and working papers from the time, 
it was quite difficult to find methodological or administrative detail readily 
Table 4.2 The ONS4 capture different aspects of well-being
ONS’ questions on personal well-being Specific perspectives on personal well-being, from 
which the questions are drawn
‘Overall, how satisfied are you with 
your life nowadays?’
This comes from the evaluative approach to 
measuring subjective well-being (i.e. a cognitive 
assessment of how life is going)
‘Overall, to what extent do you feel 
the things you do in your life are 
worthwhile?’
From the eudaimonic approach
‘Overall, how happy did you feel 
yesterday?’
This is about experience, specifically positive affect
‘Overall, how anxious did you feel 
yesterday?’
Experience, negative affect
Source: Adapted from Allin and Hand (2017)
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Table 4.3 Surveys containing the ONS4











Labour market data including 
employment and unemployment, 
as well as housing, ethnicity, 








Level of assets, savings and debt; 
saving for retirement; how 
wealth is distributed among 
households or individuals; and 












Household spending patterns for 
the consumer prices index and 
for GDP figures and detailed 











Experience of crime and 
attitudes to crime- related issues 
such as the police, the criminal 
justice system, and perceptions 









Collects information on a variety 
of topics that are too small to 
have surveys of their own. Topics 
that have been previously 
commissioned include smoking 
habits, cancer awareness, 










Diary entry survey. The 
substantive domains are main 
activity (49 categories), 
secondary activity (10 
categories), location and means 
of transport (11 categories) and 
with whom (8 categories). The 
temporal identifier holds 
information on the time when 





















Social mixing; transition to 
adulthood; teamwork, 















Measures how disabled and 
non-disabled people participate 














Psychological health and 





study of ageing 
(ELSA)
Information on the health, 
social, well-being and economic 
circumstances of the English 













Young people’s health, diet, what 
they do in their free time, 
bullying and whether they smoke, 









Information on the views and 
experiences of MoD personnel 
which helps shape policies for 
training, support, and the terms 












Information on personals in the 
MoD spouses in a number of 
areas including accommodation, 
healthcare, education and 
childcare, and deployment.
2012 Annual
Impact of FE 
learning survey
Attitudes towards further 
education, including funding, 
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Age, type, condition and energy 
efficiency of housing stock and 














Participation in and engagement 
with cultural and sporting 
activities at the individual level, 








Volunteering, charitable giving, 









Food and you Reported behaviours, attitudes 
and knowledge relating to food 
issues such as reported food 
purchasing, storage, preparation 
and consumption. It also looks at 
eating habits, influences on where 
respondents choose to eat out and 







Opinions on a wide range of 
issues affecting people living in 















Labour force estimates that 
include the official measure of 
employment and unemployment 














on people and 
the natural 
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What does it mean to live well? 
How well are we really living as a 
nation, and why? This study aims 
to provide the answers—by 
defining, measuring and tracking, 
over a number of years, what it 

















The survey which will gather 
insightful and comprehensive 
information about graduate 
outcomes. The four ONS 


















Aims to be the largest ever survey 
of single parents in Scotland. The 
results will feed into OPFS and 
GCU’s community connections 
project funded by the Scottish 
government innovation fund. 
The project aims to tackle 
isolation, loneliness and poor 









The Land Trust is dedicated to 
providing free public open space 
for the benefit of communities. 
Land Trust commissioned carney 
green to undertake a social value 







Our people survey was carried 
out in order to gauge honest 
opinions from staff on how they 
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available on how the questions themselves were decided on. In particular, the 
final wording chosen. In parallel to my PhD research, and after much search-
ing, I found a detailed report to the Technical Advisory Group (Ralph et al. 
2011) on the findings from 44 interviews.
This report is phase 2 of qualitative findings from testing the ONS4. 
Notably, not all the responses to the trials were positive in this report. 
Limitations were found in how able people were to answer the questions. 






Sport England Measuring the number of people 
aged 14 and over taking part in 



















Includes 3 of the ONS4—does 





An evaluation survey of the 
initial entrants onto the talent 
match programme. The overall 
objectives of the programme are 
to support 25,000 individuals 
with the goal of 5400 entering 
employment.
2014 Not updated





The areas of interest for this 
survey were:
• general health
• diet and physical activity
• smoking











The survey investigates the 
learning and teaching experiences 
of students, including satisfaction 
with courses, reasons for 
dissatisfaction, experience of 
different-sized classes, total time 
spent working, perceptions of 
value for money, institutional 







Interestingly, when it came to the life satisfaction question (thought to be 
the most robust, as you may remember), not everyone thought that being 
satisfied with life was positive; some believed it neutral and some thought 
it a negative commentary on their lives (Ralph et al. 2011, 5). With the 
‘worthwhile’ question, answers were affected by what was seen as social 
desirability, leading to inflated scores. This is known as response bias, and 
meant that certain people (arguably with lower subjective well-being) did 
not want to appear as if they did not have worthwhile lives to the inter-
viewer (Ralph et al. 2011, 5). A later phase in the cognitive testing also 
details how, when the questions are administered face to face, people felt 
uncomfortable giving negative scores in front of loved ones (ONS 2012, 7).
When it comes to understanding the meaning of the questions, the 
qualitative report also states that:
Where the question was not understood this tended to be by those with 
lower educational attainment. This group simply did not understand the 
term ‘worthwhile’. (Ralph et al. 2011, 5)
In some ways, what is more concerning is that:
For the most vulnerable respondents, answering this question was distress-
ing and in some cases respondents became visibly upset. It is recommended 
that ONS investigate the possibility of creating a flier that interviewers can 
leave with respondents, which tells them where they can seek help if it is 
required. (Ralph et al. 2011, 5)
Having a protocol at the end of research interview, should the inter-
view have covered sensitive issues, is standard ethical practice in qualitative 
research, but less so in survey collection methods. It is not clear whether 
filers were trialled after asking participants these questions.
In summary, there were a number of issues that the qualitative research 
in 2011 uncovered with these four questions. These include: how accu-
rately people were able to answer, based on their understanding of the 
questions; how honestly people felt capable of being when answering sen-
sitive questions; and that arguably these questions could be detrimental 
for someone who was not experiencing good well-being. These issues 
revealed by the testing were brought to the attention of the programme’s 
advisory groups.
The minutes from the Technical Advisory Group in 2011 outline the 
importance placed on these four questions. Lord Layard refers to these 
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questions as ‘the work of the ONS’ and outlines that it is the status of this 
work that is the aim of the wider MNW programme, which reiterates the 
importance of this new subjective well-being data to the broader agenda. 
Layard also outlined his concerns that the ‘UK is less likely to set interna-
tional agenda if introducing unnecessary changes’ (ONS 2011b). These 
minutes might suggest that what was learnt from the trials were unlikely 
to be able to change the new measures, which we have discovered were 
built from a synthesis of disciplines and authority.
The Technical Advisory Group (TAG) had disappeared from the ONS 
publications archive when I was originally undertaking this research to try 
and ‘follow the data’, and understand the methodological origins of the 
questions. However, I was able to find a record of the group by way of a 
fellow researcher. The National Statistician, Jill Matheson, refers to a 
National Statistician’s Advisory Forum and a Technical Advisory Group. 
All traceable records of TAG meetings are headed by a list of those pres-
ent. Only ONS, civil service and academic economists were present at the 
meetings in the minutes I was able to locate. However, another academic 
researcher confided to me during my ethnography fieldwork that there 
was a clear hierarchy in the programme and psychologists were rarely lis-
tened to, with the economics experts dominating  proceedings. This 
appears to be substantiated by minutes regarding the development of the 
SWB measures (ONS 2011a). It also corroborates claims that economists 
dominate how evidence is presented, acknowledged and applied in these 
forums. However, it is important to note that these are not impartial 
accounts, either.
Psychologists reflecting on phase 2 of the testing of the questions 
advised that they could cause psychological distress in some participants, 
but this concern is absent from other outputs. Notably the report on 
phase 3 (ONS 2012) mentions it found no issue of difference in legibility 
for different people, unlike phase 2 (Ralph et al. 2011). More importantly, 
however, it does not acknowledge that one phase of research found the 
ONS4 questions to be detrimental to well-being. As you can see, looking 
under the bonnet of the data presents questions about how the measures 
work in practice, how they are decided on and by who, and what evidence 
of success becomes part of record and what disappears.  It also reveals 
issues with regards to how data collection on well-being can be detrimen-
tal to well-being that are rarely considered.
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4.7  summarising wHat measuring subjective 
well-being Does
So, as we have discovered, subjective well-being is often characterised as 
being concerned with happiness alone (OECD 2013, 10). Instead, sub-
jective well-being is a more complex combination of various aspects of the 
lived experience; it involves several distinct ideas with disciplinary and 
theoretical histories. While these concepts can sometimes correlate when 
measured, the evidence for this remains inconclusive (Clark and Senik 
2011 in Fleche et al. 2012, 9). Research using secondary subjective well- 
being data, therefore, should clearly establish the conceptual differences 
between different components of subjective well-being, to be sure that 
what is aimed to be measured is what is actually being measured. 
Furthermore, this could be better communicated.
While subjective well-being has been thought to predict behaviour in 
meaningful ways (Diener and Tov 2012), the subjective well-being mea-
sures we have encountered are thought valuable because they enable an 
empirical examination of the factors which cause improved or reduced 
well-being (Fleche et  al. 2012, 10). Some economists (such as Layard) 
believe that these qualities make these approaches an improvement on 
traditional micro-economics approaches which rely on notions of utility. 
Utility, as we discovered in Chap. 2, is the idea that satisfaction is experi-
enced by consuming a good or service and that ‘rational choice’ drives 
consumers to remove dissatisfaction (or discomfort) and to maximise on 
this satisfaction.
In general, subjective well-being data allow for an assessment of the 
positive or negative contribution of one factor (such as public libraries) 
over another, which may seem unrelated (such as being made redundant), 
to well-being. This therefore allows an appraisal of different factors which 
can be both monetary and non-monetary (Fleche et al. 2012). However, 
we must also remember that it can be difficult to separate spurious from 
essential well-being effects, and doing so often relies on human judgement.
The qualities of these newer measures of subjective well-being have led 
to influential figures, such as Lord O’Donnell28 arguing for ‘a well-being 
approach’ to inform decisions that manage COVID-19 (O’Donnell 
2020). O’Donnell and other advocates for this type of well-being approach 
argue that well-being measures should inform ‘trade-offs’ and ‘the true 
costs of lockdowns’, for example, by declines in mental health and access 
to healthcare (O’Donnell 2020). It could be a means of deciding the 
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balance between how one policy move related to protecting the economy 
(which includes people’s jobs) to another, such as healthcare (which 
includes its own financial considerations and multiple mortality rates). It is 
also this approach that helps unpick the assumed correlation between hav-
ing money and attaining happiness that we opened this chapter with.
The different definitions of subjective well-being further complicate 
issues for those wanting to use well-being data in their research or to 
understand the research of others. The confusing naming conventions, 
overlapping definitions and disagreements as to what counts as subjective 
well-being, objective well-being, personal well-being or societal well- 
being also don’t help those wanting to understand the ways in which well- 
being measurement more broadly furthers knowledge of the human 
experience. There is also work to be done on how the different ideas of 
subjective well-being overlap with longstanding cross-disciplinary beliefs 
and assertions regarding the value of different domains of life to well- 
being that we will encounter later in the book. In short, there is a transpar-
ency gap in the discussions of rigour, classifications and measures in the 
‘science’ and the legibility of what that means to everyday people, despite 
the efforts made to do so.
4.8  conclusion
Looking at the invention of subjective well-being measures in the UK 
offers context behind the ubiquity of well-being measurement practices. 
Understanding the recent history behind a specific way of measuring a 
particular idea of well-being, that is considered robust and universal, is 
vital to appreciate the limitations of such projects. This chapter’s compre-
hensive survey and critical lens aims to offer tools to promote better 
understanding of the power of these well-being data, their capacity to 
change culture and society, and the limits of their application in areas of 
social and cultural policy and practice.
In short, 'the new science of happiness' has much to offer understand-
ings of well-being and the human experience more generally. The tech-
niques, whether originating as national-level social survey questions or 
personal psychological tests, can be adapted and applied to other environ-
ments and have been used widely to understand the impacts of COVID-19. 
Yet, politics, disciplinary and international competition compromise their 
neutrality. These contexts are vital to understanding the subjective well- 
being data generated through survey questions and their uses to inform 
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important decisions in policy development, monitoring and evaluation, 
and the way these, then, promote behaviour change in people.
We have seen evidence that the national well-being measurers want to 
be top of the class, with possibilities that complexities of the questions in 
certain contexts were disregarded. This leaves us with questions. Could it 
be that in the keenness to compete in the new science and the international 
game of devising the best measures, considering the subjective experience 
of people answering questions on subjective well-being may have been 
side-lined? It transpires that less attention is paid to the qualitative trials of 
questions that end up as ‘robust measures’ than you may imagine, as I also 
found with some questions long-used to measure class (discussed in Chap. 
9). Yet, should it be a great surprise that quantitative researchers and 
national statistics offices tend to overlook the qualitative aspects of their 
methodologies? It is hard to say because such evidence is hard to find.29
We have used data on the contexts behind subjective well-being data to 
understand them better: who collected them, interpreted them, looks 
after them and uses them. We have seen some trends emerge across people 
and policy, but found these contextual data have limits to what can be 
understood, too. It can be hard to find all the archival information we 
need, and it can be easy to interpret the absence of evidence as some sort 
of cover-up, when actually in policy-making and public services, institu-
tional memory is often lost through the ‘churn’ of staff and these issues of 
paper trails. There is, sadly, ‘no culture of a repository of knowledge’ 
(Hallsworth et al. 2011, 8). Thus, the data we have on how data are made 
can be as compromised or limiting as the quantitative or qualitative data 
we have been discussing in these last two chapters.
This chapter has looked at the new sciences of happiness as people, 
publications, projects, politicians, agencies and disciplines. Easterlin is pre-
sented as the turning point in this tale, because he offers a useful narrative 
device. However, the limitations of how economics was used to under-
stand human flourishing have been known longer—as presented in Chap. 
2—and indeed in the introduction to Easterlin’s paper. Discovering the 
stories behind data in this way, we are able to see how all these different 
components work together to make the well-being agenda. We can also 
see that it is the subjective measures, rather than the compiling of objec-
tive lists, that are the greater driver of the agenda, and that this is—in 
part—owing to claims to innovation.
Essentially, however, the new sciences of happiness: the new measures 
and uses of data from old questions (Allin and Hand 2017), are the driving 
force behind the well-being agenda. At least what we have referred to as 
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‘the second wave’ in this book. Without the technological advances and 
the advocacy for the new measures, we might ask, would we have seen calls 
for the change in policy? Thus, the terms data-driven decision- making and 
evidence-based policy-making take on new meaning—where the promise 
of the possibilities of well-being data changes the policy rhetoric and call 
for more data to be collected. Data do not only capture social change, but 
ensure it, and as the next chapter demonstrates, it feels as if Big Data 
increase this pace of change, but how do they impact on well-being?
notes
1. It is difficult to pinpoint exactly when Layard’s nickname became so preva-
lent. One of the earliest references is in Jeffries (2008). UK Prime Minister 
Tony Blair began appointing special policy advisors in 1998, which led to 
the media nickname of ‘tsars’ (see Levitt and Solesbury 2012 on pol-
icy tsars).
2. Crucially, causes of well-being and objective lists of well-being indicators 
are similar, but not the same. With the OECD example from Chap. 3, 
perception of safety of the local neighbourhood is a proxy indicator of 
well-being, but is not necessarily a primary cause. There is a conceptual 
difference between a condition indicating well-being and a cause of 
well-being.
3. It may be helpful to know that index is a rare word that has two plurals, 
indices and indexes.
4. Both Layard (2006) and Davies (2015) offer engaging commentaries on 
Bentham and his relationship to the Greatest Happiness principle that are 
worth referring to if this history interests you.
5. While equality, diversity and inclusion are ostensibly the same agenda, and 
the words are used interchangeably, there are differences in the separate 
agendas.
6. Further descriptions of the hedonic treadmill can be found in Layard 
(2006), 48–49.
7. For a comprehensive engagement with how the logic of competition has 
bled into all aspects of everyday life, see Davies, W. 2014. The Limits of 
Neoliberalism: authority, sovereignty and the logic of competition. 
London: Sage.
8. See particularly Chapter 1.2 ‘Assessing the sustainable competitiveness of 
nations’.
9. Will Davies describes the cherry picking in the weell-being agenda  suc-
cinctly in this 2015 interview, see Oman (2015b) https://theconversa-




10. These classifications include hope; wisdom; purpose; creativity; future 
mindedness; courage; emotional intelligence; spirituality or purpose; per-
severance; and being an active citizen, socially responsible, loyal, and a 
team member (Peterson and Seligman 2004).
11. Cloninger’s review stated that ‘the major accomplishment of this book is in 
showing that empirically minded humanists can measure character 
strengths and virtues in a rigorous scientific manner’.
12. There is a tension in this mode of measuring happiness at individual level, 
aggregating data, and analysing patterns at population level. Many of the 
world’s societies act as collectives, with this idea of the individual and the 
nation being specific to a particular way that western societies work, which 
some consider to be bad for well-being (as described at the end of the 
 previous section). This is also interlinked with the concerns of Chap. 2: 
that measurement and management of populations have developed in tan-
dem and structured the ways societies work. In Chap. 6, we discuss the 
Bhutanese context of well-being measures which retain culture, commu-
nity, values and understanding in their approach.
13. I encountered this in my observations, discussions and informal interviews 
with well-being experts in my PhD fieldwork (2012–2015).
14. Much of the commercial side of happiness economics, as with Paul Dolan’s 
book Happiness By Design (2014) is about finding our own ‘route to hap-
piness’ through exercises to locate pleasure and purpose in relation to what 
we do, and to be more strategic. In a broader sense, a crucial critique of 
positive thinking (which is different from positive economics, but linked) 
is Barbara Ehrenreich’s Smile or Die: How Positive Thinking Fooled America 
and the world (2009). She states in a presentation to the Royal Society of 
Arts, ‘Encouraging patients to “be positive” only may add to the burden 
of having cancer while providing little benefit’ (Ehrenreich 2010).
15. See the ONS n.d. Well-being. Office for National Statistics: https://www.
ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/wellbeing.
16. In Oman 2015a , where I discuss my reanalysis of the UK’s Measuring 
National Well-being debate, I present the complex, heart-breaking and 
rich narrative of a specialist nurse, who had become unemployed owing to 
her own ill-health (pp. 81–82). This might be compared with more expe-
dient free text answers of only a few words.
17. Ill-being, as you might expect, describes poor well-being, or to be more 
exact a deficiency in well-being.
18. I began mapping how the accounts and measures of subjective well- being 
fitted together in my PhD, initially drawing from Dolan et al. (2011a, b), 
primarily because it informed the ONS measures. Figure 4.1 and the sub-
sequent section use this briefing paper as a starting point, with many elabo-
rations I found useful along the way.
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19. Despite the popularity of the ladder of life, concerns have been raised 
about the integrity of the research behind it from an ethical and method-
ological perspective. An interesting history can be found in Zubaida 1967.
20. John Stuart Mill was the son of one of Jeremy Bentham’s proteges. Mill’s 
own depression at 20 caused him to question Bentham’s assumptions 
about happiness. He decided there were better versions of happiness that 
are linked to noble pursuits.
21. The psy-sciences are generally considered to be: psychology, psychiatry, 
psychotherapy and psychoanalysis
22. Stiglitz et al. (2009, 176) specify this as a measure, ‘such as the proportion 
of individuals, families or children that cannot afford a week of holidays 
away from home at least once a year’. ‘Among EU countries, close to 10% 
of households in the Netherlands and in most Nordic countries report that 
they could not afford a week away from home, as compared to levels above 
50% in some countries in Southern and Eastern Europe’.
23. For more on good and bad leisure, see Chap. 6.
24. Mind’s use of the Five Ways can be found online (Mind n.d.).
25. See ONS 2019, ‘Measures of National Well-being Dashboard’.
26. The MNW debate was more than simply a data collection exercise; it was 
also a way of engaging the public in the new measures of well-being 
(Oman 2015a).
27. The personal well-being domain also includes a measure of ‘population 
mental well-being’, using data from Understanding Society: UK Household 
Longitudinal Study. I found it difficult to establish why his additional mea-
sure was in the domain, as it gets overshadowed by ‘the ONS4’, with 
numerous ONS pages on personal well-being, only showing ‘the ONS4’. 
However, the population mental well-being (SWEMWBs) question was 
developed to capture a broad concept of positive mental well-being, 
including psychological functioning and affective emotional aspects of 
well-being. Respondents to Understanding  Society complete the seven-
question SWEMWBs survey questions. Eachresponse is given a score of 
between 1 and 5, resulting in a total score of between 7 and 35.
28. Gus O’Donnell served as the Cabinet Secretary between 2005 and 2011, 
the highest official in the British Civil Service.
29. As my research has found, records of the qualitative aspects of largely 
quantitative evidence projects for policy-making can be an afterthought or 
overlooked (Oman 2017a). That the minutes of civil service meetings from 
a decade ago have been re-archived a number of times, and are no longer 
easily findable is fairly common. In the writing of this book, I discovered 
my own reports on policy that I had published less than 12 months earlier 
had been re-archived, with changed links, and the document titles changed. 
This is one of the trials of a policy researcher—or of trying to understand 
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CHAPTER 5
Getting a Sense of Big Data and Well-being
5.1  What EvEn Is ‘Big Data’?
Big data generally capture what is easy to ensnare—data that are openly 
expressed (what is typed, swiped, scanned, sensed, etc.; people’s actions and 
behaviours; the movement of things)—as well as data that are the ‘exhaust’, 
a by-product … It takes these data at face value, despite the fact that they 
may not have been designed to answer specific questions and the data pro-
duced might be messy and dirty. (Kitchin 2014, Chap. 2, p. 3 of individual 
chapter version)
Rob Kitchin is possibly one of the most cited definers of ‘Big Data’, 
opening books and dissertations up and down the land. Yet, as we are 
about to discover, Kitchin himself tells us that while the term ‘Big Data’ is 
repeatedly defined (Kitchin 2014, Chap. 2, p. 3), big data themselves defy 
categorical labelling. So, it is not clear-cut, because differentiating what 
‘it’ is and what they are not is often side-stepped, or comes with caveats.1 
We encountered something similar before, if you remember, in Chap. 2. 
When it comes to understanding what well-being is, those inclined to 
measure are sometimes keen to measure well-being to understand it, 
rather than define what it is that is being measured. In a similar way, those 
describing Big Data are often more concerned with what Big Data does (or 
do), rather than what Big Data is, or are.
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In this chapter on Big Data, we will discover that how they are used 
can defy some of the old definitions of how to use data or what data are 
for. So, let us start with some definitions and what is different. For 
Kitchin, the lack of ‘ontological clarity’ of Big Data (as the individual 
concepts and categories of Big Data and the relations between them) 
means the term acts as a vague, catch-all label for a wide selection of data 
(Kitchin 2014, Chap. 2, p. 3). Despite this, he has reviewed how other 
people define it and proposes the key traits of Big Data. These qualities 
are outlined in Table 5.1. Given the word ‘big’, it is probably no surprise 
that volume is one of ‘the 3Vs’ identified by Doug Laney back in 2001. 
The other two being velocity and variety. Other qualities include 
exhaustivity, resolution, indexicality, relationality, extensionality and 
Table 5.1 Ways that Big Data are different
Label/definition Origin Meaning Pre Big Data Big Data


















An entire system is 
captured,





















fields that enable the 









Can add/change new 
fields easily and can 




Adapted from tables in Kitchin (2014) and Kitchin and McArdle (2016)
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scalability (Kitchin and McArdle 2016; Kitchin 2014). But what does 
this mean? How do these characteristics help us understand the data?
Having established a series of classifications for Big Data, Kitchin tested 
his taxonomy of traits with co-author McArdle a few years later (Kitchin 
and McArdle 2016). They applied the categories to 26 datasets which are 
widely considered Big Data and drawn from across seven sources: mobile 
communication, websites, social media/crowdsourcing, sensors, cam-
eras/lasers, transaction process generated data and administrative data 
(2016). The authors find all seven traits in Table 5.1 are only applicable to 
‘a handful’ of these datasets (Kitchin and McArdle 2016, 9). This shows 
how difficult it is to diagnose what Big Data actually are. Rather than the 
qualities of the data themselves, it might be more useful to instead turn to 
thinking about the contexts of data again: where they come from, and 
what they do (Oman n.d.).
The key differences in the characteristics of Big Data are context, which 
is often missing when presented. Table 5.2 represents how difficult it is to 
diagnose what Big Data actually are, without considering the qualities that 
affect their use. It shows there are additional Vs: veracity, value and vari-
ability—these are concerned with how the data suit their re-purposing. 
Given the multiple insights and applications of data outside of their origi-
nal setting, it can be difficult—even more difficult—to find certainty from 
them. This is because the data were collected, generated and produced for 
a specific reason, or as a by-product, that differs from how they are re-used.
The value of Big Data is the variety of insights that are possible and that 
can be used for other purposes. However, there are many things in the 
data that may not be useful. This also means using Big Data can increase 
the risk of confounding more traditional causal explanations. Instead, the 
mess of Big Data lends them to correlation with many insights, which can 
Table 5.2 Some qualities of Big Data
Label / 
definition
Origin Qualities of data that affect their use
Veracity Marr (2014) The data can be messy, noisy and contain uncertainty and 
error.
Value Marr (2014) Many insights can be extracted and the data repurposed.
Variability McNulty 
(2014)
Data whose meaning can be constantly shifting in relation 
to the context in which they are generated.
Synthesised from Kitchin and McArdle (2016)
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be used to enable prediction of well-being for individuals and society. We 
shall return to correlations and well-being in our case studies later in this 
chapter.
Table 5.3 looks at sources of different kinds of data typically used to 
predict well-being along with their pros and cons. These sources were 
drawn from an article in a journal for Data Science Analytics (Voukelatou 
et  al. 2020), and I have synthesised these with Kitchin’s seven sources 
(mobile communication, websites, social media/crowdsourcing, sensors, 
cameras/lasers, transaction process generated data and administrative 
data) retaining commentary from Voukelatou et al. on the pros and cons 
for their use to understand well-being. You may look at these and feel like 
these data sources seem like strange ways to understand people’s well- 
being: the difference in origins and what they may be used for. You may 
also note that the authors’ presentation of the pros and cons, based on 
these sources, does not really prompt consideration for the people whose 
data they are, more their ease of use for the Data Scientist.
Returning to contexts of use: mobile phone data, for example, have a 
primary purpose which is for billing, or because apps need location data to 
work (such as maps or for local restaurant recommendations). This is very 
different from these data being used to understand trends about people 
and society. Our previous examples of data re-use (or secondary analysis) 
have largely involved data that were collected in national surveys, or 
through more qualitative methods with smaller samples to understand a 
specific aspect of people and society more deeply in some way. Notably, 
even if the research question is different when data are re-used in Chap. 
3’s examples, the purpose of the data’s collection is not as different, or as 
removed, as this ‘exhaust’, ‘by-product’ nature of the data Kitchin refers to.
The process which has come to be known as ‘datafication’ (as coined by 
Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013) describes the increased demand for 
and uses of data. As we have seen in previous centuries, appetite for num-
bers (pandemics being one accelerator of data desire) has coincided with 
technological evolutions with numbers. In turn, and as we have seen over 
the last four chapters, different disciplines have increased and expanded 
their capacities for data and knowing the human experience in their own, 
particular way, and ‘new sciences’ have been declared. ‘Big Data’, as data 
with the qualities presented above, result from mounting capacity and 
faster instruments that increase the possibilities for the origins and vol-
umes of data that can be stored in expanding databases, or in different 
databases which can be readily linked for a variety of purposes. As we have 
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Table 5.3 Sources of Big Data and their pros and cons for well-being 
measurement
Data Source Pros Cons
Mobile communications 
data (including GPS)




Unbiased and classified, 
real-time monitoring
Not publicly available, 
sparsity, geographically
Imprecise









Disturbance of normal 
activities to post
Health and fitness 
(including mental health 
and well-being apps)
Cost-effective,
Prediction of near-term risk of 
events
Reduced respondent burden
Not publicly available, not 
necessarily representative of 
the population
Requests for data input can 
disrupt daily activities
Data can neglect moment- 
to- moment variations in 
mood.















Dependency on retailer’s 
permission,
Legal constraints
Websites and searches Publicly available.
Speed, convenience, flexibility, 
ease of analysis
Timeliness, observation of 
people’s behaviour through 
searches
Population size varies across 
domains.
Relevant queries difficult to 
identify
Bias of content and terms
Comparability of different 
search terms on different 
days
(continued)
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also seen before, it can be difficult to decide which came first: appetite for 
data, or capacity to expand on data possibilities.
In the age of Big Data, these newer data sources hold a wide variety of 
easy-to-capture data points, including observations of how we feel, where 
we are (or were), who we know, what we spend—and on what. These 
provide information on what products we have clicked on, and those we 
have not bought (Turow 2011). They can show how and where we spend 
our spare time and our money, both off and online. They are, therefore, 
incredibly valuable for research and commerce.
It is not these individual data points that are important, per se, but the 
links between them, that make them valuable. Through linking, assump-
tions can be made about how our behaviour, such as online spending, or 
improved mood, can be replicated in another place or time. These insights 
are also linked with other more familiar data points from administrative 
records, for example: where we were born, how much we earn, whether 
we own our own house. Other data are produced by loyalty cards, smart-
phones and in-house devices, such as Alexa, expanding such linking 
opportunities. Those who may try to avoid ‘being known’ by these other 
data will try to bypass the systems that gather these data. However, this 
resistance also becomes data in and of themselves; avoidance still produces 
digital traces that can be used to gather insights. Corporations may still 
create an automated profile of sorts, and assumptions will be made about 
the kind of products ‘the resistors’ buy. The persistence of data practices 
and their seeming inescapability are the reason we are starting to think 
Table 5.3 (continued)
Data Source Pros Cons
Crowdsourcing Large number of data
Speed, relative low-cost 
measurement of daily 
behaviour and activity
Risk of low-quality results, 
trade-off between quality 
and cost
Use of self-reports
Paid participation of users
Administration data Accurate, temporal stability, 
valid for community-level 
understanding and cross- 
cultural comparisons
Limited understanding of 
human experience in 
administration data
NOTES: Made from synthesising across Rob Kitchin’s 7: mobile communication; websites; social media/
crowdsourcing; sensors; cameras/lasers; transaction process generated data; and administrative data & 
Voukelatou et al. (2020)—with the data examples in this chapter
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about the experience of Big Data as something we ‘live with’ (Kennedy 
et al. 2020) and as something we ‘feel’.
This chapter covers some of the pervasiveness of Big Data, alongside 
the possibilities that come with that. Crucially, we look at what that means 
for well-being. We start by looking at the ways that data about mundane 
aspects of our lives is increasing, alongside how normalised increasing data 
collection, analysis and re-use are. These ‘data practices’ present new pos-
sibilities and realities of data-driven systems and decision-making that 
affect culture and society.
In this chapter, we touch on some of the uncomfortable aspects of 
these new realities, before historicising Big Data as well-being data to con-
textualise contemporary concerns regarding data practices that can be 
harmful. The second half of the chapter uses case studies to explore these 
concerns about well-being and data. Firstly, we consider a high-profile 
case that was billed as the promise of Big Data: Google Flu Trends (GFT), 
looking back from the age of COVID-19. Three further, short examples 
show the possibilities of social media data, place-based data, and health 
and fitness data to understand well-being for social and cultural policy and 
culture and society more generally.
5.2  Big Data: a NeW Way to UNDerstaND 
Well-BeiNg?
“Big Data”, was cited 40,000 times in 2017 in Google Scholar, about as 
often as “happiness”! (Bellet and Frijters 2019)
The datafication of social life has led to a profound transformation in how 
society is ordered, decisions are made, and citizens are governed. (Hintz and 
Brand n.d., 2)
Digital devices and data are becoming an ever more pervasive and part of 
social, commercial, governmental and academic practices. (Ruppert 
et al. 2013, 2)
The majority of Big Data are collected in a different way to the national 
surveys and interviews we encountered in Chaps. 3 and 4, and conse-
quently has numerous different qualities. One is that surveys and question-
naires are, by and large, overt methods, in that it is obvious you are asking 
questions to generate data. The new technologies use data which are col-
lected covertly and so often gathered on individuals without their 
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‘considered consent’, and are often processed without transparency. 
Figure 5.1 shows just a small selection of the types of personal data that are 
useful and valuable for social analytics and that are covered in this chapter. 




Social analytics involve  the: monitoring, analysing, measuring and 
interpreting of data about people’s movements, characteristics,  interac-
tions, relationships, feelings, ideas and other content. Figure 5.1 shows 
only a few of many more examples. Here, they are categorised into 
domains that share the same names as the UK’s well-being measures, to 
enable you to cross reference the different kinds of insights available under 
each domain from these data (although  biometrics is a new addition). 
The  data are from ‘observations’ of  how we move around the on and 
offline world. They can include behaviours collected by sensors (think of 
how your mobile phone uses data via GPS to tell you when the next bus 
is, or that you are about to encounter traffic on the motorway). They 
include our feelings, shared by social media data, or in apps. While demo-
graphic data have long been collected, as we know, these newer forms of 
data can say much more about us, our well-being and quality of life. As we 
shall discover, this is both for good and bad and any insights gained need 
to be put into context.
As we have also discovered, data are not only numbers or text, but can 
be sound and pictures. Analysing these kinds of qualitative data as Big 
Data holds new possibilities. In some ways it is these new possibilities that 
feel the most uncomfortably non-human. Whether it is concern that your 
phone is always listening to you, or, rather, that Alexa or Siri are (to huma-
nise these technologies). Even the Street View option of Google Maps 
allows us to look at other people’s homes. I remember keenly finding the 
image of the flat I rented in London for years, only to see my washing-up 
through the kitchen window. I couldn’t help but think, I wish I had 
known they were coming.
More notable than my neglected washing-up being on public view for 
judgement are other visual data used for training datasets, particularly for 
facial recognition. There are the moments when you know that facial rec-
ognition technology is being used: to log in to your phone, or at passport 
control at the airport, perhaps. However, they are also being developed 
for schools, public transport systems, workplaces and healthcare facilities 
(Ada Lovelace Institute 2019). Revelations about its use in shopping cen-
tres prompted media and public outrage, regulatory investigation and 
political criticism (Denham 2019; BBC 2019). These reactions are in part 
about the further encroachment on the way we live (like the call centre 
example from the 1990s that opens the book) and in part the lack of con-
sent and knowledge about these data being collected about us.
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Some people who uploaded photos to Flickr, some 10–15 years ago, 
more recently discovered they (as in the people’s faces and their photos) 
appeared in a huge facial-recognition database called MegaFace (Hill and 
Krolik 2019). They found the database held facial data on around 700,000 
individuals, including their children, and was being downloaded by vari-
ous companies to train face-identification algorithms. These algorithms 
were then being used to track protesters, surveil terrorists, spot problem 
gamblers and spy on the public at large (Hill and Krolik 2019). Notably, a 
colleague who read this chapter before publication—a digital sociologist,3 
no less—confessed to me their shock at reading this anecdote, as they had 
used Flickr and were not aware of this story. Therefore, not only are our 
personal data collected and used without our knowledge, but the contro-
versies surrounding their re-use are not even shared with users. This poses 
questions for accountability and transparency.
The questions of who is collecting these data, and who is using them, 
and for what, present a more complex issue than before. Public support 
for the police to use facial recognition technology is conditional upon 
limitations and subject to appropriate safeguards, but there is no trust in 
private company use (Ada Lovelace Institute 2019). As we have been dis-
covering—it is the contexts of data collection and uses that we need to 
understand: it is the who, what, where, why and what for? that are 
important.
Why We Need to Ask Critical Questions of Data in the Context 
of Well-being
Many issues related to Big Data don’t have clear-cut answers, especially 
where well-being is concerned. While data reveal details of the vulnerable, 
often involving risk for these people and their communities, the State uses 
data systems that people increasingly need to be a part of to access health-
care and welfare support (Dencik 2020). This is why the growing amount 
of research which problematises the utility and ethics of Big Data, and how 
they are used, is vital. In this area of critical data science (see Bates 2016), 
some researchers use Big Data to reveal the limits and social issues con-
nected to everyday datasets that we all use, such as a search engine’s image 
database (e.g. Otterbacher et al. 2017). These critical studies of data and 
their effects on society reveal how data are capable of not only new prob-
lems, but persistent racism and misogyny, as we discovered in Chap. 1 with 
Virginia Noble’s example of what happens when you search for the phrase 
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‘black girls’ (Noble 2018). These projects reveal data’s negative social 
effects, and how they are already embedded in society, exacerbating issues.
Other research aims to investigate what people know and think is going 
on. Also looking at the possibilities of Big Data (and their associated tech-
nologies) to understanding aspects of well-being. One such example 
(Living With Data n.d.) presents real-life cases of public sector data prac-
tices to members of the public. It wants to understand how much people 
appreciate the possible benefits and how much they doubt or distrust the 
possible implications of data systems and sharing in their everyday lives. 
One option being, of course, that many people may not really care as 
much as we think they do, or should.
We touch on these issues in this chapter. Most notable is the increase in 
concerns regarding the harms that Big Data and new technologies are 
capable of, and which are happening unchecked (i.e. the UK’s Data Justice 
Lab n.d.; Eubanks 2018; O’Neil 2016; Noble 2018; Benjamin 2019). 
There are two main problems here. One is that we are compromising well- 
being in the so-called aim of better understanding the human condition. 
The second is that we are not only using these data and technologies to 
understand people but also sorting and managing them in different ways 
that suit those who are already more powerful.
It is vital to note that key to concerns about datafication are how these 
practices disproportionately affect the well-being of those already most 
vulnerable. Facial recognition, for example, negatively impacts people 
already disadvantaged, owing to its own gendered, heteronormative 
classed and racialised biases (Ada Lovelace Institute 2019). These tech-
nologies are also being trialled in policing in the UK and have reported 
more than 90% of incorrect matches (Fussey and Murray 2019; Davies 
et al. 2018). In a more general way, all public services are adopting new 
data practices and possibilities.
Data-driven decision-making is growing as an everyday feature of pub-
lic services. Who receives welfare (Eubanks 2018, 37) housing (Eubanks 
2018, 93) and other interventions, such as child protection (Eubanks 
2018, 135) or education (O’Neil 2016, 5-9; 52–60) are decisions increas-
ingly made by algorithms, rather than people. Even when automated deci-
sions are questioned by people (Eubanks 2018, 141), it is unclear whether 
‘experienced workers’ (Eubanks 2018, 77) or the data system has the 
greater influence in key decisions.
Beyond welfare, algorithms intervene in other social policy areas. They 
monitor the ‘quality’ of education, using dubious proxies (O’Neil 2016), 
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with various bad outcomes, including teachers undeservedly losing their 
jobs.4 In COVID-19 UK in 2020, an algorithm also decided the grades 
awarded to school-leavers in the absence of exams, owing to social distanc-
ing measures. One national media headline (Pidd 2020) called this ‘pun-
ishment by statistics’.
The UK’s A Level algorithm example was extremely high profile, causing 
outrage that data-driven decision-making would have such an enormous 
effect on the futures of these young people. It was seen as morally outra-
geous for a number of reasons. First, because our society dictates that these 
young people’s well-being should be protected. Second, this algorithm used 
data that no one had consented to: no one knew at the time that their prior 
grades could be used as a final grade. Third, the data model also included 
proxies for expected performance which were nothing to do with each stu-
dent’s own academic record. Instead, they used their school’s overall perfor-
mance in previous years, which were scores based on previous students’ 
grades, not theirs. While the governing body, Ofqual, insisted its standardi-
sation arrangements ‘are the fairest possible to facilitate students progressing 
on to further study or employment as planned’ (Pidd 2020), there were 
further controversies over transparency around how they had arrived at ‘fair’. 
After which, Ofqual published a 319-page document explaining its method-
ology (Pidd 2020) which was criticised for not being accessible to the gen-
eral public. Therefore, not only did the whole thing seem far from fair, but 
Ofqual didn’t make explicit how the approach was fair to those affected.
Here we see public services failing to look after well-being through the 
use of data in ways which go against the moral code of fairness, account-
ability and transparency5—and without the young people’s consent. 
Beyond their high-profile nature, what is different about these data uses? 
While Chap. 2 discussed the greater role of data in public services from the 
1980s onwards, this ostensibly had a different rationale. It aimed to evalu-
ate qualities of these services, such as efficiency or cost-effectiveness. While 
these approaches led to flawed decisions and evaluations, assessments were 
made at a societal level. Contemporary data-driven decision-making, 
whether the allocation of resources to people or the labelling of individu-
als at risk, is a different approach and uses data on a different level. Or, to 
use the language of Chap. 3, there is a different unit of analysis, and that 
unit could be a vulnerable person.
In sum, why do we need to ask critical questions about how people and 
their well-being are being understood or about how data and data systems 
used to understand people can compromise well-being? Going back to 
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those definitions, people are often concerned with the speed and size, and 
so on, of Big Data. Actually, as Kitchin indicates, it is the contexts of these 
data that are the most important ways that they are different. Not only are 
the contexts of origin of Big Data more different, and further from the 
contexts of use, than before, but the practices of analysing data feel less 
human. By this I mean that less human attention is now required in data 
analysis and in important processes that require data. What does that mean 
for decisions made about people and well-being?
As we will discover in a few sections, the response to COVID-19 
required older data and data systems—and more human judgement—than 
you would have imagined if you were looking at media reports of the 
promise of artificial intelligence (AI) in the first half of 2020. However, as 
the financial value of data increases, the more expediently they can be ana-
lysed, and here we must ask other questions. Who stands to gain and who 
stands to lose? Who has chosen to participate? But then did people ever 
get to choose to participate in systems of well-being data? Or were we 
even thinking about data as ‘a thing’ about us, that affects our lives and 
was valuable? The next two sections deconstruct the financial value of Big 
Data and whether this reality is even new.
Value
Another major reason why we need to ask critical questions about Big 
Data and well-being concerns the financial value of knowing more about 
people and the financial value of the systems that sort people for public 
services and welfare distribution (Eubanks 2018). Beyond public services, 
the value of the new ways that Big Data can work is not just in knowing 
more about people, but because of the potential this knowledge has to 
orient people’s thinking through suggestion and in some high-profile 
cases to manipulate what they do. They enable marketers to sell you prod-
ucts you might be most tempted by, knowing when you might be most 
susceptible too, based on your previous sales or what else you’ve looked at 
(Turow 2011). They also enable political campaigns to target their mes-
sages in the same way and change voting behaviour (Avila 2019; Bates 
et al. 2016; Murgia 2017). The recent Cambridge Analytica scandal saw 
Facebook implicated in not only the unethical use of people’s data, and 
knowledge it had on their behaviour, but in misinformation that is thought 
to have changed the results of the US presidential election 2016 and 
Brexit in the UK the same year.
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The first and second waves of well-being (Bache and Reardon 2013) 
from Chap. 2, and to which we keep returning, evolved as historical 
moments in which data capabilities married policy-makers’ aims: improv-
ing the way we think about measuring human progress. Similarly, well- 
being metrics became more viable because well-being methodologies were 
evolving in a way that politicians saw as favourable. Political will and aca-
demic developments work with evolving infrastructure and technological 
development to enable datasets to be created with more detailed and 
nuanced information about quality of life. These factors work together for 
new methodologies to generate new kinds of data and analytical approaches 
which then, by extension, affect research and policy-making, which in turn 
impact upon our quality of life.
The increasing emphasis on Big Data as ‘the new oil’6 (a misnomer, of 
course) is not because datasets are ‘better’ (which would need some quali-
fication) or because the technologies are new (though admittedly this is 
partly why it has become such a fixation). Instead, ‘Big Data’ datasets offer 
data with different qualities than more traditional data acquired by surveys. 
This means big datasets offer capacity to answer different research ques-
tions—or answer the same research questions differently. Most importantly, 
they have been called the new oil because: (1) ‘data powers today’s most 
profitable corporations, just like fossil fuels energized those of the past’ 
(Matsakis 2019) and (2) this means these qualities can be financialised.
The amount of data on individuals that are now collected is almost 
impossible to visualise in our minds. The growing number of devices and 
sensors means we are generating more and more data than can be col-
lected: the International Data Corporation predicts that by 2025, the total 
amount of digital data created worldwide will rise to 163 zettabytes 
(Coughlin 2018). That is 1021 (1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 bytes) 
or one trillion Gigabytes. The European Commission forecasted the 
European ‘data market’ to be worth as much as €106.8 billion by 2020 
(Ram and Murgia 2019). These kinds of numbers reinforce the impor-
tance of looking at Big Data as social phenomena—with social effects, but 
how new are large datasets about people and populations? 
5.3  are Big Data EvEn actUally NeW?
While data are ‘sold’ to us as ‘the new oil’ (The Economist 2017), large 
datasets, and their use to understand human behaviour, are not new; nei-
ther is the relationship between governments, commerce and value, when 
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it comes to data. Mary Poovey’s A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of 
Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society (1998) describes the rise of 
merchants and their influence over the State, including campaigns to pro-
mote the balance of trade as the index of national well-being from the 
early seventeenth century onwards (Poovey 1998, 93–94). The new 
‘enthusiasm for numbers’ in the early to mid-nineteenth century (Hacking 
1991, 186; Porter 1986, 1996) coincided with a growing infrastructure 
to collect and analyse data. This desire for numbers, and the data processes 
that were required to provide them, led to the ‘great explosion of numbers 
that made the term statistics’ (Porter 1986, 11). If truth be told, the term 
‘statistics’ originated for governments to understand ‘the quantum of hap-
piness’ (Sinclair 1798, vol. 20, p.  xiii). In this ‘avalanche of numbers’, 
‘nation-states classified, counted and tabulated their subjects anew’ 
(Hacking 1990, 2; 1991, 186). However, while ‘statistics’ may be hun-
dreds of years old, large datasets go back further.
Managing land, agricultural hierarchies and the desire to control popu-
lations have long required systems of recording. One of the oldest-known 
writing systems is Sumerian script, which is approximately 6000 years old 
(Bellet and Frijters 2019). This script is called cuneiform, and its uses are 
said to include the tracking of trade and taxes: you need records on who 
has paid, how much; who has not paid, and what they owe (Harford 
2017). While the clay tablets these records were written on may not seem 
like a database, or feel like the Big Data futures outlined in the previous 
and subsequent sections, they were a dataset of sorts. Crucially, these data 
were used to monitor and control resources, including the management 
of people.
Most countries now undertake a census of sorts. The UK Census takes 
place every ten years and has done since 1801.7 The first four were only 
headcounts, with the 1841 Census being the first to intentionally record 
names of all individuals in a household or institution. The UK’s ONS 
website offers an interesting history of censuses in the UK, back to the 
Domesday book ordered by the Norman (French) King, William the 
Conqueror in 1086 (ONS 2016). Again, censuses precede these European 
data moments by some 4000 years in both Egypt and China, whose gov-
ernments (as they would have been formed and named in those days) 
recorded who lived where and how wealthy they were. The Romans held 
regular censuses to keep track of their expanding—and then contracting—
empire. Evidence of other institutionalised data practices exists in the 
Bible: the book of Genesis talks of kinship and marriage records and 
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Exodus mentions a population census to support the tabernacle. The 
Church collected information on births, christenings, marriages, wills and 
deaths; this tracked the business of a church and its parish, but was also a 
means of counting the faithful and tracking their wealth.
You will note that the recording of trade and births, marriages and 
deaths is not so different from the administrative data that appear in all our 
examples of well-being data, from Table 3.1 to 5.3. So, what is new about 
Big Data? We’ve long had large datasets that hold multiple data points on 
people and nations, but these are thought to be ‘state simplifications’ for 
officials (Scott 1998). Rationalisation and standardisation mean these rep-
resentations ‘did not successfully represent the actual activity of the society 
depicted, nor were they intended to; they represented only the slice of it 
that interested the official observer’ (Scott 1998, 3). What the historian 
James Scott tells us here is that the sorts of information that were collected 
on scale lacked detail that could be used to improve quality of life. He 
implies, of course, that those in charge did not actually care about quality 
of life, only quantity of resource, whether this was people to work the 
land, make armies, or pay taxes. More recently, as we have seen, govern-
ments were charged with responsibility for people’s well-being, and there-
fore, more complex data were required.8 One such development was the 
social survey.
The social survey has been used to collect data which capture various 
qualities of lives in richer ways, and for longer, than it is often credited for. 
For example, surveys in the UK in the mid-1940s (in World War II) dis-
covered almost one in ten households did not have the number of cups 
deemed necessary for essential use, and ‘the shortage of scrubbing brushes 
seems to have been extensively felt’ (Oman 2015, 88; ONS 2001, 9). 
Whilst still administrative records of resource and scarcity, the survey 
began to be used to articulate more qualitative aspects of quality of life as 
proxies for well-being. This presents richer detail than many of the con-
temporary surveys that generate the well-being data we have seen as either 
objective or subjective data so far.
These more qualitative data were not only collected using government 
social scientists that we might imagine with clipboards. A project called 
Mass Observation was established in 1937 by anthropologist Tom 
Harrisson, poet Charles Madge and filmmaker Humphrey Jennings.9 Mass 
Observation aimed to record everyday life in Britain. There were paid 
investigators who anonymously recorded people’s conversations and their 
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behaviour: at work, on the street and at memorable occasions, including 
public meetings or sporting and religious events.
This project was reminiscent of the current idea of ‘Big Data’, not only 
in the scope of the data gathered, but also in how they were gathered. Mass 
Observation had numerous phases and at one point also used a panel of 
around 500 voluntary ‘observers’. The initial aims of Mass Observation 
were to research everyday life, making use of ‘the untrained observer, the 
man in the street’10 as much as those who were thought to be skilled and 
qualified in gathering data of this sort (Madge and Harrisson 1937, 10). 
The observers used various data collection methods to generate large 
datasets on different topics: some maintained diaries, while others replied 
to open-ended questionnaires. In 1938, there was ‘a competition’ for the 
residents of Bolton, Lancashire (see Fig 5.2), asking people what happi-
ness meant for them. This was one of many themes, and people would 
reply to what were called directives with often very long texts describing 
what they thought and how they felt. The data from these and from the 
1938 project can still be accessed via a vast archive at the University of 
Sussex.11
Mass Observation began with a positive vision of democratising the 
processes behind how data were gathered to better understand people’s 
lives. However, over time, much qualitative social research shifted towards 
the narrower analysis of consumer choice, and Mass Observation became 
a market-research firm in 1949 (Albert 2019). Mass Observation re- 
launched in 1981, returning to its original egalitarian ideals and the 
archives are testament to the ways that Mass Observation aims to engage 
the public in the documenting of their own lives.
These historical examples of large datasets are, therefore, not so dif-
ferent from the qualities found in previously crowdsourced, location-
based, time-based data on how people feel about things, as seen in 
Table 5.3. The purchasing of scrubbing brushes was used as proxy data 
for other qualities of life in the same way our purchasing data are anal-
ysed to better understand us. Similarly, a lack of cups was indicative of a 
particular kind of poverty and lack of resources at a point in time, and 
this was analysed across the population. However, the democratic prom-
ise of Mass Observation and other projects of the time were superseded 
by the potential of understanding what makes people happy for commer-
cial gain.
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Fig. 5.2 What is happiness? Mass Observation competition flyer, 1938
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The Darker Side of Historical Well-being Data 
and Commercial Gain
With the rise of market research came increased interest in people’s prefer-
ences, and in what made them happy or gave them pleasure (Davies 2015; 
Savage 2010). This involved capturing subjective well-being data, as well 
as cultivating communications to imply that owning or consuming certain 
things would increase someone’s well-being in some way. The aim here in 
this context, of course, was to change people’s purchasing choices. With 
this shift, people as citizens became consumers. Over the years, ‘consumer 
sentiment’ indices have been assessed to see if these data can predict peo-
ple’s behaviours on a macro level, from economic cycles (Carroll et  al. 
1994) to presidential popularity (Suzuki 1992). This marriage of mood 
and economics is not new to us, of course. In Chap. 4, we encountered 
the development of subjective well-being data, a newer shinier well-being 
data, as a marriage of economics and psychology, known as happiness eco-
nomics that was able to measure subjective well-being at population level.
Mood and sentiment analysis are not new, then. Neither are big datas-
ets. Even Fitbits and Apple watches are not new; not really, as attaching 
technologies to people’s bodies has been used to study and improve pro-
ductivity and surveillance of workers and citizens for around a hundred 
years (Davies 2015; Cryle and Stephens 2017). So, what is new? The 
amount and variety of data on the well-being of individuals and popula-
tions are increasing as technologies develop to manage greater amounts of 
different kinds of data, not only faster, but faster together.12 Therefore, it 
is not necessarily how one thing (not that Big Data are one thing, really) 
is new. Instead, it is a far more complex picture of how different aspects of, 
and different people across fields of, politics, science, research and tech-
nology work together—and work with commerce. These all combine as 
developments in what we know, and ways of knowing, about society.
The question is, what does that mean for well-being? How can we learn 
from previous mistakes regarding the context of who is using what data—
and to what end? COVID-19 will offer us many data insights and many 
insights into how data can help us understand and look after well-being 
better. The next section looks at the role of data and learning in a pan-
demic, of old and new infrastructures and commercial and governmental 
data practices in the management of a pandemic.
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5.4  a case stUDy oN the Promise of commercial 
Big Data
One of the most high-profile cases of the possibilities of Big Data involves 
a tale that begins in 2009 when a new virus was discovered. This new ill-
ness spread quickly and combined elements of bird flu and swine flu. This 
story opens Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier’s book, Big Data: A 
Revolution That Will Transform How We Will Live, Work and Think, which 
you may remember is mentioned earlier in the chapter as a much-cited 
originator of the term ‘datafication’ (2013). The authors explain that the 
only way authorities could curb the spread of this new virus was through 
knowing where it was already.
In the US, the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
requested that doctors inform them of cases. However, the information 
on the pandemic that the CDC had to work with was out of date. This was 
by nature of the data collected, and its ‘data journey’ (Bates et al. 2016). 
There were multiple data journeys to consider: data were collected at the 
point someone went to the doctor, which could be days after initial symp-
toms, let alone contraction; sharing data with the CDC was a time- 
consuming procedure; the CDC only processed the data once a week. 
Thus, the picture was probably weeks out of date, making intervention or 
behavioural analysis difficult. In other words, while the datasets were large, 
even potentially fairly detailed, these Big Data were too slow.
Coincidentally, so Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier tell us, a few weeks 
before the new disease made the headlines, Google engineers published a 
paper in a high-profile journal, Nature, which explained how Google 
could ‘predict’ the spread of the winter flu in the US. This was possible 
just through analysing what people had typed into their search engine 
(and, of course, knowing where those people typing were). It compared 
the CDC data on the spread of seasonal flu from 2003 to 2008 with the 
50 million most common search terms in America.
The Google engineers looked for correlations between what people 
typed into the Google search engine and the spread of the disease. Mayer- 
Schönberger and Cukier point out that.
Google’s method doesn’t require traditional infrastructures to distrib-
ute mouth swabs or for people to go to doctors’ surgeries.
‘Instead, it is built on ‘big data’—the ability of society to harness informa-
tion in novel ways to produce useful insights or goods and services of 
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 significant value. With it, by the time the next pandemic comes around, the 
world will have a better tool at its disposal to predict and thus prevent the 
spread. (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013, 2–3)
Sadly, a pandemic with wider societal and well-being effects arrived 
after I started writing this book, and despite the promise of Big Data, it 
did not prevent the spread. Data hold a very important place in the story 
of COVID-19 and its management, but all data have limitations in how it 
can inform human action to change reality, as do the different ways of 
analysing data. Indeed, data are not just there but are managed and used by 
people with their own interests. Data  do not speak for  themselves but 
are  interpreted. All data realities also involve selective processes in what 
data are important and what data are not. These limits are not always 
made as clear as they should be.
Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier’s promise of Big Data as revolutionary 
and transformational in the US was clearly jumping the gun. Not only was 
the pandemic not prevented by way of predictive analytics, but actually, 
part of COVID-19 data management has very much involved doctors’ 
surgeries and mouth swabs—in the UK at least. To clarify, I was randomly 
selected from data held on people registered with a GP to participate in a 
survey in August 2020.13 I was contacted by the Real-time Assessment of 
Community Transmission (REACT) Study,14 which is in fact a series of 
studies, using home testing to understand more about COVID-19, and its 
transmission in communities in England. The logic behind the study was 
that not all people with the virus were being tested at this point, either 
because they were asymptomatic or for some other reason. This was one 
of a few projects to collect data from a sample of the population, over 
time, in order to understand how it was spreading.
This process relied on old infrastructures: I received a letter by Royal 
Mail, I signed up online, and then I was sent a mouth swab—also by post. 
That all worked fine for me, but there was a series of steps registering dif-
ferent barcodes and I found myself wondering how accessible this was for 
everyone (when I say everyone, I often think of my once tech-savvy Dad, 
who’d have been bewildered at this whole process). After completing 
these steps, a courier was ordered to collect the test. I sat in patiently wait-
ing for my test to be collected, slightly anxious about what felt like a huge 
responsibility, and acutely aware that I might need to be ready to run out 
and meet a courier with my test.
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I live in a high-rise with no working bell or intercom (and a bunch of 
other things that don’t work). For three separate days, I watched for 
details of the courier on the app, and out of my window, waiting for them 
to appear on the road, or call to say I should come down. But there was 
no sighting of the courier in real life and no phone call. When the app 
showed they were coming, they disappeared without attempting to deliver. 
After three attempts. I was told that this particular courier company was 
infamous for not bothering to try and collect from my flats, because it was 
too inconvenient. So, in my case, while some aspects of the traditional data 
infrastructure (the post) worked fine, they didn’t necessarily all work 
together as they might. This meant that my test remained uncollected, 
expired and had to be securely disposed of. This meant my data became 
‘missing data’.
What I was surprised by was how the information system assumed you 
would live somewhere that was easy to access. As we know, many people 
from our poorest communities live in high-rises where the lift doesn’t 
work, or the people in the flats themselves are difficult for a courier to 
access. Thinking about the contexts in which data are collected (or not) 
can be both extraordinary, and mundane, and we often don’t hear of these 
stories—when they work, and the odd occasion when they don’t, and 
what that might mean for the data. Yet, these contexts have huge impact 
on who is readable in data and how we understand well-being and 
inequality.
So why did COVID-19 data collection end up using more traditional 
infrastructures in the UK? On a larger scale, why did the world not use 
Google data as Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier predicted? As it turns out, 
Google Flu Trends (GFT) missed the peak of the 2013 flu season by 
140%, and Google subsequently closed the project (REF). In 2014 a paper 
called ‘The Parable of Google Flu: Traps in Big Data Analysis’ was pub-
lished in another high-profile academic journal, Science (Lazer et al. 2014). 
The authors concluded that while there was potential in these sorts of 
methodologies, and while Google’s efforts in projecting the flu may have 
been well meaning (which could be called into question), the method and 
data were opaque. This made it potentially ‘dangerous’ (Lazer and 
Kennedy 2015) to rely on GFT for any decision- making, as the context of 
the data and the analyses were not made explicit to public decision-mak-
ers. Of course, it is also perhaps unlikely that Google had designed the 
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tool for public decision-making contexts,15 considering what government 
officials need to understand for this kind of decision-making.
There are other limits to the data: its sample. Google assumes this ubiq-
uitous reputation, yet, it is not the only search engine available: people 
choose other search engines for various reasons. Crucially, Google also 
does not have global reach. Most services offered by Google China, for 
example, were blocked by the Great Firewall in the People’s Republic of 
China. This was not even the first time it was banned in China. So, even if 
GFT were still in action, would it have pre-empted the COVID-19 out-
break in Wuhan, China, before more official announcements?
If we are to think about how Big Data have transformed how we live, 
as Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier want us to, then we must also consider 
how ‘datafication’ has changed people’s practices. More and more of us 
scour the internet, hoping to reassure ourselves that recently developed 
symptoms are minor ailments. This is—as we discovered in Chap. 2—part 
of the anxiety introduced with audit culture: we consult technologies as a 
default because we can, rather than should. We search for confirmation 
that nothing is wrong, rather than only searching when something is 
wrong. In countries where access to healthcare is diminished, people are 
actively encouraged to search the internet before interacting with health 
services. Consequently, this limits the predictability of search data, as their 
contexts have changed.
In the case of COVID-19, people searched for symptoms they didn’t 
necessarily have, especially in the second quarter of 2020, when most 
nations were in lockdown and the severity and ramifications of the disease 
were becoming clearer. The implications of this are that searches would 
not necessarily have reflected the infected state of an individual that could 
be aggregated to reveal community or population infections, or more 
importantly, predict transmission so that it might be controlled in some 
way. Instead, searches for COVID-19 symptoms may well be a predictor 
of concern or anxiety. Ironically, then, Google searches are arguably a bet-
ter indicator of negative subjective well-being than of COVID-19.
The very idea of data being reliable has led to our need to feel sure—to 
have objective confirmation that all was OK, is OK or will be OK, and has 
led to an increased reliance on data. In the case of Google searches, this 
reliance has triggered people to search for verification of risk or safety. So 
how might we have cut through the ‘noise’ that the definitions at the 
beginning of this chapter point to, in order to know how it was spreading? 
We are back at the chicken and the egg dilemma: do people search about 
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COVID-19 because they have symptoms? Or do people search about 
COVID-19 because they are worried about it and feel compelled to search 
for confirmation—or search on behalf of friends or loved ones? I watched 
someone use their internet searches to check our colleague’s proclaimed 
symptoms against the common signs of swine flu—a very collegiate indi-
vidual, but one whose search history told a story of their friend’s (poten-
tial) disease state, rather than their own. In this latter case, then, Google 
searches were more indicative of personality than health or even subjective 
well-being, although, perhaps well-being data all the same.
Bigger datasets make correlation more powerful than causation, explain 
Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, devoting a whole chapter to it in their 
book (2013). Google queries went from 14 billion per year in 2000 to 1.2 
trillion a decade later. There are even websites that show a live running 
tally of how many searches have been achieved in a day.16 If Big Data were 
all about scale, then GFT would have been more, not less likely to work 
on the premise of correlation as search numbers increased. The scale at 
which we have correlations using ‘Big Data’ may be an indicator of causa-
tion, but not proof. Is this the end of the promise of Big Data, though? If 
we return to a case of COVID-19 and Big Data, what might we find?
Linking Big Datasets: For Well-being?
On New Year’s Day, 2020, a Canadian health monitoring company alerted 
its customers to the COVID-19 outbreak, some days before the US’ CDC 
or the World Health Organization (WHO) alerted anyone (Niiler 2020). 
Of course, the disease was not yet called COVID-19, and it was not known 
that it was to be a global pandemic. At this point, a cluster of unusual 
pneumonia cases had been detected. One of the companies said to have 
beaten the WHO to this discovery is called BlueDot, which uses AI-driven 
algorithm searches to look at datasets, much like GFT.
Unlike Google Flu Trends, BlueDot’s algorithms consolidate and anal-
yse data from numerous sources. BlueDot’s owner, Dr. Kamran Khan 
explains:
We can pick up news of possible outbreaks, little murmurs or forums or 
blogs of indications of some kind of unusual events going on. (Khan, in 
Niiler 2020)
Other data sources are more official, such as statements from health 
organisations, livestock and news reports in 65 languages. BlueDot also 
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uses ‘anonymous mobile phone data’ (Whitaker 2020), flight sales and 
other records. These various data points enable a prediction of a possible 
new serious disease. Importantly, the logic is that this approach also offers 
insight into how that disease becomes mobile by the people who carry it 
and the planes who carry the people carrying the disease.
What we have done is use natural language processing and machine learning 
to train this engine to recognize whether this is an outbreak of anthrax in 
Mongolia versus a reunion of the heavy metal band Anthrax. (Niiler 2020)
Also, crucially, ‘epidemiologists check that the conclusions make sense 
from a scientific standpoint’ (Niiler 2020). The company website states 
that ‘BlueDot protects people around the world from infectious diseases 
with human and artificial intelligence’ (BlueDot n.d.). Therefore, despite 
claims to its sophistication, the automated data-sifting still requires human 
analysis to make sense of what has been found.
Khan’s company utilised technological developments at its disposal to 
synthesise many different types of data from multiple datasets to construct 
evidence. Only when the data were pieced together was the information 
useful, and only after human experts had checked it, were these insights 
deemed useful enough to share and use. BlueDot is a commercial com-
pany. The human and artificial intelligence are synthesised as an enterprise, 
and Khan is often presented as both an entrepreneur, as well as a professor 
of medicine and public health at the University of Toronto. Khan has also 
worked in hospitals, so understands how they work. Khan explains in one 
interview,
Disease doesn’t wait for the reviewers, so we need a more agile system. My 
motivation for creating a company—here to start supporting an entrepre-
neurial spirit—using business as the vehicle to do that. (Khan, on Charrington 
20 February 2020)
There are two things to note here. Khan suggests that the old struc-
tures of peer review and scientific expertise are too slow in their use of data 
and evidence to tackle a global pandemic. He also suggests that his busi-
ness successfully links together ‘human and artificial intelligence’ to pro-
vide what traditional science cannot: the analysis of data with veracity and 
variability, speed, resolution, relationality and so on. The value of BlueDot 
is in its claims to harnessing the qualities of Big Data.
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To return to Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, ‘Google’s method’ may 
not have involved distributing mouth swabs, or been built on old infra-
structures, but instead, they explain:
[I]t is built on “big data”—the ability of society to harness information in 
novel ways to produce useful insights or goods and services of significant 
value. (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2)
So, there we have those familiar terms of insights (a marketing term) 
and valuation (that we discovered from economics in Chap. 2), alongside 
clear communications and the presentation of novelty (Chap. 4), goods 
and services. Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier hint at the complex politics 
at play on the value of data—and the values of data more broadly than we 
have already encountered.
Crucially, in a book about well-being and data, we have to note that 
BlueDot’s business is entrepreneurial because it is profitable. In other 
words, the insights have to be sold to clients and customers. They were 
also not the only innovator (as acknowledged by the Lancet and MIT 
Review [McCall 2020; Heaven 2020]). Here, we must return to the eco-
nomic value of data because of the possibilities of well-being insights and 
the ideological project of the well-being agenda.
If the well-being agenda is about improving redistribution of resources 
as an issue of social justice, we might want to think about what position we 
are coming from: rather than asking, ‘what are the data limits of these 
well-being projects?’, we might ask, ‘what are the well-being limits of data 
projects like these?’ Although, despite the clear sophistication of BlueDot’s 
project, it also did not prevent COVID-19’s spread. This criticism has 
been noted in the MIT Review:
The hype outstrips the reality. In fact, the narrative that has appeared in 
many news reports and breathless press releases—that AI is a powerful new 
weapon against diseases—is only partly true and risks becoming counterpro-
ductive. (Heaven 2020)
The point this MIT article was making here is that the over-reaching 
claims of AI could be damaging to its future progression, in the same way 
that GFT overstretched its claims.
Data and the distribution of resources are very much part of the 
COVID-19 story, and not just of private companies profiteering, either. 
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Such competition is also reiterated by national politicians misleading the 
public about ‘world-beating’ systems of data (BBC 2020). In the same 
way that the social indicators movement was halted because it was not 
quite measuring what it thought it was measuring (Chap. 2), the ‘promise’ 
of Big Data has adjusted. The limits of Google’s approach are in a lack of 
context: the nature of what people actually search for is different than was 
predicted. The limits on data are social, cultural, political and economic, 
and by extension, these limit the possibilities for a good society. We will 
explore social media and mobile communications data in the final few sec-
tions to better appreciate this relationship.
5.5  social meDia Data: a game chaNger?
I am sure that social media plays a role in unhappiness, but it has as many 
benefits as it does negatives. (Sir Simon Wessely, president of the UK’s Royal 
College of Psychiatrists in Campbell 2017)
Social media platforms have an interesting relationship to well-being. 
They are often demonised as bad for well-being, especially for the younger 
generation who are thought to dwell on images of idealised bodies and 
lifestyles on Instagram (Campbell 2017). All ages feel a pang looking at 
the picture-perfect presentations on Facebook, and even the NHS warns 
people to take breaks from social media (NHS 2016). Credible, successful 
women leave themselves vulnerable to criticism from strangers in the shar-
ing of thoughts, opinions and aspects of their identity on platforms like 
Twitter (Lewis et al. 2016). Similarly, hate speech against people of colour 
(Gayle 2018) or for their gender identity (Pearce et al. 2020) are realities 
of social media platforms. However, social media and online platforms also 
offer places for human connections, and have had beneficial effects for the 
social isolation brought about by measures to curb the spread of 
COVID-19. The jury is still out on many of the pros and cons of social 
media, including their propensity to spread disinformation, versus credible 
analysis of data and guidelines. Social media therefore hold an ambivalent 
place in the management of well-being.
These controversial aspects of social media are not their only connections 
to well-being. The data we share can make them useful for well- being analy-
sis. The most mundane aspects of our feeds, the venting of minor irritations, 
celebrations of small wins or just feelings shared with friends and family 
mean our social media accounts are full of well-being data. Think about 
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those ONS4 questions again (Table 4.2) that aim to gauge ‘personal well-
being’. For example, they all ask you to think about how you felt yesterday 
overall—in terms of happiness or anxiety, as well as whether you think what 
you do is worthwhile, and whether you are satisfied with your life. When 
you think about Facebook’s most prolific posters in your timelines, for 
example, much of their content will indicate how they felt in similar ways at 
specific moments. The recent addition of emojis to Facebook means it is 
easier to proclaim whether you were happy, celebrating or anxious. The 
reminders of what you were doing this time last year or ten years ago means 
we are telling everyone on Facebook how we feel now, about how we were 
feeling in previous years. Crucially, this means it is even easier for Facebook 
to know this too, as you have essentially coded your own data for them.
This compulsion to share how we feel means we are also sharing our data 
with Facebook and other platforms. These platforms are able to analyse us 
alongside millions of others at scale. Companies like Brandwatch monitor 
social media and analyse several billion emoticons each year to inform 
brands whether they are provoking hatred or happiness with their products. 
It is also possible for a broad range of actors to mine social media data, 
whether commercial companies, government agencies, academic research-
ers or amateurs with the inclination to do so. The platforms are set up with 
open Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). APIs are what allow 
other (data mining) software to interact with social media platforms. Once 
access to social media data has been gained, it can be ‘scraped’ with com-
parative speed with the right skills and software. Scraping is a process which 
essentially involves gathering and copying data that meets specific search 
terms. It is then put into a database (that can be as crude as a spreadsheet), 
for later retrieval or analysis. This can be done by a person, although the 
term more typically refers to automated processes involving a bot or web 
crawler. The fact that APIs are generally open as a standard indicates that 
these data—your data—are made available by social media platforms to be 
used by various different actors. Not many people think about the fact that 
their public post on a social media platform is public in the sense that it is 
no longer their private property and can be used by others in research.17
There are practical limits to what can be known through analysing peo-
ple’s social media posts, of course. First, people are not neutrally repre-
senting themselves on social media. As we know, people feel compelled to 
publish reflections on an idealised version of their lives (Kruzan and Won 
2019). Of course, our social media posts don’t always represent our lives 
as happier than they actually are: people often exaggerate the impact of 
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minor negative events that are as mundane as missing the bus or being 
rained on. Some people collectively engage in dissatisfaction with their lot 
in life, leading to Twitter bubbles and what has become known as ‘the 
culture wars’,18 as the contemporary cultural conflict between social 
groups. This term describes a gap between those who side with a tradi-
tional, conservative approach, and those with a liberal, progressive 
approach to society and social issues, such as immigration, abortion, 
LGBTQIA+ rights, and so on. The contemporary culture wars, as a strug-
gle for dominance of values and beliefs, now takes place on Twitter, and 
we might question the extent to which such rage and passion are indicative 
of someone’s personal well-being, or some form of tribal rage on a larger 
scale. Essentially, we are seeing how important social media can be in both 
distorting and shaping our well-being for better or for worse. The key to 
appreciating the relationship of social media, data and well-being is under-
standing limits and context—of collection and use.
Social Media Data Mining in Social and Cultural Sectors
Social media data mining is not always a large-scale affair requiring APIs 
and special software. As found in a six-month research project with city 
councils and a city-based museums group in the north of England 
(Kennedy 2016), many small organisations use quite basic techniques to 
do this work. Social and cultural policy sectors are reliant on understand-
ing well-being data, as improving well-being is at the core of what many 
of them do. Yet, as Chap. 1 of this book acknowledges, the sectors do not 
always have the skills or confidence to use data. We will look at these sec-
tors as a whole in greater depth in the next three chapters.
The project exploring how these smaller social and cultural organisa-
tions were already using data mining, wanted  to understand how they 
might use it more effectively. The researchers discovered that although 
software packages were adopted to analyse institutional impact and 
engagement on Twitter, this was largely unsystematic (Kennedy 2016, 71 
& 72). Keen to improve their social media data mining capacity, these 
organisations signed up for training in new tools that would improve their 
capability. However, it became clear that less data mining was happening 
than expected and the capacity of workshop participants to engage with 
training in the new tools also fell away (Kennedy 2016, 74). Doing better 
with data seems a good idea, but is not always as easily resourced or incor-
porated into working practices as initially hoped.
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Local councils, social and cultural sector organisations all have limited 
resources. Despite enthusiasm for being, or becoming, data-driven, capac-
ity to invest time and money in new tools at the organisational level is 
often lacking (Kennedy 2016; Oman 2019a, b). In the case of the cultural 
sector, there is a tendency to invest in grand schemes, new metrics and 
reports at policy level that claim to investigate the value of new and/or Big 
Data and the associated technologies required to generate or analyse them 
(Gilmore et  al. 2018; Oman 2013a). However, when considering the 
(already ill-defined) cultural sector19 as a whole, differences are obscured 
in requirements and capacity for data technologies, which are multiplied 
by huge variability in organisation size, type, purpose, mission and cultural 
offering across and within sectors (Oman 2013a). These top- down 
resources and contributions are not always actually used or found useful at 
an organisational level or across the wider sector (Oman 2013a). Some 
organisations recognise that their audiences are full of people whose opin-
ions are less easily captured by Big Data. Some people, for example, still 
prefer booking telephone lines to web pages and are certainly not tweeting 
or Instagramming their experience of a show. As such, some who attend a 
show are less likely to be generating data on their opinions that might then 
be mined. Advocates for using Big Data in small organisations acknowl-
edge that Big Data can be ‘debilitating’ in their complexity and challenges. 
This is not always explored in a way that offers resolution (Oman 2013a), 
and as we have seen (Kennedy 2016) when recommendations, even train-
ing, are offered, there is not necessarily the capacity to take them up.
Yet, it can be very easy and fast to interact with Big Data as social media 
data, as long as you consider the limitations of the data and their origins, 
as well as how you might analyse them yourself. Organisations and indi-
viduals do not need Big Data analytics know-how or software, although 
there are excellent resources freely available to help them understand 
how,20 as I found when I wanted to explore Twitter discussions about hap-
piness. In 2013, Mass Observation recreated the Bolton happiness study 
on Twitter  (see Fig. 5.3). This was still fairly experimental for them as 
much as me when I requested access to the tweets. There were 25 responses 
that they captured at the time.
The sample of 25 meant that—of course—I did not require data  mining 
or sentiment analysis software—or any knowledge of APIs. In fact, I did 
not even need to request these tweets from Mass Observation directly, as 
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they are still available on Twitter by searching the hashtag (or were in 
August 2020 when I last checked). A cursory analysis in this case simply 
meant reading, and noting similarities and themes, which I could have 
done on a piece of paper.
So, what did this cursory analysis tell me? Whilst 20% mentioned pets, 
all of which were cats (it is the internet after all), one person replied with 
a single word: bacon. Mainly, however, people described informal, every-
day participation,21 including reading, going to gigs, watching films. There 
were lots of glasses of wine and some chocolate in there too. The textual 
content of these tweets is reproduced in Box 5.1, without Twitter handles.
You might note the surprising varieties of theories of well-being we have 
encountered so far in the book can be present in 25 tweets. Some map 
onto clear areas of social policy, others are definitely in the private 
domain. Some people used negative language to imply life isn’t currently 
great for them: ‘Day off. Smoke in peace.’ And ‘Ability for women to 
walk down the street & not be catcalled or threatened. Few happy 
women here’. Some people were philosophical, others wistful. Some 
focussed on activities, others on the ‘bliss’ of doing nothing. The variety 
of tone and content makes for fascinating reading, but leaves these data 
wide open to interpretation—whether that is via human or artificial 
intelligence.
Fig. 5.3 Mass Observation happiness tweets
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Box 5.1 Tweets Answering the Question: ‘What Is Happiness?’
    • Beer, maps, chocolate, quizzes, the unending pursuit of knowledge
    •  Ability for women to walk down the street & not be catcalled or threatened. 
Few happy women here
    •  Short term happiness is different for everyone. Long term happiness is about 
fulfilling your potential.
    • Bacon
    •  5 minutes to myself and a good book, with peppermint tea and the cats curled 
up around me. Absolute bliss!
    •  Volunteering, yoga, baking, being with loved ones, reading, warm days paddling 
in the sea, colourful things, exploring, my cat: D
    •  Doing what I love (#history), a safe home by the sea, someone to love & share 
things with
    •  Good company, fireworks, being smiled at, a job well done, ‘sweet pea’ by 
Manfred Mann, making someone else happy, good health.
    •  I am happiest when discovering/learning new things, such as reading books and 
finding new music.
    •  Happiness is cooking for those I love, with a glass of wine and giggles on the 
side.
    • Day off. Smoke in peace.
    • “What is happiness?” something to do with dopamine levels
    • Making things that muself [sic], and hopefully other people will enjoy
    • Loving and being loved and valued for who I actually am.
    • More precisely: Time, a book, a view, a friend.
    • Choices and control in life not just in shopping.
    •  Connecting with other people, being able to make a difference to someone else, 
a good book and a purring cat on my lap!
    • My kids
    • What is happiness?’—“A warm spot on the bed in the sunshine”
    • Knowing that enough is plenty
    •  The scent of roses on a damp morning […] being where you are without 
wishing to be somewhere else
    •  Happiness is seeing my children flourish, Swansea City FC progress & succeed 
& cooking for husband. Ln that order!;)
    • Love, health and a sense of purpose. Oh, and cake.
    •  What makes me happy? Cuddling up on the sofa with my partner & animals, a 
glass of wine, chocolate, a film & crochet- bliss




I used these tweets as a light-hearted example, with my ever so light- 
touch analysis, in my first ever conference presentation in 2013. In Chap. 
3, I explained that my research question at the beginning of my PhD was 
loosely: ‘When people describe well-being, how often do they talk about 
participating in different kinds of activities—and what might that tell us 
about aspects of social and cultural policy?’ or ‘how can qualitative data 
collected to understand well-being tell us how people feel about what they 
do?’. I noted in this presentation that state-funded cultural practices (like 
art galleries and museums) were less frequently mentioned by people as 
making them happy than what is called everyday participation (Oman 
2013b). This same finding emerged from my reanalysis of the ONS free 
text data I used in my PhD (Oman 2017, 2020). By extension, these data 
(with their caveats) were another dataset to suggest we should question 
whether cultural funding was supporting activities that made people hap-
pier or increased their well-being.
This was not the only way of analysing these tweets to make an argu-
ment about the relationship between culture and well-being. Someone 
else may have counted how many of these responses included something 
creative and used their analysis to argue they have found the value of cul-
ture to people, thereby justifying more funding. These are debates about 
data and their use in politics and policy that we return to in the next chap-
ter. What is important here is that even with (arguably, especially with) 
such a small dataset we can see how human bias can interact with data and 
lead to different arguments.
If it is difficult for humans to make categorical claims from a form of 
sentiment analysis that is not much more systematic or technical than 
reading 25 tweets, we must remember these limits when these analyses are 
made through machine learning. This is especially vital as time-sensitive 
analyses of large-scale samples of emotional expressions are being used in 
research on COVID-19, particularly given they are seen to have the poten-
tial to inform mental health support and help tailor risk communication to 
change behaviours (i.e. Pellert et  al. 2020). As with all data uses men-
tioned in this book, it is not that using social media data, or automated 
sentiment analyses are necessarily bad, but rather, that their limits should 
be recognised. As ever, it is an issue of methodology, transparency context 
and legibility.
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Understanding Where People Are and How They Feel Using 
Twitter Data
Of course, it is not only what people say that can be mined, but also where 
they are. One research project attempted to gauge community well-being 
using Twitter data from between 27 September and 10 December 2010 
(Quercia et al. 2012). Interestingly, as an aside, this coincided with the 
UK’s Measuring National Well-being debate which launched in November 
of that year. The researchers were interested in a few things. They wanted 
to understand more than individuals, to measure the well-being of com-
munities. They state their intention as moving the recent developments in 
subjective well-being measures that we discovered in the last chapter for-
ward. Rather than administering questionnaires on an individual basis, or 
in a national-level survey, they wanted to explore the recent possibilities of 
sentiment analysis to understand community well-being,
Social media data can significantly reduce the time-consuming pro-
cesses that make large-scale surveys and qualitative work resource-heavy. 
Once these data have been ‘scraped’ and saved into a database, they can be 
analysed in many ways. In the case of Querica and their co-authors, they 
were interested in the idea of using sentiment analysis to see if it could 
interpret community well-being. They created a sentiment metric, which 
was originally derived from studying Facebook status updates (Kramer 
2010). This metric standardised the difference between the percentage of 
positive and negative words in a Facebook user’s posts in one day. Kramer 
used the metric to make arguments at a national level, aiming to develop, 
as he suggests in the title of his paper, ‘An Unobtrusive Behavioral Model 
of “Gross National Happiness”’.
His new standardised metric was found to correlate with self-reported 
life satisfaction. Looking at the US specifically, peaks were found in life 
satisfaction that correlated with national and cultural holidays. This is fine 
in and of itself, but what does that tell us about well-being? Christmas is 
good for well-being? Other research indicates otherwise (Holmes and 
Rahe 1967; Mutz 2016), suggesting it can cause feelings of stress for vari-
ous reasons: financial, family, and so on. What about the days either side 
when people are travelling huge distances (with everyone else) using 
transport infrastructure which is not fit for purpose? Or the excesses of 
consumption that holidays like Christmas involve, as well as their impact 
on the planet? What about all those who do not celebrate Christmas, as 
they are not of a Christian denomination? In his limitations, the author 
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acknowledges that there is a possibility that the likelihood to wish people 
‘Happy Christmas’ could have affected these results. However, he decided 
not to control for this, as wishing someone happy holidays is a positive 
sentiment. We might wonder, then, whether this study was really inter-
ested in the possibilities for understanding the human experience using 
the details of the Facebook posts, or whether it was interested in deriving 
a metric that was comparable with more established methods.
Returning to the study on community well-being, the authors state, ‘it 
is not clear whether the correspondence between sentiment of self- 
reported text and well-being would hold at community level, that is, 
whether sentiment expressed by community residents on social media 
reflects community socio-economic well-being’ (Quercia et  al. 2012, 
965). Therefore, they do note some of the limitations of using this 
approach to answer their research question. However, notably, they do 
not acknowledge some of the limitations of the metric itself.
London was chosen for the study to understand about communities, 
socio-economics and well-being. Let’s break down what they did and 
how. The study used four types of data gathering, it:
 1. ‘Crawled’ Twitter accounts whose user-specified locations report 
London neighbourhoods.
 2. Geo-referenced the Twitter accounts by converting their locations 
into longitude—latitude.
 3. Measured socio-economic prosperity, using the UK’s IMD.22
 4. Conducted sentiment analysis on tweets between particular dates 
from their sample.
How did these processes work?
1. How the crawl worked: the researchers chose three popular 
London-based profiles of news outlets: the free newspaper The Metro, 
which was available in London on the Tube at the time (it has since 
expanded), a right-wing tabloid The Sun and the centre-left newspaper 
The Independent. These media were chosen because they are thought to 
capture different demographics of class and politics. Using these three 
accounts as ‘seeds’, they used ‘a crawler’ to trace linked accounts. Crawlers 
are software that allows you to gather various kinds of available data based 
on who interacts with a particular website or Twitter account. In this 
instance, every user following these accounts was ‘crawled’.
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2. Some Twitter users stated where they live in their profiles. 
Accounts were crawled to find 157k of 250k profiles had listed locations, 
with 1323 accounts specified London neighbourhoods. They then filtered 
out likely bots by also ‘crawling’ using another metric23 for each profile. 
This brought the sample down to 573 profiles. Once these were estab-
lished, locations were converted into longitude-latitude pairs, translating 
these data into geographical co-ordinates which are easier to work with.
3. The IMD is broken into 32,482 areas, 78 of these are within the 
boundaries of London used by the authors (these are not necessarily 
fixed). The IMD offered a score for each of London’s 78 census areas. The 
authors use a census area to represent ‘a community’. We shall return to 
this key point in a bit, but hold that thought. The data comes from the 
ONS’ Census and is an objective list of sorts: income, employment, educa-
tion, health, crime, housing, and the environmental quality. It is worth 
noting that in the IMD, the ONS talk about ‘Lower Layer Super Output 
Areas’ (LSOAs), rather than communities.
4. Sentiment analysis was undertaken on the tweets using two algo-
rithms. (1) Kramer’s metric described and (2) something called a 
‘Maximum Entropy classifier’, which uses machine learning. The algo-
rithm in Kramer’s metric has a limited dictionary, so this second machine 
learning package was used to improve on the first, by using a training 
dataset of tweets with smiley and frown-y faces. The authors argue that the 
results across the two algorithms correlate and are accurate. They then 
measured the sentiment expressed by a profile’s tweets and then compute, 
for each region, an aggregate sentiment measure of all the profiles in 
the region.
Findings: So what did they find? Through studying the relationship 
between sentiment and socio-economic well-being they found that ‘the 
higher the normalised sentiment score of a community’s tweets, the higher 
the community’s socio-economic well-being’. In other words, the senti-
ment metric accounted for positive and negative sentiments, enabling each 
area’s aggregated data to show an average score. This tended to correlate 
with the scale that they used that indicates poverty and prosperity in that 
locale (the IMD).
Limitations—What did the authors identify as limitations?
Demographic bias—Twitter users are certain types of people; there-
fore, these findings will over-represent the happiness of Twitter users—
missing out on non-users.
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Causality—our old friend. Though the causal direction is difficult to 
determine from observational data, one could repeatedly crawl Twitter 
over multiple time intervals, and use a cross-lag analysis to observe poten-
tially causal relationships.
Sentiment—They tracked sentiment but not ‘what actually makes 
communities happy’ (Quercia et  al. 2012, 968). The intention was to 
compare topics across communities. Their example:
given two communities, one talking about yoga and organic food, and the 
other talking about gangs and junk food, what can be said about their levels 
of social deprivation? The hope is that topical analysis will answer this kind 
of question and, in so doing, assist policy makers in making informed choices 
regarding, for example, urban planning. (Quercia et al. 2012, 968)
As evidenced with the possibilities for making an argument using the 
crude analysis of the Mass Observation tweets, and as suggested by the 
citation directly above, there is bias in the ways that Big Data can be used 
to inform social and cultural policy. However, this is not necessarily any 
more the case in these examples than in those using more traditional data 
sources explored earlier in the book. The ways our social worlds are 
ordered do not reside in the algorithms, but in the preconceptions, lazi-
ness and judgements which become reproduced through researchers and 
their research and through policy-makers and their decisions. While the 
Quercia et al. examples were presented as a binary of opposites for narra-
tive effect, the ridiculousness of the proposition may not stop it coming 
into effect as a deductive study in future. The fact that gangs are unlikely 
to tweet about gangs is one thing. Furthermore, the idea that these gangs 
remain within their ONS-allocated geographical boundaries called LSOAs 
is also a nonsense.
This brings me to another point, LSOAs are not communities: not in 
the way that we think of community well-being as built on social relations 
and inter-related lives. People are not only active citizens where they live, 
and in a city like London especially, may actually be more likely to be 
active citizens where they work. Without the context of understanding 
London, what it is to live in London, and the complex, overlaid commu-
nities and social groups that comprise a postcode, this idea of community 
well-being is a misnomer. Instead, it matches one index that uses census 
data, which, while valuable, can be out of date, and is well-known for its 
various limitations as a metric of socio-economic deprivation or advantage.
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Perhaps another way to look at a question of community well-being 
might be to look at people interacting in public space. Plunz et al. (2019) 
also used sentiment analysis with geo-located Twitter data. They were 
interested in finding well-being indicators associated with urban park space. 
Their goal was to assess if tweets generated in parks may express a more 
positive sentiment than tweets generated in other places in New York City. 
Their results suggest that tweets in Manhattan are different from other 
NYC boroughs. In Manhattan, people’s tweets were more positive outside 
of parks than inside, whereas the opposite was true outside of Manhattan. 
They concluded that Twitter data could still be useful for aspects of social 
policy, including urban design and planning. They also note that one of the 
limitations of geo-located Twitter data is that GPS is less accurate than 
sometimes accounted for. It also does not account for elevation, so you 
could be on the metro underneath Central Park, or indeed, stuck in traffic 
alongside it. It is hard to establish whether people may have gone for a walk 
to let off steam, or commute to work, for example.
The relationships between where we are standing or where we live and 
our well-being are  not new, but a feature of much philosophy on the 
nature of subjective experience, especially since the Enlightenment (which 
we shall come to in the next chapter). Big Data offer new ways to test what 
we know about place. However, these data and devices also make assump-
tions about place and experience (Wilmott 2016). The expectations and 
suppositions of what happens where, for whom and how drive these analy-
ses with the same bias as other Big Data technologies, and we must be 
aware of the limitations of these data, technologies and the ideas of well- 
being they claim to measure. We also need to be vigilant about who holds 
the data and why they are analysing.
5.6  fit for PUrPose? health aND Well-BeiNg 
trackiNg aND aPPs
Recent technological developments have seen a rise in people using wear-
able technologies and their mobile phones to track their movements 
and behaviour. These include: periods of activity, menstruation, what they 
have eaten, how they have slept, how far they have walked and their heart 
rate, in order to gain an overall picture of their health and general well- 
being. These practices are frequently called the Quantified Self movement 
(Ruckenstein and Pantzar 2017), which refers both to the cultural phe-
nomenon of self-tracking using one’s own data, as well as the community 
of people who use and share data in this way.
 S. OMAN
213
The technologies are increasingly popular and are being discussed as 
cost-savers for the NHS, but there are barriers to their use (Jee 2016). 
Around five years ago, 85% of the general population did not own wear-
able devices (Lee et  al. 2016). Therefore, measures which use datasets 
from these technologies will only account for a proportion of the popula-
tion, who are most likely to be younger and more affluent (Strain et al. 
2019) and already demonstrating an investment in their current and future 
well-being by owning such a device in the first place. We also do not yet 
fully understand the impact of COVID-19 on wearable devices and app 
use, as at the beginning of the crisis there were stories about governments 
using these data to monitor compliance with lockdown measures (Digital 
Initiatives 2020). YouGov polling data24 indicate that even in July 2020, 
65% of the UK had still never owned a wearable device, with 22% currently 
using one (with everyone else having tried one, or owned one but not cur-
rently using one). However, the same YouGov data indicate that usage has 
increased from 22% to 27% in January 2021, and those who have never 
owned a device has decreased at a similar rate. Therefore COVID-19 has 
seen an increase in wearable technology, as people take an interest in their 
well-being data in new ways.
Self-tracking, or the practice of generating or capturing data about 
everyday activities like eating, exercise for purposes of self-improvement, 
puts data and control in the hands of people, as well as the corporations 
which produce self-tracking devices and the third parties with which these 
data are shared (Kennedy et al. 2020). The research is ambivalent as to 
whether the experience of self-tracking has positive benefits, such as per-
ception of control, agency or, in the case of professional or amateur sport-
ing, opportunities for new communities (Ajana 2017; Lupton 2019; Pink 
and Fors 2017). It is also thought that these practices in and of them-
selves, and in their relationship to control, may decrease well-being more 
generally (Kennedy et al. 2020).
Data collected via mobile phone apps present similar possibilities for 
community and compromise. Smartphone access and usage only account 
for certain sections of a national demographic, much like wearable devices. 
Similarly, people who download an app to better understand their well- 
being are already self-selecting as wanting to improve their well-being, and 
therefore may not be considered a representative sample. A number of 
apps in the early 2010s wanted to further develop the insights gained from 
better understanding subjective well-being measurement.
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In 2012, experts in geography and the lived environment based at the 
London School of Economics created a mobile phone app to understand 
happiness (MacKerron and Mourato  2013). What they branded a 
‘hedonimeter’ (after the nineteenth-century invention we discovered in 
Chap. 2), the ‘Mappiness’ app asked people to allow the app to collect 
objective data about where they were (automatically, using GPS data), 
what activity they were doing, and who they were with (as manual entries). 
It also asked them to provide hedonic responses (subjective well-being 
data) as to how awake, happy and relaxed they were. These data were col-
lected using sliders instead of the more traditional scales we have previ-
ously encountered. The data collected by the app were used in a number 
of different ways to appreciate subjective well-being and we will touch on 
a couple here.
In 2015, a report which drew on this data was published. ‘Cultural 
Activities, Artforms and Wellbeing’ reported on research commissioned 
by Arts Council England (ACE). The authors evaluated the hedonic read-
ings of various activities found in the data collected by the app (Fujiwara 
and MacKerron 2015). Table 5.4 shows what the authors describe as ‘hap-
piness activities rankings’, with theatre, dance and concert appearing to 
have the highest effect, and reading the lowest, unless you incorporate 
Table 5.4 ‘Happiness activitiesa rankings’
Activities Coefficient
Theatre, dance, concert 8.735***
Singing, performing 7.731***
Exhibition, museum, library 7.457***
Hobbies, arts, crafts 5.737***
Talking, chatting, socialising 3.789***
Drinking alcohol 3.646***
Listening to music 3.518***
Childcare, playing with children 2.888***
Reading 2.331***
Watching TV, film 2.084***
Housework, chores, DIY −0.651***
Source: Fujiwara and MacKerron (2015)
aThe table shows coefficients, rather than rankings. Compared with the baselines, these coefficients report 
how much happier participants reported being when participating in these activities on a scale, when rel-
evant variables have been controlled for. The coefficient shows the size of the impact on happiness from 




other ‘everyday participation’ activities, such as TV watching. As you can 
see housework, chores and DIY is negatively associated with happiness.
Other studies cited in this report indicate that theatre has less of an 
effect on life satisfaction, whereas reading fares much better (Leadbetter 
et al. 2013). As we encountered in Chap. 4, there are conceptual differ-
ences between life satisfaction and happiness, and common sense might 
tell us that reading and attending a theatre performance present different 
kinds of well-being experiences. Yet, seeing that reading looks quite bad 
for well-being is surprising at first glance. Elsewhere in the report are 
regression tables25 for other activities, including birdwatching, gardening 
and hunting and fishing which are significantly better than watching a 
film—or indeed—poor old reading that doesn’t win on these happiness 
scales. Interestingly, when you go back to the Twitter data answering the 
question: ‘what is happiness?’ (Box 5.1) there were many responses that 
answered reading, curling up on the sofa and watching a film, and so on. 
While the limited sample of the Twitter data makes it impossible to gener-
alise, it certainly still poses questions as to what is going on with con-
founding results in various happiness data. One thing that struck me 
returning to these cases in 2020, a world changed by COVID-19, is the 
difference between activities in the home and outside the home.
Interestingly, the app’s inventors co-authored an academic article for 
the journal Global Environmental Change. Using the same data, they 
found that outdoor activities were better for well-being. They state:
[T]he predicted happiness of a person who is outdoors (+2.32), birdwatch-
ing (+4.32) with friends (+4.38), in heathland (+2.71), on a hot (+5.13) 
and sunny (+0.46) Sunday early afternoon (+4.30) is approximately 26 scale 
points (or 1.2 standard deviations) higher than that of someone who is 
 commuting (−2.03), on his or her own, in a city, in a vehicle, on a cold, grey, 
early weekday morning. Equivalently, this is a difference of about the same 
size as between being ill in bed (−19.65) vs doing physical exercise (+6.51), 
keeping all other factors the same. (MacKerron and Mourato 2013, 997)
The numbers in the brackets refer to ‘the scale points’, showing the 
increase in probable happiness by where people are, what day of the week 
it is, what time of day it is. Interestingly, the greener the space you are in 
and the hotter the day (if sunniness seems less important than you might 
expect), the better. While this may appear to be common sense in one way, 
when you think back to how policy relies on evidence to improve well- 
being, what are the policy messages here from an investment point of view?
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I had this app for a while and my results always told me that I was hap-
piest in a pub beer garden with my best friends. Did I know that the data 
I was ploughing in when the app beeped me to do so was going to poten-
tially be used to inform policy-making? Well, yes, of course, I guessed that, 
because I was researching well-being data and policy, which was why I 
downloaded the app in the first place. But did most people who were 
interested in how they felt doing certain things imagine the contexts of 
their data’s potential future use?
What policy decisions should be made about beer gardens off the back 
of my interactions with some sliders on a mobile phone app after a few 
ciders on a summer’s day? While these data were collected at a scale that 
means my personal data and my interactions are no longer visible on an 
individual level, it does pose questions for some of the correlations we 
make with these data. Are people happier on a weekend because they are 
not working or because they can go to the pub?
5.7  coNclUsioN
Despite the conflicting evidence from different approaches to ‘Big Data’, 
people are keen to find new ways to harness them to answer the age-old 
policy and philosophy questions around people’s well-being. The increase 
in well-being research coincides with an increase in research with and on 
Big Data. Both have possibilities and challenges, but could they be exacer-
bated by combining well-being research with these data practices? Do Big 
Data have a capacity for good when making decisions about young people’s 
exam grades or whether someone is eligible for social housing? We reflected 
on some important examples of where this went awry in this chapter.
New methods and metrics using Big Data, and indeed the research 
going into developing new tools to harness them, are not necessarily being 
checked for rigour before the approach is used elsewhere, as was the case 
with the Twitter community study, and its use of the sentiment metrics. 
Generalising people’s happiness based on mobile phone data has its limita-
tions. We cannot necessarily be entirely sure of whether it is the aesthetic 
grandeur of an old Victorian bandstand in the park, whether there is a 
classical concert inside, if you had enough sleep, whether you are picnick-
ing with your favourite friends, with your kids, or having time away from 
your kids; indeed, whether you are stuck on a delayed tube underneath the 




The ethics of studying Big Data more broadly should be considered, 
and the behaviours of those who are outside the sample of users of wear-
able tech or smartphones, especially as these people may be older or 
poorer, for example, which we know intersects with well-being in very 
significant ways. Despite this, claims are still made that findings from these 
studies could be used to inform policy and investment. While they can 
offer some insights, we must be mindful of their limits—and crucially of 
their implications, especially in different contexts.
All in all, Big Data and new technologies, whilst not always revolution-
ary in kind, can offer insights into well-being that are useful for policy- 
makers on a national scale, in international pandemics and for people who 
simply want to see what people think. But they are not without their lim-
its, nor are they a magic bullet to the issues we have with existing data. If 
anything, they are also shown to have the potential to exacerbate existing 
problems as much as investigate solutions.
The capacity for Big Data to embrace complexity, and at greater speed, 
means they present new opportunities to analyse health data—and cru-
cially how health intersects with social concerns. Reflecting back from 
today on how crude the Google Flu Trends analysis in 2013 now seems, 
it is clear that Big Data technologies and techniques are improving at pace. 
The COVID-19 example, BlueDot, shows that the value of Big Data anal-
yses is in their capacity to now cope with more of Big Data’s qualities at 
the same time, and in fact, to harness them: their messiness, variability, size 
and the capacity to link previously unconnected data sources from farming 
information to flight sales. The value was in the variety of data and sources 
used. Yet harnessing the power of Big Data was not powerful enough to 
prevent a worldwide crisis, despite the grand claims.
What we think of as ‘Big Data’ offer a peculiar perspective on ‘well- 
being’. Consider the different things they capture, from sleep patterns to 
elite cycle trails to facial recognition and how many steps your walk to the 
post office takes. These devices exist to capture and produce data because 
data can be useful and commercialised. We are not even clear on whether 
more knowledge of the self is good for well-being or bad (yet?), let alone 
whether it is good at scale: that governments (and who else) know more 
about us. What is clear is that data are producing and changing culture 
and society, as much as they are capturing it.
We need to ask questions around the commercial value of these data 
practices alongside social justice issues. How would these data have had a 
greater chance of improving well-being were the contexts in which they 
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were analysed different? Who should be included in these discussions, and 
who is excluded? Ultimately, how will decisions and trade-offs be made 
between the commercial and social justice dimensions?
Notes
1. In fact, what a lot of people refer to as Big Data are not ‘Big’ at all by the 
initial standards of definition. They are just large datasets or newer types of 
data in not even large datasets, and so arguably not Big at all.
2. Kitchin and McArdle’s (2016) original table says, ‘Limited to wide’ here 
(p2), but I think this makes more sense, as: ‘Limited in width’ or narrow.
3. A digital sociologist is interested in understanding the use of digital media 
(often data) as part of everyday life, and how these various technologies 
contribute to patterns of human behaviour, identity, relationships and 
social change.
4. O’Neil describes how the bottom scoring 2–5% of teachers were fired. Yet, 
the modelled target student scores and small classrooms made the scoring 
of teachers little better than random, and there was almost no correlation 
in a teacher’s scores from one year to the next and qualitative data called 
one of the sacked teachers ‘one of the best teachers I’ve ever come into 
contact with’ (O’Neil 2016, 4).
5. Critical Data Studies are moving for more fairness accountability and trans-
parency in data practices. Please see the FAccT conference for more on 
this: https://facctconference.org/.
6. This is largely credited to the 2017 article in the Economist, ‘The world’s 
most valuable resource is no longer oil, but data’ (The Economist 2017).
7. With the exceptions of 1941 (during World War II) and Ireland in 1921.
8. Although, of course, given what we have seen elsewhere in the book, we 
might question whether the changing possibilities for what data could 
describe, changed policy, rather than the other way around.
9. There were a number of iterations of Mass Observation, with different 
people initiating them, but these were the original founding members.
10. There were no women observing anything in those days, of course.
11. See Mass Observation (n.d.) website  for more on the data available and 
how to access them.
12. Several new methodologies are emerging that propose new possibilities for 
well-being measurement through combining new data sources with the 
survey data we have explored in previous chapters (Bellet and Frijters 
2019; Daas et al. 2013; Jahani et al. 2017). These are not only hoping to 
understand well-being as personal or subjective experience, but to change 
the way that social justice issues such as poverty are approached 
(Blumenstock 2016). International organisations such as the United 
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Nations are supporting this kind of work, although primarily focussing on 
patterns of ‘health and well-being’ (United Nations 2014, 2015).
13. More information is available on the REACT’s data collection and man-
agement here: https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos- mori/en- uk/covid- 19- 
swab- test- faqs#nameaddress.
14. REACT was commissioned by the Department of Health and Social Care 
(DHSC) and is being carried out by Imperial College London in partner-
ship with Ipsos MORI and Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust. 
https://www.imperial.ac.uk/medicine/research- and- impact/groups/
react- study/.
15. A review of literature on data and data practices, Kennedy et al. (2020), 
found that tech and policy were considered different worlds when it comes 
to data practices, and with different aims, although that is evolving.
16. See Internet Live Stats, ‘Google search statistics’  (Internet Live Stats 
n.d.). Internet Live Stats offer plenty more up-to-date data on data, if you 
are interesed. 
17. For the ethical concerns regarding social media research, see Townsend 
and Wallace (2016).
18. See Davies 2018 for a discussion on the greater implications of ‘the culture 
wars’ for politics and community.
19. If you are reading this chapter a while after reading the previous ones, then 
the cultural sector is a broad description of cultural institutions like librar-
ies, heritage sites, museums, theatres and so on. Crucially, it is not only 
about the buildings themselves, but all the ways people make and consume 
culture and can include Netflix and outdoor festivals. In the UK, the cul-
tural sector includes organisations funded by public subsidy as well as com-
mercial organisations.
20. This post from Wasim Ahmed (2019) offers a clearly presented overview 
of the kinds of analyses available using different software https://blogs.lse.
ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2019/06/18/using- twitter- as- a- data- source- 
an- overview- of- social- media- research- tools- 2019/
21. ‘everyday participation’ (Miles and Sullivan 2010) has come to mean the 
everyday activities we participate in, which tend to fall outside of formal 
subsidy, which tendentially funds ‘the arts’.
22. IMD is the UK government’s Index of Multiple Deprivation.
23. This is called the PeerIndex realness score. This score is generated using 
information such as whether the profile has been self-certified on the 
PeerIndex site and/or has been linked to Facebook or LinkedIn. ‘PeerIndex 
realness score is a metric that indicates the likelihood that the profile is of 
a real person, rather than a spambot or twitter feed. A score above 50 
means this account is of a real person, a score below 50 means it is less 
likely to be a real person’ (http://www.peerindex.net/help/scores).
24. See YouGov (n.d.) ‘Brits use of wearable device’.
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25. A regression table like the one reproduced in Table 5.4 will mainly be con-
cerned with communicating the degree of association between variables. 
Chapters 7 and 8 go into this in far greater detail. The values will always lie 
between 0 and 1, and the way this table has been presented shows simplified 
detail. Ordinarily there is additional information to show not only the degree 
of association, but how sure we can be that this is a correct estimate. There will 
always be a degree of error that has to be accounted for. Typically in a regres-
sion table, you will find asterixes, as in Table 5.4. Asterisks in a regression table 
indicate the level of the statistical significance of a regression coefficient.
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CHAPTER 6
Well-being, Values, Culture and Society
6.1  The RelaTionship BeTween CulTuRe 
and well-Being
For many the arts are a real source of happiness, joy, fun, relaxation and 
learning. (The Director of Research at Arts Council England [Bunting 
2007a, 4])
A wider definition [of wealth], associated with Ruskin, sees a nation’s wealth 
as including personal happiness and fulfilment. It’s an obviously broader 
view, into which culture fits more readily. (Secretary for Culture, Media and 
Sport [Jowell 2004, 8])
to maximise and exploit the contribution of the arts to core policies includ-
ing education, health, crime, regeneration and the well-being of the popula-
tion at large. (Funding agreement between Arts Council England and the 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport,1 April 2003–March 2006 
[DCMS 2003a, 15])
In 2007 the Director of Research at Arts Council England (ACE) 
reported on phase one of its first ever ‘public value2 enquiry’ (Bunting 
2007a). The Arts Debate gathered data from nearly 1700 contributions 
to workshops, in-depth interviews, discussion groups, ‘deliberation’ and 
‘open space’ meetings and web discussions (Bunting 2007b, 4–5). The 
first of the above quotes is from one of the reports: Stage one findings and 
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next steps. It argues that the data collected in the Arts Debate prove that 
the arts are a source of different aspects of well-being, many of which we 
have already encountered in this book. If this is the case, then these data 
are useful for understanding how people feel about the arts, as well as 
how they feel about well-being.
The argument in the above quote from the Arts Debate report recalls 
the words of utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham that we have encoun-
tered before: that the most happiness of the most people should be the 
aim of policy. By extension, it could be argued that if the arts are a source 
of happiness for many, then they are important to policy about well-being. 
The Research Director’s statement seems to be a clear assertion of the util-
ity of the arts to people. This ‘public value enquiry’ was a data gathering 
exercise to understand the value of the arts to people in the UK, to enable 
arguments for value in these terms. In cultural policy, ‘culture’ tends to 
refer to ‘the arts’ by default, and this is reinforced through institutions like 
ACE and activities like this. The report conjures up a relationship between 
culture and well-being that, even if unconsciously, is reinforced by draw-
ing on a philosophical grounding. This relationship and the ideas behind 
it  have become naturalised and popularised over time  and are used to 
describe how the arts can improve life, theoretically and practically.
Three years prior to the Arts Debate, Tessa Jowell, the then Secretary 
for Culture, Media and Sport, published a personal essay called Government 
and the Value of Culture (2004). In this essay, also quoted above, utilitari-
anism is referenced directly before nineteenth-century thinker, John 
Ruskin (who is renowned for his thoughts against utility).  Jowell para-
phrases John Ruskin, stating that a nation’s wealth should include personal 
happiness. Here, the culture secretary is very consciously explaining that 
this idea of the good society shows us how culture can demonstrate its 
value. Crucially, Jowell articulates the value of Ruskin’s view: ‘because cul-
ture fits’, and ‘readily’, therefore cementing culture’s public role. The rela-
tionship between culture and well-being, or, more specifically, the appetite 
to prove this relationship, is particularly hungry for well-being data, whilst 
also producing much well-being data itself. It is, therefore, a good case 
study for this book, which we will examine further in Chaps. 7 and 8.
This chapter looks at the relationship between culture and well-being 
to uncover the background to its reliance on data. It sets out the context 
and arguments behind the subsequent individual data case studies in 
Chaps. 7 and 8. Establishing ‘the culture–well-being relationship’ in this 
chapter enables three things. First, it illustrates the role of well-being data 
in policy evaluation by focussing on one policy sector. Second, it helps us 
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expand on the political economy of data and data practices that we have 
encountered in Chap. 5. Third, it explores the specific dynamics of the 
economy of well-being data in a policy sector where few who work inside 
it consider themselves adept at data (as discussed in the Preface and Chap. 
1), despite their reliance on them.
The quotes that open this chapter present evidence of how the ‘culture– 
well- being’ relationship is invoked and has become naturalised, particu-
larly in the UK. By this I mean, there is a generally accepted view that 
culture (broadly defined) is good for well-being (broadly defined). We 
look at the lineage of this idea as something that began with philosophers 
and is now common sense; naturalised over time and then popularised. 
More specifically, these two examples from cultural policy-makers demon-
strate how the relationship is operationalised3 (put to use) to argue the 
value of culture.
We will see how this operationalisation means that these ideas can easily 
be co-opted to argue that culture should be included in delivering social 
aims. Good social policy is arguably entirely reliant on appreciating the 
cultural specificities of communities and broader society. However, this 
meaning of culture, as ‘ordinary, in every society and every mind’ (Williams 
[1958] 1989a, 4), is different from that meaning of culture which defaults 
to that of ‘the arts’ sought by the Arts Debate. We have acknowledged the 
slippage between definitions and ideas of well-being (happiness, quality of 
life, the good society, etc.) in previous chapters and will pay similar atten-
tion in terms of culture here. This slippage in meaning can be useful in 
arguments that defend the utility of culture as good for society. As we 
discover in Chaps. 7 and 8, this is important when looking at uses of well- 
being data.
This process is often called instrumentalisation4 (Gibson 2008; Hadley 
and Gray 2017; Belfiore 2012) and involves ‘culture’ being used as a 
means or ‘instrument’ for attaining goals in other areas of society, or what 
are sometimes called policy areas or domains. Examples can be found in 
policy documents (as we have seen at the beginning of this chapter), 
research agendas, strategies and practitioner movements, such as the ‘arts 
in health’ movement (ACE 2007; AHRC 2021; AHSW n.d.) or the area 
of culture in regeneration (DCMS 2004; LGA 2020; UNESCO 2018). 
What we have seen through this ongoing period of instrumentalisation is 
the idea that the arts can be used to directly address societal problems, 
leading to the argument that culture is, in fact, instrumental to these social 
policy areas. Indeed, policy documents have argued that arts are so helpful 
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in delivering positive health outcomes that they recommend that health 
and social care professionals should be trained in arts-based approaches 
(All-Party Parliamentary Group on Arts, Health and Wellbeing 2014).
This principle—that  the arts are instrumental in delivering broader 
social projects and improving social infrastructure—has in turn been oper-
ationalised to advocate for funds for the arts, as part of making the case for 
the instrumental value of culture. This has shifted the idea of the value of 
culture from something belonging to everyone (Williams [1958] 1989a; 
Keynes 1945), to something that is valued for its social impact or for its 
economic contribution (Campbell 2019; DCMS 2011; National 
Endowment for the Arts 2018). In arguing this case, the sector is increas-
ingly required to evaluate how much of this additional value it has gener-
ated in response to funding; for example, in the 2003 funding agreement 
between ACE and the government (cited above) there is a commitment to 
a contribution across various social policy areas as well as the ‘well-being 
of the population at large’ (DCMS 2003a, 15).
This is why the cultural sector requires evidence. It has become increas-
ingly reliant on data for these arguments, often requiring metrics as proof. 
As we go on to discover, the sector is dependent on commissioning 
research to articulate its value, owing to gaps in data skills and resource as 
touched on in Chap. 1, and which this book aims to help address.
The values of ‘a good society’, and the idea that culture is intrinsic to 
them, have become amalgamated into the process of valuation, which has 
evolved into a form of proof along the way. As Box 6.1 represents, the 
processes of theorising and naturalising the relationship, to operationalise 
this idea, have led to a need to prove this relationship exists. In turn the 
symbolic value of this proof to the cultural sector means that well-being 
data now have a financial value, and those who can work with well-being 
data are able to capitalise on this (Oman and Taylor 2018). This slippage 
of the meanings of value, values and valuation is part of the cultural value 
debate5 that we introduce in this chapter.
The ‘slippery’ nature of culture is revealed by how the term is defined 
and then used. Culture can be described as something more ordinary 
Box 6.1 The Culture–Well-being Relationship
Theorised → naturalised → popularised → operationalised → 
 instrumentalised → operationalised → metricised → capitalised
 S. OMAN
233
(Williams [1958] 1989a), all around us and in everything we do, but the 
same term can be used to justify the funding of artforms which are any-
thing but ordinary, with often small numbers of people interested in par-
ticipating on rare, special occasions. Culture is such a ‘complicated word’ 
(Williams [1976] 1988, 87) that it makes it difficult to write about the 
culture–well-being relationship. However, we can see this ambiguity oper-
ationalised, as some arguments for the value of culture will refer to broader 
ideas of culture, when they are arguing for the arts, as we shall see in later 
chapters.
As described in Chap. 1, change is seen in data, but felt in culture. In 
the culture–well-being relationship, data are used to ascribe value and cul-
ture is where values manifest. Recognition of the increasing value of data 
tends to focus on the scale of Big Data and the human rights issues of 
personal data. Whilst important, the effects of the fetishisation of data we 
have encountered throughout this book are also felt in smaller data proj-
ects highlighting the need for skills and literacy in social and cultural pol-
icy. This chapter establishes two things: first, the relationship between 
culture and well-being and its association with data and, second, the expla-
nation as to why there is a market for well-being data and analysis in cul-
tural policy as a form of social policy.
Well-being and Culture: Reviewing the Long Theoretical Lineage
to increase the happiness of men by giving them beauty and interest of inci-
dent to amuse their leisure, and prevent them wearying even of rest, and by 
giving them hope and bodily pleasure in their work; or, shortly, to make 
man’s work happy and his rest fruitful. (William Morris, Aims of Art lecture, 
1887, in Belfiore and Bennett 2008, 144)
The aims of art, according to William Morris, should be to improve 
‘man’s’ quality of life in numerous ways. The role of culture (broadly 
defined) in a ‘good society’ has a long history that can be traced back to 
ancient Greece. Culture tends to be presented in a positive light, and 
Aristotle’s name tends to be attached to this representation. As you may 
remember from Chap. 2, many theoretical lineages of ideas of well-being 
and its measurement for policy derive from Aristotle. Yet, these ideas are 
not without problems when viewed from contemporary society6 and the 
representation of the culture–well-being relationship as a positive one also 
requires context.
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The theoretical lineage that culture is vital to a good society actually 
began in Aristotle’s ‘counterargument’ to Plato. Plato asserted the arts 
were, in fact, corrupting (Belfiore and Bennett 2008, 39). This reframing 
of the ‘honourable and dishonourable intellectual history of the arts’ 
(Belfiore and Bennett 2008, 10) demands attention if we are to consider 
the culture–well-being relationship, which leans on this moment in its 
historical tradition.
Theories of the arts’ ‘deeply transformative effects for the individual 
and society’ (Belfiore and Bennett 2008, 10) are now an assumed truth 
that has become naturalised and popularised. However, when this assump-
tion is drawn on, it is the positive effects which are referred to. The noted 
‘dishonourable’ and negative outcomes are conveniently discarded and 
often forgotten, especially in discussions about what culture is for and in 
cultural policy.
The cultural sector ‘believes that it makes a real difference to people’s 
lives’ (NMDC, undated in Selwood 2010, 4) and in recent decades much 
effort has gone into investigating the sector’s impact on individuals and 
how this might play out in communities, societies and nations. So intrinsic 
is the idea that arts are a social good, that evidence suggests cultural man-
agers believe the sector is good for other people, even if they do not like 
certain artforms themselves (Stevenson 2019). Here, we will look at spe-
cific aspects of subjective well-being (happiness or feeling that life is worth-
while). We know from previous chapters that these have different 
theoretical lineages and subtle differences in meaning, and so how they 
appear in cultural policy documents warrants a revisit, before contemplat-
ing what is being captured when using data to understand or measure an 
aspect of well-being.
For example, Dame Liz Forgan suggested that the arts can ‘cheer us 
up’ and create forms of ‘escape, comfort, understanding and reference in 
tough times’ (ACE 2009, 3). Forgan, who became the first female chair of 
ACE the same year, echoes the German philosopher (dubbed the artists’ 
philosopher) Arthur Schopenhauer’s ([1818] 2000) ideas of the aesthetic 
experience as protective from the anguish of the human condition. 
Schopenhauer believed that as understanding and experience of the world 
develop, we experience pain and responsibility. He felt it was important for 
the individual to escape certain pressures of communal responsibility, and 
therefore this was a purpose for the arts.
To contextualise the chair of ACE’s comments, she speaks from what 
we then thought were tough times: the immediate aftermath of financial 
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crisis (the 2007/2008 crash). Reflecting on Schopenhauer’s idea that we 
sometimes need to shield ourselves from tough times might cause us to 
reflect on who Forgan means by ‘us’, particularly in tension with the com-
munal responsibilities we might want shielding from. This function of the 
arts—as tonic in times of difficulty—is also related to rejecting struggle. As 
Belfiore and Bennett (2008) point out, Schopenhauer’s meaning of will 
remains contested, but they conclude (via Janaway 1994, 6) that ‘the best 
way to understand the concept of “will” is to conceive it as a form of unre-
lenting yet blind “striving forward” for something’ (Belfiore and Bennett 
2008, 93–95). Does art, therefore, offer a way out of contemporary life’s 
relentless impetus to strive forward? If so, how might these ideas of the 
importance of art for well-being intersect with the version of well- being as 
a balance of pleasure and purpose that is introduced in Chap. 2? Perhaps 
art allows us to escape our own will and the will of society, to be immersed 
in something else. Yet, this also presents a tension between the social 
responsibility that is implicit in culture’s role in a good society and aes-
thetic pleasure as an escape from feeling these pressures personally.
Schopenhauer’s thinking builds on that of another German philoso-
pher, Emmanuel Kant. For Kant, aesthetic pleasure lies within the process 
or state of understanding. More specifically, once the aesthetic experience 
has captured the imagination, it enables greater insight and meaning, and 
this is pleasurable. Perhaps for Forgan, this is the understanding we are 
also able to refer back to from tough times?
Yet again there are contradictions, as the pleasure from aesthetic experi-
ences is found in the striving for personal enlightenment. According to 
Kant, such awareness can only be found while in a balanced state: some 
sort of equilibrium of the senses. If this has been achieved, then it is pos-
sible to experience the ‘enjoyment of wellbeing’, but only following feel-
ing stirred by ‘the play of affects’ (Kant [1790]1987, 134, cited in Belfiore 
and Bennett 2008, 86). Another way of looking at this is that Kant’s 
thinking on hedonism is not about a moment of extreme pleasure (or 
indeed the chasing of a series of pleasures), but appreciating a moment of 
satisfaction, which comes after specific kinds of pleasure that lead to 
enlightenment. For Kant, then, it is important to recognise the feeling of 
satisfaction that follows this pleasure as a change in well-being.
This is starting to sound more like the language of the happiness econ-
omists from Chap. 4 who want to measure subjective well-being as an 
experience. However, based on this highly simplified version of Kant, the 
well-being caused by aesthetic pleasure (whether in a park, or in a theatre) 
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is not a single effect, but a series of effects that happen over time. When 
relying on the theoretical lineages of well-being, it is important to con-
sider that they do not always map neatly onto the concepts that econo-
mists are hoping to operationalise. This is also true for the culture–well-being 
relationship, and its inherent assumption that all forms of culture (or any 
of its chosen sub-categories, whether art, leisure, singing, food, travel) can 
contribute to all forms of well-being (whether they are physical health, fun, 
enlightenment, relaxation, empathy, escapism, social responsibility etc.).
As a result, discussion of what culture is, who it is for and how it can be 
instrumentalised tend to be stuck in a cyclical debate, much like the argu-
ments performed to an audience 2000 years ago by our learned friends 
Plato and Aristotle in the School of Athens. As with the Arts Debate, 
consideration of what culture is or what it is for often merges with articula-
tions of the value of culture (and often as the arts). By extension, these 
discussions segue into advocacy, for investment in culture as a good choice 
for social policy (as with the public consultation on public value referred 
to above) or into debates over how investment is distributed as a public 
service. We will return to this latter point, but first we need to establish 
how cultural policy became a form of social policy.
6.2  CulTuRal poliCy as soCial poliCy
Cultural Policy: Operationalising the Question 
‘What Is Culture?’
Taking now the point of view of identification, the reader must remind him-
self as the author constantly has to do, of how much is here embraced by the 
term culture. It includes all the characteristic activities and interests of a 
people; Derby Day, Henley Regatta, Cowes, the twelfth of August, a cup 
final, the dog races, the pin table, the dart board, Wensleydale cheese, boiled 
cabbage cut into sections, beetroot in vinegar, nineteenth-century Gothic 
churches and the music of Elgar. The reader can make his7 own list. And 
then we have to face the strange idea that what is part of our culture is also 
part of our lived religion. (T.S. Eliot, Notes Towards a Definition of Culture 
[1948] 1973)
In cultural policy, ‘culture’ tends to refer to ‘the arts’ by default. There 
are many books which consider questions of culture and many ‘men of let-
ters’ have concerned themselves with its definition, with Raymond Williams 
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and poet T.S. Eliot some of the most quoted. Understanding culture is 
more complicated than thinking of its definition and devising lists of what 
it is, however. Williams and his fellow cultural studies scholars’ work on 
culture explains far more than its definition. Williams attempts to capture 
how meanings and values interact across society (1977); what he famously 
called ‘our modern structure of meanings’ ([1958] 1989a, xiii), incorpo-
rating the institutions which manage our quality of life. He is interested in 
how ideas of ‘continuity’ are determined by certain groups which define 
‘the tradition’.8 He continues that it is ‘the tradition’ of certain groups that 
gets to decide what culture is ([1961] 1971, 66), and what culture will 
continue to be. By extension, this means that only certain people get to 
define culture and its role in society, as an ongoing process that repeats itself.
The definition and management of culture might make you think of 
some of the issues we have encountered with well-being data, particularly 
the penultimate section of Chap. 3. Some people get to define what they 
think well-being is, and what should be measured, using particular data. 
This essentially defines well-being, well-being data and their role in soci-
ety, but also how society is managed. For Williams, the way well-being, 
data and culture are organised is vital to how society works, and we need 
to understand them all together.
Williams offers us more than a definition of culture. He presents a the-
ory of culture, to deepen understanding of how culture works ([1961] 
1971). He argues that to develop an understanding of culture and society, 
we need to incorporate and deepen:
analysis of elements in the way of life that to followers of the definition are 
not “culture” at all: the organisation of production, the structure of the 
family, the structure of institutions which express or govern social relation-
ships [and] the characteristic forms through which members of the society 
communicate. ([1961]1971, 57–58)
What he means by this is that if we want to understand culture and how 
it works in society, we need to look at all of the stuff around it: how it is 
organised, communicated and managed—in the context of how other 
social structures work.
A simpler way of describing this, and why it is important here, is that: 
to understand culture and society, we need also to understand social policy 
and governance in general, as well as the institutions that organise and 
manage them. This includes appreciating how social policy works on 
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society, or its effects, alongside the ways that this happens. Also, good 
social policy and governance require a better understanding of culture and 
society.9 Therefore, society and social policy—and culture and cultural 
policy—are interlinked and need to be understood together, and within 
the context of the ways they are organised. Furthermore, this book argues 
that data are cultural, and so we cannot fully understand well-being data 
without appreciating both society and culture and, as Williams explains, 
the institutions which manage them.
Cultural Policy: Institutions for Well-being
It was the task of C.E.M.A. [Council for the Encouragement of Music and 
the Arts] to carry music, drama and pictures to places which would other-
wise be cut off from all contact with the masterpieces of happier days and 
times: to air-raid shelters, to war-time hostels, to factories, to mining vil-
lages. (John Maynard Keynes 1945)
The naturalised relationship between culture and well-being is a conse-
quence of the theoretical lineage of ideas of the good society we touched 
on above. The culture–well-being relationship has subsequently been 
operationalised through cultural policy as social policy in numerous ways. 
The above quote is from John Maynard Keynes, a key figure in economics, 
whose developments still inform much government policy today. Keynes 
invokes the culture–well-being relationship here, by describing what 
would happen without its preservation. He paints a mental picture where 
cutting off miners from masterpieces jeopardises their happiness, as that is 
how they access memories of happier days.
For the Victorians, the arts and culture were considered ‘elevating and 
refining to the working man’ (Bennett 2000, 1414). Public cultural insti-
tutions were established ‘to resolve problematic class behaviours’, with 
Henry Cole advocating in 1884 that ‘museums should go into competi-
tion with the Gin Palaces’ (cited in Bennett 2000, 1414), as ‘the rapt 
contemplation of a Raphael’ would keep wayward husbands from the tap-
room (contemporary magazine [1858], cited in Bennett 2000, 1414). 
Even the public park emerged for those who migrated to cities during the 
Industrial Revolution (Gilmore and Doyle 2019). In other words, the 
park as we now know it was another Victorian strategy for the improve-
ment—and regulation—of urban populations.
When culture is categorised as a solution for society, the idea is then 
developed and operationalised, and presented as a way to restore some 
form of social balance; whilst recognising that museums are ‘in 
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competition’ with other ways of spending time, whether a park or a pub. 
Identifying problematic aspects of society and their associated pastimes 
has been long entwined with ideas that certain activities, and therefore the 
people that do them, are deficient, and lacking in the right sort of culture, 
or are ‘uncultured’. People may lack a link to masterpieces of the past, but 
that does not mean that they lack culture, are ‘cut off from it’ or are 
indeed less happy as a result.
People in fact choose to not seek links to the culture described as a 
masterpiece and find happiness in pastimes that may suit them better. This 
approach to managing society by addressing the ways in which certain 
people ‘lack’ a certain kind of culture is called a ‘deficit model’. It stigma-
tises the practices of some people, and not others, the belief being that if 
certain people only engaged in a particular form of cultural participation, 
in the same way as these other, more exemplary people do, then we could 
be closer to ‘a good society’. This model of cultural policy still dominates 
contemporary UK cultural funding (Miles 2013), despite various attempts 
to redress it (that we encounter in this chapter).
The current framework of UK cultural policy is indebted to the 
Victorians and their adoption of ideas of civilising as a way to a good soci-
ety. Its management is more a history of institutions, and in 1940, the 
Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts (CEMA, to become 
the Arts Council of Great Britain) was established. It was World War II, 
and British cultural life—whether professional or amateur—was thought 
to be retracting, as described by Keynes cited earlier. The Board of 
Education intervened, saying it is essential ‘to show publicly and unmis-
takably that the Government cares about the cultural life of this country’ 
(cited in Hewison 1995, 30). The funding agreement committed CEMA 
to the ‘preservation in wartime of the highest standards in the arts of 
music, drama and painting’ and ‘the widespread provision of opportuni-
ties for hearing good music and the enjoyment of the arts generally’ 
(Hewison 1995, 33).
We can see that slippage between meanings of culture here cemented in 
a policy document from 80-odd years ago. Where the idea of a broader 
‘cultural life’ becomes synonymous with ‘encouraging music and the arts’, 
and that these are things ‘the Government cares about’. As Hewison 
points out ‘these essentially aristocratic, though benign, intentions are at 
odds with the democratic sentiments’ (Hewison 1995, 33) of commenta-
tors like Raymond Williams who began questioning what and who culture 
was for.
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These concerns of whether people are accessing culture, and who has 
access, have become key questions for cultural policy. As we shall see, the 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) commissioned its 
own survey of ‘characteristic activities and interests’ (to quote T.S. Eliot 
again), to discover who is doing what. Yet, the model of government 
funding remains fixated on this link between the masses and master-
pieces.10 Consequently, the institutions that formulate and deliver most of 
what we think of as cultural policy have become fanatical not only about 
ideas of cultural participation for its perceived personal and social benefits, 
but also how to fix ‘non-participation’,11 by engaging those who are not 
taking part. A cynic might say that this would allow the institutions of 
cultural policy to gain credibility for social impact and social change by 
way of simply getting those who are assumed to need more culture to 
enter their institutions, and we shall see how that plays out in data.
The deficit model of participation, and how many people are participat-
ing as an indicator of impact, is increasingly recognised as politically and 
empirically problematic. Cultural institutions are beginning to address the 
question: how are we deficient, if we are not engaging communities, rather 
than why are certain people not engaging with us? It is also important to 
note that cultural participation is a distant proxy measure of any form of 
social change. Entering a museum will not dissolve the social structures or 
traumatic experiences that leave some with ill-being or social disadvan-
tage. So, counting heads of who enters institutions generates data with 
many limits, yet this method was the staple of data use for some time (as 
we will see in more detail in Sect. 6.3). To assume anyone who does not 
wish to participate in a cultural offer is deficient in some way is morally 
dubious at best and to prescribe particular activities as any sort of cure for 
social ills may even be argued to be irresponsible (Oman and Edwards 
2020; Oman 2019a, b), misleading and misdirecting resources.
Well-being data have been used to plug the gap between attendance 
numbers and the capacity of cultural institutions to deliver social policy 
aims. Yet, in spite of years of investment, reams of theory, research and 
recent evolutions in data analysis, little has changed for the better (see 
Brook et al. 2020). We will return to how well-being data can be used to 
link the masses to masterpieces and help retain how the culture–well-being 
relationship remains institutionalised. However, we first of all need to 
return to questions of how certain aspects of culture are considered good 
for well-being in certain contexts.
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Cultural Policy: Whose Culture Is Good Culture for Well-being?
Sport and culture are widely perceived to generate social impacts. There is a 
long history of academic and evaluation research into the social impacts of 
sport and culture … This evidence includes individual impacts (e.g. health/
fitness, mental health and wellbeing), life satisfaction, cognitive develop-
ment, social skills; and broader community impacts such as social capital, 
increased volunteering, improved community cohesion, perceptions of 
quality of local area, increased educational performance, reduced crime/re- 
offending, reduced health care needs and economic development/
regeneration.
Sport is a broad and vague term that includes a wide range of activities.
Culture is defined as a broad term which encapsulates the arts, heritage 
and museums, libraries and archives. (The Culture and Sport Evidence 
Programme (CASE) Taylor et al. 2015)
We encountered how the naturalised relationship between culture and 
well-being is evident in the 2003 funding agreement between ACE and 
DCMS quoted at the beginning of this chapter, in which it committed to 
‘maximise and exploit the contribution of the arts to … the well-being of 
the population at large’ (DCMS 2003a, 15). DCMS distributed funding 
to a number of arm’s length bodies in 2003, responsible variously for 
sport, the arts, heritage and museums and libraries and archives. The 2003 
funding agreement articulated the idea that via ACE, the arts have a spe-
cific and mandated role in society. That role is to address societal issues, 
and in doing so, improve quality of life. Essentially, the arts should help 
people make the most of these activities to improve their well-being.
What happened to the concern over ‘cultural life’ more generally, you 
might ask? If culture is described in cultural policy research evaluations 
(such as this CASE12 example), as the activities attached to arts and cul-
tural institutions, then what of the culture happening outside them? Why 
is this not also so for less institutionalised cultural engagement, recently 
labelled ‘everyday participation’ (Miles and Sullivan 2010)? CASE is ‘a 
joint programme of strategic research led by DCMS in collaboration with 
Arts Council England, English Heritage and Sport England’ (UK 
Government 2021). Originally a three-year-long project costing £1.8 mil-
lion, reports have continued to be published under the CASE pro-
gramme since.
Arguably two main things are going on in the way the CASE pro-
gramme is framing culture. One might be that the institutionalising of 
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certain forms of culture means that, by default, a social role must be found 
for such activities, if they are to receive government subsidy that could 
otherwise be distributed to other areas of social policy. Secondly, that evi-
dence programmes were established in support of the activities managed 
by these institutions. So, more evidence is needed to justify the social role 
of culture, media and sport, in order to provide good reason for its sub-
sidy. Crucially, evidence in support of these institutionalised areas is also 
more invested in (and more institutionalised) than broader cultural life.
The hierarchy of high art and leisure, or a more popular or vernacular 
culture, has been contested by cultural studies scholars such as Raymond 
Williams ([1958] 1989a) and Stuart Hall (various, see 1977 and McRobbie 
2016). In the Leisure Studies literature, Stebbins’ binary of ‘casual leisure’ 
and ‘serious leisure’ (Stebbins 1997, 1999) indicates that the latter is more 
‘important to the wellbeing [sic] of the individual and society’, rather than 
largely non-productive leisure activities, such as ‘hanging around’ (cited in 
Blackshaw and Long 2005, 248). What are perceived to be bad choices 
and undesirable leisure pursuits remain a target for change, with personal 
and social ‘happiness by design’ (e.g. Dolan 2014) dominating the dis-
course of behavioural economics that includes many of the happiness 
economists we encountered in Chap. 4.
In policy terms, ‘casual leisure’ is often demonised. For example, the 
description of the 1999 reversal of Bhutan’s national television ban13 
includes a story of soaring crime, drug-taking and playground violence 
(Layard 2006, 78). Richard Layard explains that ‘a third of parents now 
preferred watching TV to talking to their children’, warning that the 
introduction of television as leisure coincided with the ‘deteriorat[ion of] 
family relationships, the strength and safety of communities and the preva-
lence of unselfish values’ (Layard 2006, 77, 78).14 Bhutan was the first 
nation to begin measuring what it calls ‘gross national happiness’ (GNH). 
In 1972, the Fourth King declared GNH to be more important than 
Gross National Product (GNP, similar to GDP), and from this time 
onward, the country oriented its national policy and development plans 
towards GNH. There is, of course, a longer history: the 1729 legal code, 
which dates from the unification of Bhutan, declared that ‘if the 
Government cannot create happiness (dekid) for its people, there is no 
purpose for the Government to exist’ (Ura 2010 via Helliwell et al. 2012, 
111). Its measures incorporate the interdependence of aspects of well- 
being and the belief ‘that the beneficial development of human society 
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takes place when material and spiritual development occurs side by side to 
complement and reinforce each other’ (Helliwell et al. 2012, 111).
The story of Bhutan maintains a persistent place in narratives of the 
second wave of well-being which are otherwise Euro-American centric. 
However, the tale we are told is often partial. Bhutan’s social and cultural 
life was idealised in descriptions of the importance of well-being measure-
ment as a political and social project. The innovations of the Bhutanese 
happiness index were greatly praised. Yet, the domains and indicators 
themselves are rarely discussed. As Karma Ura, President of the Centre for 
Bhutan Studies and GNH research, explains:
The term subjective well-being, by which happiness is known in western 
literature, is telling. (Ura 2011, 1)
Ura is highlighting how happiness is an individualised concern in the 
West, rather than something oriented around an idea of society, and also 
pointing out that a fair society should be encouraged by: ‘enlightenment 
education with respect to ethics, intellect and wisdom by its population in 
order to reach happiness (dewa)’ (ibid., 2). He continues that social wel-
fare accrues from ‘unquantifiable spiritual and emotional well- being’ 
(ibid., 2). Indeed, the Bhutanese well-being index has a whole domain 
called ‘Cultural Diversity and Resilience’, including ‘native language’, 
‘cultural participation’, ‘artisan skills’ and ‘conduct’ (Helliwell et al. 2012, 
115). In short, Bhutan’s innovations in well-being measures incorporate 
many of the cultural aspects of social life that are missing from the other 
objective lists described in Chap. 3 from the likes of the OECD and 
the ONS.
Bhutan’s attention to social and cultural life can be explained by the 
fact that—as a nation—it was less entrenched in the measurement and 
policy histories that informed many of the Euro-American approaches. 
They were therefore better equipped to capture ‘culture’ and ‘well-being’ 
without the institutional histories that Raymond Williams describes and as 
outlined in the evaluation research that opened this section. The question 
may not only be, ‘why is Bhutan measuring different aspects of socio- 
cultural life than OECD countries?’ We might also ask the question, ‘why 
are OECD countries so keen to follow Bhutan and measure well-being, 
but not follow how they are measuring well-being?’ If we look at the well- 
being agenda more generally, we find a tendency to borrow (or appropri-
ate) aspects of a different culture and adapt them. These modifications suit 
institutional histories of those doing the borrowing, indeed in the case of 
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the wellness industry, to capitalise on them. This is the case of mindfulness 
(borrowed from Buddhism) and yoga, of course; Western versions of both 
of these cultural practices have been criticised for hollowing out their 
meaning, even disrespecting the beliefs of the cultures that have been bor-
rowed from.15
To return to the narrative of television and Bhutan’s happiness and 
leisure policy is, of course, informed by value judgements that preconceive 
what is ‘good’ leisure for individuals and society—and what is not. These 
value judgements are—of course—inherited. They are evidenced by 
Layard using statistics but interestingly, as noted in Chap. 4, White and 
Dolan (2009) found that time spent with children is relatively more 
rewarding than pleasurable, whereas time spent watching television is rela-
tively more pleasurable than rewarding.
What is also interesting is that the reversal of the television ban (1999) 
happened but one year after GNH was announced as Bhutan’s objective 
(Layard 2006, 77) and a few years before the indicators were developed. 
This marks a move from simply aiming for GNH, as the Fourth King 
aspired to in 1972, to actually measuring it. Bhutan was becoming less 
culturally closed to Western developments including the television—and 
social indicators. Ironically, Layard notes that the impact of television on 
Bhutan society ‘provides a remarkable natural experiment in how techno-
logical change can affect attitudes and behaviour’ (Layard 2006, 7), with-
out acknowledging that measuring society to drive objectives will also lead 
to cultural and societal change. Well-being indicators being a good tech-
nological development and television not, we must assume, in this 
value system.
Choices over what is good for well-being and what has value in these 
terms are cultural decisions in their own right. This can be demonstrated 
in Bhutan’s choice of indicators when compared to other decisions that we 
comprehensively covered in Chap. 3. It is also worth noting that the influ-
ential Sarkozy Commission that was established in 2007 and reported in 
2009 (Stiglitz et al.) references the importance of cultural specificities and 
recommends that each nation find its own measures of well-being (Stiglitz 
et  al. 2009, 18). Crucially, it is not only in the inclusion of a cultural 
domain that Bhutan differs, but also in the relationships drawn between 
social and cultural values within the structures of meaning that Williams 
advocates (cited earlier). Bhutan also included within its education indica-
tor ‘the cultivation and transmission of values’ (Ura et al. 2012, 11) sug-
gesting that these intertwined social, cultural and religious values are at 
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the heart of the rationale for developing the GNH index in the first place. 
By contrast, social and cultural values held a precarious place in the project 
to establish the UK’s well-being index, which we return to at the end of 
this chapter. For now, we must turn to how social value and cultural value 
each has a different meaning in UK social and cultural policy.
Cultural Value and the Role of Well-being Data
As with the terms culture, well-being and social value, you will probably 
not be surprised to know there is no one definition of cultural value. Like 
so many of the other terms set out in this book, there are long debates and 
no clear consensus (Oakley and O’Brien 2015). Given the extent of these 
discussions, there is a brief overview of cultural value, acknowledging how 
its definition and quantification became a much-discussed problem to 
resolve, safe in the knowledge that the detail of these debates can be found 
elsewhere.16
The impact of culture on the economy first became a prominent feature 
of cultural value in the last quarter of the twentieth century. The focus on 
efficiency of the ‘Thatcherite revolution’ (Power 1994) and new public 
management discussed in Chap. 2 saw a focus on ‘social value’ as a consid-
eration in public decision-making. In parallel, what was called the ‘eco-
nomic turn’ instigated new methodologies for measuring culture’s worth 
as economic returns on investment (most notably Myerscough 1988). 
The new possibilities for measurement enabled by new methodologies, in 
turn, resulted in an increasing focus on measuring value, full stop, includ-
ing areas of life less readily measurable than money.
Ideas of cultural value enable continuity from economic value to instru-
mental approaches to valuing what culture and leisure activities could do 
for both individuals and society. Under New Labour (1997–2010), this 
tended to be articulated more prominently as social value (harking back to 
Victorian values of social and moral improvement). However, in truth, 
there was a growing abundance of econometrics that were taken up as 
proxies for cultural value.
The Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS, formerly 
Department for National Heritage) was renamed in 1997 by the then 
recently elected Tony Blair and was keen to promote the idea that ‘sport 
and culture are widely perceived to generate social impacts’ (Taylor et al. 
2015, 11), alongside economic impacts (see e.g. Hesmondhalgh et  al. 
2015). All New Labour departments inherited a civil service culture 
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steeped in almost two decades of new public management approaches, 
mixing public and private provision and a commitment to using social sci-
ence technologies to evaluate what worked and what did not in public 
administration (as discussed in Chap. 2).
Initially, the ways DCMS was required to assess its performance against 
social and economic goals were not demanding in terms of data or data 
expertise. As discussed above, it compared visitors to a range of events 
with the general population and used these numbers to make arguments 
about contributions to social aims. If the profile of people at these events 
grew closer to that of the general population—and less highly educated 
and white—then arguments were made for a contribution to social cohe-
sion, as a ‘strategic priority’ (DCMS 2003b).
While not technically challenging, such assessments were hampered by 
the limits to the data available. It was impossible to identify how the frac-
tion of the population going to a museum had changed in the last 
12 months without a figure for the previous 12 months. The data col-
lected on the cultural sector were partial, largely driven by specific targets 
generated by DCMS and related bodies.17 Thus, they reflected the inter-
ests and management approaches nationally, as well the expertise available. 
Cultural value arguments were increasingly included in the rhetoric of 
other actors and organisations, such as local authorities. These arguments 
retained the two key focusses: social impact and economic multipliers. If a 
local authority could show their local theatres led to economic growth, or 
to social impact, they could make a case for greater funding. Similarly, bids 
for new local arts venues ordinarily entailed commitments to an evaluation 
of economic and social impact.
Here we see the general ‘enthusiasm for numbers’ (Hacking 1991, 
186; Hacking 2002) discussed in Chaps. 2 and 5, manifest in a need for 
data expertise in the cultural sector, which was lacking, because it had not 
been previously required. Consequently, there was an increasing reliance 
on consultancies to satisfy the desire for data and evidence for policy evalu-
ation. This was symptomatic of a shift from collecting and describing data 
to a more involved analysis of the data gathered, as part of the production 
of evidence for valuing culture. Whereas researchers once ‘collected and 
recorded mainly quantitative data on things like the number of creative or 
cultural businesses in a particular area, the number of people they 
employed, the amount of revenue they generated and other typically eco-
nomic “indicators” of cultural and creative activity’ (Prince 2015, 584), 
this work broadened, so that by 2010, consultancies were estimating social 
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and economic impact. This included bespoke data collection—for exam-
ple, assessing the social impact of events by surveying attendees about 
changed perceptions (Prince 2015). It also increased the demand for 
understanding statistical power and significance (Prince 2014, 755). In 
short, the more research that was brought in, the more sophisticated it 
became, and the further outside the day-to-day remit of many responsible 
for evaluations.
Meanwhile, the need to ensure culture was part of discussions of valu-
ation and appraisal encouraged further attempts to define cultural value. 
One of the most prominent is John Holden’s (2004, 2006), for whom, 
there are different parts of society with different relations to, and needs 
for, culture. These different parts of society also reflect different perspec-
tives on value: the public, the professionals and the politicians. Cultural 
value also takes three forms for Holden (2006), broadly representative of 
these groups. For example, ‘intrinsic value’ is the subjective experience of 
culture: ‘intellectually, emotionally and spiritually’ (Holden 2006, 14). 
‘Instrumental value’ is how culture can be ‘used to achieve social or eco-
nomic purpose’ (Holden 2006, 16). There is also ‘institutional value’ 
found in how people relate to cultural organisations. For example, the 
BBC was very concerned about its ‘public value’ and conducted a consul-
tation so it could articulate its institutional value (in Holden’s terms) to 
the public and its instrumental value in economic terms.18 ACE’s 2007 
Arts Debate aimed to fulfil a similar objective (Bunting 2007a, b). 
However, public consultation data may not always reinforce the values of 
institutions and can in fact challenge them. When reanalysing the ONS’ 
data from the  national well-being debate  in 2010, I also found that 
Holden’s three groups formulate the value of culture to well-being differ-
ently. The lack of reference to arts and cultural institutions in general or 
specific terms by people in these data (Oman 2020) poses important ques-
tions for the cultural value debate.
The problem of cultural value is also extrinsically linked to, yet sepa-
rated from, economic value, in the policy context. Cultural economist 
David Throsby breaks cultural value down into different elements—aes-
thetic, spiritual, social, historic, symbolic and authenticity value—arguing 
that each contributes to the overall value of a cultural object, institution or 
experience (Throsby 2006, 42). He maintains that cultural value is sepa-
rate from economic value and, relatedly, that ‘there are some aspects of 
cultural value that cannot realistically be rendered in monetary terms’ 
(Throsby 2006, 42). However, he also argues that a thorough economic 
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valuation of both the market and non-market benefits of a cultural object 
can offer a good indication of its cultural value, because generally ‘the 
more highly people value things for cultural reasons the more they will be 
willing to pay for’ them (Throsby 2006, 42; see also 2010). Some aspects 
of cultural value lend themselves more readily to being expressed in the 
language of outputs and outcomes, whilst others do not. Given the valua-
tion tools we have are predominantly from the field of economics, perhaps 
the one which is most readily measurable is economic value. This is because 
it is already numerical, in a way that people’s subjective experiences are not.
As we can see, the idea of culture, the policies which contain and pro-
mote it, those who work in it, its infrastructure and research, seem to both 
attract and resist economic analysis.19 The proliferation of data collection 
and consultancy for policy appraisal included economic impact and valua-
tion methodologies. Some of the economic valuation techniques that are 
used to capture the effects of culture are not yet technically sound (Rustin 
2012), as will be expanded on in greater detail in the subsequent chapters 
(Chaps. 7 and 8). Yet, some argue the need to satisfy the demand for evi-
dence of this kind of value has to be addressed in some way. One particular 
in-depth project focussed on how to overcome the gulf between what the 
cultural sector thought it was making culture for, and the demands of Her 
Majesty’s Treasury (HMT) (O’Brien 2010). This report argued the need 
for pragmatism in presenting cultural value to secure public funding 
(O’Brien 2010, 8–9). It argued that ‘the lack of consensus in the literature 
over the meaning of cultural value and how to best measure and capture 
cultural value suggests the potential of using established economic valua-
tion tools’ (O’Brien 2010, 15). By encouraging the sector to measure the 
value of culture in ways more acceptable to the hierarchies of evidence 
demanded by HMT, the report aimed to reconcile two cultures of evi-
dencing cultural value. Arguably, however, this may have reinforced how 
very distinct they are, as well as leading to increased technocracy in the 
attempts of arts managers to do cultural economics or deal with more data.
Many in the sector see the value of their work as exceeding its economic 
value, and feel it cannot be reduced to economic considerations alone. 
Others argue that instrumentalising culture for social policy ends is not 
ethical for various reasons. It has also been pointed out that the hierarchies 
of cultural value (that one thing is more valuable than another to solve 
social problems) essentially ‘define[] culture as a mechanism for the repli-
cation of inequality’ (Oakley and O’Brien 2015, 5). These contestations 
have led to various audits of cultural value, such as the Warwick Commission 
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for Cultural Value, which influentially cites Taylor’s finding that the most 
privileged 8%20 access culture (Taylor 2016, in Neelands et al. 2015). Arts 
Council England has commissioned numerous reviews on the subject, 
many of which ask for further evidence rather than using the evidence we 
already have. For example, the publication The Value of Arts and Culture 
to People and Society (ACE 2014) lists key themes of the value of culture as 
economy, health and well-being, society and education. Positioned as a 
rapid review of evidence, the report identifies a number of gaps, particu-
larly regarding longitudinal data and the health and well- being evidence 
on cultural participation. Another example, the Arts and Humanities 
Research Council (AHRC) Cultural Value Project, a £2.5 million initiative 
over 3.5 years, supported over 70 original pieces of research initiated by 
the call, largely from arts and humanities research disciplines. The pro-
gramme intended to improve comprehension of the value of arts and cul-
ture and the methods used to capture this value (Crossick and Kaszynska 
2016). This programme has finished, but has resulted in a new Centre for 
Cultural Value which aims to build ‘a shared understanding of the differ-
ences that arts, culture, heritage and screen make to people’s lives and to 
society’.21
A recent large-scale academic project looked at how we might re- 
articulate ‘cultural values’ through understanding what people do in their 
everyday lives as culture, rather than thinking of cultural policy as some-
thing inherited to manage an elite idea of culture (Miles and Gibson 
2016). Understanding Everyday Participation: Articulating Cultural 
Values (UEP) notably used many different types of data, collecting pri-
mary data using various methods, and analysing secondary data using dif-
ferent approaches. The premise was simple: understand what people were 
actually doing, and what they valued, rather than what cultural policy- 
makers, the government, economists or the Happiness Tsar thought peo-
ple should be doing (and then investing in programmes to get them to do 
what they thought people should be doing and measuring whether they did 
it, or not). Insights include dwindling investments in the social infrastruc-
ture presented by the local park (Gilmore 2017), or how charity shops in 
certain communities have been overlooked despite their specific ‘relations 
between culture, economy and place which has effects in the social sphere’ 
(Edwards and Gibson 2017).
As noted above, a particularly influential insight from UEP was through 
reanalysis of DCMS’ Taking Part Survey data. Taylor found that:
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approximately 8.7% of the English population is highly engaged with state- 
supported forms of culture, and that this fraction is particularly well-off, 
well-educated, and white. Over half of the population has fairly low levels of 
engagement with state-supported culture but is nonetheless busy with 
everyday culture and leisure activities such as pubs, darts, and gardening. 
(2016, 169)
Taking Part: The National Survey of Culture Leisure and Sport had 
been established in 2005 (DCMS 2006) as part of a programme of evi-
dence generation led by DCMS. This new survey (known as Taking Part, 
and often shortened to TPS) aimed to collect data that would be useful to 
the concerns of all the sectors under DCMS’ remit. Notably, the CASE 
programme cited above was also a part of this project. TPS asks detailed 
questions about what people do and where. Chapter 8 goes into greater 
detail about the wording of the questions, demonstrating the level of 
detail collected about simple pastimes, such as walking. The survey also 
collects demographic data and since the 2013–2014 dataset has also con-
tained ‘the ONS4’ (see Table  4.3). TPS data therefore have inequality 
measures, well-being measures and highly detailed data about how people 
spend their time in terms of the variety of activities they undertake, how 
frequently and for how long. While DCMS have been criticised for not 
making enough of the survey data themselves (Bunting et al. 2019), oth-
ers have analysed the data, looking at types of participation and inequality 
(Taylor 2016) and well-being (Fujiwara 2013; Fujiwara et al. 2015).
My PhD research was connected to the UEP project, and as discussed 
in Chap. 3 and briefly here, one of my approaches used free text fields 
from the ONS’ Measuring National Well-being Debate. My research pre-
sented a reordering of data to see how people value different domains of 
their life, in comparison to the published findings (Table 3.1). I found that 
when people talk about their well-being, they tend to describe the sorts of 
activities that Taylor lists, rather than those subsidised by cultural policy or 
indeed the institutions which house them. Overall, the vast body of 
research presented across the UEP project indicates the limits to research 
on and for cultural value arguments in asserting the value of particular 
forms of culture.
Most examples of articulating cultural value are attached to a specific 
idea of cultural policy (conflated here with arts policy), as you can see 
above. What is key here is that in deciding what is cultural in cultural 
value, cultural policy practitioners (policy-makers and academics) are also 
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ascribing value to certain activities or practices. Much like the definition of 
social value and well-being, as described in Chap. 2, this is a value system 
in and of itself: a ranking system which results in certain places, people and 
practices being invested in, while others are not. What is interesting is that 
what is thought to have caused the downfall of the social indicators move-
ment in the 1970s was the ‘bewildering array’ of measures, as we discussed 
in Chap. 2. It was also the lack of a robust theoretical or ideological analy-
sis, as well as the failure to establish what needed to be achieved for whom 
and how (Scott 2012, 36). Despite the breakdown in prior measures, and 
years of contestation around the limitations of metricised cultural value, 
however, it remains a resilient idea that is heavily invested in.
Well-being Measures: Arguing a Right to Culture?
Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the com-
munity, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its ben-
efits. (Article 27 of the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights)
Before the UK’s well-being measures were finalised, a national debate 
was administered by the ONS to decide ‘what matters to you?’. The first 
iteration of the national well-being measures (Beaumont 2012) did not 
account for culture. At the time, prominent commentators from the cul-
tural sector expressed their dismay at this outcome, with one observer 
concluding in a national newspaper that this was proof that ‘culture was 
invisible’ to governments (Holden 2012). In actual fact, the omission was 
for various reasons; in part, because there was no validated measure for 
culture across the UK.22 But also, the ONS acknowledge the complexity 
of measuring multiple activities and wanted to avoid judgement on what 
should count and what not:
ONS considers that the currently proposed measures of satisfaction with the 
use and amount of leisure time should adequately reflect the effect of an 
individual’s leisure time on their well-being without making a judgement 
that particular or specific activities are good for well-being. 
(Beaumont 2012, 15)
Avoiding judgement is worth reflecting on for a moment, when you 
think back to the discussions on who decides whose culture, and the 
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Victorians putting museums ‘into competition’ with gin palaces, for exam-
ple. Despite this disinclination to ‘judge’, in 2014, the ONS included one 
of DCMS’ measures of culture from TPS  in the national measures of 
well-being.
The metric is based on whether people have ‘engaged with/partici-
pated in arts or cultural activity at least three times in the last year’ and 
notably only covers England, rather than the whole UK. While it can be 
contested whether this maps directly on to Article 27 of the Declaration of 
Human Rights, cited above, the debate (Evans 2011; Oman 2020) and its 
subsequent public consultation (reported in Beaumont  and Self 2012) 
demonstrate the social importance of a measure which included socio- 
cultural concerns to the nation.
This makes it even more interesting to compare Bhutan’s multiple mea-
sures for culture to the single indicator in the UK’s well-being measures. 
We have encountered limitations on measuring domains of life that are 
relevant to well-being, and how the decisions of ‘the metric makers’ are 
largely down to deciding the metric is robust enough. The case study in 
Chap. 3 of the OECD composing its international index found a theoreti-
cal and moral commitment to including a measure of sustainability and 
yet, the measures of sustainability available were not robust enough.
There is an important tension in committing to understanding culture, 
community and sustainability, but arguing that these are too complex to 
capture. There may well be an argument that this is because these domains 
had not yet received the attention they deserved by Euro-American statis-
ticians, despite the supposed influence of Bhutan. We might also wonder 
if it is the politicians who do not care for such domains (as Holden 2012 
describes) or those who measure and research well-being?
Countering Holden’s claims that culture has an invisibility problem 
(Holden 2012), cultural participation does feature in high-profile reports 
about well-being. As the influential Commission on the Measurement of 
Economic Performance and Social Progress highlights in its report, there 
is a long tradition of research emphasising the importance of leisure time 
for quality of life. ‘This research points to the importance of developing 
indicators of both leisure quantity (number of hours) and quality (number 
of episodes, where they took place, presence of other people), as well as of 
measures of participation in cultural events and of “poor leisure”’ (Stiglitz 
et al. 2009, 49).
In Europe, levels of ‘access to cultural amenities was a significant pre-
dictor’ of well-being in the countries measured by the European Quality 
of Life Survey (Chapple 2013, 9823). However, the same report states that 
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the accessibility of amenities does not independently predict life satisfac-
tion. Instead, it has a positive impact on all other outcome variables, ‘par-
ticularly reducing social exclusion and stress/busyness’ (Chapple 2013, 
52). Therefore, there is international recognition for the role of culture in 
attempts to both measure and understand well-being, but capturing this is 
complex, especially if it is not always fully interrogated.
The slippage of the meanings of culture we encountered earlier can also 
be found in Holden’s exasperation that culture was not going to feature in 
the ONS’ well-being measures. He uses a broad definition of culture in 
the same article in which he describes its (meaning the arts) invisibility to 
policy-makers (2012). These slippages might, in fact, be exacerbating the 
lack of attention to cultural indicators in larger statistical projects.
Culture and well-being are both ‘complicated’ words and attempts to 
capture either are contested—whether this is in their definition or in data. 
Similarly, value and values attract and resist the numeration and research 
that enable the persuasive arguments people want to make. This makes 
these insights valuable to different groups, creating a market for this 
research. The fact that Bhutan measures culture and values in multiple 
ways in its well-being index, when OECD countries do not, is important 
to take away from this chapter. Yet, when these are so difficult to define, 
slippage in meanings is exploited and national statistics offices want to 
avoid these sorts of judgements, it is difficult to see a way forward.
6.3  ConClusion
As we have seen, the naturalised role of cultural life as being valuable to a 
good society (or national and personal well-being) has been popularised in 
different parts of society and instrumentalised as policy. Yet articulations 
of cultural participation slip between everyday and elite activities, arguably 
confusing claims to social impact and understanding of what I call the 
culture–well-being relationship.
We have reflected on the theoretical lineage behind this naturalised 
relationship between culture and well-being. We have problematised 
assumptions, and shown the diversity of these claims for happiness, social 
justice or indeed hiding from social responsibility. The slippery nature of 
culture and well-being as concepts enables the relationship to morph to 
the needs of whoever chooses to invoke it, whether they are cultural com-
mentators or policy-makers. This popularisation and instrumentalisation 
of the culture–well-being relationship is rife in cultural policy, and at a 
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time in which the second wave of well-being and new valuation demands 
from Treasury affected demands for evidence, the relationship is increas-
ingly reliant on well-being data and expertise.
The burden of proof is enmeshed with a historical tendency to decide 
what is good for (other) people’s well-being, and what has social and cul-
tural value. Such relations and values are not as fixed as these approaches 
assume. Of course, really, one would hope that all social policy areas 
impact on personal, social or community well-being in one way or another; 
otherwise they would not require social policy-making. Ironically, the idea 
that well-being measures can neutrally capture technological change with-
out making their own technological changes is highly disputable when you 
consider the policy histories of Chap. 2. Data are cultural and they change 
culture and society in ways that are not acknowledged.
The Bhutanese well-being index has a rich cultural domain, with cul-
tural values featuring in other domains, such as education. Yet, despite 
acknowledging Bhutan as an inspiration to measure well-being, few indices 
are inspired by the GNH indicators. In the UK, the current, single well-
being indicator has a limited capacity to capture even arts participation at 
present—let alone a broader idea of social and cultural life. The following 
two chapters account for some issues in the ‘evidence base’ of evidence-
based social and cultural policy. We interrogate data, how these are used to 
make arguments and how we might all be better equipped to interact with 
well-being data to understand culture and society for ourselves.
noTes
1. The Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) became the 
Department of Digital, Culture, Media and Sport in July 2017.
2. We will talk more about public value and cultural value later in this chapter, 
but if you want a refresher on social value, moral values and valuation, there 
is a section on it in Chap. 2.
3. Notably, operationalise means something slightly different in research, par-
ticularly quantitative research. Box 7.1 in Chap. 7 explains this further.
4. The academic literature looking at the process and effects of instrumentali-
sation are mixed. Gibson (2008) defends it, whilst many others who write 
on it talk of its damaging effects (i.e. Belfiore 2012; Hadley and Gray 2017).
5. The cultural value debate has been long-running, see: Crossick and 
Kaszynska (2016) for an overview.
6. The reliance on slavery to sustain this version of a good society, being just 
one. See footnotes 3 and 5 in Chap. 2 for further discussion and reading. 
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7. Of course, you may find yourself noting the lack of consideration of a 
female reader by this ‘man of letters’.
8. Other cultural studies scholars agree with this crucial point: Dick Hebdige 
explains that some groups have more opportunities to make more of the 
rules that organise ‘meaning’ as how we understand the world and each 
other through culture (1979). This he describes as hegemony, a term bor-
rowed from Antoni Gramsci to account for how the dominance of certain 
groups of societies—their ideals, morals, values—and financial value—can 
be sustained over time. Stuart Hall (1977, cited in Hebdige 1979) explains 
that hegemony can only be maintained if the ‘dominant classes “succeed in 
framing all competing definitions within their range”, so that subordinate 
groups are, if not controlled, then at least contained within an ideological 
space which does not seem at all “ideological” which appears instead to be 
permanent and ‘natural’ to lie outside history, to be beyond particular 
interests’ (Hebdige 1979, 16).
9. For a recent take on Williams on this point, see Levine (2020).
10. Notably, for example, Arts Council England’s ten-year strategy was called 
Achieving Great Art for Everyone (2010).
11. For discussion on issues with non-participation as an idea, see Stevenson 
(2016), and using Taking Part data, see Taylor (2016).
12. The CASE programme ran from 2008 and its outputs are hosted here 
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/case- programme#case- programme- the- 
resources, although only up until 2013, whereas the report cited in this 
chapter is from 2015. A special issue of the journal Cultural Trends 
reflected on the programme, and that publication is useful background to 
this story. See O’Brien (2012).
13. Until 1999 TV had been banned in Bhutan, as had public commercial 
advertising. Layard (2006) describes this in greater detail, acknowledging 
that we shouldn’t generalise from one event.
14. There is a rich area of media studies which interrogates these assumptions 
about media consumption and ‘deviance’ (i.e. Eithne Quinn’s work on hip 
hop, 2020). While Bhutan’s case is an interesting ‘test’ environment, as it 
had not previously had television, other studies using longitudinal data 
have been unable to substantiate a link (i.e. Shi et al. 2019).
15. See Purser’s (2019) critiques of ‘McMindfulness’.
16. For example, in: O’Brien (2010); Oakley and O’Brien (2015); Crossick 
and Kaszynska (2016); Neelands et al. (2015).
17. See Selwood (2002) for a comprehensive review of cultural sector data.
18. O’Brien (2013, 122–130) covers particular case studies of public value in 
greater detail.
19. See Doyle (2010) for a longer discussion on how culture attracts and resists 
economics.
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20. Note it was actually 8.7%, but was unconventionally rounded down in 
error to 8% when the finding was reproduced. See Taylor (2016) for more 
detail on the actual findings.
21. The Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC), Paul Hamlyn 
Foundation (PHF) and Arts Council England (ACE) jointly funded this 
call to establish a Centre for Cultural Value (CCV) to the value of up to £2 
million  (University of Leeds n.d.). The new centre is hosted at the 
University of Leeds.
22. This was partly because the work to include indicators for culture (e.g. 
within local authority Best Value performance indicators that had been 
significantly invested in during the New Labour period) was erased with 
the removal of such performance management strategies by the incoming 
Coalition government in 2010. See Gilmore (2014) for further discussion.
23. The report does not explicitly outline how ‘access to cultural amenities was 
a significant predictor’ of well-being, however. Furthermore, the question 
about amenities in the survey, which allows the authors to arrive at this 
policy recommendation, is: ‘Access to amenities (including postal services, 
bank, public transport, culture, green space)’ (Chapple 2013, 106). Green 
space is the most important predictor, but the report is not clear on the 
degree to which access to cultural amenities predicts well-being.
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7.1  Well-being as evidence for social Policy
Now, of course we’ve already got some very strong instincts—even preju-
dices, sometimes—about what will improve people’s lives, and we act on 
those instincts … These are instincts we feel to the core, but it’s right that 
as far as possible we put them to the practical test, so we really know what 
matters to people. Every day, ministers, officials, people working through-
out the public sector make decisions that affect people’s lives, and this is 
about helping to make sure those government decisions on policy and 
spending are made in a balanced way, taking account of what really matters. 
(David Cameron, Prime Minister’s Speech on Wellbeing, 25 November 
Cameron 2010)
Using well-being data is thought to improve how we understand human 
progress and development, as we discovered in the first half of this book 
(particularly Chap. 2). Chapter 6 looked at two further reasons to use 
well-being data: to evaluate policy decisions that have been made and to 
predict the impacts of possible policy change. In the case of cultural policy, 
the common rationale for using well-being data is to argue for more 
investment or to ‘defend’ (Belfiore 2012) the existing funding and status 
of the policy sector.
Shortly after the turn of this century, we saw an international commit-
ment to well-being data that has been called ‘the second wave of well- 
being’ (Bache and Reardon 2013). The UK’s Office for National Statistics 
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(ONS 2011a, 2011b) conducted a national debate so it could understand 
what people thought should be measured. The above quote is taken from 
a prime minister’s speech that launched the Measuring National Well- 
being (MNW) programme and this debate. He talks of having instincts 
about what matters, but these need to be put to the test. Chapter 6 con-
cluded with how, when the UK began measuring well-being, there was no 
measure for culture. This was despite the instinct that culture is good for 
well-being. It was also in spite of advocacy to that effect and efforts to col-
lect more robust data, analyse them better and present compelling evidence.
Various areas of social policy have claimed their contribution to personal 
or societal well-being to differing degrees over the last 25 years (Oman and 
Taylor 2018). Notably, these appeals are rarely evaluated on their own 
terms (Oakley et al. 2013). The previous chapter (Chap. 6) looked at the 
relationship between culture and well-being because of its reliance on data 
and because the cultural sector1 has sought a clear identity through argu-
ing its value to well-being (Oman and Taylor 2018). It also discussed how 
this policy sector in particular often adopts what has been called a ‘special 
case’ rhetoric (O’Brien 2013), meaning it argues that it has unique or 
exceptional qualities. These are enmeshed in claims to the historical tradi-
tions of ideas of culture and its relationship to societal well- being (Belfiore 
and Bennett 2008) that have become naturalised and popularised. In other 
words, the relationship between culture and well-being seems almost natu-
ral, and common sense, whilst also appealing and almost taken for granted.
Alongside these processes of naturalisation and popularisation described 
in the previous chapter, investment in forms of research to generate well- 
being evidence for advocacy has also increased (Oman and Taylor 2018; 
Oman 2020). This form of research is often commissioned to support an 
argument in policy or political arenas, and we have looked at this as ‘instru-
mentalisation’ in the area of culture as social policy. This type of commis-
sioned research is common in the UK and is meant to build an argument 
that a particular activity or service is good for well-being (Oman and 
Taylor 2018).2 However, commissioning research to make evidence to 
support the value of a service, and therefore maintain its subsidy, affects 
the relationship between data, researcher and evidence.
How does commissioning research to support the arguments people 
want to, and need to make, change the nature and role of evidence in dif-
ferent social policy areas? How does this affect overall knowledge of ‘what 
works for well-being’3 in terms of social policy? Importantly, how does 
‘capitalising’ on well-being data affect its capacity to do social good or to 
be good data? Do the economic value of data and their analysis change the 
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relationship between well-being data and a good society? It is important 
to ask questions about research that seeks to prove something which is of 
financial and political value to particular groups.
In this chapter, we will look at some examples of data and evidence used 
to make specific arguments about the relationship between culture and 
well-being (the culture–well-being relationship), alongside evidence that 
might trouble some of the assumptions outlined previously. The examples 
in this and Chap. 8 are primarily focussed on cultural policy as a form of 
social policy. These case studies present issues for well-being data, evi-
dence, knowledge and understanding that can be generalised more broadly 
to other domains of social policy, but focussing on cultural policy as one 
area makes the contradictions starker.
When you encounter research findings in your day-to-day life, you are 
most likely to see them in the media. Journalists don’t often have time to 
sit and read a whole piece of research, and so you are likely to see the 
reproduction of a headline finding only. Sometimes this is directly from the 
researcher’s own writing up, and sometimes it is reproduced second hand 
in others’ summaries. There is an example of this in Sect. 7.4. It is less 
common to see the inclusion of caveats, methods, limitations and discus-
sions when you see headline findings reproduced in the media, which lim-
its how we understand well-being and data, as we shall go on to discover.
Can you think of a newspaper article you’ve read that says something 
like ‘Loneliness is killing us’ (e.g. Perry 2014) in its headline, which then 
moves on to clarify that this is actually not quite the case, the headline 
exaggerated the research that this article is based on and actually the 
research itself has many caveats? No, me neither. Media reporting of 
research is not renowned for this detail. Dramatic headlines are one thing 
in a newspaper article, where we have a shared understanding—to a 
degree—of how newspapers report information. Arguably, we have a dif-
ferent expectation when it comes to reading official reports. These can 
also lack detail on contextual information, caveats and limitations, as we 
discovered at the end of Chap. 4, with the testing of the ONS4 questions. 
This not only has a bearing on our understanding, but how we trust how 
data are reported. Often, it is just convenient to read headlines of research 
as they are presented to us, even believing they represent a body of evi-
dence. The examples presented in the remainder of this chapter highlight 
that conclusive answers are difficult to find to questions about the well-
being of any particular group of people, and the role of culture—or 
work—or leisure—in this. Crucially, looking at these examples, or 
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‘problems’ in detail, and putting them in context, generates additional 
well- being data to further improve understanding.
Data and Evidence in Cultural Policy
‘Facts about the Arts’ sets out to bring together some of the available statis-
tics on the arts. Anyone who has the temerity to try to do this invites the 
scorn of those who believe that the concept of the arts itself is elusive and 
indefinable and any attempt to measure it cannot begin to represent its 
essential quality. Others, however, believe that the considerable body of 
material which does already exist can be gathered together and presented in 
such a way as to lead to a better understanding of the extent to which the 
arts contribute to the quality of life of the country. Amongst those potential 
users are Parliament, the media, the general public, and the many who have 
the power to influence and make decisions about the arts. (Nissel 1983, 1)
Muriel Nissel was a British statistician and civil servant, who collabora-
tively created ‘a national survey analysing trends in social welfare’ which 
was to become Social Trends. Social Trends (1st edition 1970) was a sig-
nificant step in the history of UK statistics, as it symbolised a move away 
from tracking economic-only concerns to a more general concern with 
welfare.4 Nissel was, therefore, key to the social indicators’ movement, 
which coincides with what we have been describing as the ‘first wave of 
well-being’ (Bache and Reardon 2013). Nissel’s quote from her book, 
‘Facts About the Arts: A Summary of Available Statistics’ (1983), points 
towards this imagined clash we have encountered between the arts and 
data5: that they somehow do not go together, and yet must be put 
together.
Evidence is a contentious idea for those working in or interacting with 
cultural policy (both narrowly and broadly defined). The idea that the arts 
and culture have a role to play in improving quality of life is inherent to 
the identity of cultural policy. We saw this, of course, when the Arts 
Council of Great Britain was created, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
This idea of the culture–well-being relationship has then become opera-
tionalised in policy, by which we mean, it has been ‘put to use’: in order to 
advocate for the social purpose and even the social value of the arts; even 
the value added of ‘culture’ for the well-being of the wider population in 
various ways. So, cultural policy research will often operationalise this 
assumed relationship between culture and well-being in terms of value (as 
social impact) using quantitative evaluations, and we will look at some 
attempts to do that in this chapter.
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Box 7.1 Operationalisation as a Process in Research
Operationalisation in research has a slightly different meaning than 
in everyday speech. It is the process through which you decide what 
you are going to measure to understand a concept. Or, more for-
mally, it involves identifying measurable dimensions of a concept.
In this book, the main concept is well-being, of course; but along 
the way, we have also encountered other concepts, like poverty, 
social value and in this chapter, of course, culture.
How do you identify measurable dimensions of a concept? This 
could be designing questions that you can ask survey respondents or 
identifying data that are already out there (administrative data like 
hospital admissions are a good example). Measurement is about get-
ting from the questions to the answers.
In some cases, it’s simple: operationalisation could be, for exam-
ple, deciding that in order to understand ‘hospital capacity’ you will 
use average A&E waiting times as the measure.
But sometimes it’s intermediate: you might be interested in 
A&E waiting times overall; or average A&E waiting times for people 
under 18; or the percentage of people who wait more than four 
hours; or the longest anyone ever waited in a four-week period.
And sometimes it’s complicated: for example, you may be calcu-
lating a scale based on responses to loads of survey questions—where 
the operationalisation is ‘we’re interested in all of these questions to 
get at this concept’. Think of something that looks like the PANAS 
Questionnaire (Fig.  4.3). Instead of lots of different feelings and 
emotions (as in the PANAS), imagine lots of questions that are more 
specific, yet similar, about your mood. This could be an operationali-
sation of ‘anxiety’ or of ‘depression’.
If we want to understand the culture–well-being relationship—
as policy, or in social impact—there are a number of ways we might 
operationalise culture and a number of ways we might operation-
alise well-being.
In statistics, operationalise, more specifically, would mean we 
need to find a concept from well-being data that is something 
measurable (a variable).
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The following two chapters will investigate how the idea of a ‘culture– 
well- being relationship’ has been operationalised in policy, also looking at 
how it has been operationalised in research that is used to advocate policy 
decisions. This chapter problematises a number of aspects of the assumed 
relationship, by reconsidering how these concepts are operationalised in 
data. It also poses questions about why some data are utilised to reinforce 
long-held beliefs and values, when other data are readily available, yet are 
not used. Could it be that they do not allow for such a positive narrative?
Given that the value of culture is promoted for its positive relationship to 
well-being, and that this is partly to assure policy investment, we begin by 
looking at the relationship between data that capture changes in govern-
ment investment in culture, and data that capture change in an aspect of 
subjective well-being. This exercise has two aims: to review the relationship 
from a different angle and to demonstrate how data can be found and used 
on websites that are accessible by everyone. We then look at ideas of being 
an artist and cultural work and compare two reports that use a similar meth-
odology to analyse data from different countries. Again, this not only reveals 
something about the relationship between ‘culture’ and ‘well- being’, but 
also demonstrates how we can interact with research and evidence. Finally, 
we examine one piece of academic research that looks at ‘cultural access’ 
(participating in cultural activities) and well-being, to observe how this ren-
dering of the culture–well-being relationship is evidenced in an academic 
journal article. While far from exhaustive, this chapter takes the key con-
cerns of cultural policy: what gets funded, and to do what; who makes cul-
ture; who consumes culture; to look at them all in their own terms.
7.2  Policy sPending on culture as good 
for society
Wellbeing evidence can help policymakers to assess the impact of arts sub-
sidy on wellbeing inequalities, and thus to ensure that the benefits of this 
spending are spread to those with lower wellbeing, including disadvantaged 
and underrepresented groups. (Berry 2014, 36)
The quote above is taken from a 2014 report that was written to the 
All-Party Parliamentary Group6 on Wellbeing Economics. The report 
addressed what it called ‘four policy areas’ that the authors labelled: 
Building a high wellbeing economy: Labour market policy; Building high 
wellbeing places: Planning and transport policy; Building personal 
resources: Mindfulness in health and education; Valuing what matters: Arts 
and culture policy. It may strike you that these ‘policy areas’ seem quite 
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different from what we have seen before—particularly in the discussion on 
well-being indicators and policy domains (see Chap. 3). Putting planning 
and transport together, for example, and foregrounding work in the econ-
omy (rather than just the financial stuff). Of course, here, we will be look-
ing at the fact that ‘arts and culture policy’ is called ‘valuing what 
matters’—recalling what we talked about in Chap. 6 and those before it, 
we might want to ask who is valuing what matters—and what matters to who?
On this point of what matters to who, the report advocates assessing 
and ensuring whether ‘benefits are spread to those with lowest well-being’ 
(cited above). Framing this statement in this way is interesting, as it seems 
to acknowledge that well-being (or, how different things impact on well- 
being) is not experienced universally. Notably, some argue that it is easier 
to improve  the well-being of those with better well-being first (Oakley 
et al. 2013, 23),7 while, of course, the Easterlin paradox implies that it is 
easier to improve the lives of those who are poorer using money than it is 
those with higher incomes (see Chap. 4 for this discussion). As you can 
see, the relationship between money, identifying need and improving well- 
being is less clear-cut than we may be led to believe.
The report does not explicitly state that policy spend does not evenly 
impact on people’s well-being, citing evidence, so that it is clear this is a 
danger we should mitigate against. Instead it says we should assess whether 
it does. Its recommendations state that government should ‘seek to ensure 
that the benefits of arts spending reach those with the lowest wellbeing, 
including communities with high deprivation’. This is an important point 
that is often glossed over. In cultural policy, it is now acknowledged that 
the most privileged tend to consume the most culture, they therefore ben-
efit most as a group from the largest subsidies (Neelands et  al. 2015; 
Taylor 2016; Belfiore 2016). The intersection of well-being and inequali-
ties and arts spending is more complex, and one deserving of its own 
book. However, it seems that investigating policy spending on the arts for 
well-being is an issue of empirical and moral concern.
Well-being Data and Investment in Culture
For now, let’s look at some well-being data to observe the relationship 
between culture and well-being. To be specific, we are not going to look at 
the concept of culture as a whole, or, as is normally investigated, the concept 
of participating in culture (in some way). Instead we are going to look at the 
money spent on culture. If advocacy for policy spending on culture is based 
on its positive impact on well-being, this implies that increased investment in 
culture is assumed to improve well-being. If this is the case, then this should 
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be visible in some data, right? New Labour claimed a 90% increase in expen-
diture (in real terms) in its so-called cultural manifesto, ‘Creative Britain’ (in 
Labour 2010). You would maybe expect to be able to see a relationship 
between increased investment in cultural infrastructure and improved well-
being as a result. You might also expect to see this demonstrated through 
statistics, whether they come from administrative data or from national-level 
surveys. Can we see this relationship in the data? How might we check?
We do not necessarily even need to find administrative data to answer 
the question ‘Did increased spending result in increased well-being?’ We 
can find sources that tell us about well-being over time and spending over 
time. The increase in spending is described in a number of other literatures, 
and specified in some as well, including Hesmondhalgh et al. (2015, 73):
New Labour increased central government grants to local government from 
£82 billion in 1999 to £173 billion in 2010 (UK Public Spending website). 
This enabled local government to invest, particularly in ‘cultural infrastruc-
ture’ such as refurbished or completely new galleries and concert halls.
So, this means we could use the numbers published elsewhere, and sim-
ply consult well-being data, or literature, to see whether the investment 
identified by Hesmondhalgh and his co-authors affected well-being. 
However, the reference we have here indicates a credible data source for 
data on cultural investment, so we can use data from the UK Public 
Spending website and the data on well-being that would be most appropriate.
Box 7.2 Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Data
Recall from Chap. 3 that…
Primary data are collected by you or a project you are working 
on. In Chap. 3 we used the example of a questionnaire outside a 
music event in a local park.
Secondary data refer to data collected by someone else or another 
organisation that is made available at individual level. They will 
almost always be either anonymous or de-identified.8 They are usu-
ally quantitative data but can be qualitative. In Chap. 3, I discussed 
reanalysing qualitative data from the Measuring National Well-being 
debate that was collected by the ONS.
Tertiary data consist of summaries of primary or secondary data, 
often called headline data. If you go to the ONS’ well-being pages 




Should you want or need to find data yourself, I am sure the idea of it 
can feel daunting, and for many reasons. I try to tackle the most obvious 
ones to me in Box 7.3.
Box 7.3 Concerns with Finding Appropriate Data
1) Where to look?: The UK Public Spending website offers figures 
for year-on-year spending (tertiary data) that is a good place to start. 
It can be difficult to have faith in your ability to find the right data, 
but you can always begin by referring to how someone else has gone 
about it. In our case, we have started with Hesmondhalgh 
et al. (2015).
2) Suitability: There are various funding streams that subsidise 
‘culture’, so what are you looking for?9 As you will see in Table 7.2, 
I chose to use declared total government spend and Grant in Aid to 
ACE (being one of four arts councils in the UK). That is not to say 
that this is not complicated, but again, I followed how it was used in 
the literature and Hesmondhalgh et al. offer detailed descriptions of 
funding at this time (Hesmondhalgh et al. 2015, pp. 71–75) that 
can help you decide which is best to use. I used the clearest to me.
3) Availability: The availability of recent historical data that was 
readily available on websites may have gone through a process of 
archiving. This changes links and might make it difficult to find the 
data you have identified as useful from the literature. You can con-
sult the UK government web archive (The National Archives n.d.) if 
it is government data, or data from a non-departmental government 
public body like the ONS or ACE. As we have already encountered, 
back when we were thinking about the role of methodology in data 
in Chap. 3, there are pros and cons to all data, but administrative 
data are easy to access and managed by public bodies, with strict 
guidelines. It is therefore a great place to explore possible relation-
ships and patterns for further research.
4) Assurance: Knowing you have made the right choice can feel 
impossible. It is not always explicit that many choices are made in 
even a simple data process, like the one I describe here. The key 
thing is to know that most choices will have pros and cons and that 
there are limits to all claims of what can be known with the data and 
methods used. You just want to be sure to be aware of the limits, and 
state them when you describe your findings.
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I have chosen to consult the ONS for well-being data, as their platform 
is most familiar to me, and therefore feels easiest to refer to. Going back to 
the choices we make about which data we choose (Table 3.1), there can 
be a trade-off between resources (skill, time, money) and robustness. In 
another situation, you might find other tertiary data more accessible. The 
data I use here are headline statistics, rather than the whole dataset of 
every response. Therefore, basic data practices (cleaning and aggregation) 
have already been done by those who administer the data, for ease of use 
by the media, government and indeed anyone who is interested. The same 
is true for the public spending data I have chosen.
As we have previously discovered, Life Satisfaction (LS) is probably the 
most popular measure of subjective well-being (see Sect. 4.5 for reasons 
why). While the UK’s Measuring National Well-being (MNW) pro-
gramme did not officially begin until 2010, the UK had national-level 
surveys that had a question about life satisfaction for decades. Other 
national statistics offices, and international statistics bodies, have also 
administered surveys with life satisfaction questions in. The tertiary data I 
use here are from the British Household Panel Survey. It followed the 
same representative sample of individuals—the panel—over a period of 
years between 1991 and 2009. The same households who took part in 
BHPS were asked to participate in a larger survey, called Understanding 
Society.10 The same questions are asked of participants in the later survey, 
so data are available for after 2009.
Table 7.1 demonstrates that using data for satisfaction with life overall, 
as measured by the BHPS, does not show an increase in life satisfaction 
over time. While this is a somewhat crude attempt to use data that is read-
ily available, it demonstrates that it can be easy to explore a fundamental 
question quickly and sensibly. In this case, the question might be: ‘if we 
know that investment in a particular policy initiative or policy domain has 
increased substantially over time (Hesmondhalgh et al. 2015), how can 
headline well-being statistics help us understand the influence of invest-
ment on well-being?’ As Table 7.1 shows, the increase in funding is not 
seen in an increase in LS scores.
There are many limits to what we can know from the data sourced—we 
know very little of its context in this table, for example, but it tells a clear 
story. As it was from an ONS summary (for ease), rather than LS data 
from the UK Data Service, the years represented (2002/2003–2009/ 
2010) are those available and only a subset of New Labour’s time in gov-





































































































































































































































































































































The UK government’s changes in funding and policy are unlikely to see an 
instant impact on a national population’s life satisfaction. There are likely 
to be lags in effects. However, as noted with the poverty data in Chap. 1, 
selecting your timeframe can alter the narrative about the effects of gov-
ernment policy, be that life satisfaction or poverty. But we can check. 
Hesmondhalgh et al. kindly gave us the rest of the data for Grant in Aid 






Therefore, the increase in Grant in Aid spending was about the same in 
the five years that we didn’t include, as in the eight years we did, and it 
increased quite steadily.
What if we want to ask a more complex question, or see if there is any 
pattern between well-being and funding? In Table  7.1 we were only 
exploring one dimension of data: life satisfaction over time. Table 7.2 uses 
the same LS data points over time with some additional rows to report 
data on arts funding too. This will let us see a relationship between 
‘amount of funding’ from one set of data and the level of life satisfaction 
over time from another set of data. We can then plot these data over time 
as a line graph that looks like Fig. 7.1. A positive relationship between 
increase in funding and life satisfaction over time would see the lines on 
the graph charting a similar course, so to speak.
There is no obvious relationship between policy spend on culture in the 
data plotted and life satisfaction. Even if we account for the additional five 
years of data, life satisfaction does not appear to relate to policy spend. 
Interestingly, LS data from the BHPS from the longer timeframe11 are 
even less inclined to show a steady increase than our subset. While the eas-
ily available data do not have all of the 13 years in which New Labour were 
in office, you might expect that 8 years’ data would be enough to find a 
relationship between policy spending on the arts and life satisfaction, if 
there is one to find.
So, what about the limits of what we can know about the relationship? 
Figure 7.1 may only report life satisfaction data, but we know some other 
things about cultural investment, based on the literature presented so far. 
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Fig. 7.1 Patterns between arts funding and life satisfaction over time. (Total 
spend data from UK public spending website https://www.ukpublicspending.
co.uk/download_multi_year_1997_2010UKb_17c1li111mcn_F0t8nt. Grant in 
Aid data via Hesmondhalgh et al. 2015)
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For one, we have evidence that policy spend on the arts does not reach 
everyone equally, because not everyone participates in the culture that this 
money is spent on. This could mean that the way that culture was funded in 
this timeframe would, therefore, possibly limit potential increases in life sat-
isfaction overall across a whole population. We need to acknowledge that 
there is a difference between cultural participation and investment in culture.
Let’s quickly return to what we have already learnt about life satisfac-
tion data as a measure of subjective well-being. Firstly, let us consider the 
question: ‘How dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your life overall?’ This 
does not capture all aspects of subjective well-being. In fact, if we think 
back to Chap. 4 on subjective well-being and Table 4.2, with the ONS4 
questions, you will remember that life satisfaction falls under one of the 
three dimensions of subjective well-being: evaluative. Then, it follows that 
there may be increases in aspects of well-being that were not captured by 
responses to this question. Life satisfaction data are therefore useful, and 
may be the most useful according to some (Layard 2006), but still limited 
in evaluating overall subjective well-being (if we are to follow the accepted 
reasoning presented so far).
So, we need to acknowledge that there are many limits to knowing the 
extent to which policy spending in one area can have a clear relationship 
with life satisfaction, and what that means for the culture–well-being rela-
tionship. There are, in fact, numerous limits to any claim that might be 
made for causation. The life satisfaction data could also include the effects 
of countless other things happening at the same time which could be 
counteracting the effect, if, indeed, it existed. Remember the conditions 
of a good measure of well-being in Chap. 3? It should
be sensitive to important changes in wellbeing and insensitive to spurious 
ones. In practice, distinguishing between the two is quite a challenge and 
often relies on judgement based on a priori expectations. (Dolan and 
Metcalfe 2012, 411)
Clearly, the process I have described is not seeking a metric. All I have 
done here is describe the data easily available to look for a relationship 
between arts funding and LS. Therefore, no attempts have been made to 
account for confounders (which we will come to in others’ research later). 
There are so many variables that might affect life satisfaction in a way that 
would be captured by life satisfaction data, that it is extremely difficult to 
pinpoint the impact of one aspect only in this descriptive way. People who 
analyse data, rather than simply describe it, will use a theory or hypothesis 
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about pathways that shape well-being to help them create models that do 
this work. We will return to this in Chap. 8.
Life satisfaction is a very influential measure that we have encountered 
numerous times in this book. We have been measuring it for years, as it 
was in the first wave of well-being indicators (see Chap. 2). Realising that 
life satisfaction had not changed as expected with income over the years, 
resulted in Easterlin’s paradox that was influential in the second wave of 
well-being as happiness economics (Easterlin 1973; Chap. 4). Life satisfac-
tion is also measured using Big Data technologies (Chap. 5) and is thought 
to be the measure of subjective well-being that people most readily under-
stand (Chap. 4). Crucially, because questions about satisfaction with life 
(although worded slightly differently) have appeared in numerous surveys, 
and for decades, we have a lot of life satisfaction data to make simple com-
parisons over time, as we have just seen. LS can also be used to show very 
powerful relationships to outcomes of well-being, such as suicide rate and 
the familiarity of LS, together with the prevalence of the data, make it use-
ful for simple exercises, as we have attempted here.
We’ve briefly looked at ways that the relationship between different 
variables (different policy spend data and life satisfaction) can be plotted. 
This will hopefully make it a bit easier for you to engage with similar rep-
resentations in future. This section also demonstrated that it is quite easy 
to play with data that are publicly available. You can download the data 
into a table, like those featured, and use a simple function in Excel to plot 
line graphs to look for relationships over time.
Of course, there is another key point to this section, really, and that is to 
problematise the assumption that the arts and culture are a priority for pol-
icy spending if you want to improve well-being (Berry 2014). If you look at 
historic well-being data that coincide with previous increases in policy spend, 
you cannot find patterns in the data that prove that this relationship exists. 
There are many limitations to the claims that can be made with these data. 
The increase in arts funding coincides with a more general increase in public 
spending overall, therefore  it is hard to disaggregate policy spend from 
other things that may affect life satisfaction in this time. Another issue is 
that life satisfaction data only capture one aspect of well-being. I’m sure you 
have thought of other limits, as well. What is key is that while using data in 
this way may not prove anything, sometimes exploring data can be good 
enough reasons to ask questions—remember this is what Easterlin did when 
he found that life satisfaction did not have the relationship to income that 
had been long-assumed in the data he had. This is said to have changed 
well-being research forever—even if people still argue about it. Sometimes 
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data help us question the status quo in productive ways. They are not only 
there to help certain people answer certain questions. 
Policy Decisions and Investments Using Well-being Data
Lord Richard Layard (the Happiness Tsar from Chap. 4) has previously 
stated that ‘policy is not going to be framed around [well-being] for 
decades, but unless you have the index you’ll never get to a point where 
you can influence things’ (Rustin 2012).12 This is a far more measured 
take on well-being data and evidence being used for policy-making than 
suggested by the prime minister’s speech that opens this chapter. Lord 
Gus O’Donnell, another major advocate for well-being in policy-making, 
is also an economist and an extremely influential civil servant.13 He 
explained that same year:
We now know much more about what drives the wellbeing of people and 
communities than we did 10 years ago, and our knowledge and understand-
ing is set to increase significantly over the next few years. (O’Donnell in 
Legatum Institute 2012)
As recognised by the OECD and the ONS early on in their programmes 
to measure well-being (see Chap. 3), there was a general acknowledge-
ment at this time that well-being measures were evolving and exploratory. 
So, while a simple visualisation of how life satisfaction over time might 
interact with arts funding or suicide rates, not all well-being measurements 
are equally robust, and all have limits that are not often made clear when 
data are expressed. This is also the case when the concept of well-being is 
operationalised with another concept, such as culture.
Well-being valuations are far more complex than the way tertiary or 
headline data were ‘described’ in the previous section’s simple line graphs. 
As we discovered at the end of Chap. 6, demands from and on govern-
ment departments to evaluate the impact of their decisions, evolved from 
the descriptive to more complicated modelling in the 2010s. These mod-
els can analyse primary or secondary data and enable a more sophisticated 
reading of the data. A model helps researchers understand far more com-
plex relationships, including what might be interfering with our under-
standing (confounders). It can also express a relationship between two 
things, such as culture and well-being, in monetary terms. We will look at 
an example of well-being valuation modelling, and how complex this is, in 
greater detail in the next chapter.
7 EVIDENCING CULTURE FOR POLICY 
Box 7.4 What Is a Model?
Earlier in this book, I stated that data don’t just fall from the sky as 
facts. Neither do the models that analyse them. A model will prob-
ably contain assumptions about how concepts like ‘well-being’ and 
‘culture’ are associated.
There are two main kinds of models: exploratory and 
confirmatory.
Exploratory models
These allow you to try numerous variables that may be associated, 
and see what emerges as of possible interest. In other words, you are 
exploring the possibilities of the data. Developments in machine 
learning have sped up this kind of exploratory modelling with Big 
Data, as we discovered in Chap. 5.
Confirmatory models
Most of the chapters in this book refer to work that aims to con-
firm a hypothesis. Statisticians and others who model quantitative 
data in this way don’t just throw a bunch of variables into a model 
and hope for the best. Their models are designed with a theoretical 
foundation and that will most likely be arrived at from what we 
already know from previous studies  about how one thing (say 
income) affects another, well-being, for example.
Before a good confirmatory model is designed, it is important to 
establish ‘what counts’ in the issues you are considering, and how 
things are expected to fit together.
In exploratory analysis, you won’t need to guess how concepts fit 
together (although you might have an inkling), and won’t need the 
same level of attention to the variables you pick in relation to the 
concepts.
An example of what a model does
A simple model might be based on the hypothesis of a positive 
correlation. Say, between the average wealth of a nation and its aver-
age happiness (as with Easterlin). Imperfect measures tend to be used 
that represent far more complex concepts like wealth and happiness. 
For example, variables for life satisfaction and income will not tell us 
all we need to know about wealth or well-being. Also, resources dic-
tate that it is unlikely a researcher will examine the entire path 
between income and well-being; instead it will examine whether the 
two measured concepts (variables) have a statistical association.
It is likely that the relationships examined in any one study repre-
sent only small parts of a larger theory. This is not unusual, but is it 
always explicit when research is presented?
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As Chap. 6 describes, government departments including DCMS were 
indeed looking at how to use well-being data in valuations14 before 
Cameron’s speech in November 2010 from the official launch. This is 
because DCMS and the areas it funds were addressing HMT’s preference 
for valuation techniques (see O’Brien 2010). There are a couple of 
approaches that have been called well-being valuation. Fujiwara’s (2013) 
seems the most influential in the UK, but other examples (Sidney et  al. 
2017) called well-being valuation take a different approach. Following the 
increase in using subjective well-being data to value the impact of services, 
there has been a growing number of studies investigating the impact of the 
arts or specific cultural organisations in this way (such as Fujiwara et  al. 
2014a, 2014b and Fujiwara 2013 that we look at in the next chapter). These 
studies use responses to subjective well-being questions in national- level 
surveys, together with data on, say, theatre attendance, and estimate the 
impact of that artform. Such valuations assess data which can tell you that 
people who go to the theatre are more or less likely to have answered subjec-
tive well-being questions in a particular way. The magic is in the modelling.
Important questions remain, however, when it comes to the limits of the 
data and the extent that valuations can advise policy; particularly when it 
comes to stating one thing is more valuable than another. The practice of 
ordering the value of one thing over another does not seem to be present-
ing us with findings that corroborate each other. In one study, one artform 
is more important than another. As we saw in Chap. 4, ‘excessive TV watch-
ing’ is pitted against an unspecified amount of gardening when reporting 
on data collected to understand how people are spending their time in lock-
down and measuring their well-being (Bu et  al. 2020; Mak et  al. 2020; 
Nuffield 2021). Bias is brought to the data, which means they can be read 
in ways that confirm prior beliefs about what is an excessive amount in one 
area, but not necessary to measure about another. Consequently, this bias 
will feed into the presentation of findings and shape recommendations to 
decision-makers. In other words, ostensibly rational, neutral decisions 
which are supposedly made on the basis of well- being data are in danger of 
reproducing prior judgements and beliefs of the researchers—especially if 
they confirm those of the policy-maker reading the recommendations.
7.3  Well-being data and cultural Practice
So, we know that culture is a tricky word to define and can be measured 
in different ways; we know the same is true of well-being. We have 
looked at how we might need to think about how the concept of 
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well-being is ‘operationalised’. This is, of course, also true of culture, 
and the previous chapter spent some time covering different meanings 
and uses of culture.
What is it about culture that is being measured? This is, therefore, 
another question to think about, when we are trying to understand the 
relationship between culture and well-being. It is just as true whether we 
are reading the research of others, or, indeed, trying to design our own. Is 
it the specific activities that make culture? Different cultures? The culture 
wars? If it is measuring the activities that make up ‘culture’ (however 
defined), is it people who do things themselves or watch others? That is, 
are you producing culture (i.e. making art) or consuming it (i.e. watching 
Netflix)? Are you an artist or another kind of cultural practitioner who 
makes culture as their profession? Or a painter or singer in your spare time? 
Does singing along to the radio count the same way that being a member 
of a church choir does? Is it about participating with people? Does watch-
ing other people sing (because you are an audience member with people) 
count as participating in culture, just through watching? If so, does it 
make a difference if you watch it digitally—and with family or alone? What 
about the evidence we have seen that being outside seems to increase the 
relationship between different activities and well-being (MacKerron and 
Mourato 2013)? Should that mean that all outside arts get more money 
because they will have extra well-being value?
All these ways of thinking about what you might want to measure about 
culture for society or people actually involve quite different experiences for 
people. In this language of well-being valuation and data, you might find 
someone saying that how you operationalise culture matters for well-being 
effects. If you measure going to pubs or restaurants, how can you be sure 
that this is not a proxy for disposable income, leisure time or spending 
time with friends? The following might be the questions you might want 
to ask for cultural and social policy:
• What are you doing?
• Who are you doing it with?
• Where are you doing it?
• How long are you doing it for?
• How often are you doing it?
• How long do we expect an effect to last?
• How big should that effect be to count as impacting on well-being?
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We’re not going to go into arguments for what the most important 
aspect of cultural participation is. We have touched on these debates in 
Chap. 6 and acknowledged they are comprehensively covered elsewhere. 
Instead, as this book is about well-being data, we are going to look at how 
data can help answer certain questions, and what the limits to these are. 
We are going to compare how two different research projects answered a 
question about being an artist or having a creative occupation, and how 
that might be related to well-being.
Being an Artist and Well-being
For those of you who didn’t watch Disney-Pixar’s Soul at Christmas in 
2020 (and again for those of you who didn’t watch it, I’ll try to not spoil 
it), the film places a lot of emphasis on the meaning of music for the main 
character, Joe Gardner. He sees music—specifically jazz—as his purpose 
in life. The cruel twist is that, just as Joe gets his big break, and is on the 
cusp of being able to make music—in a real band—not just as an elemen-
tary school teacher, this big break is jeopardised. Ironically, it is the sheer 
joy at his big break that leads to this twist of fate. The unfairness of Joe 
not getting to fulfil his potential keeps us rooting for him through a 
meandering journey of self-discovery. Much of the journey is watching 
him strive to get back to where he was, so that he is able to enjoy that 
big break.
The over-riding feeling for most of the movie is that, for Joe, ‘making 
it’ in music is what will make his life worthwhile. The movie goes some 
way to explain the moment of getting lost in music, something that posi-
tive psychologists have described as ‘flow’,15 but which the movie 
describes as ‘in the zone’. You watch Joe reflect on what he thinks 
amounts to his meaningless existence, like the existential philosophers 
before him. There is also a moment where you watch Joe, sitting on a 
New York sidewalk, feel the sun on his face and wonder at a helicopter 
seed spiralling from a tree. This—‘being in the moment’—differs from 
flow. In flow, you are lost in your thoughts, in an activity, whereas being 
in the moment is about being present in your body, and is what mindful-
ness practice is based on. This Disney movie better describes some of the 
complex theoretical imaginings of well-being than thousands of years of 
philosophers we’ve come across before in this book—possibly this is of 
no surprise?
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The drive to be able to do something creative as a job—and in the way 
you want—is not just the stuff of Disney films. In fact, being an artist of 
sorts has long been seen as desirable and holds much symbolic value.16 
Idealised representations of creative and cultural jobs include creativity 
and expression, autonomy and passion—or doing something you love. 
The realities are often far harsher: with independence comes precarity of 
employment; there are inequalities in opportunities to ‘do what you love’. 
Often people end up working for money doing something associated to 
their creative practice—like our main character Joe being a music teacher, 
while awaiting his big break. Also, the rarity of opportunity to do what 
you love, and to be expressive and creative, often means you are expected 
to put up with being treated badly, or indeed to work for free, which is not 
an option for all.17
In short, the idea of being an artist is an ideal and the reality of creative 
occupations is quite different. While quality work is seen as important for 
well-being (What Works Wellbeing 2017), the actual quality of creative 
work and the anxieties that accompany the lifestyle necessary of such occu-
pations make it an interesting case for well-being research. The idea of 
creative work or being an artist is filled with contradictions that deserve 
attention, and yet the well-being of ‘creatives’ and artists is less frequently 
looked at than you may imagine (as the publications we are about to look 
at tell us).
Two Reports on the Relationship Between Being an Artist or 
Working in a Creative Occupation and Well-being
The two reports we will turn to were published in subsequent years. Their 
titles and their named approaches suggest that they both contain findings 
from research using similar methods to answer a similar research question 
about the well-being of ‘creatives’. This enables us to see how ‘culture’ 
can be operationalised as being and working as an artist, and how this can 
relate to well-being. It also continues to allow us to familiarise ourselves 
with looking at others’ research as it appears in reports, and to think more 
about what might be happening under the bonnet.
Report 1, Artful Living: Examining the Relationship Between 
Artistic Practice and Subjective Wellbeing Across Three National 
Surveys was funded by the National Endowment for the Arts in the US 
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(Tepper et al. 2014). The research looked at different cohorts of arts prac-
titioners and graduates in the US, using three different surveys.18 Contrary 
to the received wisdom that music and the performing arts are associated 
with the largest increases in well-being (e.g. Fujiwara and MacKerron 
2015), Tepper et al. found that fine arts and crafts consistently related to 
higher well-being; music did so for some groups and not others; and par-
ticipating in theatre ‘seemed unrelated to wellbeing’19 in the data they had 
on arts practitioners and graduates (Tepper et al. 2014, 7). Overall, the 
authors say that there was ‘strong support’ that what they call ‘artistic 
practice’ is associated with higher life satisfaction and lower anxiety, as 
aspects of subjective well-being.
Report 2, Creative Occupations and Subjective Wellbeing is a 
working paper for NESTA, a UK Thinktank. This study used data from 
the UK’s Annual Population Survey (APS).20 This research concurs with 
Tepper et al. (2014) that creative occupations are associated with higher 
than average life satisfaction, worthwhileness and happiness, ‘although 
most creative occupations also have higher than average levels of anxiety’ 
(Fujiwara et al. 2015, 1). This is contrary to Tepper et al.’s findings on 
anxiety from their data, but is corroborated by a number of studies, 
including the recent book, Can Music Make You Sick? (Gross and 
Musgrave 2020).
We are going to break down the ways that these studies may seem 
similar, yet differ. Both Tepper et  al. and Fujiwara et  al. use multiple 
regression of cross-sectional ‘national survey’ data that ask subjective 
well-being questions from people with an artistic practice in the case of 
the US or a creative occupation in the case of the UK. This means that 
these data include variables based on questions asked by the organisa-
tions who administer the survey; the named researchers (or authors) 
don’t ask these questions of the participants themselves. Some of the 
datasets used include creative practitioners and people who are not cre-
ative practitioners. This is fairly common, and the researchers simply 
distinguish which cases (people in the data) meet the criteria of their 
research question, meaning they analyse the people who have a creative 
occupation/artistic practice and remove those who do not form from 
the model.
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Box 7.5 Multiple Regression and Cross-Sectional Data
What is multiple regression of cross-sectional data?
Let’s look at these separately.
Regression analysis is common in statistical analyses. It involves 
estimating the relationship between a dependent variable and one or 
more independent variables.
In an analysis (e.g. a regression) you distinguish between
(1) Independent variables: that can take different values. You 
use an independent variable to predict the dependent variable. That 
is why it is sometimes called a predictor variable.
(2) Dependent variables: that can take different values. When 
you are measuring your relationship, you are interested in how the 
dependent variable is affected by the independent variable. It is, 
therefore, sometimes called the outcome variable to reflect this.
Say you are interested in private music tuition in childhood and 
creative occupations. You are not expecting an adult professional 
occupation to retrospectively generate experience of music lessons, 
but you might want to understand if the opportunity of private 
tuition affected a later career. So, occupation would be your 
dependent variable, and music tuition in childhood would be 
your independent variable.
So, we are still interested in private music tuition in childhood 
and creative occupations. We have established we want to under-
stand how the first affects the second (and not the other way around). 
You might decide on other things that you think predict being a 
creative, such as gender, which previous research may suggest affects 
the likelihood of entering a creative occupation. Therefore, you 
would bear this in mind as another possible independent variable.
This is what makes it ‘multiple’ because we have now got more 
than one independent variable to predict our dependent variable.
A regression to explain how many people work in creative occu-
pations could be conducted with either cross-sectional or longitudi-
nal data.
Cross-sectional data are collected from a survey from a specific 
point in time, or time period. The same survey questions can be 




The two research projects on well-being from the US and UK that we 
are exploring use different samples and surveys. This means that in both 
studies the group in ‘creative occupations’ may not necessarily map onto 
those with an ‘artistic practice’ as neatly as the labels used suggest. We 
come back to this in the next paragraph. The UK report uses the Annual 
Population Survey, which contains information on people’s occupation 
and the ‘ONS4’ questions that we keep encountering. Creative occupa-
tions were defined using DCMS’ Creative Industries Economic Estimates 
(DCMS 2011) and then coded using the ONS’s standard occupational 
classifications, called SOC codes (ONS 2010b).22 The authors are there-
fore able to look at the four ONS measures: life satisfaction, worthwhile-
ness, happiness and anxiety for the 30 creative occupations as defined by 
the DCMS (2011) in Table 7.3.
Box 7.5 (continued)
Longitudinal data hold information on the same people over 
time. This means you can ask the same questions, year on year, to see 
change over time. For example, you can ask people year on year if 
they have private music lessons. You can also have data for different 
questions. This is useful for our example, as we might have data on 
private music tuition in childhood, and data on occupation in  adult-
hood, should the participant be around that long.
DCMS’ Taking Part Survey (TPS) has a longitudinal compo-
nent21 and a cross-sectional one.
Since 2005/2006, TPS has been run on a cross-sectional basis 
that involves a new sample of households, which is drawn annually, 
and a new group of respondents who are asked the same questions. 
This enables researchers who use this data to say ‘last year X% of the 
population had music lessons’. But it cannot, therefore account for 
change that happens to an individual, so you won’t know that ‘the 
people who stopped music lessons last year are like abc’. Given that 
change implies impact, this is a big deal for many of the studies we 
encounter in this book.
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There are many discussions over what counts as a creative occupation 
using these classifications that we won’t get too caught up in here.23 However, 
when you imagine a town planning officer, they probably feel quite different 
to you from a musician. Also, realistically, the day-to-day duties of one is 
Table 7.3 Occupations in the creative industries
Creative industry Creative occupations
Description
Advertising and marketing Marketing and sales directors
Advertising and public relations directors
Public relations professionals





Architectural and town planning technicians
Crafts Smiths and forge workers
Weavers and knitters
Glass and ceramics makers, decorators and finishers
Furniture makers and other craft woodworkers
Other skilled trades not elsewhere classified
Design: Product, graphic and 
fashion design
Graphic designers
Product, clothing and related designers
Film, TV, video, radio and 
photography
Arts officers, producers and directors
Photographers, audio-visual and broadcasting 
equipment operators
IT, software and computer services Information technology and telecommunications 
directors
IT business analysts, architects and systems designers
Programmers and software development 
professionals
Web design and development professionals
Publishing Journalists, newspaper and periodical editors
Authors, writers and translators
Museums, galleries and libraries Librarians
Archivists and curators
Music, performing and visual arts Artists
Actors, entertainers and presenters
Dancers and choreographers
Musicians
Adapted from DCMS (2011)
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likely to feel very different than the other. A town planning officer will prob-
ably have more regular hours and a more secure contract than a cellist. You 
might also imagine that a cellist may have more capacity for self-expression, 
and feeling, well, artistic, than a town planner. The differences in day-to-day 
tasks, security, income and so on are all important external factors that will 
affect well-being. Therefore, these discrepancies across creative occupations 
(some of which may not feel that creative) may limit improved understand-
ings of the impact these professions have on well-being, if the model treats 
everyone with a job defined as ‘creative’ (using occupational codes) as equiv-
alent. What is key here is that it is that the categories used to break down the 
data (from the APS), and how they have been coded into professions (using 
the ONS’ occupational classifications) is important context to knowing what 
we can understand about differences in well-being.
In contrast, the US case uses data from three surveys which target dif-
ferent groups. The Strategic National Arts Alumni Project (SNAAP) cap-
tures data about graduates of arts institutions. The Double Major Student 
Survey focusses on undergraduates who have two majors from four com-
prehensive institutions and five liberal arts colleges. The DDB Needham 
Life Style Survey (DDB) is the nation’s largest and longest running annual 
survey of consumer attitudes. The report states that the researchers ‘look 
specifically at responses to creative practice, life satisfaction, and “sense of 
control” in one’s life’, but it is not precisely clear whether they identified 
‘creatives’ or looked at everyone who answered these questions. The par-
ticipants across these surveys are classified as ‘having an artistic practice’ 
for different reasons. In fact, most of the secondary data analysis is of 
responses regarding how people do cultural activities in their spare time.
Crucially, and confusingly, the participants across the three surveys do 
not all actually have an ‘artistic practice’, in a professional sense. In fact, 
the authors ‘use the terms artistic practice, creative engagement, and cre-
ative practice interchangeably throughout this report’ (Tepper et al. 2014, 
8). So, there is no analysis of the relationship between well-being and 
creative occupations, per se, or necessarily any differentiation between a 
professional artist or an amateur who ‘engages’ in artistic practice. 
Similarly, the questions used to establish aspects of subjective well-being 
are not the same across each survey. Table 7.4 shows the subjective well- 
being questions and how the ‘artists’ were identified across the three US 
surveys, alongside the UK case. Therefore, establishing what counts as ‘an 
artistic practice’ is one of the issues, and the other is establishing how sub-
jective well-being is understood. There are therefore key differences 
in how these concepts were operationalised in these reports.
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Table 7.4 is populated with text that has largely been cut and pasted 
from the two reports. It contains contextual information on the nature and 
purpose of the surveys used (you will see that in most cases the surveys have 
different aims) and the wording of the questions. I have attempted to cat-
egorise the US study into Evaluative, Experience, Eudaimonic, as per the 
categories in Chap. 4 and Table 4.1.24 This was easy for the ONS4 from the 
UK case, as these have been categorised for us already. The US case proved 
more difficult. The question about what Tepper et  al. call ‘positive self-
image’, while not unrelated to well-being and anxiety, fell less neatly into 
our categories, as designated by Dolan et al. (2011a, 2011b), the ONS or 
those recommended by the OECD (OECD 2013; Smith and Exton 2013).
‘So what?’ you may ask. Well, these two reports came out in subsequent 
years and with titles that imply they are researching the same relationship 
between culture and well-being. They may appear to have used a similar 
approach, listed as multiple regressions of cross-sectional data. However, 
there are key differences in the data they investigate. 1, they report on dif-
ferent countries; 2, one uses three data sources, the other uses one; 3, their 
operationalisation of the ‘cultural occupation/artistic practice’ variables are 
very different; 4, as are the operationalisations of subjective well-being; 5, 
those running the regressions (the modellers) used slightly different con-
trols (see Table 7.5). There are numerous reasons for these differences, but 
mainly, remember that  theories of what is good for well-being are not 
entirely universal, which will affect what someone wants to control for, but 
also the data are different, which will limit what it is possible to control for.
Box 7.6 Control Variables
Controls are control variables
Say there was a positive relationship between older people and 
enjoying jazz music, and a negative relationship between younger 
people and enjoying jazz music. A study to see if there is an associa-
tion between increasing funding for jazz music and enjoyment of 
jazz music may find no significant difference. The differences by age 
would be masked because  the negative (younger people) relation-
ship and the positive (older people) relationship could cancel each 
other out, resulting in no overall observable relationship.
Controlling for age can better establish that ‘funding jazz is likely 




When look back at Table 7.4, the survey questions generating the vari-
ous forms of subjective well-being data are different. They do not use the 
same concepts of subjective well-being and the questions are not identi-
cally worded. The samples of creative practitioners appear to overlap con-
ceptually at first, but they are far from identical. Therefore, we are not 
actually really looking at the relationship between identical things. Creative 
occupation or artistic practice do not  strictly mean having a job that is 
creative  in these studies, and the meanings and measures of subjective 
well-being are different in the data analysed.
Again, ‘so what?’ you may ask. Looking at the headline evidence 
together is the most typical way of understanding other people’s data anal-
ysis and findings to construct a body of evidence. Taking a moment to 
compare these two reports highlights how different two studies which 
may appear comparable really are, as well as the difficulties in finding con-
clusive answers to questions about the well-being of any particular group 
of people, and the role of culture—or work—or leisure—in this. Looking 
at differences in data sources, concepts, methodology, findings and moti-
vations provides extra data that help establish how conclusions and head-
line findings may have been arrived at.
The studies differ in numerous ways: the questions asked, who was 
asked (or included), the nature of the sample—as well as the interpretation 
of what being creative involves. Furthermore, the research designs were 
Table 7.5 Controls used in the two studies looking at well-being and creatives
Controls used in the report Artful Living: Examining 
the Relationship Between Artistic Practice and 
Subjective Wellbeing Across Three National Surveys
Controls used in the report 















Adapated from Tepper et al. (2014) and Fujiwara et al. (2015)
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analysing different subjective experience contexts: different places, and 
different relationships to creative cultural engagement (e.g. professional 
or amateur). The two reports were also commissioned by different organ-
isations in different countries with undoubtedly different research agen-
das. Therefore, while in principle, these two studies are looking at the 
same social issue in the same ways, they have different research questions 
that are applied to different contexts.
While the two studies were not designed to test each other, the two 
headline findings can be used together in a literature or evidence review to 
make a statement about what is known about being a ‘creative practitio-
ner’ well-being. Notably, the UK case states: ‘[t]o our knowledge this is 
the first quantitative study that specifically analyases the connection 
between creative jobs and wellbeing’ (Fujiwara et al. 2015, 2). The US 
case notes that ‘[a]s of yet, no one has examined the complicated relation-
ship between creative practice and wellbeing within the US’ and ‘prelimi-
nary work has failed to demonstrate a robust relationship between creative 
practice and wellbeing in part because of limited sample sizes’ (Tepper 
et al. 2014, pp. 8, 10). Interestingly, neither of these reports seems to have 
been cited much.25 When they are cited, for example by Tiller (2014, 43), 
the positive impacts tend to be reported. Also Tiller (2014) reports on the 
benefits of ‘artistic practice’ as cultural participation, rather than being an 
artist, and others interpret Tepper et al.’s results as follows:
Researchers have found that the more individuals  participate in artistic 
activity, the higher they score on a variety of wellbeing. (Kemp 
et al. 2018, 1)
Tepper et al. (2014) found that creating crafts, gardening, and playing 
a musical instrument—or personal art‐making—were positively related 
to life satisfaction. (Kemp et al. 2018, 3)
Part of the nonsignificant relationship between active arts participa-
tion and life satisfaction may be due to a perceived lack of time indi-
viduals feel they have to engage in creative practice. Hence, if they 
feel that time is constrained such that they do not have sufficient 
time to engage in artistic creation, benefits related to SWB may be 
minimal. (Kemp et al. 2018, 6)
This final point is of interest, as neither Tepper et al. nor Kemp et al. 
really pick up on the fact that it may not be that those engaged in active 
arts participation, as described,  do not have enough spare time to do 
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enough creative practice, but instead, that they could be—like our friend 
in the Disney movie—dissatisfied with the job they have. Tepper et al. say 
that it may be better for some graduates to walk away from their artistic 
practice (Tepper et al. 2014, 28), but leaving ‘the industry’ seems to be 
attributable to a lack of time for ‘robust artistic life’ versus ‘simply dab-
bling in the arts’. This analysis does not incorporate what we know of the 
hardships of those who are full-time artists and those who are still aspiring 
(refer to Brook et al. 2020 for discussion on this). Given that the authors 
state: ‘this report represents an initial exploration of the thesis that the arts 
are essential to a high quality of life’ (Tepper et al. 2014, 28), we might 
question whether they were ready for an interpretation of the arts and 
their labour markets as bad for well-being in various ways.
Tepper et al.’s title Artful Living: Examining the Relationship Between 
Artistic Practice and Subjective Wellbeing Across Three National Surveys 
was misleading to some audiences, particularly in the UK, where artistic 
practice tends to mean working as a professional artist. Instead, it was 
more broadly defined to include practising an art as a hobby. Similarly, not 
all the creative occupations in Fujiwara et  al.’s report were as closely 
aligned to having an artistic practice as you might assume by the term 
creative occupation. Ultimately, it can be more difficult to compare or 
synthesise studies than is obvious by the title of a report, or its headline 
findings. This is often not acknowledged and can limit the validity of com-
parisons when evidence is reviewed and synthesised.
The way that the idea of culture and well-being are operationalised in 
these two cases differs more than to be expected: the data and the contexts 
in which they were collected, or the surveys or questions which generate 
the variables, are not always as similar as might be assumed. When we 
describe findings from apparently comparable studies, it is just as impor-
tant to account for the motivations and methods of these studies (their 
contexts) as it would be our own. This is because when we synthesise the 
research of others, we create new knowledge that is able to make grander 
claims as it appears more generalisable.
7.4  Well-being data and ‘cultural access’
Once we put the culture/well-being link under the right set of analytical 
lenses, it turns out quite clearly that ‘culture counts’, namely, that there is 
clear evidence that cultural access has a definite impact on individual psycho-
logical well being (and particularly so if cultural access occurs in a well- 
balanced mind–body perspective), and moreover that culture provides for 
some of the most effective predictors of well-being. (Grossi et al. 2012: 147)
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Among the various potential factors considered, cultural access unexpect-
edly rankes [sic] as the second most important determinant of psychological 
well-being, immediately after the absence or presence of diseases. (Grossi 
et al. 2012, 129)
Moving national contexts again, the Italian Culture and Well-being 
Project used what it called ‘data mining’26 to understand the ‘interaction 
between culture, health and psychological well-being’ (Grossi et al. 2012). 
It is clear to see from its concluding lines that it is of interest to our explo-
ration of how people understand what it calls the culture/well-being link. 
The headline outcome (also quoted above) foregrounds what it calls ‘cul-
tural access’. Interestingly, the authors claim that ‘cultural access unex-
pectedly’ appears to be the second most important thing for people’s 
well-being, after physical health. We will return to finding the right set of 
lenses and a finding being unexpected at the end of this section. First, we 
will look at what the researchers mean by culture.
What does the report mean by ‘cultural access’? The 15 ‘cultural activi-
ties considered in the survey’ consist of ‘jazz music concerts; classic music 
concerts; opera/ballet; theatre; museums; rock concerts; disco dance; 
paintings exhibition; social activity; watching sport; sport practice; book 
reading; poetry reading; cinema; local community development’ (Grossi 
et al. 2012). Therefore, does ‘cultural access’ mean ‘can you access these 
activities?’ or does it mean ‘do you do these activities?’ This is a key ques-
tion for cultural policy as social policy, as we have discovered a number of 
times in the last few chapters: for if taking part in culture becomes some 
kind of proxy for having access to things that improve our well-being, the 
word access—and the implications for fairness of who has access and who 
wants access are important to establish.
One of the concerns over using well-being metrics to value culture is 
that the models used do not include all forms of cultural life (Jones 2010; 
O’Brien 2010). As we know from Chap. 6, defining culture is compli-
cated. Thus, the value of what has come to be described as ‘everyday 
participation’ (Miles and Gibson 2016), including activities, such as 
attending sporting events (Oakley 2011) or chatting in a local shop 
(Edwards and Gibson 2017) should be acknowledged in some way when 
valuing ‘culture’ as something broadly defined. Increasingly, evidence 
indicates that it is ‘participation per se’ that is good for well-being, irre-
spective of what one is participating in (Miles and Sullivan 2010). Likewise, 
when people describe what is important to them for well-being, arts and 
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culture activities, such as formalised theatre attendance, appeared less fre-
quently in the ONS data I analysed than a more general and everyday 
participation (Oman 2020). It is therefore important that well-being met-
rics include—or at least acknowledge if they exclude—everyday participa-
tion, together with recognised artforms, such as theatre.
The inclusion of various ‘everyday’ forms of participation in Grossi 
et al.’s model might address concerns about formal culture and everyday 
participation. However, can 15 activities address the concerns of O’Brien 
and Jones in 2010, that metrics miss some aspects of cultural life? The 15 
aspects of ‘cultural access’ chosen by the authors are said to have resulted 
from a literature review. Incidentally, this review and its results are not 
mentioned in more than passing by the authors, so as readers we don’t 
know why or how they came upon these 15, how many documents were 
reviewed before the 15 were decided, and so on.
These 15 categories of cultural access were formulated into a question 
that was added to a questionnaire. There is also no detail on the decisions 
made in this respect. The survey was conducted by an Italian pollster com-
pany called Doxa, through telephone interviews, according to the CATI27 
system, with 1500 random participants of the National Statistical Survey 
conducted by the Italian Statistics Bureau (ISTAT 2015). You may remem-
ber in Chap. 3 that the ISTAT is one national organisation that uses the 
same dimensions of well-being as the OECD. This project didn’t use these 
dimensions of well-being.28
Instead, the authors describe that ‘their survey collected information 
covering socio-demographic and health-related data’ (Grossi et al. 2012, 
132), together with the 15 activities as a proxy for cultural access. See 
Table 7.6 for these categories, as described in the article. They also describe 
questions from the Psychological General Well-being Index (PGWBI), 
which has 22 self-administered items ordinarily, but they used a trialled 
and tested shorter version of six items (Grossi et al. 2012, 133). As you 
can see in Table 7.7, these psychological questions ask very similar things 
to the ONS4 that we have encountered multiple times before. They are 
however worded slightly differently, which will have an effect on the data 
which may or may not be relevant to the claims made about the findings.
In order to analyse ‘cultural access’, the authors take the answers from 
the questions about how many times people have participated in a particu-
lar activity. What is intriguing is that the authors have then combined these 
activities into a single measure, without accounting for this in the paper’s 
definition of ‘cultural access’. Consequently, the authors seem less 
7 EVIDENCING CULTURE FOR POLICY 
300
Table 7.7 The Psychological General Well-being Index questions used in Grossi 
et al. (2012)
PGWBI: The six ‘shorter 
version’ questions
Have you been bothered by nervousness or by your 
‘nerves’ during the past month?
How much energy, pep or vitality did you have or feel 
during the past month?
I felt downhearted and blue during the past month.
I was emotionally stable and sure of myself during the 
past month.
I felt cheerful, light-hearted during the past month.
I felt tired, worn out, used up or exhausted during the 
past month.
Table 7.6 Variables used in Grossi et al. (2012)



























concerned with deciphering what it is that people do (i.e. the nature of 
cultural access) than the frequency of cultural participation.
If we follow the recommendation that it is participation per se that mat-
ters for well-being (Miles and Sullivan 2010), incorporating various types 
of activity into a single dimension of culture could be a positive research 
decision. As we have already encountered a number of times, valuing one 
activity over another is ethically, methodologically and politically problem-
atic. Of course, the data in and of itself do not account for all ‘cultural 
access’, or as we have described before, cultural activity. The questions can 
only account for the 15 activities included, missing out many social and 
cultural concerns, but as we saw in Box 7.4, this is not unusual in and 
of itself.
The analysis includes variables for aspects of cultural activity which are 
undoubtedly important to some people’s well-being. It is in the descrip-
tions, categories and claims where issues may arise. For example, a ques-
tion on ‘social activity’ could end up with data including almost anything, 
depending on the wording of the question. We do not know the exact 
wording of the question, but the paper states:
Each subject being surveyed in the study had to go through a structured 
questionnaire asking about the daily frequency of access to all of the activi-
ties listed. (Grossi et al. 2012, 132)
This seems to imply that the participants could define social activity for 
themselves, which could include leaving the house and talking to someone 
in a shop, which while valuable (feeling all the more valuable as I edit this 
book in lockdown), is not able to argue the value of investment in opera, say.
Is that a problem in and of itself? Possibly not. However, to include all 
social activity, and then conflate all the results to a single measure, without 
making this explicit in the headlines of the research may be misleading. As 
a consequence of these decisions, the value of ‘cultural access’ potentially 
includes the value of all social activity, as defined by different people. The 
authors have decided upon such a list to act as ‘a proxy of individual levels 
of “cultural access”’ (Grossi et al. 2012, 132). However, they have then 
combined the 15 proxies into one measure of cultural access. This could 
considerably inflate the impact of ‘cultural access’. This is important, as, 
the authors state ‘that there is clear evidence that cultural access has a defi-
nite impact on individual psychological well being’ (Grossi et  al. 
2012, 147).
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Combining variables into one category is an issue with the evidence 
base for culture and it confuses the well-being evidence base as well. The 
language used in findings, and reproduced in evidence reviews, assumes it 
argues the value of a particular idea of culture. This limits the reach of the 
‘discussion’ aspects of academic journal articles, as much as it does our 
understanding. Here we see the slippage in the definitions of culture 
described in the previous chapter can be used to include many aspects to 
account for culture’s impact; yet ‘cultural access’ comes to mean the arts 
when this argument is reproduced, as we shall see.
Before we move towards our conclusion, let us remind ourselves of the 
headline findings, again:
The results show that, among the various potential factors considered, cul-
tural access unexpectedly rankes as the second most important determinant 
of psychological well-being, immediately after the absence or presence of 
diseases, and outperforming factors such as job, age, income, civil status, 
education, place of living and other important factors. (Grossi et  al. 
2012, 129)
In spite of queries with the Italian Culture and Well-being Project, the 
headline results appear in other high-profile reviews. These include the 
‘Understanding the Value of the Arts and Culture’ report from the 
AHRC’s Cultural Value project (Crossick and Kaszynska 2016) and a 
2020 report to the Welsh government (Browne Gott 2020). The more 
findings are reproduced, the more credible they seem, and the more they 
are reproduced. One review (Taylor et al. 2015) was commissioned by the 
CASE programme, which you may remember from Chap. 6. The report 
describes the Culture and Sport Evidence (CASE) programme as a joint 
programme of strategic research led by the Department for Culture, 
Media and Sport (DCMS) in collaboration with the Arts Council England 
(ACE), English Heritage (EH) and Sport England (SE). The report was 
of a systematic review of the literature and evidence (Taylor et al. 2015, 8) 
and it evaluates the above study as follows:
Grossi (2012F) offers arguably the most authoritative review based on 
quantitative research, linking participation in arts with better social out-
comes and impacts, including health. (Taylor et al. 2015, 71)
[A]rts-related activities are seen as central to wellbeing by most people, 
according to a recent Italian study (Grossi 2012F). Among the various 
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potential factors considered, cultural access ranked as the second most 
important determinant of psychological wellbeing, immediately after the 
absence or presence of diseases, and outperforming factors such as job, age, 
income and other important factors. (Taylor et al. 2015, 75)
Even without concerns about the category of cultural access, the meth-
ods of the study did not ask people whether culture was central to any-
thing. It asked them what they did and how they felt. There is a concern, 
with all social research, that if you look for a particular outcome, you are 
more likely to find it. Hold that thought. Because, we might want to have 
a think when considering others’ research, whether it is putting the 
culture– well-being relationship under different ‘lenses’, until it finds the 
one it likes? That is until that lens, or series of lenses, finds that ‘culture 
counts’ in the way that is desired (Grossi et al. 2012: 147).
It is easy to see that the CASE review of the literature and evidence cut 
and pasted the findings directly from the article and, in fact, its abstract. 
The reason I mention this is that this is not abnormal practice. Instead, I 
want to highlight that it is not always clear that when a finding appears in 
a review commissioned by such significant body, that this does not actually 
qualify that the finding has been checked by that authority; there is no 
guarantee that the authors checked  for robustness, or that it  should be 
authoritative.
So, in presenting the impact of ‘cultural access’ (however defined) on 
well-being, research satisfies the hunger for those who want evidence of 
the culture–well-being relationship. This also has silly ends, fuelling the 
fires underneath claims such as culture can ‘reduce crime’ (Morris 2003) 
or ‘tackle poverty’ (National Assembly Wales 2019). The sad thing is these 
actions are a double-edged sword: they are popular because they seem to 
justify people’s feelings that the arts are good for us, while at the exact 
same time discrediting the good evidence that is available for advocacy.
This indicates both the value of, and requirement for, a review of rigour 
when it comes to data and their categorisation in the empirical work 
underway to understand the relationship between different activities and 
programmes on well-being. Perhaps, even more importantly, attention 
must be paid to the resource in the teams synthesising and evaluating the 
evidence base in order to direct future research, policy and practice. It is 
not simply a case of levels and areas of expertise, but the resource of time 
to review and evaluate evidence.
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This chapter has revealed that it is not hard for everyone to look a bit 
further—beyond the headlines—and establish potential issues. If we 
acknowledge that culture and well-being are slippery concepts, then how a 
concept such as cultural access is defined and measured requires some clarity 
if the evidence is going to be used politically, whether that is to justify fund-
ing or as we are increasingly seeing in this book, how resources decided by 
policy-makers are related to inequities of resource in society more generally.
7.5  conclusion: using Well-being data 
to understand Policy Questions
We began this chapter with David Cameron promising to put ‘instincts we 
feel to the core’ to ‘the practical test’ so that those whose decisions on pol-
icy and spending, that affect people’s lives, take account of what matters. 
We end with concerns about impact and conflated variables. We consid-
ered data and evidence in cultural policy briefly, before looking at three 
components of the culture–well-being relationship that are relevant to our 
policy concerns. First, we looked at subjective well-being (measured as life 
satisfaction) over time and policy spending on culture in the UK over time. 
Second, we looked at different kinds of subjective well- being data and 
‘creatives’ (broadly defined) in the UK and the US. Finally, we looked at 
subjective well-being and ‘cultural access’ (broadly defined) in Italy.
We had a play with different kinds of readily available data to look at the 
relationship between policy spend on culture and whether that impacts on 
national well-being. We considered the contexts of the data, the limits of 
what we can expect in terms of impact on life satisfaction as a measure and 
in terms of policy spend on a measure. Although these data were used 
descriptively, we found ourselves with questions as to why more research 
has not been done on the relationship between policy investment and well-
being, given claims for investment based on improved well-being? This left 
us at a point of provocation: why are some data operationalised to under-
stand the culture–well-being relationship, when other data are not?
We compared two studies that seemed to look at comparable groups, 
but reached different conclusions about the well-being of people who 
could be called creatives. Again, we reflected on the contexts of data, the 
ambitions of the researchers and the aims of the research to appreciate the 
limits and extents of claims that can be made. We spent some time break-
ing down how models and categories work, and why they are important 
for understanding what is being measured about culture and what is being 
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measured about well-being. We also considered a much-cited study on the 
impact of what the authors call ‘cultural access’ on well-being. We discov-
ered that ideas of culture and cultural access were slippery which enabled 
a favourable outcome. We reflected on how an outcome that might be 
popular, because it reinforces people’s beliefs about the culture–well-being 
relationship, can result in the study being frequently referred to in later, 
and influential literature reviews.
This chapter has tried to break down some features of how these differ-
ent aspects of cultural policy (investment, labour, access) are measured. It 
also wanted to demonstrate that these relationships can be explored sim-
ply, using easily available data. The lack of relationship between life satis-
faction and GDP (the Easterlin paradox) is lauded as the starting point for 
a whole new area of research in happiness economics and positive psychol-
ogy. Yet, the lack of relationship between life satisfaction and arts subsidy 
is not discussed as an important research question. We might be similarly 
interested in how little research has happened since the two projects on 
being an artist or the creative occupations, to further understanding of the 
complex relationship between professional creative practice and well-being.
The final question for this chapter, though, is  are we using data to 
establish evidence or finding data to suit arguments? There are frequent 
calls that more evidence is needed to support the cause of cultural policy to 
argue its value as social policy. Why are there not more analyses of the data 
already available, even if they reveal a possibly uncomfortable relationship, 
as in the case of cultural funding, or other aspects of delivering social 
policy and well-being? Perhaps this might be where more complex rela-
tionships between well-being, inequality and culture might be explored. 
Despite the crudeness of tracking arts funding and life satisfaction data 
together, they tell a simple and effective story and definitely warrant future 
research. Or, at least ask questions of existing research. In the next chapter 
we will explore one of a number of studies that use increasingly complex 
quantitative techniques to express the relationship between culture and 
well-being differently.  Thus, continuing our exploration of evidencing 
culture for policy.
notes
1. The cultural sector is a broad description of cultural institutions such as 
libraries, heritage sites, museums and theatres. Crucially, it is not only 
about the buildings themselves, but all the ways people make and consume 
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culture and can include anything from Netflix to gaming (video games) and 
outdoor festivals.
2. In some ways, this may be an expected development of the aspects of well- 
being data usage from Chaps. 3 and 4, where part of this work is to estab-
lish a connection between, say, income and happiness (as with Easterlin 
1973, see Chap. 4), or housing in the OECD index (Chap. 3).
3. ‘What Works’ is a programme across areas of government that is about 
evidence for what works in policy (Cabinet Office 2019). There is a What 
works for well-being centre, focussed on well-being evidence (What Works 
Wellbeing n.d.).
4. A review of the first edition of the associated publication stated that Social 
Trends covered ‘public expenditure, leisure, personal income and expendi-
ture, social security, welfare services, health, education, housing, justice 
and law’ (Rose 1970, 241).
5. The above review of the first edition of publications reflecting on Social 
Trends lists the main areas of interest in a thought-provoking order, namely 
leisure is further towards the front of the list than you may expect, given 
what we have been led to believe are the priorities for evidence.
6. All-Party Parliamentary Groups (APPGs) are informal groups organised to 
investigate particular issues that might cut across government departments 
and involve members from different political parties.
7. You may remember in Chap. 4, we touched on the arguments against the 
Greatest Happiness principle and the introduction of the idea of a Utility 
Monster.
8. There are  two helpful explanations on how data are anonymous, de- 
personalised or de-identified. One is here from the Future of Privacy 
Forum (2017). A simpler example is available from Understanding Patient 
Data (n.d.).
9. For discussion on these various streams, see Hesmondhalgh et al. (2015). 
For further discussion on how increased National Lottery spend on muse-
ums was justified in terms of increased visitors, see Selwood and Davies 
(2005). It is worth noting, as well, that fundraising became more profes-
sionalised in parallel, with philanthropy and private sources of investment 
and sponsorship also contributing.
10. As an aside while I accessed the headline data from the ONS website, the 
survey itself is not administered by the ONS, but in fact the Institute for 
Social and Economic Research (ISER) at the University of Essex. This has 
no bearing on my use of the data in this instance, but it is important to 
acknowledge the data source. Also, administration of Understanding 
Society is slightly more complicated than I explain in-text. Those who 
administer the survey have to re-sample due to what is known as ‘respon-
dent attrition’ which means that members of a panel who have been 
recruited fall away over time and are then lost from the sample from whom 
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longitudinal data are being collected. This does not impact how we use the 
data in this chapter; however, it would be a concern were other types of 
claims made regarding the longitudinal qualities of the data.
11. Fitzroy and Nolan (2020) was the first article that came up in my search for 
life satisfaction data over these dates. Their plotting of life satisfaction over 
the whole period shows it is even more erratic, or, in other words, the line 
would be even less straight on the graph.
12. Legatum Commission Chairman Lord O’Donnell said: ‘We now know 
much more about what drives the wellbeing of people and communities 
than we did 10 years ago, and our knowledge and understanding is set to 
increase significantly over the next few years. I look forward to working on 
this exciting project which could transform the way we develop policy’ 
(Legatum 2012).
13. Lord O’Donnell served as the Cabinet Secretary between 2005 and 2011. 
Cabinet Secretary is the highest official in the British Civil Service and it is 
notable that he held this position under three prime ministers: Blair, Brown 
and Cameron.
14. Some pivotal examples from the broader DCMS evidence programme 
include O’Brien (2010); Matrix Knowledge Group (2010); Miles and 
Sullivan (2010).
15. Flow is an important concept for thinking about how subjective well- being 
is conceptualised as experience. Positive psychologist, Mihaly 
Csikszentmihalyi, in particular has spent much of his career looking into 
how people get lost in flow, and he studied artistic practitioners to under-
stand ‘flow’ (1997). His 1975 study of the nature of enjoyment was largely 
based on expert cultural practitioners, such as dancers and musicians. Years 
later, interested in ‘flow’ in everyday life, Csikszentmihalyi returned to the 
study of creative professionals, and with colleague Nakamura, theorised 
‘vital engagement as a relationship to the world’ that is characterised both 
by experiences of flow (enjoyed absorption) and by meaning (subjective 
significance) (Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi 2002; Csikszentmihalyi and 
Hunter 2003).
16. You may remember we talked about symbolic value back in Chap. 2, where 
something’s value is more than its material or financial value, and involves 
something’s status.
17. See Brook et al. (2020) for compelling evidence and arguments on this 
matter, with nods to the more on the extensive literature on the many 
issues of creative labour.
18. The three national surveys were the DDB Needham Life Style Survey 
(DDB), the Double Major Student Survey and the Strategic National Arts 
Alumni Project (SNAAP). Full details of sampling can be found in 
the report.
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19. In this book the spelling of well-being is used, unless it is a direct quote, 
and then the spelling of the author is used.
20. Confusingly, what is called the Annual Population Survey is actually not 
one survey, but a conglomerate of other surveys, as explained in Table 7.4.
21. See TNS 2011 for more information on the longitudinal element.
22. This is detailed in the report, however, for more explanation on SOC codes 
and the cultural sector, please also see Oman (2019).
23. A prominent recent example is Campbell et al. (2017): one of the biggest 
problems the author identify is the disproportionate role of IT.
24. As described in Chaps. 2 and 4, Eudaimonia is most often understood as 
purpose or flourishing.
25. Google scholar searches show that Tepper et al. has been cited 15 times, 
and Fujiwara et al., 17 times. However, of course, that does not include all 
the non-academic places where these reports are cited.
26. ‘Data mining’ might seem a bit of a reach. The sample of 1500 people 
would not necessarily be considered a  large enough ‘dataset’ to warrant 
data mining. The novelty of the method at the time was in its complexity, 
because it aimed to assess the importance of lots of variables at the same 
time. This approach was called AutoCM and is described in the paper.
27. CATI is a computer-aided telephone system that is widely used in large- 
scale surveys, as well as examples such as this, where participants in large 
surveys are invited to participate in a smaller, specialised survey. CATI does 
not involve the computer doing the interviewing (as may be suggested). 
Instead, people, who still do the interviewing, will follow an electronic 
survey script. As a participant answers, the responses are recorded in the 
CATI system, which guides the interviewer to questions which are routed 
through the questionnaire based on prior responses.
28. The ISTAT implemented its well-being domains and measures in 2012, 
see: https://www.istat.it/it/files//2018/04/12- domains- scientific- 
commission.pdf for more details. Therefore, the Grossi et  al. study pre-
ceded the ISTAT’s new measures.
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CHAPTER 8
Talking Different Languages of Value
8.1  RetuRning to the CultuRe— 
Well-being Relationship
The arguments of cultural value are curious, yet mundane. Chapters 6 and 
7 offered glimpses of how some people argue about the value of culture 
one way, while others seem to speak a different language entirely. The 
language of data, metrics and numeric valuations of culture can feel at 
odds with how the majority of artists and cultural practitioners speak and 
think about culture. In one hand, we might hold a 2010 report of the 
UK’s Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) (O’Brien 2010), 
which offers an overview of evaluation techniques, such as Quality 
Adjusted Life Years (or QALYs1). While, in the other, we might hold a 
copy of the Arts Council England (ACE) Strategy from the same year,2 in 
which artist Jeremy Deller explains that art makes ‘life worth living’ (ACE 
2010, 26). The report in one hand talks cost-benefit analysis, while in the 
other, artist Tim Etchells speaks of artistic ‘value not bound up with price’ 
(ACE 2010, 26).
Many in the cultural sector3 are sceptical that cultural experience can be 
expressed in quantitative terms (Hill 2017; Oman 2013; Oman and Taylor 
2018), with some being adamant that it should not be (Nissel 1983; 
Meyrick and Barnett 2021). Academic research on cultural metrics is 
equally two-sided (Belfiore 2002; Merli 2002; Selwood 2002; Gilmore 
et al. 2017). The gentler end of the critical scale involves damning metrics 
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with faint praise by stating that ‘[s]tatistical data well channelled can pro-
vide useful ancillary information’ (Phiddian et al. 2017, 179); the harsher 
end involves describing ‘ideas pertaining to the measurement of culture’s 
value’ as ‘stupid’ (Meyrick and Barnett 2017, 109).
The previous chapter outlined some differences in quantitative expres-
sions of the culture–well-being relationship. It began with a walk through 
some examples of how data could be and are used to understand questions 
about culture and well-being. This step-by-step approach aims to open 
‘the black box’ of well-being data (and some culture data for good mea-
sure). It is not always easy for everyone to have a practical sense of how 
data are used, or how they work, with the way that arguments and work-
ings are generally shared. Looking closely at how analysis and valuation are 
presented helps understand what is going on ‘under the bonnet’ but can 
feel intimidating. Given that how people feel about these relationships is 
associated with their own values, the trick is to feel more confident in mak-
ing value judgements for yourself.
That is why in this chapter, there is one more example of using well- 
being data to understand culture and their role in social policy. We are 
going to look in greater detail and break down these processes further 
again. This includes a description of how the data were collected in a 
national-level survey. We look at the questions, as they appear in the sur-
vey, because it can be hard to imagine the mundane contexts that data 
originate from when you are looking at the complex results. It is also not 
easy to imagine what has happened already, or indeed, what happens next.
What does research do? How does it affect the world or change things? 
What do well-being data become when their analyses are presented as 
findings, and then reproduced? We will begin to think through some of 
these questions by following key findings, to see how they are interpreted 
in the real world, to imagine data’s capacity to change things. We will 
return to the conceptual work behind what is being measured before 
reflecting on what the analysis is trying to do, step by step. In this chapter 
I want to share that it is possible to think through what quantitative analy-
ses are doing, without necessarily doing the maths or understanding the 
quantitative processes and their confusing terms.
The steps involved in data analysis like the ones in this chapter are 
designed on the basis of how concepts go together. It is possible to 
understand the research on this level, even if expressing terms in an equa-
tion feels intimidating. People may be ambivalent, even outraged at 
understanding aspects of well-being in numeric terms, and this is also 
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true of trying to describe the role of an idea of culture in delivering well-
being aims. Yet, numbers help us understand the extent of relation-
ships in particular conditions; they do not necessarily decide whether that 
relationship exists at all. You can choose to retain that judgement for 
yourself.
8.2  talking DiffeRent languages of Value
This chapter began its life in a Manchester hotel in 2014. I was preparing 
a conference presentation called ‘Measuring National Well-being and 
Cultural Participation—why don’t things quite add up?’ A colleague was 
passing as I was editing a slide with this equation on it:
He asked me what the equation was for. I was a bit taken aback, because 
I had assumed that while I didn’t really understand what the equation was 
saying, that this would be immediately obvious somehow to people who 
work in quantitative methods, or ‘Quants’. I explained that it was from a 
report on measuring happiness for the cultural sector, but that I didn’t 
think that it would mean much to many I knew. As I outlined in this 
book’s Preface, I had experienced a general lack of data confidence in the 
cultural sector and I imagined that most people reading a report called 
‘Museums and Happiness: The Value of Participating in Museums and the 
Arts’ would struggle to make sense of the equation. In some ways, more 
importantly, that this equation was probably a barrier to understanding 
data and these valuations more generally. My colleague joked that he 
wasn’t sure it was talking his language either,4 and agreed it probably 
wouldn’t make much sense to the sector.
I left the conversation with one overarching question: what does an 
equation like this do in this context? How does it reinforce the divide 
between those who see value in valuations, and those in cultural and social 
sectors, or people working for small charities, who maybe do not? Or per-
haps, aren’t sure? Could the ways that ‘quants’ are presented reproduce 
traditions called ‘the Quant-Qual debate’ that we touched on in Chap. 3, 
even outside research contexts? Is this detrimental to the ways that some 
people feel capable of actually reading the research reports that evidence 
arguments they use in their day-to-day jobs in the cultural sector? This 
equation triggered more questions for me and my colleague5: Who was 
this algebraic expression for and what was it aiming to do? How did the 
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equation relate to the headline findings, and most importantly, whose 
value and values might be expressed in such a way?
I wondered if we could ‘follow the data’ to answer some of these ques-
tions about the equation. Which we did—in our own different ways. I 
mostly handled the qualitative research: I looked at the report on museums 
and happiness, and the cultural, policy and data histories that preceded it. 
This work contextualised the report in various ways, enabling us to see how 
it ‘fit’ in the general overlapping concerns of data, well-being, politics and 
value that we have encountered throughout this book. More specifically, 
these include beliefs and theories about well-being and its role in society, 
ambitions of the movement to establish cultural value, developments in 
well-being metrics, which coincided with a desire for valuation from gov-
ernment—and questions of data’s capability remaining unanswered.
‘Following the data’ also included ‘following the findings’. In other 
words, understanding context also meant researching what came after the 
report and how its findings were used. This gave us an idea of the impact 
of the report, and how it was received by different audiences. Following 
the findings also included reproducing aspects of the original research. My 
colleague led on this, the quantitative side of our project. This chapter 
walks you through steps in the original research about museums and hap-
piness, as well as our subsequent project to demystify what is going on in 
these kinds of valuations.
Earlier in this book, I covered some of the discussions about how data 
tend to be presented as these neutral and objective things. This means that 
in some cases, it should be possible to do the same thing with the same 
data and arrive at the same results. This is one of the reasons why there are 
so many ‘workings’ in quantitative research—including the equation we 
started with: this working out is presented, so it can be scrutinised, and 
potentially reproduced. This is also one of the reasons why quantitative 
approaches are often thought to be more persuasive and robust than qual-
itative ones. It is not necessarily that numbers are more powerful in and of 
themselves; rather it is assumed that less interpretation is undertaken by 
the researcher. Therefore, you can work towards reproducing someone’s 
findings by following their steps in quantitative research, in a way that you 
would be unlikely to do in qualitative research.6
This happenstance discussion about an equation in a Manchester hotel 
in 2014 led us to a project that wanted to understand the value of this 
genre of research to the cultural sector—and beyond to charities and other 
areas of social policy. Were there limits to understanding and presenting 
the culture–well-being relationship in this way? What would happen if we 
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followed the data and processes used ourselves? The headline finding of 
our project is that when we reproduced these processes, we had a different 
finding: the monetary estimates of the relationship between participation 
and subjective well-being do not match across our reading and the origi-
nal. Why might this be?
There are a number of reasons why two pieces of research following the 
same steps with the same data might offer different results. We will return 
to this later, but first, the aim of this chapter is to ‘follow the data’ on a 
journey of informed discovery, hoping to achieve a number of other things 
along the way. First, break down some of the barriers between quantitative 
research that helps people with their advocacy, and the practitioners who 
will read it and need it. Second, enable people to feel more confident with 
quantitative expressions and some of the language and principles of quan-
titative research. Third, it is a reference for people to return to, and apply 
to other reports they need to understand, but which ‘do not speak their 
language’. This leads me to fourth, to help people feel greater data confi-
dence and literacy, and perhaps enable them to make better judgements 
for themselves about whether more than headline findings can be useful—
to them or in general.
8.3  Context: the happy MuseuM anD Data
The aim is to arm museums with compelling statistics to show how a healthy 
culture must be at the heart of a healthy society. (Tony Butler, Director 
Happy Museum Project and Director Museum of East Anglian Life in 
Fujiwara 2013, 5)
The relationship between culture and well-being has been operation-
alised7 by a number of different organisations in the cultural sector. This is 
particularly true in the UK. Chapters 6 and 7 have covered a number of 
processes and projects that want to naturalise, even celebrate, this relation-
ship. One obvious example, by virtue of its name, is The Happy Museum 
(n.d-b). Established in 2011, The Happy Museum focusses on more than 
happiness as a hedonic8 idea; also embracing other, broader aims of the 
well-being agenda we covered back in Chap. 2: possibilities for sustain-
ability, community and a sense of purpose. The Happy Museum is an 
advocacy organisation that has slowly grown and expanded on its activi-
ties, for example offering frameworks and training for those in the sector 
to understand the opportunities for the role of museums in well-being 
(The Happy Museum n.d-a). One of its aims was to contribute to the 
evidence base on the value of museums. The Happy Museum’s Director, 
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quoted above, invoked the values of culture and its relationship to a 
healthy society, whilst embracing the idea that this is best expressed with 
compelling statistics. This statement is testament to the will to progress 
towards bridging the gap between the languages of valuation and cul-
ture’s values.
‘Museums and Happiness: The Value of Participating in Museums and 
the Arts’ was commissioned by The Happy Museum Project and funded 
by ACE. The equation I mentioned earlier originated from this report. It 
is important to say that the equation wasn’t left floating alone to explain 
the workings, but the report contains details on why things were done and 
how. We will go through some of these explanations in the subsequent 
sections, elaborating for context and hopefully clarity. The key stated goal 
of the research was to ‘look at the impacts of the arts on people’s subjec-
tive wellbeing and health and attach values to these impacts’ (Fujiwara 
2013, 7). The project took a ‘well-being valuation approach’, which we’ve 
touched on in Chaps. 2 and 7, and which I will walk you through. As I 
have said before, this is not a Quants textbook, and you will not read this 
chapter, suddenly conversant in statistics, but it should hopefully give you 
a better idea of what is going on.
Taking Part Survey and the Data on Culture
‘Museums and Happiness’ includes findings from quantitative research that 
used data from the Taking Part Survey (TPS; DCMS 2010). The report 
explains why TPS data were chosen over other surveys, based on the differ-
ent variables available, sample size and so on.9 It points out that while this 
technique had been used before, it had not yet been used on this dataset.
We have talked about why TPS was established in Chap. 6: that it was 
part of an instrumental project by DCMS to address a need for evidence. 
Here, we are going to think about the data itself and the context in which 
it is generated. TPS covers England only, rather than the whole of the 
UK.  It employs interviewers to go to people’s homes, if they agree, of 
course, and interview them face-to-face with a questionnaire. The survey 
questionnaire asks about all different types of activities. A script asks the 
interviewer to request the interviewee to think in great detail, and to be 
specific, for example:
Firstly, I would like you to think about all the walking you have done. Please 
include any country walks, walking to and from work or the shops and any 
other walks you may have done.
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In the last four weeks, that is since [TODAY’S DATE MINUS FOUR 
WEEKS] have you done at least one continuous walk lasting at least 
30 minutes?10
Were you to participate, you would be asked this, and more questions 
and clarifications, and finally whether your walking was ‘for the purpose of 
health or recreation (not to get from place to place)’. The questionnaire 
then asks the same questions about cycling, for example; and so on. All in, 
you would expect to be speaking to the interviewer for about 40 minutes. 
In Box 8.1 you can see the museum questions from 2009–2010 survey.
To make everyone’s answers analysable, all responses are combined into 
one dataset. Alongside questions on activities are questions about personal 
characteristics, for example, income, how many people live in your house-
hold, age, marriage status, whether you have children and so on. These 
variables allow researchers to understand how many different types of 
people ‘take part’ in different activities. These data also allow DCMS to 
see whether the percentages of different groups of people participating in 
different activities go up or down over time. These are reported on by 
DCMS in ‘Statistical Releases’, in which the results are synthesised and 
Box 8.1 The Museum Questions from the Taking Part Survey 
2009–2010
The museum questions11 were phrased slightly differently from those 
on cycling and walking and listed below:
During the last 12 months, have you attended a museum or 
gallery at least once?
1. Yes 2. No -1. Don’t know
In the last 12  months, have you attended a museum or 
gallery…?
1. In your own-time 2. For paid work 3. For academic study 4. As 
part of voluntary work 5. For some other reason -1. Don’t know
How often in the last 12 months have you been to a museum 
or gallery [in your own-time] [or] [as part of voluntary work]?
1. At least once a week 2. Less often that once a week but at least 
once a month3. Less often than once a month but at least 3 or 
4 times a year 4. Twice in the last 12 months 5. Once in the last 
12 months -1. Don’t know
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available for anyone to access.12 They include information on, for example, 
the numbers of people who have participated in the arts in the last twelve 
months, and the same for sport, and so on. DCMS (n.d.) also releases a 
number of ‘Focus On’ reports each year, which they call ‘short stories’ 
(DCMS 2015a, 2). For example, in 201513 there were ten of these reports, 
including one on well-being (DCMS 2015b) and one on art forms (e.g. 
DCMS 2015a); in 2016, there was one on diversity (DCMS 2016).
Box 8.2 Variables: A Reminder
A variable takes different values in different situations. These values 
vary between cases or observations (which in this case are people but 
aren’t always). They also vary over time or space.
So, for example, height varies across people, because some people 
are taller than others, but also within people over time, because peo-
ple get taller as they grow up.
It is a variable because it varies. It is this change or variability that 
is measured, whether over time, or to compare characteristics.
In a regression, you would analyse the relationship between an 
independent variable, or independent variables, and a dependent 
variable.
Because we look at how variations in independent variables can 
predict values of a dependent variable,
• independent variables are sometimes called predictor 
variables,
• dependent variables are sometimes called outcome 
variables.
So, if you want to see the relationship between age and museum 
attendance, presumably, you are not expecting museum attendance 
to make someone age, but you might want to understand if older 
people are more likely to attend museums. Therefore, age would be 
your independent variable.
To measure the culture–well-being relationship, we need an inde-
pendent variable (for culture) and if we wish to measure culture’s 




The Well-being Data Available in the Taking Part Survey
Happiness taps in to people’s emotions, technically their affective state, and 
hence tries to gauge people’s moods at that moment. (Fujiwara 2013, 12)
As we saw in Chap. 6, part of thinking through how humans experience 
well-being, is acknowledging these processes are cultural and centre ideals 
of ‘society’; they also involve imagining moments of social or cultural 
engagement and how they affect people on an individual level. Questions 
of when and how we experience particular well-being effects (or, perhaps, 
different kinds of well-being) are a key part of the puzzle of philosophers’ 
thinking for centuries. As we have also seen in Chap. 4, this problem has 
driven recent developments in well-being measurement, arguably shaping 
what we have called the second wave of well-being and happiness econom-
ics. Understanding people’s emotions in this way is used in various research 
contexts: whether using the diary reconstruction method (DRM) outlined 
in Chap. 4 to understand how people are doing in the day-to-day life, or 
to understand how a major event, such as the financial crisis of 2007/2008 
or COVID-19 has impacted on people’s well-being at scale.
What is hopefully clear by now is that deciphering which particular 
moment is actually being captured when attempting to measure an ‘affec-
tive state’ (such as happiness), and whether that is the moment that is 
relevant to your research question, has proved complex for a long time. 
Chapter 4’s Fig. 4.1 and the related section outline how approaches to 
variable to be the dependent variable. For ease, let us say because 
we want to see whether people who participate in culture have higher 
well-being.
*We also want to add other independent variables to make sure 
that we’re not inadvertently measuring other relationships as 
well. For example, if married people report higher well-being on 
average, and are more likely to attend cultural events, we should 
include marital status as an additional independent variable. Without 
accounting for it in the analysis, marriage could be a confounding 
variable, meaning it could exaggerate the results. Therefore, here 
marriage would be controlled for, even though it is not of primary 
concern in the outcome.
Box 8.2 (continued)
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understand this differ, yet are related. ‘Museums and Happiness’ uses TPS 
data, which now include all of the UK’s Office for National Statistics’ four 
well-being questions (ONS4),14 and has since the 2013–2014 dataset. 
However, the research we are looking at analysed data from 2005 to 2011, 
so before this change. Therefore, the question is similar, but not identical, 
to the ONS4 experience measures which ask about happiness and anxiety 
yesterday (see Table 4.2). The TPS data we are looking at in ‘Museums 
and Happiness’ understand happiness through the following question:
“Taking all things together how happy would you say you are?” on a scale 
from 1–10 where 10 is described as “extremely happy” and 1 as 
“extremely unhappy”.
The report says (as cited at the beginning of this section) that the data 
from this question establish someone’s mood at that moment. The report 
continues:
This differs to wellbeing questions that contain an evaluative judgment such 
as life satisfaction or eudemonic15 wellbeing. Life satisfaction is held to con-
tain a response about one’s current emotions together with an evaluation of 
their life overall (how it measures up to their goals for instance) and eude-
monic wellbeing questions tap in to people’s perceptions of whether they 
are living a meaningful life. (Fujiwara 2013, 12)
If you return to Fig. 4.1 while reading this, you can see how this expla-
nation maps onto the figure and the descriptions of approaches in Sect. 
4.3 that follows it on how these measures are used. Notably, the ‘taking all 
things together’ part of the question makes it a ‘general happiness’ ques-
tion, which is sometimes approached using Cantril’s ‘ladder of life’ (Fig. 
4.2). I say this, so you can probably imagine different ways you might 
answer this particular question.
There is a broader consideration with using national-level survey data 
to understand someone’s ‘happiness’ in any moment. We have also 
encountered this before in Chap. 4, discussed in the section on experience 
measures. The ideal way of understanding happiness as an affective state is 
to ask people repeatedly during a particular day, over a period of days 
about how they feel in the moment. In other words, you would collect a 
sample of their moods and ask them what they are doing at that moment 
(which is why it is called the experience sampling method). This method 
is hard to translate into a survey because it is too time-consuming—for the 
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interviewer and the interviewee to repeatedly ask and answer questions. 
This would make it too expensive to run, and difficult for many people to 
be available to participate in, which would then affect your sample—or, 
who you are talking to, and limit understanding. As an alternative, the 
rationale with the ONS4 experience measures is to ‘replicate’ or ‘proxy’ 
ESM approaches by asking respondents for their experiences and feelings 
relating to a whole day (yesterday).
So, let us briefly consider what is being captured by the question: these 
data are collected through a national-level survey and therefore at a time 
and in a place that is most likely completely unrelated to a museum visit. 
The implications of the headlines of this report is that the ‘affective state’ 
is ‘gauge[d]… at that moment’, but that moment is—of course—not the 
moment in the museum, but when the survey interviewer is in someone’s 
home. On top of that, the question asks you how happy you feel you are 
overall, so it is not directing you to consider a period of time (as the ONS4 
experience measures do), let alone a specific moment. So, we are begin-
ning to encounter some limits, but this is not necessarily abnormal, 
because, as we know, all measures will have their pros and cons.
You may remember the difficulties in establishing whether a concert 
changed someone’s well-being, even when you ask them immediately 
afterwards (Chap. 3). When the question is presented to someone by the 
TPS interviewer, that person may struggle to even remember the last time 
they were inside a museum. In truth, that is not even asked. As the box in 
the previous section demonstrates, the questions are about the last 12 
months in general, not specifically the length of time since someone’s last 
visit. Also, the survey did not request that they rate their happiness whilst 
in the museum (or before and after), but to comment on their happiness 
overall. Therefore, talking about measuring happiness in this way may feel 
confusing, because the happiness derived from visiting a museum in-the- 
moment is not what is captured directly in the data that are available for 
analysis. The title of the report implies that there is a relationship between 
museums and happiness, which at glance for some will undoubtedly con-
firm their belief or personal experience that museums make them happier, 
and encourage better overall well-being. This, of course, may well be true. 
However, we must remember that not everyone is the same, and to ques-
tion what the data that are available for analysis are telling us. We must 
remember that it might be that—in general—people who go to museums 
tend to be happier than those who do not. A causal relationship may be 
difficult to demonstrate.
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8.4  MuseuMs anD happiness 
anD otheR Relationships
The research reported in ‘Museums and Happiness’ was actually looking 
for more than one relationship. The equation I cited earlier in that presen-
tation in the Manchester hotel was one of two presented in the text. The 
report states:
We look at the impact on wellbeing and health of participating in and being 
audience to the arts and of being involved with museums and compare these 
impacts to other activities such as participation in sport. (Fujiwara 2013, 7)
This means, that as well as the ‘general happiness’ question, used in the 
TPS questionnaire, the researchers were also able to use other general 
questions on health.16
They also used income. We’ll come back to this. But for now, we know 
that there are some culture variables (participating in and being an 
Box 8.3 Causal Inference: A Reminder
Causal inference describes the process to identify whether there is a 
relationship that involves the independent variable (culture) affect-
ing the dependent variable (well-being). It means that there is an 
effect in the connection under study.
When looking to identify and measure causal relationships, we 
analyse the relationship between the cause variable and the effect 
variable.
To find that cultural participation is a cause of improved well- 
being (as the phenomenon), we need to establish that the cause pre-
cedes the effect, which means eliminating other plausible alternative 
causes. This is difficult because you cannot test this question in the 
real world.
The classic example is if we found a relationship between whether 
people were wearing shorts and whether they were buying ice cream, 
it wouldn’t mean that wearing shorts caused people to buy ice cream, 
or that buying ice cream caused people to wear shorts. There is 




audience to), some other activities, including sport. For ease, we are going 
to call all of these ‘participation variables’. You can find these in Table 8.1. 
The participation variables are the independent variables (or, you might 
find it easier to think of them as the predictor variables). The two depen-
dent (or outcome) variables are health and subjective well-being.
The same process was used to calculate the relationship between visit-
ing museums and happiness and ‘has done sport or physical activity in the 
last four weeks’ and happiness. This is a fairly simple process for someone 
who knows what they are doing, as they can run the same model multiple 
times, swapping out one participation variable for another. You might 
then do the same thing again with the outcome variable as health, going 
through the process of swapping the predictor participation variables.17 
The takeaway point is really, that we are going to proceed by talking about 
the processes involved in calculating the relationship between museums 
and happiness, for ease of understanding, but really there are multiple 
museum and non-museum ‘participation’ variables used to calculate dif-
ferent associations with health and happiness in this research.
To go about achieving the aims of this research: looking at the ‘impact 
on wellbeing and health of participating in and being audience to the arts 
and of being involved with museums’ (Fujiwara 2013, 7), a well-being 
valuation approach was used.18 This approach aims to estimate ‘monetary 
values by looking at how a good or service impacts on a person’s well-
being and finding the monetary equivalent of this impact’ (Fujiwara 2013, 
7). In order for us to engage with this process of valuation, it may be 
Table 8.1 Participation variables modelled in ‘Museums and Happiness’
Participation variables (the independent variables)
Museum 
variables
whether participants visit museums in their free time
whether they volunteer in museums
a measure of the number of hours spent in museums per year




whether participants had done sport or other physical activity in the last 
four weeks
whether participants had (in the last year) participated in each of ballet, 
dance, singing, playing music, painting and drawing, photography or 
crafts
whether participants had (in the last year) attended exhibitions (also 
referred to as ‘audience to arts’), opera, concerts and live music, ballet 
and dance
Adapted from Fujiwara (2013)
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helpful to get into a mindset in which we think of participating in an activ-
ity (let’s stick with museums for ease) as a ‘good’ or a service. By goods 
here we mean the same as ‘trading in goods’: that is, this experience has a 
market value; this experience can be valued in this way. That is, people can 
choose to spend time or money on attending museums, as opposed to on 
another thing, like the cinema or rock-climbing. This is a slightly different 
mindset, perhaps, than the idea of culture as a social good.
You have maybe spent most of this book thinking of well-being as a 
social good, without thinking about a social good as having a market 
value. In many ways, instinctively they feel opposite, as often actions to 
maximise something’s financial value, feel at odds with a social good (we 
discussed this in Chap. 2 in thinking about McDonald’s and the rainfor-
est). But theoretically, all things which are good can become ‘goods’. In 
this mindset, culture is not just a qualitative, incommensurable (has no 
common measure) experience. It is not only a way of experiencing fulfil-
ment and happiness, but people can choose to consume culture, and it is 
something that makes them feel satisfied. This means it has utility (because 
it makes them happy).
Getting into this mindset helps us ‘talk the talk’ of valuation and imag-
ine how culture may be quantified (in theory). When you think about it, 
we all have limited time to do anything, whether that is watching Netflix, 
going to the gym, playing video games, blowing dandelions or going to 
museums. Different ways of spending time might be associated with dif-
ferent value, but because we don’t have unlimited time, we have to priori-
tise. The relationship between value, museums and experiential benefit is 
there; it is just not always readily visible to us, or something we think about.
So, if someone wants to estimate museums’ impact on well-being, then 
they might say that they hypothesise that attending museums has a posi-
tive association to well-being, but we know more about the ways different 
types of well-being have a relationship with money. The amount of 
research on the relationship between income and different forms of sub-
jective well-being far exceeds that on participation and well-being. As we 
discovered in Chap. 4, the relationship between income and happiness 
(the Easterlin paradox) is even described as the very turning point in well- 
being research. So, using income enables us to
1. begin to understand the relationship between museums and hap-
piness, and
2. express this relationship in financial terms.
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Of course, we have many prior estimates of the culture−well-being-
money relationship to work with. This is not one undisputed value. For 
example, there have been thousands of studies on the relationship between 
income and well-being. This inevitably means that there are different 
approaches with different results. So, a decision has to be made by the 
researcher about the most suitable way to estimate the relationships they are 
interested in, in the specific context in which they are working. This refine-
ment of which variables to use is standard practice, so long as the decisions 
made are subsequently clearly outlined and are justified and the limitations 
to research and the caveats to claims acknowledged and discussed.
In a valuation approach like Willingness to Pay (or another of the stated 
preference techniques we have previously covered in Chaps. 2 and 3), the 
data used are from people’s responses to questions which asked them for 
their preferences or what they value. The questions ask people to state the 
value themselves for a good or service. In the simplest of terms in this 
example, this would be: ‘how much would you be willing to pay to attend 
museums?’ There are noted cons to asking people to attribute value them-
selves that are acknowledged in the report.
Page 28 of the report explains that a study in Bolton in 2005 found that 
people were willing to pay £33 a year for museums in Bolton. The reason 
this is so low, in comparison to the £3200 per year in the Museum 
and Happiness findings, is explained as follows. It is unlikely that people 
will state a high value for a currently publicly available service in case they 
may get asked to pay for it in the future (Fujiwara 2013, 28). This is called 
strategic bias. However, there is not one way that strategic bias might affect 
the valuation. This argument works just as well as saying that some people 
will overinflate their willingness to pay for a museum, knowing that the 
more they say it is worth, the more attractive it is to fund, and the less likely 
they will have to pay for it, of course. We might guess that some people 
would be very likely to apply a high number to their willingness to pay, by 
virtue of working in the cultural sector. It is not possible to be sure which 
way strategic bias will go in this context or indeed the motivation.
There are other issues with ‘willingness to pay’ and other contingent 
valuation methods.19 They have limits in part because of the hypothetical 
nature of what you are often asking people. For example, ‘existence value’ 
is worth thinking about (and is, again, noted in the report). It is hard to 
imagine how much something like a museum or library is worth to you, as 
they exist and have value just in people knowing they are there, and some 
people want them to be there in case they—or others—want it (called 
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option value). There is also the knowledge that they will be there for 
future generations. This is not the same as using these services, or being 
prepared to pay for them. When people are threatened with the removal 
of museums or libraries they do not use, they see a hypothetical value in 
them. Or, the theory goes that there is a value in knowing they exist at all.
The TPS data used in the ‘Museums and Happiness’ study did not 
contain people’s own valuations. This means that it was not possible to 
have ‘preference satisfaction’ measures in the valuation model. Instead, it 
used a well-being valuation approach. The report explains that this over-
comes the biases in people’s own evaluations by estimating for them. The 
‘Museums and Happiness’ report states that ‘two very distinct measures of 
wellbeing are used’ in the Bolton Study on the one hand and ‘Museums 
and Happiness’ on the other (Fujiwara 2013, 28). The report continues: 
‘there is no philosophical or theoretical reason why values from these 
methods should converge in anyway [sic]’ (Fujiwara 2013, 28). This 
means that even though these two pieces of research are both using eco-
nomic approaches to value museums and well-being, the findings should 
not be expected to be similar. When you think back to Chap. 7, and the 
importance of how culture and well-being are operationalised, versus the 
headline findings from reviews of evidence, you might think to yourself 
that this does not bode well for arguments on how much we can know the 
relationship between culture and well-being, if we cannot expect studies 
to have more similar results than £33 and £3200 as answer to the question 
‘what is the value of museums to people in terms of well-being?’
Let’s return to the well-being valuation approach used here and how it 
can know the value of something to people without asking them. It 
requires a dataset to include a measure of well-being, a measure of the 
good we are interested in valuing [museums] and other determinants of 
(things we know are associated with) well-being, such as income. The 
logic is that say we imagine a unit of happiness as an ‘HAP’, and we know 
that £1 neatly equals exactly 2 HAPs (how convenient), economic 
approaches can use what we know about this relationship and apply it to 
understand others. The technique runs on the following rationale:
so, 1: if ‘museums have a relationship with well-being that we need a 
value for’
and, 2: ‘money has a relationship with well-being that we have a value for’
then, 3: ‘how much money makes you as happy as a given unit of muse-




What they are estimating here are the coefficients behind particular 
types of participation. When you look up the meaning of ‘coeffi-
cient’, you are likely to see something like this: ‘a numerical or con-
stant quantity placed before and multiplying the variable in an 
algebraic expression’.
It’s probably important to bear in mind that the amount of 
museum participation isn’t how many times someone goes, how 
long they are there or how many people are inside a given museum. 
Museum participation is a variable in and of itself that will represent 
whatever people answered in response to the survey question, and/
or how those data have been coded.
The coefficient is basically: if you increase a unit in your indepen-
dent variable, how large an increase do you get in your dependent 
variable?
In this example, the variable ‘museum participation’ means ‘visits 
to a museum a certain number of times a year’, so if you increase the 
museum participation, how much increase in the happiness variable 
is there?
The variable might have values between 0 and 1 (which means the 
unit increase is ‘goes from not doing it to doing it’, and it might be 
continuous in hours, or could be another type of proportional 
increase). Say it is one of the questions from TPS in Box 8.1.
During the last 12 months, have you attended a museum or 
gallery at least once?
1. Yes 2. No -1. Don’t know
This is either 0 or 1, for yes or no. In this instance, if people take 
the don’t know option, they won’t be included. The coefficient is 
how much of the variable ‘attended museum or gallery’ there is. So, 
the coefficient behind ‘goes to museums or not’ might be large, but 
that’s because it only goes from 0 to 1.
However, if you have ‘number of hours spent in a museum’, with 
values lying between 0 and 1, you would expect a much smaller coef-
ficient because the max number of hours is much more than 1.
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Remember that using income is (1) a way into understanding the rela-
tionship between museums and happiness, and (2) a way to express this 
relationship in financial terms.
In a previous study, the researcher found that ‘when using lottery wins 
as an instrument for income… the size of the impact of income on happi-
ness increases more than ten-fold’ (Fujiwara 2013, 26). The reason why 
lottery wins are thought to be a good indicator for income is they are from 
outside of a person’s day-to-day life. Theoretically, this makes it easier to 
determine the impact of the money on someone’s happiness. You might 
find yourself asking ‘well, how can you know how much of the happiness 
from the lottery win is from the increase in wealth, and how much of the 
happiness is from the joy of winning?’ There is even a whole body of 
research that argues that winning the lottery doesn’t impact on happiness 
at all.20 However, the rationale in ‘Museums and Happiness’ is that it is 
suitable ‘to get a good estimate of the causal effect of income’ (Fujiwara 
2013, 26).
The report also explains prior studies ‘derive implausible large value 
estimates for non-market goods’ because of this discrepancy in income 
(Fujiwara 2013, 26). Notably, a CASE21 study using an income compensa-
tion approach found that going to the cinema once a year had a value of 
£9000 per household per year (Matrix Knowledge Group 2010a, b). The 
report states that
Box 8.5 Imagining Units of Happiness, Museums and Money
Say a HAP = 1 unit of happiness.
You went to the British Museum yesterday, and your HAPs 
increased by 8.
The day before yesterday, someone gave you £1, and your HAPs 
increase by 2.
This suggests that going to the British Museum is equivalent to 
getting £4 increase in income. Or if you were to stop going to the 
British Museum, but were to get £4, you would stay equally happy.
Once you have established this relationship, you can equate 
museum visitation happiness to happiness from getting more income. 




Since there is no suitable instrument for income in the Taking Part data we 
also estimate values using an income coefficient that has been multiplied by 
8 (which is in the scale between 2 to 10, which is the level of bias found in 
the studies above, but weighted more towards 10 since the analysis of hap-
piness data using the BHPS suggests that the true impact of income on 
happiness may be more than ten times larger than the OLS coefficient). 
(Fujiwara 2013, 26)
In simplest terms, the idea is that those previous studies are able to 
‘instrument for income’—which means that they can isolate the benefits of 
money from the benefits of being a high earner. It is important to remember 
that as a higher earner, you are unlikely to have data collected on how long 
you went to the loo; maybe you have a nicer office and get to expense your 
coffee, perhaps even someone else goes and gets you nice coffee from your 
vendor of choice? In the same way it is difficult to disaggregate the joy of 
winning from the impact of money, it is difficult to account for all the ways 
that being a higher earner may improve your life outside of money alone.
Returning to these previous studies, they found the discrepancy 
between income and lottery wins. There is therefore a number for that 
that can be plugged into the valuation. The report explains that this means 
it is therefore plausible to use people’s income, as declared in the TPS, and 
multiply the coefficient by 8, based on the fact that the estimates between 
studies that ‘instrument for income’ and those that don’t tend to differ by 
around this much in previous studies. This is accounted for in the report, 
like this:
This is part of the reason why Wellbeing Valuation studies that do not 
instrument for income derive implausible large value estimates for non- 
market goods. (Fujiwara 2013, 26)
The report accounts for the robustness of this approach, like this:
The wellbeing valuation techniques used here are in line with welfare eco-
nomic theory on valuation (which underlies all cost-benefit analysis and 
SROI techniques), but we should note that these values should not be seen 
as amounts that people would actually be willing to pay per year for these 
activities. This would only be the case if people satisfy their preferences 
solely on the basis of what makes them happy, but other factors may impact 
on people’s preferences and market decisions. These values should be seen 
as the equivalent amount of money required to create the same impact on 
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people’s happiness and they are useful as they show us the magnitude of 
importance of museums and the arts to people. (Fujiwara 2013, 33)
In other words, these valuation principles are considered robust, but 
these values are not what people would actually be prepared to pay. Instead 
how much extra money would keep someone at their current levels of 
happiness if they had to stop participating. In a section called ‘Key 
Findings’, the valuations are presented as follows:
✓ People value visiting museums at about £3200 per year.
✓ The value of participating in the arts is about £1500 per year per person.
✓ The value of being audience to the arts is about £2000 per year 
per person.
✓ The value of participating in sports is about £1500 per year per person. 
(Fujiwara 2013, 8)
Using ticks for bullet points may feel an unusual way of presenting find-
ings, especially when there are so many caveats to these estimates, particu-
larly whether people actually do value museums like this, or not. More 
importantly, these statements imply that people value participation in 
these monetary terms. Again, it is not that people do not—either con-
sciously, or unconsciously, but the presentation might be confusing to the 
report’s audience. These are in fact what the report calls ‘the compensat-
ing surplus’ for these activities. In other words, according to these calcula-
tions, this is the amount of money people would in theory give up in order 
to undertake the activity. In other words, the finding is that on average, 
people who go to museums are as happy as people who don’t go to muse-
ums but are paid £3200 a year more.
This can be difficult to understand when you are reading the key find-
ings from a report as a non-expert, and especially difficult when they are 
presented out of context, like in a daily national newspaper. We will now 
look at how findings can appear in different contexts in ways that can be 
distracting.
8.5  folloWing the finDings
Even when you follow the processes involved in estimating the relation-
ships in the ‘Museums and Happiness’ research, as they are broken down 
here, it still might be hard to see how this valuation works—from a 
common- sense perspective. Following the data did not find data in which 
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people explicitly value visiting museums at about £3200 per year, and yet 
this is what it appears to say. This is confusing for people who are not 
familiar with these kinds of valuations.
These valuations were presented as Key Findings in bold in the intro-
duction on page 8. However, the Caveats section on page 33 clearly states:
The wellbeing valuation techniques used here are in line with welfare eco-
nomic theory on valuation (which underlies all cost-benefit analysis and 
SROI techniques), but we should note that these values should not be seen 
as amounts that people would actually be willing to pay per year for these 
activities. (Emphasis in original)
The findings are partially presented in the Director’s Foreword, on 
page 5, which states:
By finding that the individual wellbeing value of museums is over £3000 a 
year, the report makes a strong case for investing in museums.
We are going to pause and follow some findings to see how and why 
this is important. They were reproduced partially in a number of places. 
The Museums Journal described the report as having ‘found museums 
improve people’s happiness and perception of good health, even after 
other factors that might be influencing them are accounted for’ (Harris 
2013). They also go further than the original report by claiming that visit-
ing museums ‘boosts’ happiness. Notably, this exaggerates the claim of the 
report—not in the monetary estimates, but the idea of impact is exagger-
ated to become a boost, when impact was not being measured in these 
terms at all. This is an example of translating value and impact from one 
setting to another, and how it can easily be misinterpreted.
This is especially important because it is not a one-off. This is not the 
only report of this nature with key findings that were altered when they 
were reproduced. A report written to the DCMS in 2014 saw its findings 
become muddled before it reached the headlines. In Quantifying and 
Valuing the Wellbeing Impacts of Culture and Sport (Fujiwara et al. 2014), 
the authors present the key findings as:
• Arts engagement was found to be associated with higher well-being. 
This is valued at £1084 per person per year, or £90 per person 
per month.
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• A significant association was also found between frequent library use 
and reported well-being. Using libraries frequently was valued at 
£1359 per person per year for library users, or £113 per person 
per month.
• Sport participation was also found to be associated with higher well- 
being. This increase is valued at £1127 per person per year, or £94 
per person per month.
Much like in ‘Museums and Happiness’, the report for DCMS also 
includes estimates for many activities. Towards the end of the report, on 
page 29, the authors express the finding that participation in dance has the 
highest value of £1671 pa, followed by swimming (£1630 pa) and library 
visits (£1359 pa). The finding about dance appears in this form, only twice 
in this report, in a regression table and as a finding underneath it in bold, 
around two-thirds of the way through the report. In other words, it is far 
from a headline finding. Despite the lack of prominence of this monetary 
estimate in the original report, it finds itself at the beginning of a journey 
which results in a national newspaper headline, like this one in the 
Telegraph: ‘Dancing makes people as happy as a £1600 pay rise’ 
(Swinton 2016).
This is why following the data in different ways (and in different direc-
tions: back in time and into the future) provides valuable context. In see-
ing where interpretations of the findings end up, we can see the impact of 
claims to impact. These are attractive headlines because they feel simple to 
grasp, and yet, as with many headlines, they obscure the real story. In rec-
ognising the appeal of these monetary headlines, we are able to see the 
market value of valuations like this. We can see that the numbers—and the 
data practices behind them—are valuable to a sector wanting to find what 
the Happy Museum’s director calls ‘compelling statistics’, as the language 
to articulate its value to Treasury.
However, these presentations of findings also create barriers for those 
who will scoff at how ridiculous an idea it is that anyone could know that 
‘dancing makes people as happy as a £1600 pay rise’. We must also ques-
tion how helpful they are to anyone in the dancing profession who might 
like to understand how to translate what they do into something that is 
valuable to a funder. At the moment, much of what is going on behind the 
headlines is quite obscure for those who most need to understand and 
articulate this relationship for themselves. This calls into question the 
value of these valuations in the current context.
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8.6  hoW Was the Value of the Relationship 
betWeen MuseuMs anD happiness CalCulateD?
The previous sections have walked you through some of the contexts of 
the research in ‘Museums and Happiness’: the data, the concepts and the 
relationships being modelled—as well as an aside about how appealing 
headline findings are when they are formulated in monetary terms that 
appear easy to grasp. We have looked at what this example of quantitative 
research was aiming to do with a hypothesis on various relationships, but 
fundamentally: that museums improve people’s happiness.
This one hypothesis emerges from a series of contexts: the naturalised 
relationship between culture and well-being and a hypothesis that this can 
be measured; a desire to isolate the qualities of museums in this relation-
ship to argue their value; philosophical reasoning on how this is possible; 
prior research indicating other values that help understand the relation-
ship in question—and prior research indicating methods and models that 
will be useful. We are now going to look at how the numbers were 
generated.
We discussed how the same model could be run over and over again, 
changing one variable each time. The calculations, when taken together, 
can model how when an individual goes to a museum, their happiness 
goes up because of the experience. This can account for some of the addi-
tional things that could be going on. One might be that their happiness 
could be going up directly because of the specific experience, and also 
indirectly, because their health could be getting better because their hap-
piness has improved. So, again, it is not ‘museums’ that is valued, per se, 
but a series of variables which are different in each set of models, but some 
of these variables are about going to museums. I am reproducing Table 8.1, 
together with Table 8.2, so you can see the variables together.
As a reminder, the key findings are summarised as follows in ‘Museums 
and Happiness’ (Fujiwara 2013, 8):
• People value visiting museums at about £3200 per year.
• The value of participating in the arts is about £1500 per year 
per person.
• The value of being audience to the arts is about £2000 per year 
per person.
• The value of participating in sports is about £1500 per year 
per person.
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There are four regression tables in the report that estimate the relation-
ships between
• museum participation and happiness
• museum participation and health
• ‘audience to arts’/arts attendance, arts participation and happiness
• ‘audience to arts’/arts attendance, participation and health
Just to remind you, that all these variables in the regressions tables 
began their life around someone’s kitchen table, or on their sofa, answer-
ing the questions of an interviewer, using the TPS script. Let’s consider 
two questions again. We have already thought about the subjective well- 
being question. I have copied the explanations from the report as to why 
each variable was used in the table. It is not normal practice to display 
these two aspects of methodology together like this, but I find it helpful 
to see the what and the why (Table 8.3).
Table 8.2 Variables modelled in ‘Museums and Happiness’ that are not about 
participation
Other variables
Binary variables for each of:
 • marital status,
 • religiosity,
 • educational qualifications (having General Certificates of Secondary Education 
(GCSEs) and above vs not),
 • sex,
 • employment status,
 • frequency of meeting friends (at least once a month vs less than that),
 • being in London,
 • satisfaction with the local area (‘satisfied’ and above vs less than that),
 • smoking,
 • ethnicity (white vs other),
 • volunteering;
Scales for:
 • numbers of children in the household
 • and how often participants drink (from ‘never’ to ‘every day’).
 • The self-rated health measure is also incorporated into the x vector.
Bands of:
 • income in £5000 bands
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It is interesting that the rationale behind using health is stated as it may 
pick up on mental health, which may pick up on well-being and happiness. 
Of course, it does not necessarily follow that responses to a health ques-
tion will ‘pick up’ on happiness and there is much work on these complex 
relations. For example, Clark et al. (2018) find that measures of mental 
health explain more variation in well-being than measures of physical 
health. Again, it is not that this is not going on, but it is hard to say that it 
definitely is.
As the reader, you can make your own decisions on whether this ques-
tion ‘how is your health in general?’ may be likely to collect meaningful 
data regarding subjective well-being for respondents. You can do this by 
imagining how you might answer this question, and whether you feel you 
would respond about your general health in a way that incorporated your 
subjective well-being. You might also do this for others you know well, 
who, for example, might identify as having poor physical health, but are 
generally happy, and vice versa. Again, this is not to say that because peo-
ple with poor physical health are susceptible to poor subjective well-being 
that the health question cannot pick this up.
The other thing to remember here is that this representative sample was 
asked these questions between the years 2005 and 2011. When this report 
was written in 2013, the general public would have made less association 
between health and happiness. Arguably, much advocacy and attention- 
raising have happened in the last few years, which would possibly change 
Table 8.3 Health and subjective well-being variables, questions and rationales in 
‘Museums and Happiness’
Variable Question from TPS Rationale for the question
Subjective 
well-being
‘Taking all things together 
how happy would you say 
you are?’ on a scale from 1 
to 10 where 10 is described 
as ‘extremely happy’ and 1 
as ‘extremely unhappy’
‘Happiness taps in to people’s emotions, 
technically their affective state, and hence 
tries to gauge people’s moods at that 
moment’ (Fujiwara 2013, 12)
Health ‘How is your health in 
general?’ on a scale from 1 
to 5 where 1 is ‘very good’ 
and 5 ‘very bad’
‘ …questions on general health will cover 
mental health and so we may be able to pick 
up some aspects of well-being or happiness 
that are not captured in the stand-alone 
happiness question’ (Fujiwara 2013, 13)
Adapted from Fujiwara (2013)
8 TALKING DIFFERENT LANGUAGES OF VALUE 
340
how people align health and subjective well-being. Back in 2005, cultur-
ally, it would have been different again. Therefore, when claims are made 
about how one thing picks up another, we can all think about the contexts 
in which the questions were asked, how we might answer them, and begin 
to think about the assumptions made on this basis.
Perhaps another reason that the study includes health is that it would 
have helped the process of comparison across the two models, in that it 
offers two measures of subjective well-being (according to the theory that 
health will pick up on subjective well-being). It will therefore be possible 
to check for robustness. This is because, and we should continue to bear 
this in mind, no measure is perfect. Having multiple measures that are 
shown in previous studies to be related to the relationship you want to 
understand will add confidence to your finding. That is, if they are all 
pointing in the same direction.
In summary, the research reported on in ‘Museums and Happiness’ 
compares the relationships between participation (various) and subjective 
well-being, and income and subjective well-being, by interpreting what 
the coefficients mean. In line with standard practice, assumptions about 
the measures of subjective well-being and everything else have been stated. 
So, there is a theory behind why particular variables are used, and what 
they can tell us (and the limits to what they cannot), and efforts have been 
made to communicate them. It gets confusing when the coefficient of the 
relationship between income and subjective well-being is then substituted 
with other estimates (multiplying by 8) that emerge from other reports 
which used different modelling techniques, different variables and con-
cepts. They may also be based on other conceptualisations that may have 
been used in previous examples of the well-being valuation technique. The 
researcher also points out that this part of the process is also established, 
however, and has also been accepted by Treasury22 (p. 8).
Following the key findings on page 8, some caution is advised in the 
report, for a number of reasons. I summarise these below (the text in 
brackets aims to explain the reason behind caution being required):
• arts participation and museum attendance are not randomised
(without a randomised sample, claims to causation are limited)
• there are likely to be hidden factors that affect both participation and 
the outcome variables
(it is not possible to isolate participation from all other possible vari-
ables to be sure that the effects measured are because of participation 
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in museums, rather than any of a number of other things that could 
affect well-being)
• it is possible that the described causal relationship could be backwards
(it might be that happier people tend to go to museums, rather than 
museums make you happier) (Fujiwara 2013, 8).
These caveats, briefly explained, are: if you really wanted to under-
stand the relationship between museums and happiness. In a theoretically 
perfect world, you would engineer a sample of people that you could then 
randomise, making sure that half had gone to museums and half of them 
not, and see whether one group’s happiness is higher on average at the 
end than the start. This is a randomised control trial (RCT) used as the 
gold standard in medicine to understand the effects of medication or other 
interventions  and has become increasingly popular in policy-making 
(Haynes et al. 2012). Yet, such a test is not really practical or ethical in the 
social sciences—making it very imperfect for a well-being researcher. As I 
have said before, it is important to (1) use the best available data and be 
clear on their limitations, and (2) imagine the origins of data. For exam-
ple, imagine a reality in which people were surveyed en masse in an RCT 
like this. It would be unethical for the cultural sector to force half the 
population into a museum and forbid the other half from going in for a 
year in order to model its value! Also, RCTs use placebos, so people who 
have not been dosed don’t know. It’s not as if there’s a placebo version of 
a museum you can send people to.
When it comes to the hidden (latent) factors, the explanation in the 
report is useful. There are always likely to be some influences that cannot 
be observed in the data available.
For example, extraverted people may be more likely to participate in the arts 
and also are more likely to report higher happiness and wellbeing, which 
means that any observed relationship between the arts and happiness may in 
part be driven by this personality trait rather than the act of participation 
itself. (Fujiwara 2013, 8)
Latent traits are personal characteristics that affect what people do, but 
which cannot be measured directly. So, for example, some people are more 
curious about the world than others. This would mean ‘curiosity about 
the world’ is your latent variable of interest, and maybe those people are 
both more interested in going to museums and are happier, but you can’t 
just ask people ‘how curious are you about the world?’ to find out.
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As a result of these typical limitations, it is hard to be sure whether it is 
the going to museums per se that means people are happier, or whether 
it’s some latent trait that means that people who are more likely to go to 
museums are more likely to be happier. As we know, one of the key issues 
with the evidence base on the value of culture is that most of the research 
struggles to argue that ‘doing culture makes you well-er’, rather than peo-
ple who are more well participate in culture.
These caveats are all threats to causal inference. Yet, as the report points 
out, this ‘level of rigour… is anyway normally acceptable in public policy- 
making and policy evaluation in OECD governments’ (Fujiwara 2013, 8). 
Therefore,  the report implies  that there are a number of limits to the 
claims that can be made, but that these limits are considered acceptable. In 
other words, there is a shared understanding that this is acceptable between 
experts who do valuations and experts in government who accept them as 
evidence.
Some Reasons Why Findings May Differ
As I mentioned in Sect. 8.2, we began a journey which involved under-
standing the contexts in which the research in ‘Museums and Happiness’ 
was undertaken. My colleague also looked at the quantitative work and 
used the same data, following the methodology section, to try and repro-
duce the results. The headline finding of the quantitative work in our 
project is that the monetary estimates of the relationship between partici-
pation and subjective well-being do not match across the two pieces of 
research. There are a number of reasons why this may be the case.
Why the difference? The second study may have recoded variables in 
different ways from the initial study. As we know from Chap. 3, coding 
ordinarily requires human decision-making on what to code how, and 
there is no single objectively correct way to code variables—all approaches 
have their own pros and cons under different circumstances. However, 
what follows from that is that the difference in coding, based on the way 
it is reported, leads to the finding being backwards. By this, I mean that 
there is a positive relationship between participation and happiness, but 
not between attendance and happiness. For example, people who play a 
musical instrument are happier, but people who go to concerts aren’t. In 
short, the reports’ key headlines, and their focus on the positive relation-




There are also questions about how ‘participation’ and ‘audience’ were 
operationalised in the analysis. The ‘Museums and Happiness’ report 
includes some variables and excludes others in its construction of these 
terms. This is another example of how models require decisions, and it is 
difficult to be certain that such decisions are not affected by bias, particu-
larly regarding which variables relate to happiness and which do not. We 
discovered in Chap. 7 a number of ways that the operationalisation of 
culture and well-being is important. If the operationalisations are too nar-
row, and ‘participation’ and ‘attendance’ do not include all activities that 
we might want to be classified within these scales, then the apparent posi-
tive effects from participation could reflect something broader than just 
the publicly subsidised cultural sector. It may be that the positive associa-
tions of participation in publicly funded culture are similar to those of 
playing in a darts team or watching Eurovision with friends.
Alternatively, if the operationalisations are too broad, then the positive 
association between participation and happiness might be driven by one 
activity, or type of activity, and other activities are then undeservedly clas-
sified as being associated with happiness. For example, if dancing is associ-
ated with happiness but playing a musical instrument is not, and these two 
activities, along with several more, are combined into a single variable for 
whether or not people have participated in the arts, then dancing will be 
under-credited for its association with happiness, while playing an instru-
ment over-credited. We encountered something similar in Chap. 7, where 
the incorporation of ‘social activity’ in the category called ‘cultural access’ 
with multiple other variables made it difficult to establish what the effect 
of cultural participation might be. We also encountered this in Box 7.6 
with the hypothetical situation that young people don’t like jazz music, 
but older people do, if you looked at everyone together you would likely 
find that the two groups would cancel each other out, to a degree, finding 
that people weren’t really bothered by jazz at all.
Most importantly for the context of this book and chapter, data are not 
neutral, data modelling requires many human interventions, such as clean-
ing and coding, and experimenting with different ways to derive a rela-
tionship from the data. This leaves the processes open to human error, 
numerous biases and disagreements in a way that is not ordinarily 
accounted for. The claims made may not reflect the data collected, given 
the questions asked, and through careful reading we do not need to neces-
sarily be quantitative social scientists to ask questions about where head-
line findings came from.
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8.7  ConClusion: the Value of Valuation
Value is, in other words, both various and variable. (Throsby 2001, 28)
Where are we with our thinking on the value of valuation? If some 
people in the sector work in the sector because they know it improves hap-
piness from their own experience, do they need proof that this is true? 
Even if this validation comes from research that is not immediately legible 
to them, is it necessary to understand the findings cited in detail? How 
important are the various contexts of this research and the potential limi-
tations of its findings for those who want to use it? The Museums Journal 
described the report as having ‘found museums improve people’s happi-
ness and perception of good health, even after other factors that might be 
influencing them are accounted for’ (Harris 2013), and goes further than 
the original report by claiming that visiting museums ‘boosts’ happiness, 
as opposed to museum-goers being happier. While the research project 
aimed to contribute to the evidence base on the value of museums, its 
findings are extended by those who wish to see such positive results. How 
does this impact positively or negatively on the status of evidence in this 
area—and the arguments for the value of culture?
Previous chapters have explained why there is an avalanche of numbers, 
and the various stories of why quantitative approaches to understanding 
well-being tend to dominate research used in policy. Population-level 
understandings of well-being are necessary to understand geographic, 
racial and gendered disparities. Revealed discrepancies can then indicate 
where policy investment should focus (in theory, although these analyses 
were not included in the ‘Museums and Happiness’ research). But we 
must scrutinise the relationships involved in these processes—theoretically 
and empirically. To do this requires more people feeling like they could 
understand well-being data. This takes practice and familiarity, but most 
importantly, more care is needed in research and data communications to 
move towards more shared understandings.
This book aims to help people feel more comfortable with data by 
explaining what is going on. This chapter has offered snippets of a step-by- 
step consideration of the data contexts: their origins, how the data were 
used, how researchers arrived at these results, and how these findings were 
then used by others. We looked at all the decisions made, and how repro-
ducing methods with the same data does not always lead to the same results. 
We also considered how claims were made, and findings subsequently 
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shared. More care is required around transparency around research: even 
when reports are transparent, more effort could be put into doing transpar-
ency differently, to improve understanding and enable people to use research 
more fully. While these valuations may work for HM Treasury, there are 
multiple audiences for research like this, and those who present it, could try 
harder to speak different languages and be more understandable.
At the moment, this sort of research is not published  in a way that 
makes it accessible. Instead, the culture of this kind of research more 
broadly tends to mean that only headline findings are accessible to cultural 
and social policy practitioners, who are reliant on data and expressions of 
data for advocacy, yet are not necessarily comfortable with their origins. 
Stating one thing in headline findings, but explaining how the meaning is 
slightly different in practice in bits and pieces further into the report is not 
necessarily making it as understandable as it could be, and yet it is the 
norm. The Happy Museum aspired to produce compelling statistics to 
bridge the gap of cultural values and valuations, and the research behind 
the report aimed to meet this challenge. However, the research met the 
aims of valuation, rather than the needs of those who need the research. 
Acknowledging this demands resource and skill in and of itself, but the 
culture of research for policy and social policy organisations could change 
to make the ways in which it uses data and discusses limitations and caveats 
more easily understandable.
This chapter presented one example in great detail to be a reference 
point for readers to come back to, to aid future understandings of how 
well-being data can be used. As this book has acknowledged elsewhere, 
there are still many issues in data and evidence that are relied on for cul-
tural and social policy. In the age of well-being measures and measurers, it 
is important that we all feel  able try and engage with the data and the 
claims on our terms—should we wish to. Given that how people feel about 
these relationships is imbued with their own values, the key is to feel more 
confident to ask questions and make value judgements for yourself.
notes
1. Quality adjusted life years (QALYs) are explained in Box 2.5, in Chap. 2.
2. The two valuation techniques are evaluated for their possible use in culture 
in O’Brien (2010) Measuring the Value of Culture: A Report to the 
Department for Culture Media and Sport. The Arts Council Strategy, 
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Achieving Great Art for Everyone (2010), includes a number of artists on 
the value of the arts, including Jeremy Deller and Tim Etchells, who are 
cited here.
3. If you are reading this chapter a while after reading previous ones, then the 
cultural sector is a broad description of cultural institutions like libraries, 
heritage sites, museums, theatres and so on. Crucially, it is not only about 
the buildings themselves, but all the ways people make and consume cul-
ture and can include Netflix and outdoor festivals.
4. I have since learnt that actually there are differences in the ways that differ-
ent disciplines express characters in equations; and so, arguably they also 
talk different languages in this way, but we don’t need to get into marginal 
differences between economists and statisticians here.
5. It is really hard speaking for him. If truth be told, I am not sure I knew 
what he was thinking, exactly, five years ago.
6. Many qualitative researchers argue that the value of context, bias and sub-
jectivity is too important to qualitative research to enable it to be repro-
duced in a way that findings could be repeated.
7. In quantitative research, operationalisation refers to the process through 
which abstract concepts, such as happiness, are translated into measurable 
variables. This is different from the way we use the word in day-to-day 
discussion. When we operationalise something, we more generally and 
simply put it to use. See Box 7.1 in Chap. 7 for more detail.
8. Chapters 2 and 4 are good to refer to if you need a reminder on what 
hedonic means.
9. If you are interested in more information on the differences across BHPS, 
TPS and Understanding Society at the time, and why they mattered, or 
indeed, want to see another example of how research like this makes deci-
sions, do look at the original report.
10. All the questions outlined, where specifically worded, can be found in UK 
Data Service (2009). You can find questionnaires for each year here: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/adult- questionnaire- 
taking- part- survey- 2009- to- 2010. It is worth being aware that TPS has a 
longitudinal element, which is an adapted questionnaire, as it wants to 
accommodate change. Therefore, the adapted questionnaire wants to also 
know ‘why the change?’ For example, ‘you say you have participated more 
or less in this than last year. Why do you think that is?’
11. The formatting of the questions does change slightly over time, as adapta-
tions and improvements are made. Again this is from the 2009–2010 
schedule, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
adult- questionnaire- taking- part- survey- 2009- to- 2010.
12. The statistical release page is currently in DCMS (2013).
13. Focus on reports from 2015 can be found in DCMS (2015b).
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14. Table 4.3 shows a selection of the surveys that the ONS4 have been 
added to.
15. This book uses the alternative spelling of ‘eudaimonic’.
16. TPS also now asks more specific, subjective questions about whether peo-
ple put an increase in activities down to improved or worsened health. This 
question is only in the longitudinal version of the survey which has been 
going on since 2012. It has small differences to the version of the survey 
used in ‘Museums and Happiness’.
17. Perhaps confusingly, the calculation is slightly different for health in 
‘Museums and Happiness’ (it does not include income), but you could 
swap the outcome variables in principle.
18. The report tells us that a similar approach was used in the CASE (Culture 
and Sport Evidence) programme (DCMS 2010), but with different data. 
The CASE programme used the BHPS study to value: sport, going to the 
cinema and going to concerts (as the variables available). It also used data 
from life satisfaction questions to measure well-being, rather than ‘happi-
ness’ as with our case study here.
19. A really clear discussion of the limits of contingent valuation methods can 
be found in Throsby (2001, Chapter 5).
20. The first and most famous of these studies is Brickman et  al. (1978). 
However, as with other previous examples of wealth and happiness, the 
evidence is not universal.
21. For more information on the Culture and Sport Evidence (CASE) pro-
gramme, see Chap. 6.
22. HM Treasury is the government’s economic and finance ministry, 
maintaining control over public spending, setting the direction of the 
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9.1  Understanding, Well-being and data
We started this book with a preface: a personal note on why and how it 
came about. This included reflections on some of my experiences of com-
ing to understand data and well-being—not only my direct experiences, of 
course, but my observations of people I know and have met, and how they 
interact with data issues and well-being issues. I argued this book was for 
friends, family and acquaintances on Facebook. For my students from 
courses across theatre studies to data sciences to social policy. For the data 
practitioners I work with in the cultural sector and for the hundreds of 
people I have spoken to about their well-being and/or their data in my 
research.
Given that most of these people are people I have met, the preface also 
points to how this book is based on my understanding of these issues. It 
often uses UK cases and relates them to more general problems, interna-
tional contexts, lessons learnt and some of those that remain. Perhaps in 
another ten years, I will be writing about these issues from a different place 
again. I have been honest about how I came to know data and theories 
about well-being. I found it hard to find all I needed in order to be confi-
dent that I understood what I needed to understand.
Because there is a need to understand well-being and data together 
across many areas of society, this book is written for anyone. You are told 
to write a book with a specific reader in mind, but this is hard when you 
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are writing about big problems and your audiences are multiple. Given the 
aims of this book, it had to address everyone, but knowingly; aware that 
not all its parts are everybody’s cup of tea. It is therefore up to the reader 
which bits they want to read, and what they wish to pass on. All I could do 
was write for what I understood to be (1) the needs and (2) the desires to 
grasp these issues better or, indeed, differently. But the needs and issues 
are various, so one size can’t always fit all if you want to address under-
standing of the broader concerns. So, to return to all the people I wrote 
this book for, I want it to be clear that everyone can contribute to how we 
could understand the issues, and differently. What if we looked at the 
issues from someone else’s perspective, or approached them in an alterna-
tive way?
I want to close this book by focussing on understanding for all these 
reasons, and more. The title Understanding Well-being Data might imply 
that we were simply going to try and understand well-being, data and 
‘well-being data’. Its subtitle ‘improving social and cultural policy, practice 
and research’ implies, of course, that I aspire for this book to change big 
things in society for the better. Really, this book has more modest aspira-
tions to improve understanding in small ways—and who knows, perhaps 
these small ways can make their own differences. Whether it enables any-
one who reads it to think about things they had not thought of before, or 
from a different perspective.
I have been talking about understanding in relation to data in a few 
ways for a while now (i.e. Oman 2019a, b): first, as in how we acquire 
knowledge; second, as how we share understanding; third, how these work 
with becoming a more understanding society. When I have summarised 
my findings on how people understand data, I have also suggested that we 
might think of this on a scale of knowing at one end, and feelings on the 
other (Oman 2019b, c). These qualities of understanding are in essence 
what well-being data should be about. Collecting data to inform how we 
might be more understanding of people’s needs and experiences to do 
better for them and society.
How do data, well-being—and data about well-being, help us with 
these two concerns of understanding? In many ways, that is what this book 
is about. We are going to touch on what understanding means, explaining 
it through another case study: this time one of my own experiences of 
watching people try and understand what data are doing. But more gener-
ally, how the social sciences can adopt a more understanding position.
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9.2  Meanings of Understanding
understanding | ʌndəˈstandɪŋ |.
noun [mass noun].
1 the ability to understand something; comprehension: foreign visitors 
with little understanding of English.
• the power of abstract thought; intellect: a child of sufficient intelligence 
and understanding.
• an individual’s perception or judgement of a situation: my understand-
ing was that he would find a new supplier.
2 sympathetic awareness or tolerance: he wrote with understanding and 
affection of the people of Dent.
[count noun] an informal or unspoken agreement or arrangement: he 
and I have an understanding | he had only been allowed to come on the under-
standing that he would be on his best behaviour
adjective
1 sympathetically aware of other people’s feelings; tolerant and forgiving: 
a kind and understanding man | people expect their doctor to be 
understanding.
2 archaic having insight or good judgement. (Oxford Lexico n.d. [bold 
and italics in original])
Sympathy This was first used to express ‘understanding between people’; it 
came via Latin from Greek sumpathés (from sun- ‘with’ and pathos ‘feeling’). 
(Cresswell 2010, 432 [bold and italics in original])
Now that I spend some of my time in academic research meetings, I am 
party to conversations on how we understand what understanding means. 
As you can see above, people who write dictionaries also think about these 
things. Ironically, people talk about academics living in ivory towers—not 
caring about what people think and feel; but for some of us, that is so 
much of what we think about. For example, I am a co-investigator on a 
research project called Living With Data (n.d.).1 In project meetings (per-
haps you can picture it?), we academics have spent quite a lot of time dis-
cussing what we mean by understanding and knowing. How they differ 
and overlap and how our understanding may be different from people in 
their day-to-day lives. This was also a conversation point in a recent proj-
ect meeting with our Advisory Group2 made up of experts from across 
public sector, civil society, advocacy and research.
One of the experts on the Advisory Group suggested that perhaps 
understanding was such a ‘complicated’3 term that maybe we might want 
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to ask people what they understand by understanding. At this point, we all 
took a moment to laugh (kindly at ourselves, I like to think) and con-
cluded that while this is important, ‘ordinary’ cultural understandings of 
the word understanding were a simpler experience. What I meant by this 
in the meeting, and still do now, was that most people move through life 
not really thinking about what the word ‘understanding’ means but are 
familiar with its meaning.
Understanding is a process by which we come to know something, the 
amount of or the depth of knowledge we have about something. At the 
same time, being understanding involves empathy, and putting yourself in 
someone else’s position. Shared understanding, on the other hand, 
requires the sharing of knowledge with someone in a way that you know 
they will understand it.
Hence, understanding is both knowing and feeling—crucially it is as 
much about ‘understanding between people’ (as cited at the beginning of 
the section) as it is to grasp knowledge about something. As this book has 
explained, data and the way science and social science knowledge are con-
structed are also about having a shared understanding of how things are 
done: how to collect and analyse data in the ‘right way’ is a matter of dis-
cipline and tradition, which are not universal. This can lead to differences 
in interpretation of both well-being and how to use data across disciplines. 
How do those who work with data share their understandings with those 
who don’t? Often this is done quite badly, or without thought, care and 
empathy.
More care is given to sharing understanding in other areas of life. When 
you ask a child ‘do you understand?’ after you have told them off for doing 
something and explained why: you are asking, do you understand why I 
had to tell you off? Have you learnt why what you were doing was danger-
ous or wrong? You are asking them to appreciate things on an emotional 
level and on a cognitive level—whether this is successful or not, is another 
matter. Understanding is both an emotional and cognitive exercise for all 
of us: we gain knowledge through understanding, and we become more 
understanding of others through experience.
You may remember that this idea of developing understanding is one of 
the age-old arguments for the benefits of aesthetic and cultural experiences 
in Chap. 6. Watching a film or reading a book can help us understand 
other people’s lives, and culture’s contribution to well-being is often argued 
because of its capacity to increase empathy. Philosophers have long seen 
the moment where we come to understand something as a pleasurable 
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moment, as well as one that brings purpose and meaning to our lives. This 
is an idea of how understanding improves personal well- being; while of 
course, knowledge and understanding are seen as contributing to the 
development of good societies, thus improving well-being at population 
level. If this is indeed the case, then there is a strong case that more care 
and attention should be paid to understanding as good for well-being.
Using data about well-being should fulfil all of the functions of under-
standing: caring for and appreciating the conditions of others, building 
knowledge of what to do to improve it—and sharing these understand-
ings. As an aside, it should also involve learning from mistakes. Yet, as we 
have discovered in this book, the limitations of ‘following the data’ are not 
always admitted to, but instead, often dodged around. First of all, I want 
to return to the importance of understanding in data. As with the rest of 
this book, we are going to use a case study to look under the bonnet of the 
data. While not strictly well-being data, this case study does show how 
simple processes of everyday data collection can feel ‘hostile’, and 
unsympathetic.
The Case for Understanding in Data
In 2018, I began a large-scale qualitative research project to understand 
data and diversity in the cultural sector. More specifically, Arts Council 
England (ACE)4 wanted to introduce additional questions to its existing 
equality monitoring processes.5 The research was undertaken in partner-
ship with ACE to advise on how to improve data in the sector and intro-
duce the potential new data to measure inequality better.
Inequality and inequality data are contentious issues across the UK cul-
tural sector.6 Commitment to social inclusion is integral to the sector’s 
identity and values, as this book has argued. However, qualitative and 
quantitative data reveal, first, the failure to achieve diversity goals in terms 
of who gets to participate in, and work in the arts (Brook et al. 2020) and, 
second, the amount of missing data from administrative processes (DC 
Research 2017; Oman 2019c). What does ‘missing data’ mean? In this 
instance, it means a gap where there should be a value. For example, all 
those households who did not complete the census in March 2021 become 
missing data, and so people were hired to knock on your door to remind 
you to complete the census. Missing data reduce the accuracy of under-
standing that is possible from data, which can affect government decision- 
making, including how resources are allocated.
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An example of missing data in the cultural sector equality monitoring 
story can be found in organisations that refused to ask people about their 
sexuality. One organisation I spoke with heartily believed that this ques-
tion was irrelevant to their workplace, especially as they had such good 
LGBTQI representation in their senior workforce. They therefore did not 
collect these data, or report them to ACE for a sector-wide picture. Linked 
to this are longstanding discussions between people who don’t like feeling 
audited by existing data collection processes that aim to understand 
inequality issues. It feels like this organisation took a pretty understanding 
position, then. However, an organisation may think it is being sensitive to 
people’s privacy in not asking them the question and may not think it has 
issues of discrimination, but how could it know? When asked about their 
sexuality in a subsequent sub-study at this organisation, one person wrote 
that they were relieved this issue was finally being looked at, as they had 
experienced discrimination. Understanding what is best for knowledge 
and understanding is therefore far from easy.
We can see a disconnect emerging: between collecting data for good, 
but it feeling bad while it is happening. This tension has exacerbated issues 
related to data practices and diversity practices in the sector that required 
attention—and at the same time. How can the sector know how to change, 
when it doesn’t know what changes to make and where? Data and research 
can help answer these questions in different ways, but research on data 
needed to be done first.
The thrust of the empirical research I was doing was to understand how 
inequality data currently worked in organisations funded by ACE and, 
crucially, how this might be improved (in terms of data quality and pro-
cess). In essence, this was very much a project to understand the complexi-
ties of the existing context before we might know what to do to improve 
it. To do this, I collected and analysed many different types of data7 to 
help me understand the main problems across various areas and layers of 
the sector, and in different ways. You may remember that in Chap. 3 we 
covered how different kinds of data help us understand things from differ-
ent standpoints. I describe the value of understanding a complex issue like 
this ‘in the round’ (Oman 2021, forthcoming). Here, I needed to capture 
the complex ecosystem of data collection and analysis that informs inequal-
ity policy in the publicly funded cultural sector.
As well as various desk-based policy research, 15 organisations that 
were funded by ACE, called National Portfolio Organisations (NPOs), 
were sampled. Each NPO was chosen for a balanced distribution of 
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geography, size of organisation, size of grant from ACE, discipline area 
(i.e. dance or visual arts) and social mission (i.e. reaching local working-
class communities or working with disabled performers). In each NPO, I 
undertook participant observation, interviews with experts in data or 
diversity and focus groups with staff who held no management responsi-
bilities in these areas.
One crucial aspect of this as a project was to improve understanding of 
how people feel about questions that are used to gather data about class 
and social mobility alongside other inequalities8 that are protected by the 
Equality Act (2010). So, I am going to concentrate on my focus groups 
here—as these were about how people understood data in their everyday 
lives. People were grouped together in teams within their workplace and 
asked to fill in ‘fake’ equality monitoring forms. When I say fake, I mean 
that they were fabricated through bringing questions used elsewhere onto 
one form for people to answer, and then reflect on them. It was hoped 
that this would help me understand the data differently, through looking 
at the questions that generate them through other people’s eyes.
The context and set-up were important, because, as I keep saying, con-
text is central to people’s understandings of data and how they work. It is 
also vital to researchers’ understanding. Context is—again—another one 
of those ‘contested concepts’ (Gallie 1956). It is often discussed as a prob-
lem for the researcher: qualitative researchers need to be sensitive to the 
contexts they are researching. The same is true of evaluative research, irre-
spective of your approach, a researcher should understand as much about 
the contexts they are evaluating as possible. It is an important concern in 
data studies, with the concept of ‘contextual integrity’ proposed as a 
framework for good practice when it comes to using personal data and 
protecting privacy (Nissenbaum 2009). So what is context? In this book, 
it is all of the whos, wheres, whats, whens, hows and whys, as well as the how 
much? and the so whats? and what nexts? Context is, therefore, vital in how 
we understand how people feel about data more generally—and how data 
get used, more specifically. It is also vital to sharing understandings of data, 
which we will return to in a bit.
Keeping context at the forefront of the research design and analyses 
enabled interesting insights into how the data work. People’s reflections 
on the questions used to gather these data offered new understanding on 
their utility and their accuracy. After asking everyone to complete these 
‘fake’9 equal opportunities forms, we spent time discussing how people 
felt about the questions: how they were formatted, what they were 
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asking—and any other reactions. People indicated that they felt a combi-
nation of the types of understanding defined by the dictionary (mentioned 
earlier), of data and data processes, in which they could see benefits and 
harms that I discuss below.10
I categorised four main issues, which touch on the differing aspects of 
understanding we have encountered above. I grouped people’s responses 
into political, personal, practical, proxy (Oman 2019b see below; Oman 
forthcoming-a). When I say political issues, I refer to those who raised 
objections to collecting these data in this way as an issue of public concern. 
These sorts of responses are characterised by people asserting it is not right 
to collect these data like this, from a position of sympathy and shared 
understanding. I used the term ‘personal issues’ to explain people’s 
responses which described how the process was, or could be, hurtful for, 
or to, themselves and others. These data were seen as too private, and the 
processes could disproportionately affect some more than others. There 
were a number of practical issues raised, including people not knowing the 
answer to the questions, or not being able to answer using the categories 
provided. This probably feels very familiar to many of you who have tried 
to fill in a questionnaire and not been able to make your answer fit the 
form. There was a lack of shared understanding between the person asking 
the question and the lives of the people trying to complete it. Despite the 
importance of all the responses across categories, I want to focus on the 
final category, ‘proxy’, below.
You may remember, a ‘proxy’ is an indirect measure of something. The 
example I gave in Chap. 2 is that someone’s income does not necessarily 
tell you about their quality of life directly, but because the relationship has 
been long-studied, assumptions are made about well-being using what we 
know about how income relates to well-being. Or so the theory goes. 
Another example from Chap. 5 is that 5% of teachers were sacked in 
Washington, D.C., as a result of a determined mayor wanting to turn-
around the city’s underperforming schools. However, the teachers were 
judged and then let go off the back of a complex and flawed algorithm, 
called a value-added model which ‘define[d] its own reality and use[d] it 
to justify their results’ (O’Neil 2016, 7). The idea was that ‘the numbers 
would speak more clearly and be more fair’, but those who interacted with 
these models, numbers and judgements said, ‘I don’t think anyone under-
stood them’ (O’Neil 2016, 5). The example of the use of proxies in man-
aging schools is more complex than the class metric in the arts question I 
outline above, but the premise is the same: these proxies categorise 
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people, telling someone else something about performance, identity and 
background, and are not often presented in a way that is easy to understand.
In the case of equalities data, personal characteristics are used to under-
stand class and social mobility, but it is not as simple as measuring some-
thing like age. Class tends to be categorised in bands, but the meaning and 
dividing lines between these bands (e.g. working class and middle class) 
are not universally understood by people. People are notoriously bad at 
self-defining their class (O’Brien 2018). This means that a direct measure 
of class using self-definition is unlikely to be accurate. Instead, asking peo-
ple questions about their lives can indirectly establish aspects of privilege 
and disadvantage as a result of their socio-economic status, or their class. 
Some obvious questions might be to do with the house people live in, 
their salary—or another one that is popular is what newspaper you read. 
You probably have a different picture in your head for a person reading the 
Sun (a UK right-wing tabloid) than you do, say, the Guardian (a UK left- 
wing broadsheet). These questions get at different indicators of class: sal-
ary, wealth and cultural consumption, for example, and have all been 
shown to have different pros and cons.11
Although the class proxy questions that were trialled in these group 
discussions were new to many answering these equality monitoring forms, 
they have long-established methods with their own institutional histories. 
Many of the questions have been used for decades in sociological measures 
of social mobility (Goldthorpe and Hope 1972). One question asks for 
the occupation of the main wage earner in your household when you were 
14. It is considered a more accurate measure of class than income or self- 
identification or any of the other proxy options (O’Brien 2018; Brook 
et al. 2020). This question is part of a schema that informed the National 
Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC) system used for half a 
century (ONS 2010). The schema identifies someone’s class origins by 
way of the school they attended, whether their parents attended higher 
education, and parental occupation at 14. While policy and data experts 
consider these questions most able to produce the most robust metric, the 
latter question in particular was queried in every one of my focus groups, 
because of these issues of understanding as political, practical, personal 
or proxy.
Returning to the findings on the proxy question, what were the issues 
with it? People by and large understood that this was a proxy question—
even if they did not understand what is meant by the term ‘proxy’. Let me 
explain: one person said, ‘I know that you are trying to get at something, 
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but I don’t know what it is, exactly’. The participant grasped that what 
their mum or dad did for a job years ago was not really the important 
thing for the researchers who would be looking at this data to understand 
class and social mobility. But they could not work out what the connection 
was between what they were being asked and inequality. What did it mean 
in the context of equality monitoring in their workplace at that moment, 
many years later. They found themselves in a process of trying to under-
stand what the proxy question was doing, but it did not quite make sense 
to them.
Wanting to understand the rationale behind the question was not an 
isolated incident. There was a palpable moment in most of these group 
discussions where someone, or numerous people, identified that these are 
not neutral processes. There was more going on than met the eye and they 
wanted to understand. I was asked numerous questions by participants in 
almost every group, such as ‘What are you trying to get at?’, ‘Why has this 
question been worded like this?’, ‘Why my parents? What have they got to 
do with my job now?’, ‘Why the employment of only one?’ ‘Why employ-
ment at all?’ and, most frequently, ‘Why 14?’ and ‘What about the infor-
mation about my life that this question does not capture?’ It is clear that 
this proxy question that aims to produce robust, objective data provokes 
many more questions when it comes into play with ordinary understand-
ings. The key thing to learn from this was that many people did not feel 
comfortable answering the question for various reasons, but largely this 
was because they did not understand what it was doing, or how the data 
would be useful. They couldn’t imagine what would happen next or how 
it would be valuable.
As a researcher doing research for a policy organisation, I was asked to 
make recommendations on what to do next. So, my key recommendation 
was to improve communications about what was happening when people 
gave their data (Oman 2019d). Essentially, context is not only important 
to understanding how data work in context for the researcher, but com-
municating these contexts is vital to move towards a shared understanding 
of how data work and why they are important.
It seemed clear that people needed to know why a question is being 
asked and what that question does, and why. They also craved to under-
stand why these personal, intimate data are important to share. The question 
was not a question about questions, in so much as a question about data. 
Given the nature of the proxy was so far removed from everyday under-
standings of what the aim of using these data was, this is understandable. 
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People in the focus groups were (or at least claimed to be) committed to 
helping address issues of inequality, which is typical of people working in 
this sector (Brook et al. 2020). In other words, the people I spoke to by and 
large had the empathy part of understanding down, but equality monitor-
ing processes were not designed for shared understanding.
Remember that well-being data or inequality data are data about us. 
Yet, it is not common practice to help people understand what their data 
can do and how their data can improve anything. Cultivating communica-
tions about the whats, whys, whos, hows and so whats and what nexts is 
important to increase public understandings and trust (Oman 2019c, d). 
We are seeing increasing attention to public engagement with data 
(Kennedy et  al. 2020). Yet, to date,12 this work is not necessarily con-
cerned with how people come to understand data, and is still too focussed 
on how the tech/media company or the government wants people to 
engage with what they are doing.
The recommendations I made as a result of the inequality research 
aimed to not only improve understanding of why measuring class was 
important, but to be more understanding when collecting data (Oman 
2019d). As a director of a major museum said to me while I was setting 
the research up:
This [understanding inequality] is a project of care. It’s about trying to 
make the sector a better place for everyone, but somehow, the way it is done 
is the opposite. Its unfriendly, and I think, can feel hostile. (Oman 
forthcoming-b)
Interestingly, this sentiment that people collecting data don’t care 
about people was quite common in the UK’s Measuring National Well- 
being debate (2010–2011). The quote below was one I chose to illustrate 
that you got the feeling when reading the comments people wrote in the 
free text fields, that people who completed the debate survey felt that the 
survey authors were talking a different language from them. They were 
almost from two different cultures.
Your [sic] talking to people about their lives, not selling them a product. 
Empathy and understanding with how you word your surveys will make 
people actually give a damn and ‘want’ to take part as they believe (rightly 
or wrongly) that they will be listened too [sic] and their opinion might just 
count for something. (Oman 2015, p. 82)
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Being more understanding when collecting data reduces these ‘hostile’ 
conditions of data collection in a project of social justice and well-being 
(Oman 2019c, 2015). Those who want data, especially to improve things, 
need to be mindful of the well-being of those whose data they need. They 
need to be more understanding of those whose data they ask for, and they 
need to take account of the personal nature of these kinds of questions and 
the experience of being asked questions about your identity and your 
background (Oman 2019a). They also need to move towards an idea of 
shared understanding of data and inequality.
Context should not only be a concern for researchers to improve their 
understanding on their terms, but needs to account for sharing under-
standing more broadly. We encountered this in Chap. 8, where research to 
understand the culture–well-being relationship is designed to prove this 
relationship and presented in a way that speaks to decision-makers. When 
in fact work should be done in social, cultural and charity sectors so that 
research is designed to work with and speak to the sector that wants to 
better understand the value of the work it does. Again, this means moving 
towards more shared understandings of data and their processes.
Subsequent to my research with ACE (Oman 2019c) and policy rec-
ommendations (Oman 2019d), this advice now features in the Social 
Mobility Commission’s new guidelines on collecting data (SMC 2021). 
The focus on the questions rather than the data is more people-centred:
Asking someone what their socio-economic background is can seem like a 
personal question to ask, and some people may not be used to being asked it.
In order to build trust, help employees understand why the question is 
being asked—to help get a better picture of the socio-economic diversity in 
the business. People need to hear a purpose.
This movement towards being understanding when collecting data to 
understand society is an important one, and one that has been little 
acknowledged up to this point in much large-scale data collection: whether 
that data are about well-being or inequality. Crucially, those marginalised 
by inequalities are most at risk of suffering from ill-being as a result of data 
(Data Justice Lab n.d.; Kennedy et al. 2020). While the government sta-
tistical service (GSS) has a pledge for statistics for ‘public good’ (GSS 
n.d.), this still does not formally13 account for being understanding of the 
public in data’s collection, analysis and use.
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9.3  data Uses as barriers to Understanding
Beyond the arguments I have just made about how a lack of understand-
ing can lead to bad data practices that are bad for well-being, I also argue 
that they lead to bad data. If people cannot answer the questions in a 
survey for practical, personal or political reasons, or because they feel 
uncomfortable that they do not know enough about why the data are 
important and what is happening with them (as is the case with the proxy 
questions), you jeopardise possibilities for good data, instead ending up 
with missing or incorrect data.
What we have also encountered in this book is how data uses lead to a 
lack of understanding more broadly. As in the case with Google Flu Trends 
we covered in Chap. 5, if you do not consider the variety of contexts in 
which people will type the symptoms of a pandemic illness, you will not 
appreciate the limits to your method. This is a barrier to understanding. 
Similarly, if those modelling the data on COVID-19 ‘in the community’ 
are not aware of the fact that it is more difficult to collect tests from high- 
rise flats in poorer communities, whose data are missing? How might that 
hinder understanding of inequalities and the pandemic, if the data are to 
be analysed to answer those questions? Context is important to under-
standing. If you don’t think about who is missing from your missing data, 
how can you know how important the missing pieces are? How can you 
know how limited your understanding is?
The gift of search engines offers us access to so much more informa-
tion—daily—as we go about our business. We can playfully search to prove 
a family member wrong at Christmas—‘no that’s not the same so-and-so 
that was in that thing. You’re thinking of this one…’—or cheat at the local 
pub quiz. However, the lists of information it presents us with are not 
always a simple single answer to a closed question. Searches of course 
enable you to put a proxy term in and see what the search comes up with. 
But there often are millions of results.
Search engines have been designed to learn what we might be looking 
for, based on information they have on our previous searches (and every-
one else’s). This means that a search engine wants to understand what we 
might want to know. Yet, as we discovered in Chap. 1, the search engine 
does not only gather data on us and show us results back in some sort of 
neutral process. Instead, it makes decisions on what it will recommend we 
look at as a result of our search terms. As Noble explained, if you typed in 
the phrase ‘black girls’ as recently as 2011, you were shown indecent 
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images. This is not a question and answer process, but rather one of selec-
tion and assumption.
Instead, search engines try to understand what we might want to find 
by making associations that may be very different from our own way of 
understanding things, or indeed what we are imagining we might find. 
Returning to an important point from Chap. 1, it is possible that being 
shown an association subconsciously changes an aspect of our understand-
ing of what people do, or what they look like. Data and data practices can 
change culture. This is potentially dehumanising and can lead to the 
opposite of greater understanding—or, indeed the good society. We must 
design data practice, along with the ways in which we engage with data, 
more responsibly to ensure that well-being is improved through this 
engagement.
9.4  folloWing the data: hoW We have CoMe 
to Understand Well-being data in this book
We have covered a number of different understandings of well-being and 
data in this book, as well as considered their impact on, and relevance to, 
culture and society. We have identified how ideas of well-being differ and 
transcend time, place, culture and religion. We have encountered how 
people feel about well-being in their everyday life, and projects to try and 
understand this phenomenon, as well as the understandings of those 
responsible for people’s well-being, such as those in government. We have 
also considered how people interact, even live with data in their everyday 
lives, but are not always sure they understand them.
We have followed the data into ‘disciplines’, as groups of academics and 
professionals who look at the world in a particular way, and tend to agree 
on certain methods to understand it. We have considered how experts 
understand well-being across research disciplines (including economics, 
social and cultural policy, social statistics and philosophy), and how they 
work together in sub-disciplines, and in practice. For example, many econ-
omists look for trends in what people value over time and what that means 
for well-being. This book has presented documents as data to analyse what 
well-being economists (and other disciplines) value and how that changes 
over time. We found indications that happiness psychology as a new disci-
pline suited the ends of those eager for ‘a new science of happiness’, but 
that when it came to deciding on data processes, some psychologists felt 
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their expertise was overlooked. We found that economics has traditionally 
held much sway with policy-making institutions, but not necessarily made 
their ideas and principles accessible to all. Of course, these issues are not 
specific to economics, but most disciplines using data to understand well-
being can lose sight of shared understanding, or being understanding.
In Chap. 5, some of the pros and cons for writers on different Big Data 
approaches were synthesised. Notably, Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 indicate 
that these concerns tended to reflect on the utility of data for the data 
scientists, or whoever else might want to use them. They did not account 
for whose data they were and how ethical these approaches might be. 
Given that Big Data are often collected in ways that are not obvious to 
people, what could be done better to ensure shared understanding?
There are moves towards greater fairness, accountability and transpar-
ency in data uses. Yet, following a data controversy and watching how 
these principles work in practice demonstrate that much effort remains to 
establish what a shared understanding of these values look like in practice. 
We briefly considered the case of the algorithm that decided on students’ 
A level grades, in lieu of an exam under COVID-19 restrictions in the 
UK. The outcome was contentious, but the regulator (Ofsted) insisted 
this was the fairest way to approach the problem. Yet as the headline prem-
ises behind the decision-making method emerged in the press, the process 
became a national scandal; notably, because of the impact on young peo-
ple’s futures and current well-being. There were then calls for transpar-
ency and accountability, but when the algorithm’s methodology was 
published, the 319-page document was not legible to many and was only 
even manageable to a very select few.
Transparency could involve showing everyone everything, but how 
does this compromise understanding? What does that mean when the data 
and the actions surrounding their  use are complex, highly detailed and 
outside of everyday understandings? Chapter 8 reviewed one research 
project using valuation with well-being data, step by step. It followed the 
data backwards, to understand the contexts from which they and the study 
originated. It also followed the findings forwards to understand how the 
research was interpreted in other contexts. The report explained that these 
methods were accepted by experts in government. However, the chapter 
found that when the methods were reproduced, using the same data, the 
findings differed, so what does that mean for shared understanding of 
experts. The chapter also showed that when the findings were reproduced 
in the media, they were misinterpreted to say that museums boost 
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happiness, which was not how the research was presented in the report. 
What does that mean for shared understanding with non-experts in data?
Shared understandings are difficult, when within the same field. In 
Chap. 7, we encountered two research projects which were ostensibly 
looking at ‘subjective well-being’ in a similar population: people with an 
artistic practice and people with a creative occupation. We found that 
while the term ‘artistic practice’ indicates a level of professionalisation, this 
was not what the research was necessarily looking at. Similarly, that cre-
ative occupants didn’t need to be creative at all—as we might understand 
the word—according to the UK government’s Department for Culture, 
Media and Sport. We also found very different data were used to under-
stand the concept of subjective well-being in these studies. What does that 
mean for how we join-up and share understanding of the well-being of 
different groups?
We have discovered that the meaning of well-being changes as the 
nature of data changes, and desire for data evolves and demands for data 
analytics increase. We have looked at well-being as it is understood as vari-
ous measurements, and the benefits of understanding well-being at scale 
and over time, and have witnessed how knowledge and information can be 
gained, but also how some meanings can be lost by these exercises. 
Context that ties the data to the people it is about is removed, to enable 
patterns to become visible at scale, and yet context is rarely accounted for 
in narratives of the benefits of these data and their uses.
We have seen how well-being data are data about us—they are our data. 
They require our interactions, often our time, and are used to make deci-
sions that are ostensibly on our behalf, but we may disagree with. We have 
seen how they change the workplace, how people were managed in 
COVID-19 and even the TV programmes we end up watching or the 
music we listen to. We have seen the growth of apps to track our well- 
being and tell us how to live better or walk more steps, and the market 
value of these apps increased considerably in this last decade. We have also 
witnessed how lucrative well-being data can be when their analysis has 
value to a policy sector, government or, in the case of a pandemic, the 
whole world.
We have also found indications that despite the fact we are ‘living with 
data’ (Living With Data), we don’t all necessarily grasp what is happening 
with our data and what they do for and against us in our day-to-day lives. 
Unpacking various types and forms of well-being data (data about well- 
being) and touching on the possible impacts that data and their uses have 
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on our own well-being, and society more generally, is crucial to grasping 
some of the contexts of data that get obscured. So, understanding well- 
being data can help us understand data better. But more than that, con-
textualising well-being data—discovering the whos, whats, wheres, whens, 
hows and whys, as well as the so whats and the what nexts—offers insight 
into politics and policy. It also helps us understand how research and 
knowledge may claim to know things, but that these claims may have limits.
There are limits to the promise of data: what they can achieve for society 
is not always good. Technical progress in data and their handling are not 
always a development for good. The fetishisation of data and proof of value 
(as with the case studies of social and cultural policy) prove that attach-
ments to data in society are flawed, opening up a market for data practices 
that shifts the relationship between researcher and data. Our attachment to 
ideas of novelty and innovation, as with the case of ‘the new sciences’ and 
Big Data also blindside us to their limits. These are a few of the growing 
concerns in critical data studies, but need to be a bigger concern in all stud-
ies of well-being, across social policy, social statistics, sociology, economics, 
psychology and so on. There is an opportunity to take what we are learning 
in critical data studies and well-being studies to help the social sciences 
consider how it might adopt a more understanding position.
We need to return to how we understand how data are understood and 
how they can make us a more understanding society. Context matters: 
where data come from, who they are for and about, where they go and for 
what purpose. But context matters for more than researchers and more 
effort should be placed on how it can improve shared understanding, and 
being a more understanding society. Without acknowledging the limits in 
capacity, or indeed possibilities for understanding, the What Next? or How 
can we do it better? questions will not be answered properly for well-being.
notes
1. The full name of the Living With Data project (because we love a colon in 
academia) is: Living with Data: knowledge, experiences and perceptions of 
data practices.
2. It is not only the OECD and ONS projects about data that have an 
Advisory Group. Many research projects do. The current Living With Data 
Advisory Group is here: https://livingwithdata.org/advisory- group/.
3. Remember that Raymond Williams describes culture as ‘one of the two or 
three most complicated words in the English language’, this is actually an 
issue of understanding: ‘This is so partly because of its intricate historical 
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development, in several European languages, but mainly because it has 
now come to be used for important concepts in several distinct intellectual 
disciplines and in several distinct and incompatible systems of thought’ 
(Williams [1976] 1988, 87).
4. ACE is a non-departmental public body (NDPB) and the largest funder of 
the arts in England. ACE wanted to introduce a measure of social mobility 
or class inequality to its data-monitoring processes. I was asked to conduct 
research and to recommend a new inequality metric.
5. There has been pressure on organisations and the public sector to collect 
workforce demographic data as a result of the Equality Act 2010 and the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission Employment Statutory Code of 
Practice (EHRC 2015). This typically involves ‘Equal Opportunities’ 
forms that draw on the same questions as national surveys, although the 
formatting and wording may differ. In the cultural sector, equality of access 
to jobs and access to commercial content, such as cinema visits, or publicly 
funded culture, such as the BBC’s broadcasts, is ascertained using national-
level survey data, consumer insight data and these mandatory monitoring 
processes. The BBC has, for example, added proxy questions to its data 
processes to understand the class of its workforce—in line with recent Civil 
Service developments (BBC 2017; Cabinet Office 2016).
6. There is so much rich evidence on lack of diversity in the sector, although 
the arguments about this and data are summarised in Brook et al. (2020) 
and Oman (2019c); it is crucial to acknowledge the wider research across 
film, museums, television and broadcast, music, theatre and so on.
7. More detail on the data and the methodology can be found in Oman 
2019c and Oman 2021, forthcoming.
8. The Equality and Human Rights Commission Employment Statutory 
Code of Practice (EHRC 2015) has also placed pressure on organisations 
and the public sector to collect workforce demographic data, again of pro-
tected characteristics. These are currently listed as age, disability, gender 
 reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, 
race, religion or belief, sex and sexual orientation (EHRC n.d.).
9. It is important to acknowledge that, as these questionnaires were fabri-
cated, and while the context was comparable in some respects, the context 
was different to how one would normally complete an Equality Monitoring 
form. The complexities of this are discussed in Oman (forthcoming-a) and 
are touched on in the working paper (Oman 2019c). Much care and atten-
tion were also paid to protecting participants who did not want to have 
personal conversations with colleagues.
10. In the working paper (Oman 2019c), which is open access, I outline these 
concerns, challenges and issues in greater detail.
11. Dave O’Brien (2018) in Arts pro explains this well
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12. However, this will change, as it is one of the aims of the Living with Data 
project (and others) I’ve mentioned elsewhere in this chapter.
13. To be fair, there is good work happening in this area, it has just not been 
formalised yet.
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